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Preface
In 1980, as the work of the National Commission on Unemployment 
Compensation was drawing to a close, its Chairman, Wilbur J. Cohen, 
and I discussed and agreed to pursue the idea of producing a new 
updated edition of "Unemployment Insurance in the American Econ 
omy" by William Haber and Merrill G. Murray, published in 1966 by 
Richard D. Irwin, Inc. Clearly, much had happened in unemployment 
insurance since the mid-1960s, and it was time to consider a new vol 
ume. Merrill Murray had passed away several years earlier, and Profes 
sor Haber was in no position to undertake the task by himself. He did 
endorse the idea, however, and agreed to join us in the undertaking.
We asked the Upjohn Institute to support the project as it had the 
writing of the 1966 volume. The Institute agreed, making some of my 
time available for the research and writing involved. Richard D. Irwin, 
Inc. released its rights to the 1966 edition for use in preparing the new 
one. The Upjohn Institute assumed responsibility for its publication. 
Other professional activities and health problems caused lengthy inter 
ruptions in the project. Before the work could be completed, both 
Cohen and Haber died, in 1987 and 1988 respectively.
As was the case with Haber and Murray, Cohen's connections with 
unemployment insurance traced back to its creation and early years. 
Cohen's contributions to the account of early developments enriched 
that part of the book. Haber, in turn, was stimulated to recall other 
aspects of the story not previously covered.
While the structure of the 1966 volume's early chapters was largely 
followed and some of its text retained, only part of the ground covered 
in the Haber-Murray book is included in the present volume. New 
material about the program's early years and the addition of 25 more 
years of experience greatly expanded the size of the new book. The 
result was to divide it into two volumes, with the second volume deal 
ing primarily with unemployment insurance issues. The expansion of 
content and its restructuring into two volumes made the work more 
than a second edition of the 1966 book, although it is clearly a descen 
dant to a large degree. Because of the long delays in completing the 
entire work, the decision was made to publish the first volume now.
The planned second volume will cover issues in the program, its rela 
tionships with other government programs, and some conclusions.
In the rewriting and expansions that I needed to accomplish after 
Cohen and Haber passed away, I have tried to remain faithful to their 
views and ideas on the subject. Disagreements that emerged with 
respect to earlier drafts were few and not of major consequence. Both 
men would, I am confident, be content to be cited as contributing 
authors of this volume. My association with them over many years has 
been and remains a source of inspiration and pride for me. The same 
sentiment applies with regard to Merrill Murray, a close and valued 
long-time colleague.
An undertaking of this magnitude could not have come so far with 
out the support and assistance of many people. Early drafts of the book 
were reviewed by two key individuals. One was William Papier, for 
decades the Director of Research and Statistics in the Ohio Bureau of 
Unemployment Compensation and secretary of that state's Advisory 
Council. The other was Murray Rubin, long a legislative and policy 
analyst in the Department of Labor's Unemployment Insurance Ser 
vice and later a consultant on unemployment insurance. Mr. Rubin 
died in 1990. Their thoughtful comments and suggestions were of sig 
nificant value in enhancing the quality and integrity of the book. Valu 
able help with regard to statistical and statutory information came from 
staff of the Unemployment Insurance Service in the Labor Department 
who also reviewed much of the draft manuscript. Among them, I am 
especially indebted to Joseph Hickey, Virginia Chupp, and James Man 
ning.
The support of the Upjohn Institute has been critical to the success 
ful completion of this volume, not only for its financial backing but for 
the human resources made available. Christopher O'Leary and the 
Institute's Director, Robert Spiegelman reviewed the final draft, con 
tributing to its further improvement. Moreover, since I was no longer 
present at the Institute during the later years of work on the book, I 
came to rely increasingly on Chris O'Leary. He played an important 
role by supplying me with research information, occasional guidance 
for other staff assisting me, or simply by being available for discussion 
of subject matter whenever I felt the need for it. I am also grateful to 
several members of the Institute's support staff for research and secre 
tarial assistance. Irene Krabill and Ellen Maloney typed the manu-
IV
script, patiently enduring many revisions and changes through 
successive drafts. Final editing and preparation for publication by Judy 
Gentry added to the quality and polish of the finished product. Typeset 
ting of the manuscript by Natalie Lagoni was her usual deft contribu 
tion. To Bob Spiegelman I am especially grateful for his constant 
encouragement, support, and great patience.
While many have helped generously, only I can take the full respon 
sibility for any shortcomings and errors in this book.
Saul J. Blaustein 
TXicson, Arizona 
April 1993
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I
The Changing Unemployment
Problem and Its Implications for
Unemployment Insurance
Some unemployment is inevitable in a free, dynamic society. In an 
economic system that places a premium on private enterprise and free 
choice, not all economic activity runs smoothly. Ebbs and flows occur 
in business, including seasonal and cyclical variations. Business under 
takings do not always work out. The same is true for public policies 
and government programs. Above all there is change, constant change, 
in the structure and patterns of economic activities. All of these factors 
can and do result in some unemployment. Decisions of individuals to 
enter the labor market to seek jobs, or to leave jobs they have held to 
find other employment, may also lead to unemployment if the demand 
for workers is less than the supply of labor offered, or if job seekers 
and employers with openings do not match or do not find each other 
right away. Even if "full employment" were attained, there would still 
be some unemployment simply because the labor market requires time 
to serve its function. Full employment, in the sense that everyone who 
wants to work is working all the time, does not appear to be likely or 
necessarily desirable.
A substantial share of involuntary unemployment represents tempo 
rary job loss with assured or good prospects for reasonably prompt 
recall to the same employer. But recall can also be less certain and long 
delayed, especially during a business recession. Much permanent job 
loss and subsequent unemployment is a consequence of significant 
changes that occur constantly in the economy. New products, new 
technology, altered markets and consumer tastes, increased foreign 
competition, and shifts in government procurement and regulatory pol 
icies all can and do cause dislocations of labor. The ensuing unemploy 
ment of displaced workers may be due to their inability to fit into new 
types of jobs. The search for a new job is often not smooth or easy.
2 The Changing Unemployment Problem
Unemployment insurance is a "first line of defense" 1 against invol 
untary unemployment, whether it be structural, cyclical, long term, or 
short term. An understanding of trends in the extent, duration, and 
nature of unemployment, as well as employment and labor force 
trends, is therefore of prime importance to those interested in under 
standing and evaluating the unemployment insurance program.
Labor Force Growth
Unemployment insurance became fully established in the United 
States during the late 1930s in the wake of the Great Depression. Soon 
after came World War II, and the economy went on a war footing; 
unemployment virtually disappeared and civilian labor shortages 
became a central problem. By 1947, the postwar readjustment was sub 
stantially over. Most of the ensuing period was one of prosperity and 
comparatively full employment. The year 1947, therefore, is a good 
starting point for the purpose of considering those changes in the labor 
force that affect the character and operation of the unemployment 
insurance program. These changes and trends are here reviewed over 
the next forty-three years to 1990, the threshold of the closing decade 
of the century.
Beginning at an average level of 59.4 million persons in 1947, the 
civilian labor force grew to nearly 125 million by 1990, an increase of 
110 percent.2 This growth averaged about 1.5 million a year during the
1. This phrase was used early to identify unemployment insurance as the primary and preferred 
form of income support for involuntarily unemployed workers, with public work relief used as a 
supplementary form of support, if needed. See, for example, Lampman 1962, p. 229.
2. Labor force data, including employment and unemployment statistics, are developed from 
sample household surveys (the Current Population Survey) conducted monthly by the U.S. 
Bureau of the Census and published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The data refer to persons 
16 years of age and over. The numbers cited for years prior to 1950 generally come from Hand 
book of Labor Statistics (December 1980), hereafter cited as HLS 12/80. The numbers cited for 
years 1950-1953 generally come from Handbook of Labor Statistics (June 1985), hereafter cited 
as HLS 6/85. Data for subsequent years are from the January 1991 issue of Employment and Earn 
ings, a monthly publication of the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics, hereaf 
ter cited as E&E 1/91.
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entire period, but about 2 million annually after 1965 compared with 
840,000 a year before then (HLS 12/80, table 1; E&E 1/91, table A-l).
One of the most important elements of this growth during the 
period was the striking rise in the number of women in the labor force. 
Women accounted for 61 percent of the total increase in the forty-three 
years after 1947 when their labor force participation rate was only 
about 32 percent; that rate was 57.5 percent in 1990. By contrast, the 
male participation rate declined from 87 percent in 1947 to 77 percent 
in 1990.3 Women made up almost 45 percent of the labor force in 1990 
compared with 28 percent in 1947. In 1990, over 58 percent of all mar 
ried women living with their husbands were in the labor force, com 
pared with about 20 percent in 1947 (HLS 6/85, table 50; E&E 1/91, 
table 8).
Unemployed married women who file claims for benefits may 
present special concerns for the unemployment insurance program. 
Determining their continued eligibility for benefits can pose difficulty 
in some cases when uncertainty surrounds their current labor force 
attachment, i.e., their availability for work. As a group, they have 
tended to move in and out of the labor market more than other groups. 
For example, 28 percent of all married women (spouse present) 
between 25 and 44 years of age who worked at some time in 1987 were 
out of the labor force for three or more weeks during that year (14 per 
cent were out for twenty-six or more weeks). These figures compare 
with 8 percent for all men in this age group (3 percent for twenty-six or 
more weeks), also in 1987.4
The higher proportion of wives in the workforce means relatively 
fewer workers are the sole providers for their families. Insured unem 
ployed workers in 1990 are thus much more likely to be from multi- 
earner families than was the case in 1947. This change has prompted 
some question about how critical the unemployment insurance pro 
gram's role is in alleviating hardship.
Another major component of civilian labor force growth was the 
increase in the number of young workers, 16 to 24 years of age, from
3. Participation rates from HLS 12/80, table 2, and E&E 1/91, table A-2. The participation rate 
for a population group (e.g., women age 16 and over) is the number of that group in the labor 
force divided by that group's total population.
4. Based on tabulations supplied by the Bureau of Labor Statistics from the March 1988 house 
hold survey.
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11.7 million in 1947 to 21 million in 1990. Virtually all of this increase 
occurred after 1960, reflecting the coming of age of the baby boom 
generation born in the approximately fifteen-year period following 
World War II. The numbers in this age group leveled off in 1979 and 
1980, and declined somewhat since then, as most of that generation 
was 25 years of age or older by that time. By 1980, the 16-24-year-old 
age group accounted for 23 percent of the labor force; it was down to 
17 percent by 1990, the same proportion as in 1960 (HLS 12/80, table 
3; E&E 1/91, table 3). Young persons also show a greater tendency to 
move in and out of the labor force than do older workers. Those with 
enough work experience qualify for unemployment benefits when job 
less, but some may stir eligibility questions because of the circum 
stances of their job separation or the uncertainty of their availability for 
work, especially if they are also going to school. Most unemployed 
youths do not qualify for benefits.
Older labor force participants, age 55 and over, increased in number 
from 10 million in 1947 to 15.4 million in 1990, but their proportion of 
the labor force fell from 16.8 to 12.3 percent over this period. Older 
women accounted for most of the increase, more than tripling in num 
ber from about 2 million to 6.6 million in this time. The number of men 
age 65 and over in the labor force declined from 2.4 to 2.0 million, 
reflecting the strong trend toward retirement since the mid-1950s (HLS 
12/80, table 3; E&E 1/91, table 3). The increase in both the availability 
and value of pensions, including Social Security, during this period 
accounted for much of this trend. Dual receipt of pensions and unem 
ployment benefits by some older workers produced a significant issue 
for the program.
Labor force growth is expected to continue, though at a slower rate, 
beyond the end of this century. A mid-range projection5 sees a work 
force of almost 151 million by the year 2005, representing an increase 
of about 21 percent over the 15-year period, compared to 33 percent 
growth during the previous fifteen years. Women will continue to 
account for the majority of the increase about 58 percent of it rais-
5. Based on Fullerton (1991, pp. 31-44). This article reviews projections prepared by the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics using alternative assumptions about labor force and population 
changes to denve high, medium, and low growth projections from 1980 decennial census baseline 
levels; adjustments for a shift to a 1990 census baseline are not expected to affect significantly the 
medium-level projections.
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ing their proportion of the labor force to over 47 percent and their par 
ticipation rate to 63 percent, from 1990 levels of 45 and 58 percent, 
respectively. While the number of workers in all age groups will 
increase, the largest proportionate rise (about 44 percent) is expected in 
the number of older workers, age 55 and over, increasing from about 
15 million in 1990 to 22 million in 2005. Moreover, the labor force 
participation rate for persons in this age group will rise to 35 percent, 
reversing a decline in the prior fifteen years. By 2005, baby boomers 
born in the first years of the post-World War II period will have moved 
into their later 50s, still in the workforce and not yet at the usual retire 
ment age. Also by 2005, the baby boom generation will account for 
less than half the labor force and all of them will be over the age of 40. 
Overall, the labor force will be somewhat older and more experienced 
than in 1990.
These changes are likely to have broad effects on unemployment 
insurance. More experienced, prime-aged workers tend to have lower 
rates of unemployment than their younger counterparts. They are also 
more likely to qualify for benefits if unemployed. While the rising 
number of women may increase the concerns associated with unsteady 
labor force participation, as women workers gain greater experience 
and acceptance in all kinds of jobs, their steadiness as participants may 
very well improve. Child care and other family responsibilities may 
also create fewer interruptions in employment for women as their num 
bers concentrate increasingly in the older age groups.
Employment Trends
Employment growth roughly paralleled total labor force growth 
from 1947 to 1990, although changing economic conditions produced 
more variability in the employment trend. Over the entire period, when 
employment more than doubled from about 57 million to 118 million, 
the average annual increase in employment was 1.4 million. During 
recession years, however, the level of employment declined or, as in 
1980, failed to grow to match the rise in the civilian labor force. In 
general, employment growth did not keep up as well with labor force
6 The Changing Unemployment Problem
increases in the 1970s and early 1980s as it did in the two prior 
decades.
Actually, the growth in nonagricultural employment from 1947 to 
1990 of 66 million about matched the growth in the labor force, while 
employment in agriculture declined from 7.9 to 3.2 million. Among 
nonagricultural industries, the rates of increase were uneven. Wage and 
salary employment more than tripled, from about 25 million to 85 mil 
lion in private service-producing industries over the 43-year period, 
but grew less than 50 percent, from 18.5 million to 25.0 million in 
goods-producing industries.6 Government employment rose from 5.5 
million to 18.3 million, mostly in state and local government. As a pro 
portion of all employees, production and nonsupervisory workers 
declined over the years. Nonproduction workers in manufacturing 
accounted for about 16 percent of all manufacturing employment in 
1947 and 32 percent in 1990. In a number of industries, the employ 
ment of production workers actually declined over the period, or rose 
very little. Production employment in primary metals hovered around 1 
million in most years since 1950, but was down sharply in later years 
to less than 600,000 by 1990. In transportation equipment manufactur 
ing, production worker employment fluctuated between about 1 mil 
lion and 1.5 million over the years and averaged 1.2 million in 1990. 
Employment levels declined from 1950 to 1990 in textile mills, food 
and kindred products, and leather goods manufacturing. Sizable long- 
term employment declines also occurred in mining, particularly in coal 
mining, although a temporary surge came in the 1970s and early 1980s 
with rapid expansion of oil and gas drilling. 7
Between 1950 and 1990, employment gains were proportionately 
much larger in the South and West than in the Northeast and North 
Central states. While nonagricultural employment more than doubled 
over this period nationally, it increased more than sevenfold in Florida, 
nearly fourfold in California, and more than threefold in Texas. It dou 
bled in New England and the East North Central states, and it
6. E&E (1/91, table B-l). Data for 1990 are preliminary.
7. Most data cited on industry employment are based on monthly surveys of employing estab 
lishments. They are published in HLS 12/80, tables 72-76; E&E 1/81, tables B-l and B-2; E&E 51 
88, tables A-l and B-l; and E&E 1/91, tables 65 and 66.
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increased somewhat over 50 percent in the mid-Atlantic region. 8 
Increasing industrialization in the more rapidly growing states pro 
vided expanding job opportunities which, along with the good climate, 
attracted workers from elsewhere in the nation. Heavy concentrations 
of federal defense and space agency procurement contracts in Califor 
nia, Florida, Texas, and a few other states in the South and West con 
tributed strongly to their rapid industrial growth. The energy crises of 
the 1970s stimulated oil and gas industry expansion in several Rocky 
Mountain and Gulf Coast states. The areas benefitting from all these 
developments in turn became more vulnerable to the business cycle, to 
federal procurement policy changes and budget reductions, and to wide 
swings in world petroleum prices. As these events occurred during the 
1970s and 1980s, many of the "boom" areas experienced their first 
serious encounter with substantial industrial unemployment. The states 
involved found it necessary to reexamine the adequacy and solvency of 
their unemployment insurance programs.
Another notable employment trend with increasingly important 
implications for unemployment insurance has been the growing popu 
larity of a variety of work patterns as alternatives to full-time and year- 
round employment. There have always been part-year temporary and 
seasonal jobs, as well as part-time jobs (less than thirty-five hours per 
week). Since about the mid-1950s, the number of people who work 
part time has increased dramatically. This trend reflects the rising labor 
force participation by women, many of whom cannot or prefer not to 
work full time. In 1990,11.5 percent of all men who worked during the 
year worked at part-time jobs, compared with 27.7 percent of all 
women who worked; the comparable proportion for teenagers in 1990 
was nearly two-thirds (E&E 1/91, table 7). Another element in this 
trend has been the growing interest of older workers in more limited 
employment, including many who retire early from regular full-time 
work. Some employers have organized their job arrangements to make 
possible alternative work schedules. Flextime, job splitting, and other 
forms of work sharing have emerged as new options for workers (Best 
1981).
8. Changes cited based on data in HLS 12/80, table 79; and E&E 1/90, table B-8. The divisions 
of states applied are from the standard "Regions and Geographic Divisions of the United States," 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.
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The number of persons who work part time by choice grew from an 
average level of about 5 million in 1957 to 16.7 million in 1990, more 
than a threefold increase over the period when all employment dou 
bled.9 Women accounted for most voluntary part-time workers (about 
70 percent during the mid- and late-1980s), and about three-fourths of 
these women were employed in clerical, sales, and service occupa 
tions. 10 The rate of growth in voluntary part-time employment slowed 
during the 1970 to 1990 period, rising an average of about 2.9 percent 
a year compared with a 6.2 percent annual rate of increase during the 
prior thirteen years. The smaller increases, and even decreases, in the 
number of teenage workers during the later 1970s and 1980s contrib 
uted to the slower growth in part-time employment.
Some workers are employed part time not by choice but for eco 
nomic reasons. They include, for example, persons who worked less 
than 35 hours a week because of slack work, job changing, material 
shortages, and inability to find full-time work. They represent the 
underemployed. Their number fluctuates with economic conditions. 
During the 1970s, it ranged between annual averages of 2.4 million 
and 3.7 million; it rose during the 1980s, reaching a high of 5.4 million 
in 1987, of whom about 32 percent usually worked full time. 11 The 
majority of the latter were men, while most of those who usually 
worked part time were women. 12
The implications of these employment trends for unemployment 
insurance are not entirely clear. For example, should unemployed 
workers who voluntarily work part time and who qualify for benefits 
remain eligible if they refuse full-time jobs that are otherwise suitable? 
When full-time employment is scarce, to what extent should unem 
ployed full-time workers receiving unemployment benefits be urged or 
required to accept part-time work? Dealing with workers whose
9. Based on workers in nonagricultural jobs. The number in 1957 was 5.2 million but includes 
14- and 15-year-olds who are not included in later data. HIS 1975, p. 77, table 22; E&E 1/91, 
table A-l, table 1, and table 7.
10. HLS 12/80, table 23; HLS 6/85, table 20; E&E 1/81, table 35, and other January issues for 
1984-1990, tables 33 and 34.
11. After 1987, the number of workers employed part time for economic reasons fell slightly to 
5.2 million in 1988 and then to 4.9 million in 1989 (E&E 1/90, Tables 31 and 33).
12. HIS (12/80, table 24 and 25); E&E (1/88, tables 31 and 33). Those who usually work part 
time prefer more work but have been on short-time for so long that they can no longer be regarded 
as full-time workers.
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employers place them on short-time or who are usually employed on a 
part-time basis may become a more active area of concern for unem 
ployment insurance.
Trends in Unemployment
The annual average level of unemployment in the nation varied 
from 1947 to 1990 between a low of 1.8 million in 1953 to more than 
10.7 million in 1983 (table 1.1). The higher levels of more recent years 
are due, in part, to the growth of the labor force. Rates of unemploy 
ment (the number unemployed as a percent of the total labor force) 
overcome this effect of labor force growth. The rates are thus useful 
when assessing the significance of unemployment. Between 1947 and 
1990, the annual average civilian unemployment rate has varied over a 
range from 2.9 percent in 1953 to 9.5 percent in 1982 and 1983.
The pattern of unemployment during the post-World War II era has 
been largely a cyclical one. Recession year rates ranged from 5.5 per 
cent in 1954 to 9.5 percent in 1982-83. At no time, however, did these 
rates come close to the levels experienced during the depression of the 
1930s, which dominated the economic climate that helped shape the 
nation's unemployment insurance system. Although the 1954 unem 
ployment rate of 5.5 percent represented a recession peak in that 
period, it is notable that until 1988, the nation's unemployment rate 
had not averaged that low for any year after 1970, except for 1973. The 
annual rate was less than 5.0 percent in fourteen of the twenty-four 
years from 1947 to 1970; it was more than 6.0 percent in eleven of the 
twenty years from 1971 to 1990. Indeed, the unemployment rate was 
never as high as 7.0 percent for any year from 1947 to 1974; the rate 
averaged 7.0 percent or higher in nine of the sixteen years from 1975 
through 1990. While the pattern was generally cyclical throughout, the 
entire forty-four-year period saw a significant rise in the rate of unem 
ployment along with the cyclical swings. This difference between the 
earlier and later years of the period is a fairly crucial one for unem 
ployment insurance, considering the various effects on the program of 
the more serious unemployment of the later period. These effects and
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Table 1.1 Average Annual Levels and Rates of Unemployment and
Percentage Distribution of the Unemployed by Duration of 
Unemployment: 1947-1990
Year
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
Number 
unemployed 
(in 
thousands)
2,311
2,276
3,637
3,288
2,055
1,883
1,834
3,532
2,852
2,750
2,859
4,602
3,740
3,852
4,714
3,911
4,070
3,786
3,366
2,875
2,975
2,817
2,832
4,088
4,993
4,840
4,304
5,076
7,830
7,288
Percentage distribution of the 
unemployed by duration of 
unemployment0
Rate of 
unemployment
3.9
3.8
5.9
5.3
3.3
3.0
2.9
5.5
4.4
4.1
4.3
6.8
5.5
5.5
6.7
5.5
5.7
5.2
4.5
3.8
3.8
3.6
3.5
4.9
5.9
5.6
4.9
5.6
8.5
7.7
Less than 
15 weeks
82.8
86.4
81.2
76.2
85.3
87.7
88.5
77.0
75.4
80.6
80.4
68.4
72.2
75.2
67.5
71.4
73.3
74.3
77.6
81.7
84.9
85.4
86.7
83.8
76.3
76.1
81.2
81.5
68.3
67.9
15 to 26 
weeks
10.1
8.5
11.8
12.9
8.1
7.9
7.2
14.0
12.9
10.9
11.2
17.1
12.5
13.0
15.4
13.6
13.1
12.9
12.0
10.0
9.1
9.1
8.5
10.4
13.3
12.3
11.0
11.1
16.5
13.8
27 weeks 
and over
7.1
5.1
7.0
10.9
6.7
4.5
4.3
9.0
11.8
8.4
8.4
14.5
15.3
11.8
17.1
15.0
13.6
12.7
10.4
8.3
5.9
5.5
4.7
5.7
10.4
11.6
7.8
7.4
15.2
18.3
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Table 1.1 (continued) Average Annual Levels and Rates of 
Unemployment and Percentage Distribution of the 
Unemployed by Duration of Unemployment: 1947-1990
Year
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
Number 
unemployed 
(in Rate of 
thousands) unemployment
6,855
6,047
5,963
7,448
8,273
10,678
10,717
8,539
8,312
8,237
7,425
6,701
6,528
6,874
7.0
6.0
5.8
7.1
7.5
9.5
9.5
7.4
7.1
6.9
6.1
5.4
5.2
5.4
Percentage distribution of the 
unemployed by duration of 
unemployment8
Less than 
15 weeks
72.1
77.2
79.8
75.5
72.4
67.4
60.7
67.9
72.3
72.9
73.3
75.8
78.9
78.1
15 to 26 
weeks
13.1
12.3
11.5
13.8
13.6
16.0
15.4
12.9
12.3
12.7
12.7
12.0
11.2
11.8
27 weeks 
and over
14.8
10.5
8.7
10.8
14.0
16.6
23.9
19.1
15.4
14.4
14.0
12.1
9.9
10.1
SOURCES: Employment and Earnings, January 1981, table A-l, and January 1991, table A-l; 
Handbook of Labor Statistics, August 1989, table 33, and December 1980, table 38; Employment 
and Earnings, January 1981, table 17; Employment and Earnings, January 1986, table A-16, Jan 
uary 1988, table A-16, January 1990, table 13, and January 1991, table 14. 
a. Weeks unemployed in current spell of unemployment as of the week surveyed each month.
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the response will occupy a great deal of the discussions in later chap 
ters of this book.
Long-term Unemployment
Higher rates of unemployment are accompanied by higher levels of 
long-term unemployment (table 1.1). In years when the average unem 
ployment rate was below 4.0 percent, the proportion unemployed for 
fifteen or more weeks (as of the time of the monthly labor force sur 
veys) ranged between 12 and 18 percent of all unemployed persons. It 
ranged from about 19 to 39 percent in years when the rate exceeded 5.0 
percent. Since the higher proportions unemployed for long periods 
occur when the total number of all unemployed is high, the rise in the 
number of long-term jobless is even more extreme. For example, in 
1969 when unemployment averaged 2.8 million and 3.5 percent of the 
labor force, long-term unemployment (fifteen or more weeks) averaged 
less than 400,000 persons, including only about 133,000 unemployed 
twenty-seven or more weeks. In 1975, when unemployment averaged 
over 7.8 million Qess than three times the 1969 level) and 8.5 percent 
of the labor force, the number unemployed fifteen or more weeks 
exceeded 2.5 million, over six times the 1969 level; the number unem 
ployed twenty-seven or more weeks that year was about 1.2 million, 
almost nine times the 1969 level. 13
The annual averages in table 1.1 do not convey the full extent of 
unemployment experienced by labor force members throughout the 
year. Table 1.1 data are based on a snapshot, a cross-section picture 
taken by a sample household survey (see footnote 2) of the labor force 
status of the adult population as of a single week in the middle of each 
month and averaged for all twelve months of the year. In each monthly 
cross-section survey, persons are counted as unemployed if that is their 
status in the week on which the survey focuses, and the duration of 
their unemployment is measured by the number of successive weeks 
they have been jobless and seeking work as of the surveyed week. This 
duration measure, thus, is truncated; it excludes any additional weeks 
of unemployment the unemployed may continue to have before their 
current spells end. Nor does the duration measure include unemploy-
13. Even adjusting for a 12 percent increase in the total labor force over the 1969-75 period does 
not alter the significance of this pattern very much.
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ment in other spells they may have in the same year. (Generally, about 
a third of all persons with any unemployment during a year experience 
two or more spells of joblessness in that year. 14) Also missed by the 
monthly surveys are persons with very short spells of unemployment 
which begin and end between the survey weeks.
By contrast, another view examines the adult population's total 
labor force experience as accumulated throughout the year. This longi 
tudinal perspective, also provided by a survey, 15 develops counts of the 
total number of weeks each person was employed and unemployed 
during the year. The unemployment experience data derived from this 
information are presented in table 1.2 for each year beginning with 
1957, the first for which work experience survey data are available. A 
comparison of the total number of people experiencing unemployment 
during the year (table 1.2) with the annual average level of unemploy 
ment in the survey weeks of the year (table 1.1) shows that the total 
runs about 2 to 4 times higher than the average level for the same year. 
In 1969, for example, a year of relatively low unemployment, 11.7 mil 
lion people experienced some unemployment, over four times the aver 
age level of 2.8 million that year. In 1982, a severe recession year, 26.5 
million experienced some unemployment, nearly two-and-one-half 
times the average unemployment level of 10.7 million that year.
As noted above, the duration of unemployment measured as of the 
surveyed week is limited to the number of weeks those unemployed in 
that week had been seeking work in their current spells. The proportion 
who had been unemployed fifteen or more weeks at that time, there 
fore, is limited, since additional unemployment beyond the surveyed 
week or in other spells during the year is not reflected. On the other 
hand, when duration or the total number of weeks of unemployment is 
measured on the basis of all experience in the year, the proportion with 
a total of fifteen or more weeks of unemployment is higher, usually 
much higher, than the proportion unemployed this long in their current
14. For example, about 5.8 million, over 32 percent of all workers with some unemployment in 
1990 (almost 5.9 million, 31 percent in 1991) had more than one spell that year (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics News 1992, table 3).
15. The work experience survey is taken in March of each year as a supplement to the regular 
household survey for that month. This supplement obtains information about each person's 
employment and unemployment experience during the preceding calendar year. For further 
description of the work experience survey, see Mellor and Parks (1988, pp. 13-18).
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Table 1.2 Persons with Unemployment During Year and Percentage 
Distribution by Extent of Unemployment, 1957-1990
Persons with unemployment8
Year
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
Number 
(millions)
11.6
14.1
12.2
14.2
15.1
15.3
14.2
14.1
12.3
11.4
11.6
11.3
11.7
14.6
15.9
15.3
14.5
18.5
21.1
20.4
19.5
17.7
18.5
21.4
23.4
26.5
23.8
21.5
21.0
20.7
Percent of 
all persons 
in 
labor force 
during year
14.7
17.9
15.3
17.2
18.4
18.2
16.7
16.2
14.1
13.0
12.9
12.4
12.5
15.3
16.3
15.4
14.2
17.9
20.2
19.1
17.8
15.8
15.8
18.1
19.5
22.0
19.6
17.4
16.7
16.2
Weeks unemployed during year 
(percentage distribution)6
Less than 15 
weeks
68.5
59.6
65.9
64.6
62.3
64.2
64.1
66.8
71.8
76.2
77.5
78.8
77.9
69.1
63.1
65.6
70.5
66.9
57.1
59.0
62.3
65.9
66.7
58.8
58.6
51.6
52.5
61.0
58.3
57.3
15 to 26 
weeks
17.8
20.5
19.1
19.6
21.2
20.7
21.1
19.8
18.3
15.5
14.7
13.9
14.6
19.2
21.5
20.4
18.5
20.6
24.0
22.8
21.9
20.7
20.5
23.4
24.1
26.0
25.0
23.6
23.8
24.3
27 or more 
weeks
13.7
19.9
15.0
15.8
16.5
15.1
14.8
13.4
9.9
8.3
7.8
7.3
7.5
11.7
15.4
14.0
11.0
12.5
18.9
18.2
15.8
13.4
12.8
17.8
17.4
22.4
22.4
19.4
17.9
18.4
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Table 13 (continued) Persons with Unemployment During Year and 
Percentage Distribution by Extent of Unemployment, 1957-
Persons with unemployment8
Year
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990
Number 
(millions)
18.5 
17.1 
17.3 
19.8
Percent of 
all persons 
in 
labor force 
during year
14.3 
12.9 
12.9 
14.7
Weeks unemployed during year 
(percentage distribution)1*
Less than 15 
weeks
58.6 
60.9 
63.1 
60.6
15 to 26 
weeks
23.8 
22.7 
23.0 
24.1
27 or more 
weeks
17.6 
16.4 
13.9 
15.3
SOURCES: Handbook of Labor Statistics, December 1980, table 49; Monthly Labor Review, 
June 1981, p. 50, table 2; Handbook of Labor Statistics, August 1989, table 50; Bureau of Labor 
Statistics News, 1990, p. 5, table 3; and Bureau of Labor Statistics News, 1991, p. 5, table 3. 
a. Includes unemployed age 14 and 15 years old from 1957 to 1965 and excludes them thereaf 
ter, 
b. Excludes unemployed who did not work but looked for work during the year.
spells as of the surveyed week. Again, using 1969 and 1982 as exam 
ples, the proportions accumulating fifteen or more weeks of unemploy 
ment during these years were 22 and 48 percent, respectively, (table 
1.2) compared with 13 and 33 percent, respectively, unemployed this 
long in their current spells as of the time surveyed (table 1.1).
Dealing with longer-term unemployment, especially during reces 
sion, has been one of the most difficult of all problems faced by unem 
ployment insurance. The program's response over the years through 
liberalized benefit duration provisions and extended benefits during 
high-unemployment periods has probably altered the structure and 
reach of the system more than any other factor.
Characteristics of the Unemployed
Reflecting labor force and employment trends, the unemployed 
became younger and increasingly female over the years through the 
1970s, though somewhat less so in the 1980s. Table 1.3 indicates these 
changes. Since the mid-1960s, women have averaged over 40 percent 
of the unemployed; they were closer to a third of the unemployed in the
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early 1950s. Their rising rate of labor force participation has also 
affected the family circumstances of unemployed men. In 1990, for 
example, about 69 percent of unemployed husbands had wives in the 
labor force, compared with about 32 percent in 1958. 16
Teenagers (age 16-19) and young adults (age 20-24) together also 
comprised over 40 percent of the unemployed from the mid-1960s, but 
less than this share after 1982. Teenagers alone were about 30 percent 
of the total in the late 1960s, compared with less than 20 percent in the 
1950s and after 1981. The young adult group's share of unemployment 
peaked in the 1970s. Older workers, age 55 and over, as a proportion of 
the unemployed, declined from about 15 percent in the early 1950s to 
less than half that level by the end of the 1970s. Early retirement has 
contributed to this trend, especially among men. Except in recession 
years 1975-76, new entrants and reentrants to the labor force made up 
about 40 to 45 percent of the unemployed during the 1970s, reflecting 
the high concentration of women and teenagers. This proportion fell 
below 40 percent in the 1980s with the declining size of the teenage 
group.
New entrants and reentrants typically do not qualify for unemploy 
ment insurance. Nor do workers who leave their jobs voluntarily. The 
latter group accounted for another 10 to 15 percent of the unem 
ployed. 17 For those reasons alone, about half the unemployed are not 
likely to be eligible to receive unemployment benefits. Other factors, 
such as unemployment continuing beyond the duration limits of unem 
ployment insurance, further reduce the proportion of the unemployed 
who receive benefits. New entrants, reentrants, and job leavers tend to 
make up smaller proportions of the unemployed during recession peri 
ods when involuntary layoffs of regular established workers mount 
steeply.
Total year unemployment experience data also show the increasing 
importance of women and youths over the years. The proportion of 
women among all persons experiencing any unemployment during the 
year rose from about 33 percent in 1957 to about 43 percent in 1990
16. HLS (6/85, table 57); E&E (1/91, table 8). 1958 is the first year for which this information is 
available.
17. Data for new entrants, reentrants, and job leavers based on HLS 12/80, table 39; HLS 8/89, 
table 37; E&E 1/86, table 12,1/88, table 12, and 1/90, table 12.
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Table 13 Women and Selected Age Groups as Percentages of All 
Unemployed, Selected Years, 1950-1990
Percentage of all unemployed (annual averages)8
Women 
Year (age 16 and over)
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
31.9
35.0
35.5
43.6
45.3
44.1
45.6
46.8
49.5
49.4
44.2
44.7
42.1
41.6
44.4
45.6
45.0
44.8
45.5
46.0
44.7
Teenagers 
(16-19)
15.6
15.8
18.5
26.0
27.0
22.4
23.3
24.0
25.8
25.6
22.0
21.3
18.5
17.1
17.6
17.7
17.7
18.1
18.3
18.3
16.7
Young adults 
(20-24)
17.1
13.9
15.1
16.5
21.1
23.3
22.9
23.0
23.6
23.1
23.7
23.9
22.4
21.7
21.5
20.9
20.0
19.6
18.8
18.7
17.8
Older workers 
(55 and over)
15.4
16.6
13.4
12.6
10.1
8.6
8.9
8.6
7.6
7.4
6.5
6.6
7.1
7.4
7.8
7.4
7.0
6.6
6.9
7.2
7.3
a. Percent calculations based on data in: Handbook of Labor Statistics, December 1980, table 30, 
and August 1989, table 27; Employment and Earnings, January 1981, table 15, January issues of 
1985-1991, table 17.
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(HLS 12/80, table 49; Bureau of Labor Statistics News 1991, p. 5, table 
3). Teenagers and young adults (age 20-24) together accounted for 
about 28 percent of all persons with unemployment in 1959, increased 
to about 43 percent of the total in 1978, and diminished to 32 percent 
in 1987. 18
How individuals with unemployment during the year are distrib 
uted by their household or family status gives some sense of the signif 
icance of their unemployment in family terms. Table 1.4 summarizes 
this information for the 18.5 million who experienced any unemploy 
ment in 1987, the latest year for which such information was available 
as of 1992. Almost one-fifth lived alone or with unrelated individuals 
and, for the most part, were self-supporting. The rest of the unem 
ployed lived in families. Nearly one in three of all unemployed were 
family heads, if we assume that husbands headed husband-wife fami 
lies. Only about 10 percent of this group were under 25 years of age. 
Wives of husband-wife families were 18 percent of all unemployed, 
with about one out of seven under age 25. The remaining groups con 
sisted of other family members, mostly the children of family heads. 
These groups accounted for about 30 percent of all persons with unem 
ployment during the year; over two-thirds of them were teenagers or 
young adults. Combining persons who lived alone with all family 
heads, 52 percent of individuals experiencing unemployment in 1987 
were the sole or principal providers for their households. The rest were 
wives and other family members, nearly half of whom were under 25 
years old. As noted earlier, to the extent that these latter groups con 
sisted of new entrants and reentrants to the labor force, or persons who 
tended to quit their jobs or leave the labor force, their eligibility for 
unemployment benefits would have been limited or nil. Those who 
received benefits were more likely to be concentrated among the 
unemployed who lived alone, were family heads, or wives of heads.
Not included in the unemployment counts based on the monthly 
surveys are persons who indicate that they want to work but have not 
looked for a job for a month or more because they think they cannot
18. Cooper (1960, tables 6 and 9). The 1959 figure includes 14- and 15-year-olds while the teen 
agers in the 1978 and 1987 figures do not. Data for 1978 are based on Young (1979, table C-l). 
Data for 1987 are based on tabuladons supplied by the Bureau of Labor Statistics from the March 
1988 household survey.
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Table 1.4 Persons with Unemployment During 1987 by Family Status 
and Age
Percentage distribution
Total with 
unemployment
Family status
All unemployed
Unrelated individuals0
Family beads 
Husbands'1
Other family heads'
Non-head family 
members
Wives*
Other non-heads
Number 
(thousands)
18,535
3,581
6,061 
4,472
1,589
8,893
3,412
5,481
Incidence 
rate*
14.3
16.1
12.0 
10.8
17.3
15.5
10.4
22.2
By family 
status
100.0
19.3
32.7 
24.1
8.6
48.0
18.4
29.6
By years of ageb
16-24 
years
31.6
27.3
9.7 
7.8
15.1
48.2
14.8
68.9
25 or 
more 
years
68.4
72.7
90.3 
92.2
84.9
51.8
85.2
31.1
SOURCE: Based on tabulations supplied by the Bureau of Labor Statistics from the March 1988
household survey.
a. Number with unemployment as a percent of all persons who worked or looked for work during
year.
b. Percentage distributions by the two age groups shown are for each family status category and
add horizontally to 100.0 percent.
c. Lived alone or with unrelated persons in households.
d. In husband-wife families.
e. Persons without a spouse present but with children or other relatives in household; women
comprised 78 percent of this group in 1987.
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obtain one given current labor market conditions or personal factors 
which they feel deter employers from hiring them. These "discouraged 
workers" averaged almost 1.4 million in recession year 1982; they 
averaged about 850,000 in 1990. Women accounted for 57 percent of 
this group in 1990 (Bureau of Labor Statistics News 1991, table A-12).
Types of Unemployment
Any classification of unemployment by type is necessarily arbitrary. 
For convenience, however, unemployment will be discussed under the 
headings of short-term unemployment, cyclical unemployment, and 
unemployment due to structural and technological developments. 
Short-term unemployment includes unemployment from several 
sources frictional unemployment, short-term layoff (a temporary 
state without loss of the employment relationship), and seasonal unem 
ployment.
The way the unemployment insurance program responds to the 
unemployed depends to a fair degree on the type of unemployment 
generating the claims for benefits. The ensuing discussion will refer to 
how or why a particular type of unemployment makes a difference for 
unemployment insurance. It should be understood that the program 
does not necessarily identify the unemployed individual by type of 
unemployment to determine benefit rights. Moreover, it often is not 
possible to clearly classify the unemployed by type, especially at the 
outset of their unemployment. General analysis of unemployment by 
type can be useful, however, in helping to evaluate program policies 
and in guiding administration of eligibility rules regarding the current 
availability for work and job search of unemployment benefit recipi 
ents.
Short-term Unemployment
Most unemployment is of short duration. The proportion varies with 
business conditions, but usually about 70 to 85 percent of the unem 
ployed have been out of work less than 15 weeks, and from 40 to 55 
percent have been unemployed less than five weeks, as reported in the
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monthly surveys. The proportion with less than fifteen weeks of unem 
ployment tends to run lower when experience is reported and totaled 
over a full year. It has usually ranged from about 60 to 75 percent, but 
fell below 60 percent during most of the 1980s and in recession years 
(tables 1.1 and 1.2).
Much short-duration unemployment is what is sometimes referred 
to as "frictiona!" unemployment. It simply may take a little time for 
qualified job seekers and employers with openings to find each other. 
Some factional unemployment is a necessary ingredient of a dynamic 
economy and represents people who enter or reenter the labor market 
to look for work they soon find, or who are idle for a short period while 
changing from one job to another. Such mobility of labor characterizes 
a healthy economy if the jobless periods are short. Some of this unem 
ployment can be reduced or shortened through improved labor market 
information and organization; not all of it can be eliminated. Workers 
terminated from jobs through no fault of their own and who have 
another job lined up to begin in a short time or good prospects for one, 
may draw unemployment benefits in the meantime to compensate for 
lost wages.
The bulk of short-term unemployment, however, is caused by con 
stant changes in the need for labor during the year due to temporary 
changes in consumer demand, inventory adjustments, model change- 
overs, seasonal factors, and a host of other reasons. Work reduction 
usually takes the form of short layoffs after which the workers return to 
their former jobs. These workers typically draw unemployment bene 
fits during such layoffs.
An important component of short-term unemployment is the result 
of pronounced seasonal reductions in employment. Outdoor work, 
food processing, and other activities affected by the weather are exam 
ples of seasonally oriented employment patterns. Consumer demand 
for and production of apparel is also markedly seasonal, as is the use of 
vacation, travel, and holiday-related services. Swings in employment 
levels follow these seasonal variations. It is possible for seasonal 
unemployment to last or accumulate to fifteen or more weeks for some 
workers, as in construction work. The seasonal adjustment factors used 
by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics to eliminate seasonal variations 
in the monthly levels of unemployment during 1989-90 ranged from 
0.875 in September 1989 to 1.186 in February 1990 for males age 20
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and over. This means that adult male unemployment resulting from 
seasonal influences alone may cause the unemployment level of this 
group to fluctuate from nearly 13 percent below the annual average in 
September to almost 19 percent above the average in February. The 
range is narrower for unemployed adult women but much wider for 
teenage unemployment. 19
Compensation of seasonal unemployment has always been an issue 
for unemployment insurance. Concerns include fears about potentially 
heavy drains on funds since benefits paid to the seasonally unemployed 
may substantially exceed the taxes paid into the funds by their employ 
ers. Concerns also include uncertainty about the unemployed worker's 
availability for work and the administrative agency's ability to test or 
monitor availability and job search adequately during the off season. 
There is some evidence that the availability of unemployment compen 
sation has actually increased worker attachment to seasonal employers 
and some types of seasonal unemployment (Lester 1962, pp. 49-50; 
Hamermesh 1977, pp. 64-72).
Some states have attempted to identify specific industries or occu 
pations as seasonal and pay benefits only to employees laid off during 
the normal season of operation, but without significant results (Murray 
1972). Federal law prohibits the payment of benefits to professional 
school employees, under specified conditions, during summer or other 
between term breaks, and to professional athletes in their off season. 
Although the bulk of seasonal employment is covered by unemploy 
ment insurance, some industries that operate for only a short season are 
excluded under state laws that cover only employers who operate for 
twenty or more weeks in the year. The minimum amount of past 
employment or earnings required of unemployment insurance claim 
ants to qualify for benefits works to exclude some seasonally employed 
workers from drawing any benefits.
Cyclical Unemployment
When it occurs, cyclical unemployment caused by business reces 
sions generates national concern. Although it may vary in intensity
19. E&E (7/89, table 1, and 1/90, table 1). Reported monthly unemployment counts are divided 
by the adjustment factors to "deseasonalize" the data to permit month-to-month comparisons 
unobstructed by regular seasonal influences.
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across regions, cyclical unemployment is usually nationwide in impact 
and more in the public view than other types of unemployment. Total 
unemployment levels run comparatively high, and long-term unem 
ployment accumulates more than usual.
Most business recessions since World War II have been relatively 
mild and of short duration. Those occurring in 1957-58 and in 1974-75 
were quite severe. The recession of 1981-82 was also very serious and 
came soon after the brief recession of 1980, which was more regional 
in nature. Unemployment rates in 1982 and in 1983 averaged higher 
than in any year since the 1930s. During recessions, unemployment 
tends to concentrate heavily in manufacturing, particularly in the dura 
ble goods manufacturing industries. Employment declines during these 
periods in manufacturing, construction, and trade, however, may be 
partially offset by continuing employment gains in government and in 
the finance and service industries. For example, between July 1974 and 
July 1975, when total nonagricultural employment (seasonally 
adjusted) declined by about 2.1 million, the employment drop of 2.9 
million in the first three industry groups noted above was partially off 
set by a gain of nearly 1 million in the last three. Between mid-1981 
and mid-1982, the corresponding offset was far less significant, largely 
because of a decline in government employment. 20
As table 1.5 shows, unemployment levels and rates rise sharply 
when the economy slips into recession. There were eight recessions 
between 1947 and 1989. 21 The percentage increases in unemployment 
to peak year averages from the previous year range from 22 to 93 per 
cent. The latter, occurring in 1954, reflects the very low level of unem 
ployment of the prior year; the 1954 peak unemployment level and rate 
were actually lower than those of any other recession year. The low 
end of the range of percent increases in unemployment represents the 
opposite situation in 1961 when unemployment rose from a relatively 
high level in 1960, reflecting incomplete recovery from the 1958 reces 
sion. The short and less widespread recession of 1980 produced a com-
20. Based on data in Monthly Labor Review (September 1975, p. 87, table 11); E&E (7/82 and 
7/83, table B-l).
21. During late 1990, the ninth recession since 1947 began.
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paratively limited rise of 25 percent in average unemployment over the 
1979 level. The weak and faltering recovery in 1981 did not prevent 
further unemployment increases that year, near the end of which began 
the next recession. While unemployment averaged only 29 percent 
higher in 1982 than in 1981, the rise from 1979 to 1982 came to nearly 
80 percent. The unemployment rate in 1982 and in 1983 averaged 9.5 
percent, the highest level of the entire post-World War II era and well 
above the previous high of 8.5 percent in 1975. The 1975 unemploy 
ment level was 54 percent above that of 1974, but 82 percent above the 
level in 1973 when unemployment began its rise. If the increases are 
measured from low to peak months of unemployment during recession, 
the swings are considerably larger. For example, unemployment (sea 
sonally adjusted) rose from a low of 4.1 million in October 1973 to a 
peak of over 8.5 million in May 1975, an increase of 108 percent (E&E 
6/74 and 6/75, table 1).
Table 1.5 Percentage Increases in Number and Rate of Unemployment in 
______Recessions, 1947-1991 ____ _________ ____
Percentage increase from prior year
Recession year8 Number unemployed Unemployment rate
1949 59lJ553
1954 92.6 89.7
1958 61.0 58.1
1961 22.4 21.8
1970 44.5 40.0
1975 53.8 51.8
1980 24.4 22.4
1982 29.1 27.6 
______1991_____________22.6_____________21.8______
SOURCES: Recession years based on periods designated by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Inc. as given in Zarnowitz (1992, table 11.7); percentages based on the Economic 
Report of the President, February 1975, table C-25 and C-26; and the Economic Report of the 
President, February 1992, table B-37 and B-33. 
a. Calendar year of peak unemployment.
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The large and rapid rise in unemployment as a recession develops 
brings on very heavy use of unemployment insurance. It is then that 
the reserve funds, if sufficiently accumulated during low unemploy 
ment periods, can come into play to help compensate for the extensive 
loss of wage income. The program serves two of its vital roles by help 
ing to brace so many workers against the financial shocks of job loss 
and hard-hit communities against serious loss of purchasing power.
During recessions, unemployment increases not only in number but 
also in duration. The average proportion unemployed fifteen or more 
weeks at the time of the monthly surveys rose 61 percent from 1957 to 
1958,71 percent from 1974 to 1975, and 61 percent from 1979 to 1982 
(18 percent from 1981 to 1982). The proportion unemployed 27 or 
more weeks increased 71,105, and 91 percent, respectively (19 percent 
from 1981 to 1982). Long-term unemployment sometimes continues to 
rise beyond the peak recession year. The proportion out of work 27 or 
more weeks rose another 20 percent from 1975 to 1976 and 44 percent 
more from 1982 to 1983.22 As noted earlier, the combination of much 
heavier concentrations of unemployment in the long-term categories 
and the much higher levels of unemployment produce very large 
increases in the number of long-term unemployed in recessions.
The impact of the rise in long-term unemployment in recessions has 
fallen heavily on unemployment insurance. The program's response to 
this problem, involving adjustments in its benefit duration limits, is a 
major development that has altered some of the character of the pro 
gram over the years. How unemployment insurance deals with long- 
term unemployment, particularly in recession periods, constitutes one 
of its major policy issues.
Structural Unemployment
Perhaps the most serious type of unemployment is structural unem 
ployment, the result of basic change that is taking place all the time in 
many aspects of the economy. The sources of such change are numer 
ous. They include technological modifications in industrial production, 
the replacement of old products and services by new ones that serve
22. These increases based on data in table 1-1. The comparatively limited increase from 1981 to 
1982 in the proportion unemployed long term reflects the higher levels of long-term unemploy 
ment lingering after the 1980 recession.
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their purposes more effectively or at less cost, the geographic reloca 
tion of production facilities, the closing of obsolete and inefficient 
plants, shifts in consumer tastes and preferences, the substitution of 
new materials or new forms of energy for those that are more costly or 
which have become less available, shifts in various policies of govern 
ment that affect private economic activity, and the impact of foreign 
competition.23
The list of causes of structural unemployment can be extended; all 
have their effects on employment. Old jobs may disappear entirely and 
new job opportunities may emerge. Workers who have worked regu 
larly in the same occupations or for the same employers, sometimes for 
many years, may suddenly face transformed situations which require 
substantial adjustment on their part to meet new work conditions or 
which simply eliminate their jobs with no comparable employment 
alternatives available. For many workers, permanent layoffs induced 
by any of these factors may be the beginning of long periods of unem 
ployment or of unstable employment. Regaining steady employment 
may call for difficult adjustments, such as retraining or relocation, or 
the willingness to try something quite different, often at lower pay or 
under less favorable working conditions. Some affected workers may 
never go back to work, or to a regular job. They may choose early 
retirement instead, if they can, or simply leave the labor force con 
vinced after prolonged and futile job search that they cannot find work. 
Another employment effect of structural change is the curtailment of 
job opportunities for new entrants to the labor force who have particu 
lar skills and training for which there is less demand, or no skills at all 
in a labor market in which more skills are in demand.
Structural changes and their effects on employment have ranged 
from limited, isolated instances that attract little but local attention to 
major events affecting thousands of workers. The latter can take on the 
proportions of a national crisis and may affect entire industries. Some 
changes occur suddenly while others may develop over an extended 
period with substantial accumulation of employment effects.
Several examples are worth noting briefly to illustrate various kinds 
of structural unemployment. The twentieth century witnessed a major
23. Racial, ethnic, sex, and age discrimination by employers in their hiring practices may be 
considered another source of structural unemployment.
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shift from reliance on coal to reliance on petroleum as the principal 
source of energy. Employment in the coal mines declined from an 
average level of 438,000 in 1945, already less than half the peak level 
of 1923, to 133,000 in 1969 (Historical Statistics of the United States 
1979, p. 608). This trend reversed itself somewhat in the 1970s, a 
result of the Arab oil embargoes, skyrocketing petroleum prices, and 
the recognition of an energy crisis in which coal, especially low sul 
phur coal, regained some favor. By 1980, coal mining employment had 
increased to 246,000, approaching twice the 1969 level. Many Appala 
chian coal fields, long the prime examples of depressed areas awash 
with structural unemployment, showed signs of revival in the 1970s. 
However, few of the miners left stranded by the earlier mine closings 
benefitted from the new employment opportunities. It was a new gen 
eration of younger workers which filled the demand. Moreover, mining 
technology has changed greatly, raising productivity and requiring dif 
ferent skills. New coal fields were developed in the West. The structure 
of the industry and its location have altered dramatically. In the 1980s 
employment in coal mining subsided to less than 200,000 again as oil 
became plentiful and lower in price.24
The shift of the textile industry from New England to the South left 
in its wake widespread and lasting depression in the former mill towns. 
Only decades later did New England show strong signs of economic 
revival with the development of its electronics and other high technol 
ogy, often defense-related industries to significant levels. But a large 
part of a whole generation was left stranded in the meantime.
The rise of trucking, automobile, and air transportation sent the 
nation's railroads into a steep, long decline, wiping out hundreds of 
thousands of jobs in that industry. Foreign imports have captured sig 
nificant shares of American markets for many products steel, televi 
sion sets, and automobiles, to name a few. The result has been 
substantial losses of jobs in these import-sensitive domestic industries. 
Employment in the automobile industry plunged from a peak average 
of over 1 million in 1978 to 70 percent of that level in 1982. Besides 
the foreign competition, the shift of car production to more automated
24. Data on employment in coal mining for the years 1980 to 1990 from January issues of 
Employment and Earnings, each following the year of reference, table 30 for the first three years 
and table 28 for the next seven years.
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processes and to concentration on smaller, more fuel-efficient vehicles 
led to the general expectation that with diminishing labor intensity in 
this industry, employment may not regain former high levels at least 
for many years. In the mid-1980s, average employment did move up 
toward 900,000, but then fell to about 800,000 in 1990. The story for 
the nation's steel industry has been even grimmer. From an average 
level of almost 600,000 in 1965, employment at blast furnaces and 
steel mills fell over the years to about 200,000 by 1990.^
Successful foreign competition has stemmed, in part, from a major 
shift in government policy, dating back to the early 1960s, to cooperate 
with other countries in lowering tariffs and other trade barriers on a 
wide range of goods in order to promote trade expansion for all. Firms 
and jobs in some industries in the United States have been adversely 
affected as a result, while other industries have gained. Other policies 
and actions by the federal government have also produced employment 
effects in certain industries leading to structural unemployment. 
Deregulation of the airlines and restrictions on the lumber industry in 
the cutting of California redwood trees are but two cases in point.
Ups and downs in military procurement usually have strong effects 
on employment. A well-known example was the cutback in govern 
ment purchases of military aircraft around 1970. The effect on aircraft 
manufacturing, particularly in the State of Washington, was devastat 
ing. Employment there fell deeply and rapidly. Despite the exodus of 
many workers, unemployment remained high in the Seattle-Tacoma 
area for some years. Structural unemployment was not confined to the 
workers laid off by the aircraft plants, but also included workers laid 
off by supplier subcontractors, as well as many in the area's secondary 
services and trade industries that depended heavily on the health of the 
primary aircraft industry. Yet, several years later that industry recov 
ered handsomely with the booming demand for new planes from the 
commercial airlines. The cold war's dramatic end at the close of the 
1980s has set off a major reevaluation of the nation's huge defense 
budget. The likely results are significantly reduced outlays for military 
procurement, base closings, and cutbacks in service personnel, all pro 
ducing serious employment dislocation in the coming years.
25. Employment trends were examined using Bureau of Labor Statistics (1991) page 148 for 
blast furnaces and steel mills and page 331 for the auto industry.
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These examples emphasize several important points about the 
employment effects of structural change. One is that while the change 
leads to loss of jobs in a particular industry or location, there are often 
contrary forces that result in new jobs elsewhere. Over time, the aggre 
gate level of employment may not decline; it may even rise. The aggre 
gate, however, hides the painful dislocation and usually long-term 
unemployment of workers whose jobs have disappeared. Because of a 
mismatch of skills and location, those workers are not the ones likely 
to reap the advantage of the new jobs created by the change. Sustained 
or higher total employment levels also obscure the effects of the 
replacement of lost high-wage, full-time factory jobs by more low- 
wage or part-time trade and service jobs. From 1982 to 1990, a period 
of substantial structural change and concern about displaced workers, 
about 18 million jobs were added, a gain of 18 percent in employment. 
Despite productivity improvements, the average earnings of workers 
over this period could hardlv keep pace with inflation; indeed, for most 
workers real earnings fell.
Another point to be noted is that the decline that may occur in a par 
ticular industry or area because of a shift in demand, as for coal and 
military aircraft, can eventually reverse itself with subsequent shifts. 
The passage of time, however, is critical for those workers initially 
affected.
A third point is that structural unemployment is often the hand 
maiden of cyclical unemployment. It is when business in general turns 
down that the weakest and most marginal elements of the economy 
suffer most. Obsolete and cost-inefficient plants closed, many never to 
open again. Distinguishing between cyclical and structural unemploy 
ment at such times is difficult. If the recovery is strong and subsequent 
economic growth is vigorous, then unemployment will fade, including 
long-term unemployment. But the period of recession and subsequent 
recovery is usually the occasion for improvements in efficiency of 
operations, for applications of new technology, and for building new
26. See E&E (1/92, table A-l) for employment data, and (1/92, table C-l) for earnings data. The 
latter shows an increase of 29 percent in the average weekly earnings of production and nonsuper- 
visory employees on private nonagricultural payrolls from 1982 to 1990; over this time, consumer 
prices rose 34 percent. See Monthly Labor Review (1991, p. 80, table 33) for Consumer Price 
Index.
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modern plants in new locations. What remains are stubborn pockets of 
clearly structural unemployment, unrelieved by these developments.
Structural unemployment is the most difficult and most worrisome 
type of unemployment of all. Its total number may not account for a 
very large share of all unemployment nationally (and how to define the 
structurally unemployed for counting purposes is itself a debated ques 
tion), but it can be quite significant for an affected community or 
industry, and it is a substantial component of long-term unemploy 
ment. The financial hardship for individual workers and their families 
can be severe and steadily worsening. Deterioration of morale, of men 
tal and physical health, and even of the social fabric of a community is 
not an uncommon consequence of structural unemployment. The fears 
generated by the announcement of a permanent plant closing with 
mass layoffs, or the introduction of new technology that will replace 
labor, can arouse strong resistance and unrest among the affected 
workforce. Government involvement is frequently the result as efforts 
to forestall or ease the problem turn political. The political response 
has ranged from the establishment of public programs, such as those 
provided under the Area Redevelopment Act of 1961, the Manpower 
Development and Training Act of 1962, and many successor, including 
the Job Training Partnership Act of 1982. Other legislative efforts were 
designed to regulate the timing of plant closings and employer respon 
sibility for effects on workers and communities. The 1962 legislation 
was a response to the widespread fears of automation's effects on jobs 
at that time. Other legislation has provided for special unemployment 
benefits and adjustment assistance for workers dislocated because of 
the adoption of particular government policies, most notably with 
regard to foreign imports or industry regulation (see Rubin 1980).
Unemployment insurance comes into play at the outset of structural 
layoffs, buying time to work out alternative possibilities and vocational 
readjustments. The time needed, however, may be more than unem 
ployment insurance alone can provide. Advance warning of plant shut 
downs and of permanent mass layoffs, therefore, appears desirable 
(Freedman 1980, p. 15). At least sixty days advance notice of plant 
closings by large employers (100 or more employees) and of mass lay 
offs, permanent or very long-term (six months or longer), became a 
mandatory federal requirement in 1988 after many years of unsuccess-
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fill legislative effort.27 Concern persists about potential workforce dis 
locations portended by widening prospects for the application of 
computerized electronic or robotic operations to many factory and 
office processes in coming years. 28 Structural unemployment seems 
destined to be a continuing problem for our society.
The Insured Unemployed
The discussion thus far has dwelt on employment and unemploy 
ment trends based on data reported from the monthly household labor 
force surveys and the yearly work and unemployment experience sur 
veys. Trends in employment covered by unemployment insurance pro 
grams and in insured unemployment have not closely followed the 
total employment and unemployment patterns all of the time. To obtain 
a firmer grasp of the unemployment insurance system and the role it 
plays, it is important to understand the differences in these trends and 
the reasons they have been different.
Covered employment has increased proportionately much more 
over the years than has total employment. In 1990, it is estimated that 
an average of about 111 million jobs were covered under all state and 
federal unemployment insurance programs. That number compares 
with average covered employment of 34 million in 1950 (Economic 
Report of the President 1981, table B-34; Economic Report of the Pres 
ident 1992, table B-40). The 226 percent increase over this period was 
more than double the percentage increase in all employment over the 
same period. The difference is due to the extension of unemployment 
insurance coverage, through state and federal legislation, from very 
limited beginnings to where about 97 percent of all wage and salary 
jobs are now covered. Employment that was not covered as of 1990
27. Public law 100-379 specifies that sixty days advance notice must be given to employees of 
firms with 100 or more employees when a plant closing is expected to result in at least fifty work 
ers losing their jobs. Furthermore, the law requires that sixty days advance notice be given when 
50 or more workers, amounting to at least 33 percent of a firm's workforce, will be laid off for six 
months or more. A similar rule applies to six-month layoffs of 500 employees regardless of the 
firm size.
28. See, for example, Norman (1981, pp. 30-32); and Hunt and Hunt (1983).
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consisted mainly of self-employment, domestic household service, 
agricultural employment on small farms, and employment of elected 
government officials.
The insured unemployed are workers who file claims for unemploy 
ment benefits for a week of unemployment. Each week the number of 
claims is compiled from all local claims offices throughout the nation 
and aggregated to state and national totals. 29 The total of all insured 
unemployment ranged between annual averages of about 1.8 million 
and 4.9 million during the 1970s and from 2.1 million to 4.6 million 
between 1980 and 1990 (table 1.6). During the two decades prior to 
1970, that total exceeded two million only in recession years. In nonre- 
cession years, insured unemployment was less than half of all unem 
ployment. Federally mandated programs which extend the duration of 
unemployment benefits when unemployment is high have become a 
significant factor in swelling the insured unemployed total in those 
times.
A number of reasons explain the large differences between total and 
insured unemployment levels. The most important is that total unem 
ployment includes new entrants and reentrants into the labor force who 
have not yet found jobs. Lacking recent work experience, they do not 
qualify for unemployment benefits. As noted earlier, they accounted 
for about 40 to 45 percent of all unemployed during the 1970s and 35 
to 40 percent during most of the 1980s. Others among the unemployed 
who are not insured include (1) workers from jobs not covered by 
unemployment insurance, a more significant group in earlier years; (2) 
those who exhaust their unemployment benefits and remain unem 
ployed, an important group in recession periods; (3) unemployed 
workers who leave their jobs voluntarily and therefore, in most cases, 
are disqualified from receiving benefits, a group that usually accounts 
for from 10 to 15 percent of all unemployed; (4) jobless workers who 
for various reasons do not qualify or are determined to be ineligible for 
benefits; and (5) unemployed workers who do not file for benefits even 
though they are eligible. On the other hand, a small percentage of the 
insured unemployed receive partial unemployment benefits because 
they currently have some limited employment and earnings while
29. For a description of the compilation and uses of these data, see Blaustein (1979).
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Table 1.6 Total and Insured Unemployment, 1970-1990 and Selected 
Years, 1950-1965 (Numbers in thousands)
Insured unemployment
All programs8 State programs
Total Percent Percent of 
unemployment of total all 
Year (number) Number unemployment Number programs Rateb
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
3,288
2,852
3,852
3,366
4,088
4,993
4,840
4,304
5,076
7,830
7,288
6,855
6,047
5,963
7,448
8,273
10,678
10,717
8,539
8,312
8,237
7,425
6,701
6,528
6,874
1,605
1,399
2,071
1,450
2,070
2,608
2,192
1,793
2,558
4,937
3,846
3,308
2,645
2,592
3,837
3,410
4,594
3,775
2,565
2,693
2,746
2,401
2,135
2,205
2,575
49
49
54
43
51
52
45
42
50
63
53
48
44
43
52
41
43
35
30
32
33
32
32
34
37
1,513
1,265
1,908
1,328
1,805
2,150
1,848
1,632
2,262
3,986
2,991
2,655
2,359
2,434
3,350
3,047
4,061
3,396
2,474
2,611
2,650
2,000
2,081
2,158
2,522
94
90
92
92
87
82
84
91
88
81
78
80
89
94
87
89
88
90
97
97
97
97
98
98
98
4.5
3.4
4.7
2.9
3.4
4.1
3.0
2.5
3.4
6.1
4.4
3.7
2.8
2.9
3.9
3.5
4.7
3.9
2.7
2.8
2.8
2.3
2.0
2.1
2.4
SOURCES: Total unemployment Table 1.1. Insured unemployment (All Programs) Eco 
nomic Report of the President, 1981, p. 272, Economic Report of the President, 1988, p. 295, and 
Economic Report of the President, 1992, p. 343, table B-40.
a. Includes federal unemployment compensation programs for veterans (UCV), ex-servicemen 
(UCX), federal civil service employees (UCFE), the railroad unemployment insurance program, 
the federal-state extended benefit programs, temporary extension programs, and state regular 
unemployment insurance programs. Does not include federal supplemental benefits program, 
b. State insured unemployment as a percent of employment covered by state unemployment 
insurance programs.
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awaiting return to full-time employment; they are not included in the 
total unemployment count.
Insured unemployment varies during the year because of seasonal 
factors, but in patterns that do not coincide entirely with those for total 
unemployment. Levels are high in the winter months for both, but rela 
tively more so for the insured. As a result, insured unemployment tends 
to be a much higher proportion of all unemployment in those months 
than at other times. Total unemployment levels rise sharply in May and 
June when large numbers of students leave school and look for sum 
mer work, but these new entrants or reentrants into the labor market 
add few, if any, claimants to the insured unemployment count. The 
insured-total ratio tends to be the lowest in these months. During 1977, 
for example, that ratio ranged between 39 percent in June and 56 per 
cent in the winter (Blaustein 1979, p. 221). In 1986 and 1987, the 
monthly ratios reached their lowest levels in late summer and fall, 
rather than in May or June, perhaps reflecting the accelerating eco 
nomic activity at the time unrelated to seasonal factors and which espe 
cially limited layoffs and unemployment of insured workers 
(Economic Report of the President 1988, table B-42).
The insured-to-total unemployment ratio was lower in the 1980s 
than in prior years (table 1.6). It was only 43 percent in 1982, a severe 
recession year; normally, the ratio exceeds 50 percent at such times. In 
the recession of 1975, the ratio averaged 63 percent; including recipi 
ents of the Federal Supplemental Benefits program enacted at the time 
for the very long-term unemployed, the ratio was 78 percent. During 
the eight years following 1982, the ratio dropped off sharply to 
between 30 and 37 percent. The ratio had averaged less than 40 percent 
in only one year between the end of World War II and 1982.
The low ratios of the 1980s have stirred debate about the reasons for 
the decline and their implications concerning the effectiveness of the 
unemployment insurance system. Attempts have been made to explain 
the various factors accounting for the difference between insured and 
total unemployment and for the ratio's decline in the 1980s. Not all of 
the difference can be accounted for or measured. There is recognition, 
however, that statutory changes adopted early in the 1980s affecting 
extended benefits during high unemployment periods made those ben-
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efits available later and terminated them sooner than had been the pat 
tern during previous recessions. These changes helped to keep insured 
unemployment, including extended benefit recipients, unusually low in 
1982 and 1983. Moreover, increased qualifying requirements and stiff 
ened disqualification rules backed by their closer administration also 
appear to have barred more unemployed workers during the 1980s than 
before from eligibility for unemployment insurance, although it has 
been practically impossible to measure these effects.30
Insured unemployment levels have generally increased over the 
long span of years, reflecting rising employment levels, wider cover 
age by unemployment insurance, and longer duration of benefits, 
among other factors. Insured unemployment can and does at times 
fluctuate considerably from year to year because of cyclical factors. 
The fluctuation is more readily apparent in the insured unemployment 
rate (IUR) insured unemployment computed as a percent of covered 
employment.31 Table 1.6 shows annual lURs, based on state unem 
ployment insurance programs, for the 1970s, 1980s, and selected ear 
lier years. The annual rates ranged between 2.0 and 6.1 during the 
1970s and 1980s. They were below 2.5 in the late 1960s, above 4.0 in 
the early 1960s, and varied from 2.7 to 6.5 during the 1950s (Unem 
ployment Insurance Financial Data, 1938-1982). Total unemployment 
rates (TURs) show similar fluctuations though at higher levels (table 
l.l). 32 The relative swings in lURs tend to be larger. For example, the
30. Studies of declining insured unemployment relative to total unemployment have noted other 
factors. These include a rise in the incidence of exhaustion of regular benefits as long-term unem 
ployment has worsened; changes in the demographic and industrial mix of the unemployed result 
ing in greater concentrations among those less likely to qualify for benefits; the treatment of 
unemployment insurance as taxable income since 1979 probably discouraging some filing for 
benefits; and the new restrictions on benefits payable to pensioners beginning in the 1980s. For 
further discussion, see Burtless (1983, pp. 225-249); Burtless and Saks (1984); and Corson and 
Nicholson (1988).
31. Rates are computed each week by dividing the number of insured unemployed for the week 
by the level of covered employment averaged over a period of four calendar quarters lagged from 
six to nine months before the week involved. An annual rate is also calculated for average state 
insured unemployment for a year taken as a percent of average employment covered by state pro 
grams during the same year.
32. Total unemployment rates are not truly comparable with insured rates, not only because of 
differences between the two measures of unemployment noted above, but also because the total 
rate is based on the total labor force (the employed plus the unemployed) while the insured rate is 
based on covered employment only.
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percentage increase in the IUR from 1974 to 1975 was 79 percent com 
pared with 52 percent for the TUR; from 1969 to 1970 the correspond 
ing increases were 62 and 40 percent; and from 1957 to 1958 they were 
81 and 58 percent. The increases in the 1954, 1961, and 1982 reces 
sions were not so different between the two rates.
It is noteworthy that the lURs for the years 1987 to 1990 were less 
than 2.5 percent. The only other period since 1947 when they were 
equally low was from 1966 to 1969. It may be conjectured that the low 
rates of the late 1980s may reflect the more restrictive tendencies in 
state unemployment insurance laws in recent times, especially as the 
TURs of the late 1980s exceeded 5.0 percent while those of the late 
1960s were 4.0 percent or less.
Since unemployment insurance is mostly operated on a state basis, 
it is important to know something about the geographic distribution of 
unemployment. lURs permit comparisons among states with regard to 
their insured unemployment which varies greatly in number because of 
state-size differences. The range of insured unemployment rates, how 
ever, is also quite wide among the states (see table 1.7). With a national 
rate of 4.7 in the recession year 1982, state lURs ranged from 2.0 in 
Texas and 2.3 in South Dakota to 7.4 in Oregon and 7.6 in Michigan 
Oeaving Puerto Rico aside, which is not typical because of its relative 
underdevelopment). In the comparatively low unemployment year of 
1989, insured unemployment dropped to a national rate of 2.1, but 
ranged from 0.9 in Virginia and 1.1 in South Dakota, Nebraska and 
Hawaii to 3.1 in Idaho and Rhode Island (again leaving aside Puerto 
Rico and also Alaska with its very high winter unemployment).
In short, insured unemployment rates can be several times as high 
in some states as in others. This diversity is due partly to differences 
among state unemployment insurance laws, particularly with respect to 
provisions that affect the duration of benefits and qualifying require 
ments. It is mainly due, however, to interstate differences in economic 
characteristics and economic conditions, differences that are also 
important factors for the financing of unemployment insurance bene 
fits.
As compared with all unemployed in recession year 1982, propor 
tionately more of the insured were male and less were under twenty-
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Table 1.7 Rate of Insured Unemployment by State, 1982 and 1989 
(Annual averages)
19821989~
United States ............................... 4.7 2.1
Alabama................................... 5.5 2.2
Alaska..................................... 6.2 4.4
Arizona.................................... 4.1 1.7
Arkansas................................... 5.7 2.9
California.................................. 5.3 2.5
Colorado................................... 2.9 1.6
Connecticut................................. 3.4 1.8
Delaware................................... 3.5 1.2
District of Columbia.......................... 3.9 1.7
Florida .................................... 2.5 1.1
Georgia.................................... 3.4 1.4
Hawaii .................................... 3.6 1.1
Idaho...................................... 7.3 3.1
Illinois..................................... 5.7 2.1
Indiana .................................... 5.0 1.2
Iowa...................................... 4.6 1.6
Kansas .................................... 4.1 2.0
Kentucky .................................. 6.0 2.1
Louisiana .................................. 4.5 2.5
Maine ..................................... 4.7 2.2
Maryland .................................. 4.3 1.5
Massachusetts............................... 3.9 2.8
Michigan................................... 7.6 2.9
Minnesota.................................. 4.2 1.9
Mississippi................................. 6.0 2.5
Missouri................................... 4.4 2.1
Montana................................... 5.3 2.7
Nebraska................................... 2.8 1.1
Nevada.................................... 4.8 1.6
New Hampshire............................. 2.8 1.1
New Jersey................................. 4.7 2.3
New Mexico................................ 3.8 2.1
New York.................................. 3.8 2.3
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Table 1.7 (continued) Rate of Insured Unemployment by State, 1982 
______and 1989_____________________________
19821989
North Carolina .............................. 4.7 1.4
North Dakota ............................... 3.6 2.0
Ohio...................................... 6.1 1.9
Oklahoma.................................. 2.9 1.6
Oregon .................................... 7.4 2.8
Pennsylvania................................ 6.8 2.6
Puerto Rico................................. 9.1 4.7
Rhode Island................................ 6.1 3.1
South Carolina .............................. 5.7 1.6
South Dakota ............................... 2.3 1.1
Tennessee.................................. 5.1 2.0
Texas ..................................... 2.0 1.6
Utah ...................................... 4.6 1.3
Vermont................................... 5.1 2.0
Virginia.................................... 2.6 0.9
Virgin Islands............................... 4.7 1.7
Washington................................. 6.8 3.0
West Virginia............................... 7.3 2.8
Wisconsin.................................. 5.9 2.2
Wyoming .................................. 3.7_______2.0
SOURCES: Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, 1938-1982 and annual supplements.
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Table 1.8 Selected Characteristics of the Insured Unemployed and of All 
Unemployed, 1982
Percentage distribution 
within each characteristic
Characteristic
Sex
Male
Female
Information not available
Age
Under 25 years
25 to 44 years
45 years and over
Information not available
Duration of current spell of unemployment
Less than 5 weeks
5 to 14 weeks
15 or more weeks
Industry of last employment1*
Construction
Manufacturing
Trade and services
Other industries
Gov't. workers, no prior work experience
Information not available
Insured 
unemployed8
64
33
2
17
52
26
4
33
43
24
17
34
20
16
0
13
All 
unemployed
58
42
 
41
43
16
 
36
31
33
10
26
33
10
21
 
SOURCES: Data for all unemployed based on Economic Report of the President, 1992 (tables 
B-31 and B-39); and E&E (1/83, tables 12 and 15). Percentages for the insured unemployed 
based on data supplied by the Unemployment Insurance Service, U.S. Department of Labor; the 
data represent weighted averages of percentage distributions in the mid-months of the four cal 
endar quarters of the year.
NOTE: Totals may not add to 100 percent due to founding, 
a. Under state unemployment insurance programs, 
b. For all unemployed, only wage and salary workers identified by industry.
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five years old (table 1.8). Larger proportions of the insured had worked 
in construction and manufacturing, and smaller proportions had been 
unemployed for more than fifteen weeks. The considerable numbers of 
new entrants and reentrants included in the all-unemployed total 
account for most of these differences since they are predominantly 
women and youths, many with little or no prior work experience.33
Concluding Observations
The flourishing economic climate during much of the half century 
following the establishment of the federal-state unemployment insur 
ance system contrasted sharply with that of the depressed 1930s when 
the system was formed. Strong employment growth and moderate 
unemployment, compared with depression levels, made the demands 
on the program much lighter than originally anticipated. Although 
cyclical recessions temporarily increased unemployment, recoveries 
usually proceeded well enough to avoid seriously prolonged national 
stagnation, at least until the 1970s. Unemployment insurance gradually 
extended its coverage of the workforce and the duration of benefit pro 
tection of the insured employed. Long-term unemployment, particu 
larly the very high levels common during recession periods, posed one 
of the foremost challenges for unemployment insurance. The response 
led to a major addition to the program's structure.
As the nation prospered in the decades following World War II and 
avoided sliding back into depression, numerous changes accumulated 
which altered much of the economic context in which unemployment 
insurance operated. Prominent among them were changes in the com 
position of the workforce, in the patterns of employment, in the indus 
trial make-up of the economy, and in its industrial geography. These 
and other related developments influenced the levels and character of 
employment and unemployment. In turn, the program was affected and 
under pressure to react appropriately.
33. Similar data for the insured unemployed in 1990 or the late 1980s are inadequate for com 
parison because information about these characteristics was not available for very significant pro 
portions of the insured unemployed.
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A different tone distinguished the character of the economy after 
the 1960s. Growth slowed, faltered, and at times, stalled. Recessions 
marked the early and mid-1970s and early 1980s. Recoveries between 
recessions were weak. The resulting heavy unemployment fallout in 
these years placed severe strains on unemployment insurance and pro 
duced a financial crisis for the system. The ensuing pressures on the 
program to adjust were substantial. It is not yet time to gauge the full 
consequences for unemployment insurance of these circumstances or 
of the adjustments that have been made thus far, but it is clear that the 
program has become more restrictive.
Economic recovery and expansion in the 1980s persisted longer 
than usual. Employment grew steadily and the unemployment rate 
declined to pre-1980 levels. A sense of unease, however, lingered 
about the future. Concerns have continued with the eventual impact of 
many successive years of huge federal budget deficits, of unending 
trade deficits, and of heavy corporate and consumer debt. The unem 
ployment insurance system was generally solvent as of early 1990, but 
how long it can remain so given a substantial and widespread rise in 
unemployment is a troubling question. Also troubling is the large gap 
between total and insured unemployment and the doubt it casts on 
whether the approximately two-thirds of the unemployed in recent 
years who have not received benefits are appropriately excluded, or 
whether they include many barred from benefits because the program 
has grown overly restrictive. 34
Economic developments, although significant, are not the only fac 
tors that influence unemployment insurance. This book considers how 
the program evolved in response to these various factors and to the 
controversies that emerged in the process. Unemployment insurance 
operates in a dynamic setting; change is constant, a phrase that seems 
to be an oxymoron. The program must adapt and adjust in order to con 
tinue relevant, viable, and faithful to its purposes.
34. Recession conditions reappeared in the early 1990s. Although by many measures, this reces 
sion did not seem as serious as that of the early 1980s, a persistent underlying public perception of 
fundamental weaknesses in the economy has served to undermine the confidence required for a 
good recovery and restored economic vigor.

The Broad Objectives 
of Unemployment Insurance
Unemployment insurance serves a number of purposes. Its primary 
objective is to alleviate the hardships that result from the loss of wage 
income during unemployment. Other objectives are also significant. 
They have been a source of controversy, however.
More than ten years after the passage of the Social Security Act, a 
congressionally sponsored review of its various programs stated, with 
respect to unemployment insurance, that "there is still some disagree 
ment as to its primary purpose and as to its basic principles. It is gener 
ally conceived of as a multi-purpose program, although different 
groups emphasize different aspects of it" (U.S. Congress, House, 1946, 
p. 368). Views about the program's objectives continued to differ and 
evolve in succeeding decades. The more broadly they were stated, the 
wider the agreement about them tended to be. More elaboration or 
specificity on particular purposes usually evoked greater disagreement.
This chapter reviews the basic objectives advanced during the early 
efforts to establish unemployment insurance in the United States. It 
also notes a few later statements of purposes for the ongoing program. 
Each of the broad objectives generally indicated for unemployment 
insurance is then considered and, to some extent, explored for its sig 
nificance. It should be noted that these discussions do not cover the 
purposes of specific elements of the program, such as those of the qual 
ifying requirement, the maximum benefit amount, and the taxable 
wage base. Those are treated in subsequent chapters concerned with 
different elements of the program.
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Early Expression of Objectives
The strong focus of social insurance generally on relieving hardship 
and forestalling poverty was stated long ago by Dr. I. M. Rubinow, a 
physician, actuary, and one of the earliest and foremost proponents of 
social insurance in this country. In his study of the subject, after dis 
cussing different social insurance programs for dealing with contin 
gencies involving interruption or termination of worker earnings, 
Rubinow noted that "the purpose of every one of the measures 
described is to give relief in the case of human destitution." He con 
trasted this with the purpose of public poor relief which is "to grant the 
necessary minimum for a physiological existence, and that only." Fur 
ther, "the ideal purpose of social insurance, the purpose to which the 
best insurance systems tend,...is to prevent and finally eradicate pov 
erty, and the subsequent need of relief, by meeting the problem at the 
origin, rather than waiting until the effects of destitution have begun to 
be felt" (Rubinow 1913, pp. 480-81). This purpose was the predomi 
nant objective of the British and other European unemployment insur 
ance programs adopted before 1935, as it was for some of the early 
efforts to enact state unemployment insurance laws in this country.
A competing point of view emerged in the United States, however, 
articulated forcefully by Professor John R. Commons of the University 
of Wisconsin. Commons saw, as the primary purpose of a program to 
compensate workers for joblessness the prevention of unemployment 
in the first place. His idea was to hold employers responsible for the 
involuntary unemployment of their employees. A comparable concep 
tion had been established as the basis for workers' compensation, 
which Commons had administered in Wisconsin. He was a leading 
advocate of employer initiatives in reducing labor turnover and irregu 
lar employment, seen widely in the early 1920s and prior years as a 
major source of unemployment. He wrote that "neither the wage earner 
nor the state can prevent unemployment. All that they can do is partly 
to relieve it. ...But the business-like way of doing it is to place the 
responsibility on the businessman who alone is in a position to prevent 
it" (Commons 1922, p. 21). He regarded the European unemployment 
insurance plans as paternalistic. If full responsibility and all the costs 
of compensation were placed on individual employers, they would be
The Broad Objectives of Unemployment Insurance 45
motivated to avoid layoffs and "regularize" employment, just as work 
ers' compensation worked to prevent accidents and promote industrial 
safety. His views were embodied in legislative proposals in Wisconsin 
and elsewhere and had strong influence on the development of the 
unemployment insurance system that was eventually adopted for the 
United States.
Besides alleviation of hardship and prevention of unemployment, 
other objectives were advanced for unemployment insurance. One was 
to eliminate for unemployed workers the social stigma and humiliation 
of needs-tested relief by substituting the "earned rights" basis of insur 
ance. By associating unemployment insurance with public employ 
ment offices and requiring recipients to register and accept suitable 
work offers, the program was seen as serving the objective of reem- 
ployment. Its role in limiting economic decline through the mainte 
nance of purchasing power was another aim stressed by some 
proponents. The significance of all of these objectives was contested in 
the debate about unemployment insurance that intensified as the 
depression deepened in the early 1930s. Most of all, however, the 
objectives of alleviation and prevention vied for primacy since each 
carried different implications for the design of unemployment insur 
ance, especially of its financing.
Much of the debate of the period was over the relative importance 
to be assigned to these objectives. Those stressing prevention included 
students of Commons Elizabeth Brandeis, Harold Groves, Paul A. 
Raushenbush and others of the so-called Wisconsin school of 
thought. 1 A model unemployment insurance bill advanced by the 
American Labor Legislation Association emphasized prevention by 
establishing individual employer reserves to finance compensation, as 
Commons had proposed in Wisconsin, rather than a pooling of funds. 
The enactment of the first law in Wisconsin in 1932 gave great weight 
to this approach. The opposing viewpoint, which stressed alleviation, 
urged pooled funds as a means of broader financing to assure adequate 
benefits. The principal advocates of this position included Professor
1. All were members of the economics faculty at the University of Wisconsin and helped draft 
the bill that became the first state unemployment compensation law in the nation. Groves, also a 
member of the legislature, introduced the bill. Raushenbush became the Executive Director of the 
Wisconsin program.
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William Leiserson of Antioch College and Dr. Rubinow, who were 
mainly responsible for the Report of the Ohio Commission on Unem 
ployment Insurance in 1931-32. That report provided specific and 
strongly reasoned proposals along with impressive research support 
and cost estimates. Others who generally supported the so-called Ohio 
school of thought included Professor Paul Douglas of the University of 
Chicago and Abraham Epstein. 2 The Ohio report also carried great 
weight
In transmitting to Congress the recommendations of his Committee 
on Economic Security, which led eventually to the Social Security Act 
of 1935, President Roosevelt reiterated his frequently expressed sup 
port of the prevention objective: "An unemployment compensation 
system should be constructed in such a way as to afford every practica 
ble aid and incentive toward the larger purpose of employment stabili 
zation."3
While the Social Security Act contained no statement of purposes 
or objectives of unemployment insurance, the first state unemployment 
insurance laws generally included a "declaration of policy" that usu 
ally used or adapted the following language suggested by the U.S. 
Social Security Board in 1936, which reflected the various purposes 
seen for unemployment insurance:
Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to 
the health, morals and welfare of the people of this state. Involun 
tary unemployment is therefore a subject of general interest and 
concern which requires appropriate action by the legislature to 
prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which now so often 
falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his 
family. The achievement of social security requires protection 
against this greatest hazard of our economic life. This can be pro 
vided by encouraging employers to provide more stable employ 
ment and by the systematic accumulation of funds during periods 
of employment to provide benefits for periods of unemployment, 
thus maintaining purchasing power and limiting the serious social 
consequences of poor relief assistance (Social Security Board 
1936, p. 1).
2. Epstein was the Executive Secretary of the Fraternal Order of Eagles and a strong proponent 
of old-age pensions and of the pooled-fund principle in unemployment insurance.
3. As cited in Witte (1962, p. 128).
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Later Renditions of Objectives
In the early 1950s, various efforts were made to formulate broad 
statements of unemployment insurance purposes.4 The statements pro 
duced were not always in close agreement.
Several broad purposes of unemployment insurance were suc 
cinctly set forth in a statement issued by the United States Department 
of Labor in 1955:
Unemployment insurance is a program established under Fed 
eral and State law for income maintenance during periods of 
involuntary unemployment due to lack of work, which provides 
partial compensation for wage loss as a matter of right, with dig 
nity and dispatch, to eligible individuals. It helps to maintain pur 
chasing power and to stabilize the economy. It helps to prevent the 
dispersal of the employers' trained work force, the sacrifice of 
skills, and the breakdown of labor standards during temporary 
unemployment (USDOL, Bureau of Employment Security 1955).
The 1955 statement was the last official federal expression of the 
program's overall objectives.
A restatement of program purposes was developed in 1968-1969 by 
a group of authorities in unemployment insurance and related fields. 
They distinguished between primary objectives, which are designed 
for "assisting the individual unemployed worker," and secondary 
objectives, which aim at "promoting economic efficiency and stabil 
ity." The primary objectives included: assuring adequate cash compen 
sation of wage-loss to help sustain, "to a substantial degree," the 
unemployed worker's current living standard; allowing the worker 
"the time needed to locate or regain employment that takes full advan 
tage of his skills and experience"; and, through coordinated employ 
ment services, helping the worker find a job and, if necessary, achieve 
vocational readjustment. Secondary objectives included: fuller and bet 
ter use of the labor supply, by facilitating rapid and suitable reemploy- 
ment; support of consumer purchasing power in the face of wage
4. These included, for example, work of a Joint Legislative Committee on Unemployment 
Insurance in New York, work of the Committee on Employment Security Objectives of the Inter 
state Conference of Employment Security Agencies, and a statement of the National Association 
of Manufacturers (see "Unemployment Compensation in a Free Economy," July 1952).
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income declines in economic recessions; distribution of the social costs 
of unemployment among employers in some relation to their layoff 
experience "to improve resource allocation"; motivation of more stable 
use of labor by employers; and retention by employers of their skilled 
and experienced workers during short periods of reduced operations.5
The National Commission on Unemployment Compensation of 
1978-80 provided no statement of broad program purposes. In his 
introduction to the Commission's Final Report, Chairman Wilbur J. 
Cohen wrote: "It is significant that employer, employee, and public 
representatives on the Commission endorse the principle that a public 
system of insurance against the hazards of unemployment is a logical 
and necessary institution in a free-enterprise economy. The contro 
versy now shifts to the pros and cons of specific proposals" (National 
Commission on Unemployment Compensation 1980, p. x). The phrase 
"insurance against the hazards of unemployment," while not a state 
ment of purpose, may in effect cover several of the various objectives 
advanced over the years, especially in their broadest terms. In turn, 
"controversy over specific proposals" may include disagreement about 
some objectives with respect to their contemporary significance or the 
means for their achievement.
The objectives of unemployment insurance are next considered 
under three main headings: alleviation of hardship, prevention of 
unemployment, and promotion of reemployment. The program can be 
said to serve all three types of goals. A few other objectives are also 
noted.
Alleviation of Hardship
Although motivating employers to avoid layoffs was pressed early 
as a primary purpose for unemployment insurance, it seems fair to say 
that relieving or forestalling financial hardship for the unemployed 
worker by partial replacement of wage loss is the central aim of the 
program. Unemployment insurance can and does serve other valuable
5. Committee on Unemployment Insurance Objectives (1969, pp. 2-3). The Committee was 
chaired by Professor William Haber and included Saul J. Blaustein and Merrill G. Murray.
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ends; if alleviation of hardship were not the focal objective, however, it 
is difficult to imagine the program's existence based wholly on other 
purposes. It is, of course, possible to approach the hardship problems 
of the unemployed through a relief program based on a test of individ 
ual need or low income rather than through unemployment insurance. 
Negative aspects of relief emerged clearly in the early 1930s, however, 
providing strong impetus for the insurance approach.
Relief Problems During the Great Depression
Unemployment insurance was enacted in the 1930s after five years 
of bitter experience with the difficulties and inadequacies of relief as a 
means of easing the hardships of unemployment. It is difficult for any 
one who did not live through the period to appreciate how unprepared 
the nation was for the large-scale unemployment of the time and how 
much the unemployed suffered as a result.
There was little or no public provision for the unemployed at the 
beginning of the depression. Unemployment relief was left normally to 
charity. Through communitywide campaigns, various organizations 
made efforts to raise additional private relief funds. In most places, 
local public relief was poorly organized and pitifully inadequate. It was 
often offered in the form of soup kitchens or, at best, in the form of 
food parcels which the unemployed had to seek and carry home in the 
full view of their neighbors. The following description of one type of 
relief administration is taken from the report of an investigation pub 
lished in 1931 in Wisconsin:
One of the most deplorable situations was found in one of our 
medium-sized cities where each applicant for relief was com 
pelled to appear before the monthly meeting of the poor commit 
tee composed of the mayor and aldermen and be cross-examined 
by these 8 or 9 city officials. This winter when so many were 
needing help, the meeting sometimes lasted until 2 or 3 o'clock in 
the morning. One can imagine how much sympathetic consider 
ation an applicant, after waiting for 8 hours to be heard, would get 
at 2:30 a.m. (Lescohier and Peterson 1931, p. 35).
After graphically relating his experience as Mayor of Youngstown, 
Ohio in struggling with the problem of providing relief for the unem-
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ployed in 1930-31, Joseph L. Heffernan gave this description of what 
happens to the unemployed who must go on relief:
With quiet desperation they will bear hunger and mental anguish 
until every resource is exhausted. Then comes the ultimate strug 
gle with heartache and an overwhelming sense of disgrace, they 
have to make the shame-faced journey to the door of public char 
ity. This is the last straw. Their self-respect is destroyed; they 
undergo an insidious metamorphosis, and sink down to spiritless 
despondency.
This descent from respectability, frequent enough in the best of 
times, has been hastened immeasurably by 2 years of business 
paralysis, and the people who have been affected in this manner 
must be numbered in millions. This is what we have accomplished 
with our breadlines and soup kitchens. I know, because I have 
seen thousands of these defeated, discouraged, hopeless men and 
women, cringing and fawning as they come to ask for public aid 
(Heffernan 1932).
As unemployment increased, the traditional methods of providing 
unemployment relief through private charities and local public poor 
relief became more and more inadequate. The exhaustion of resources 
for relief in cities that faced bankruptcy because of local tax delinquen 
cies gradually led the state governments to take over the responsibility, 
often through the appointment of state emergency relief commissions. 
In turn, state resources also became overstrained or exhausted and the 
federal government had to take over the burden, first through loans to 
the states from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and then 
through the direct financing of relief by the Federal Emergency Relief 
Administration.
As the state and the federal governments assumed the major respon 
sibility for financing unemployment relief, the methods of administra 
tion and the kind of relief provided gradually improved during the 
1930s. Staffs were trained and relief was granted under less humiliat 
ing circumstances. Cash relief became the rule, and public work pro 
grams were developed for the unemployed.
Unemployment Insurance as a Preferred Alternative
Although it had been proposed for a generation and tried out on a 
limited scale by some unions and employers, unemployment insurance
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was not seriously considered in this country until the inadequacies of 
relief as a means of providing for the unemployed became widely 
apparent in the 1930s. The superiority of unemployment insurance 
over relief was stated eloquently in 1931 as follows:
The alternatives before us, then, are reliance on the hastily 
devised machinery for the distribution of doles during the time of 
crisis, or systematic provision for unemployment compensation 
out of reserves set aside for this purpose in advance... .Our 
present method reduces a multitude into breadlines and soup 
kitchens, and reduces to starvation those self-respecting and timid 
workingmen who prefer hunger and cold to the ministrations of 
eleemosynary agencies. The second alternative, wisely conceived 
and expertly managed, represents...a decent and far-sighted 
approach to the problem of protecting the standards of living of 
American employees which are our proud boast (Wolman 1931).
One of the values of unemployment insurance, as compared with 
public relief, is that it not only prevents destitution but enables those 
drawing unemployment compensation to maintain their self-respect. 
The basic difference between the two methods is that relief is granted 
only on the basis of proven need, whereas unemployment insurance is 
made available without regard to the applicant's need. It is provided if 
the claimant has worked for a substantial period in employment cov 
ered by unemployment insurance and is able and available for work. 
The unemployed worker does not have to wait until savings and 
resources are exhausted in order to be eligible for it. Instead, unem 
ployment insurance is designed to prevent poverty by immediately 
providing a cash payment to help the worker sustain some of the finan 
cial objectives normally supported by the lost wage income.
Although unemployment insurance in this country has many short 
comings, the program is accepted as the best method of alleviating the 
strains and stresses of unemployment, short of reemployment. There 
may be a widespread feeling that many recipients of unemployment 
insurance are not genuinely unemployed and available for work, but 
few would abolish the system. It is generally recognized that some 
unemployment is unavoidable in a dynamic and free industrial society 
and that most workers do not have adequate resources to tide them 
selves over temporary spells of unemployment without some hardship.
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The Reemergence of the Insurance-Relief Issue
Unemployment insurance triumphed as the preferred means for alle 
viating unemployment. At the outset, with its limited duration of bene 
fits and restricted coverage, the new program was not intended to be 
responsive to the mass, long-term unemployment of the period. Most 
of the unemployed then in need of income were expected to find it 
through public work programs, such as those sponsored and funded by 
the Works Progress Administration. Need remained the main criterion 
of eligibility for public work relief, but the labor expended in exchange 
for the cash received made the latter earned income and thereby helped 
to reduce the indignity associated with relief; it yielded, as well, some 
useful productive results. Cash relief that remained was reorganized 
and expanded under a new federal-state welfare system for needy per 
sons who were not able to work the aged, the blind, the disabled, and 
dependent children in fatherless families. Only in some states or local 
jurisdictions was meager general assistance made available for some 
needy employable persons.
Public work relief programs disappeared in the early 1940s as war 
manpower needs essentially eliminated unemployment. In time, unem 
ployment insurance expanded its coverage and benefit duration so that 
it insured most of the unemployment of experienced workers. Many of 
the insured unemployed, however, exhaust their benefits and continue 
jobless, especially during recession periods. The later temporary exten 
sions of unemployment insurance for longer and longer periods, espe 
cially during recession, have raised again the issue of whether 
insurance or welfare is the appropriate method of alleviation, this time 
in the case of long-term unemployment.
The issue's revival has been helped along by the improvements 
made in welfare over the years. Compared with the gross inadequacies 
and painful, often chaotic treatment of applicants that characterized 
relief in the 1930s, the present welfare system, even with its serious 
shortcomings, offers a stark contrast. Among the improvements are 
higher levels of cash assistance and the addition of in-kind assistance, 
such as food stamps, Medicaid, and housing subsidies, although there 
was some slippage in the adequacy of assistance levels during the 
1980s. Needy families with unemployed fathers not eligible for or no 
longer receiving unemployment insurance benefits who were previ-
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ously excluded from Aid to Families with Dependent Children may 
now receive such support as long as the unemployed father is available 
for and seeking work. The means or income tests that applicants must 
pass to qualify for welfare are not so restrictive as they were much ear 
lier. Nor are the methods used to investigate the applicant's eligibility 
as harsh and demeaning. Administration of welfare is more systematic 
and professional. Going on welfare still is not an agreeable prospect, 
but it is a far cry from the fearful agonies of relief during the Great 
Depression. The latter image no longer inhibits as much as it once did 
the contemplation by some policymakers of treating the needs of the 
long-term unemployed through welfare rather than social insurance.
A new generation has grown up with no recollection or direct 
knowledge of the painful stigma that attached to relief for the millions 
unable to find work during the Great Depression. To many in this new 
generation, the value of the insurance approach over welfare is not so 
clear. A national survey conducted in early 1980 found that 59 percent 
of all respondents regarded unemployment compensation as "earned 
insurance," while 32 percent saw it as "part of our welfare system." 
Younger respondents were somewhat more likely to view it as welfare, 
as were respondents from households which had not experienced 
unemployment (Curtin and Pouza 1980, pp. 766-67).
Need for Support Among the Unemployed
During the Great Depression, with its massive and prolonged unem 
ployment and so many eventually having to seek public relief, there 
was no question that most of the unemployed could not live on their 
own resources. By contrast, unemployment has been far less massive 
or prolonged in later decades. Most workers today have steadier 
employment and earn significantly higher real wages than did their 
counterparts of fifty to sixty years earlier. Moreover, the multiearner 
household has become more common than the previously typical sin 
gle-earner family. Given these favorable conditions, some people 
believe that workers generally should be able to accumulate sufficient 
savings to tide them over relatively limited periods of unemployment. 
Others hold that large numbers of the unemployed do not need unem 
ployment compensation because someone else in the family is work 
ing, especially if it is the spouse of the unemployed worker.
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In recent times, the worker and his or her family have been subject 
to heavy pressures to spend, not to save. With high-powered advertis 
ing backed by the encouragement of "easy" credit installment buying, 
making regular payments to reduce substantial debt incurred to pur 
chase homes, furniture, automobiles, or other durable goods has 
become a way of life for the typical worker family. Some workers do 
manage to save while employed, even as they incur and pay off debt. A 
long-range goal is often the motivation for saving a down payment 
on a house, college education for children, additional funds for retire 
ment.
When unemployment interrupts the normal flow of a household's 
wage income, financial problems can arise quickly. How quickly and 
how serious they become depends on a number of factors. Studies of 
insured unemployed workers conducted between the mid-1950s and 
mid-1970s show a range of wage-loss impacts, but all indicate some 
degree of spending cutback by most surveyed households even with 
the use of accumulated savings and the support provided by unemploy 
ment insurance. At this point, only a few findings from two of the stud 
ies are cited to give some idea of the need for income support by 
unemployed workers generally.
A study in New York in 1972-74 of unemployment insurance recip 
ients unemployed for eight weeks or more showed that about 35 per 
cent withdrew savings during their unemployment. Yet, 90 percent 
reduced spending and about 27 percent postponed payment of bills for 
goods and services previously obtained (Entes 1977, pp. 8-9). A 1975- 
76 study in Arizona showed that two-thirds of unemployment insur 
ance recipients unemployed for thirteen weeks had reduced their 
spending on "necessary and obligated expenses" from preunemploy- 
ment levels, most of them by at least 20 percent. About 62 percent had 
some savings when job loss occurred and 76 percent of this group drew 
on their savings during unemployment (Burgess and Kingston 1978, 
pp. 20-21 and 33). Even with unemployment insurance and savings to 
draw from, retrenchment was still the rule, to say nothing about for 
gone or postponed savings goals. Without unemployment insurance, 
retrenchment would have been deeper and financial difficulties more 
widespread.
Except those from multiearner households, relatively few insured 
unemployed workers have much income from sources other than
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unemployment insurance. A large proportion of benefit recipients are 
sole earners in their households, including one-person households. The 
1972-74 New York study found that half of all beneficiaries surveyed 
had no other earners in their households 57 percent of the men and 
40 percent of the women. Among married beneficiaries, only 35 per 
cent of the men had an employed spouse compared with 80 percent of 
the married women (Entes 1977, p. 82). The 1975-76 Arizona study 
found that two-thirds of the beneficiaries surveyed were the sole earn 
ers of their households about 75 percent of the men and 55 percent of 
the women (Burgess and Kingston 1978, p. 25).
Questions are frequently raised as to whether working wives need 
benefits when they become unemployed if their husbands are working. 
When employed, the average working wife contributes significantly to 
family income. Half of all wives employed full time in 1987 accounted 
for about 40 percent or more of total family income. 6 Most employed 
wives usually do work full time, especially those who can qualify for 
unemployment insurance when unemployed. Loss of a wife's wage 
earnings because of unemployment often translates into financial strin 
gency for the family even though the husband continues working. In 
1990, for example, weekly wage and salary earnings were down to 
$443 or less for half of all husband-wife families in which the wife was 
unemployed and only the husband was working (E&E 1/91, table 53). 
Unemployment insurance benefits received by unemployed wives thus 
do help make up for a critical loss of income in many families.
To emphasize the role of unemployment insurance in alleviating the 
hardship that can result from the loss of income during unemployment, 
one might consider the potential effects of the absence of unemploy 
ment insurance. Few insured unemployed workers can qualify for wel 
fare at the start of their unemployment. Without unemployment 
insurance, many probably could get by for a while on savings, on other 
household earnings, by postponing debt payments, by cutbacks on 
spending, or by incurring new debt. Even with unemployment insur 
ance, past studies have shown that most benefit recipients resort to one 
or more of these other sources of support or adjustments; only part of 
the wage loss is compensated, but the net loss is limited and therefore
6. Unpublished data on marital and family characteristics supplied by the Bureau of Labor Sta 
tistics' Current Population Survey taken in March 1988.
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more manageable. Some unemployed workers have few, if any, of 
these alternatives to fall back on except for reduced spending. As 
unemployment continues without compensation for several weeks or 
for a couple of months or so, more and more of them become finan 
cially squeezed, encountering strain and hardship. Those managing to 
stay afloat may nevertheless see serious damage done to the level of 
living their earnings went to support, including the loss of cars or other 
assets not fully paid for, and the surrender of long-term plans.
Not until the unemployed are financially drained would those with 
dependent children be potential candidates for welfare under existing 
rules. Without unemployment insurance, the sense and reality of eco 
nomic insecurity would likely spread among the experienced work 
force as the harsh effects of unemployment became manifest. Although 
the trauma of the Great Depression is no longer a personal memory of 
pain and anguish for most Americans, it remains a deep scar on the 
national psyche. It is doubtful, therefore, that the nation would aban 
don unemployment insurance and risk exposing workers to the threat 
of financial ruin and hardship because of a period of involuntary unem 
ployment.
Prevention of Unemployment
Two objectives served by unemployment insurance are considered 
under this heading. One concerns the program's motivation of employ 
ers to avoid layoffs of their employees in the first place through the 
design for financing of unemployment benefits. The other relates to the 
program's role in sustaining consumer purchasing power through its 
compensation of the wage loss suffered by workers laid off during 
business downturns, thereby helping to retard or halt further worsening 
of business and unemployment.
Employer Incentive to Stabilize Employment
By emphasizing employer financing of unemployment insurance 
and by applying experience rating principles for lowering unemploy 
ment tax rates, employers are expected to be motivated to "regularize" 
their employment of labor and to minimize layoffs. This objective,
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urged quite frequently at the beginning of the program, was not men 
tioned as much after the first few decades.
Considerable effort was put into promoting the idea of stabilization 
of employment through experience rating of unemployment insurance 
taxes. Whether or not the attraction of reduced tax rates actually 
induces employers to avoid layoffs is very difficult to determine empir 
ically, given the complexity of reasons for variations in a firm's 
employment level. Three interview studies, two made early in Wiscon 
sin (1937-38) and Indiana (1941-42), and one in Connecticut (1968), 
sought to elicit from employers the degree to which they were influ 
enced by the experience rating incentive. The study findings were gen 
erally similar: about one-fourth of employers indicated an appreciable 
degree of influence, a minority of the remainder, only a slight degree, 
and the majority indicated no effect at all. After reviewing the findings 
and emphasizing their similarity among the studies but also the uncer 
tainties of such results, Joseph M. Decker, a leading authority on expe 
rience rating, observed:
The general result of the three studies...provides the basis for a 
cautious acceptance of the proposition that while it would be false 
to assign major (incentive) influence to the unemployment insur 
ance tax, it would be equally erroneous to write off the effect as 
insignificant" (Decker 1972a, p. 37).
In Wisconsin, it appeared that the initial impact of unemployment 
insurance taxes soon wore off, and experience rating did not induce 
much additional employment stabilization (Meyers 1945, pp. 337-54).
A major reason for the lessened impact of experience rating on sta 
bilization over the years is that the effective differentials in tax rates 
assigned through experience rating have become so diminished as to 
lose the force of their inducement to employers to stabilize. Significant 
proportions of benefits paid are not charged to individual employers or 
exceed what some employers' taxes can finance and therefore are 
pooled and shared equally among all employers. Relatively high mini 
mum and low maximum tax rates may appreciably restrict the range 
for assigning rates in between on the basis of experience, so as to make 
rate differences less effective in motivating employers. The long-term 
failure of the taxable wage base to keep pace with rising wage levels 
has shrunk the proportion of payrolls subject to the tax rates, further
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compressing the range of rates when viewed on the basis of total pay 
rolls. These are program elements that can be changed to reverse the 
erosion of the employment stabilization incentive effect of experience 
rated taxes.7 Economic factors, however, are not so controllable, and 
thereby limit the ability of many, perhaps most, employers to avoid 
layoffs even if a lower unemployment tax rate is highly desired. It 
should be noted that other arguments are advanced in support of expe 
rience rating in addition to motivating employers to avoid layoffs.
Stabilization of the Economy
Another preventive aim of unemployment insurance is to help mini 
mize the spread and depth of recessions through the maintenance of 
purchasing power. This objective has been emphasized over the years. 
It was included in early statements of the purposes of unemployment 
insurance. The Bureau of Employment Security elaborated on this 
objective in 1950 as follows: "By maintaining essential consumer pur 
chasing power, on which production plans are based, the program pro 
vides a brake on down-turns in business activity, helps to stabilize 
employment, and lessens the momentum of deflation during periods of 
recession" (USDOL, Bureau of Employment Security 1950b, p. 1).
This objective of unemployment insurance was referred to in both 
the majority and minority versions of the "Report of the Senate Special 
Committee on Unemployment Problems" in 1960. The majority report 
stated that "the payment of unemployment benefits has the secondary 
effect of maintaining purchasing power and cushioning the shock of 
unemployment to the community and to the national economy" (U.S. 
Congress, Senate, 1960, p. 87).
The minority report of the Committee made an even stronger state 
ment: "In regard to cyclical unemployment, unemployment compensa 
tion payments have constituted an important antirecessionary measure 
available to the Federal government...of all the countermeasures the 
so-called built-in stabilizers which have served to sustain buying
7. After analyzing the results of a study of the effects of state unemployment insurance taxes on 
layoffs by individual employers in the mid-1970s, Robert Topel (1984) concluded that despite 
experience rating, the typically rated employer paid directly for only about 75 percent of the costs 
of the benefits drawn by workers laid off by that employer, and that even a modest reduction in the 
degree of subsidization of those costs by other employers would substantially improve the 
employment stabilization effect of unemployment insurance taxes.
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power and cushion recessions, this is the most important single mea 
sure" (U.S. Congress, Senate, 1960, pp. 165-66).
On a number of occasions, the President's Council of Economic 
Advisers has also cited the countercyclical role of unemployment 
insurance as an important factor in economic stabilization. In its 1965 
annual report, for example, after offering some quantitative measure of 
the countercyclical effects of increased unemployment benefit outlays 
during the 1960-61 recession, the Council concluded:
Strengthening the unemployment compensation system deserves 
high priority among possible steps to increase the automatic resis 
tance of the economy to recessions. The most important reasons 
for improving the system are to increase individual security and 
reduce the unnecessary human costs of unemployment. But a 
strengthened system would also sustain consumer purchasing 
power more effectively, thereby reducing the amount of unem 
ployment as well (Economic Report of the President Together 
with the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers 
1965, pp. 101-02.).
The 1969 report of the Upjohn Institute's Committee on Unemploy 
ment Insurance Objectives, in referring to the program's capacity to 
"counter deflationary effects of unemployment on national and local 
economies," pointed out:
Moreover, increased benefits are dispensed at just the right time, 
in just the right places, and among those who tend to need them 
the most. This happens quickly and automatically, and the process 
is precisely reversible at all the appropriate times and places. 
These effects take place as needed whether locally or nationally. 
They are seen most dramatically at times of national recessions, 
but they are also important in local downturns and, in fact, help in 
those circumstances to prevent local slumps from spreading 
(Committee on Unemployment Insurance Objectives 1969, p. 20).
After a review of a number of studies made between 1962 and 1976 
to quantify the countercyclical effects of unemployment insurance, 
Professor Daniel S. Hamermesh of Michigan State University con 
cluded that the postwar recessions would have been about 10 to 20 per 
cent worse without the program. He further concludes that 
"unemployment benefits...must be paid automatically if we are to
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avoid substantially greater hardships during the recessions of the kind 
that have prevailed since the 1940s" (Hamermesh 1977, pp. 62-64).
A study made to estimate the impact of unemployment insurance on 
a local economy during the 1975-76 recession revealed a number of 
specific effects. The study employed an econometric model of the 1\ic- 
son, Arizona metropolitan area economy to simulate effects on such 
key variables as employment, unemployment, income, and sales. The 
analysis indicated that without the benefits paid in the area, unemploy 
ment levels would have been 5 to 10 percent higher than they were in 
1975-76. Each dollar of benefits paid in 1975 was estimated to have 
generated about $3 in disposable personal income over the two-year 
period. Alternative estimates of sales induced by the added income var 
ied widely, but the bulk of them concentrated in the construction, trade, 
and service sectors as did the additional employment produced. The 
study report describes certain methodological limitations that tend to 
restrict the impact results.8 This study was subsequently extended to 
estimate similar effects for the Phoenix, Arizona area during the same 
recession period. Moreover, the model was expanded to measure the 
effects in the two local economies of total unemployment benefits paid 
throughout the nation, in addition to the effects of those paid locally. 
The result was a larger impact than that produced by local benefits 
alone. Phoenix, with a broader and more cyclically sensitive manufac 
turing base than 1\icson, exhibited a stronger impact. Overall, how 
ever, both areas showed modest benefit-induced gains in employment 
and income and reductions in unemployment (Oaxaca and Taylor 
1986).
The extent to which unemployment insurance can help stabilize the 
economy by maintaining purchasing power during recessions is lim 
ited. Nevertheless, it is not insignificant and, therefore, economic stabi 
lization can legitimately be considered as one of the objectives of 
unemployment insurance.
8. Danzau, Oaxaca, and Taylor (1979). The study did not include extended and other federally 
financed unemployment benefits paid in the area.
The Broad Objectives of Unemployment Insurance 61
The Reemployment Objective
Return to work is the foremost concern of the unemployed worker. 
By itself, of course, the payment of a weekly benefit does not bring 
about speedy reemployment. Indeed, it may tend to delay return to 
work if the recipient's preference for leisure is at least temporarily 
strong and not overcome by the attraction of the potentially larger 
income from wages and other attributes of a job. The staying power 
provided by unemployment insurance, on the other hand, does enable 
the job seeker to search longer for a suitable job that is in line with pre 
vious earnings and experience. In this way, the program helps workers 
preserve the use of their skills through a reasonable period of job 
search.
The unemployment insurance program contributes to the reemploy 
ment objective in two ways. One is to keep down the disincentive to 
work, the preference for leisure, by placing limits on the weekly 
amount and duration of unemployment benefits paid. Only a portion, 
usually about half of the weekly wage loss, is compensated, and less if 
the maximum is paid. Some financial pressure thus remains on the 
recipient to regain employment and full wage income. The pressure 
builds up over time as the uncompensated wage loss accumulates, forc 
ing more difficult adjustment; the prospect becomes especially acute as 
the benefit duration limit nears, usually at twenty-six weeks. The ques 
tion of how restrictive these limits should be is balanced against the 
question of how adequate benefits should be to enable the program to 
achieve its other objectives.
The other way the program contributes to reemployment consists of 
its job search and availability-for-work requirements and the way they 
are administered. Eligibility for benefits requires unemployment insur 
ance claimants to be available for work and reasonably active in 
searching for work. Most states specify a minimum amount of work 
search activity by the claimant. The program's association with the 
public employment service, at which most of the insured unemployed 
must register for work, the degree of care and effort taken in diagnos 
ing the unemployed worker's employment prospects and needs, and 
the quality of counseling and job search assistance supplied and the 
extent and intensity of independent job search urged are all important
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factors that can be drawn together in the administration of unemploy 
ment insurance. Properly organized and applied, they can be brought to 
bear positively on the reemployment objective. The claimant's failure 
to cooperate with these efforts, as well as failure to register and be 
available for work are grounds for denial of benefits.
Unemployment insurance's positive role in pursuing the reemploy 
ment goal has received inadequate emphasis in the past. The program 
has tended to concentrate instead on negative considerations tests of 
eligibility and detection of malingering. A few efforts have been made 
to address the positive side. These include, for example, the required 
continued payment of benefits to the unemployed while in approved 
training, and more insistence on independent job search. The former, 
however, has had little impact because of limited promotion and 
opportunity for training. The latter has generally taken the form of 
arbitrary uniform job search requirements often applied with little or 
no thought for the variability in the search approaches appropriate for 
different types of jobs, different labor market conditions, or different 
worker search capabilities and needs. The program's ability to contrib 
ute positively to the reemployment of its beneficiaries remains in need 
of development and strengthening; the objective is an important one.9
Other Objectives
Several other objectives served by unemployment insurance should 
be noted. One is to provide an orderly method of meeting the cost of 
unemployment since financing large scale public unemployment relief 
during times of great need has always been difficult and unsatisfactory. 
Not only is there a reluctance to appropriate adequate funds, but the 
costs of unemployment relief fall heavily on the most impacted states 
and local communities during periods of low business activity at a time 
when their tax revenues have fallen. Unemployment insurance, on the 
other hand, is a system for building up reserves in good times which 
are automatically available for the increased payment of benefits in bad
9. For a discussion of how unemployment insurance can be organized to play a more positive 
role in this regard, see Blaustein (1981).
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times. To the extent that the program follows this reserve policy, it 
eases the management of unemployment costs.
The payment of unemployment compensation to employees placed 
on short layoffs is of advantage to an employer. The compensation 
tends to preserve the workforce intact, with its particular skills, train 
ing, and experience, until it can be recalled. Laid-off workers are not 
forced to scatter in search of jobs, at least during short layoffs. Indeed, 
the development in the late 1970s and 1980s of short-time compensa 
tion by a number of states within their unemployment insurance pro 
grams is a further step towards accommodating this objective. 10 While 
this support of workforce retention may somewhat restrict the mobility 
of labor, it is of value to the employer, as well as to the worker and the 
community.
Not usually mentioned but worth noting is another broad goal 
served by having available a program of unemployment insurance. It is 
"to preserve flexibility and freedom of choice for private and public 
economic policy," and further elaborated as follows:
In a broad sense, unemployment insurance helps to support this 
nation's adherence to a system that emphasizes free economic 
choice and individual initiative by mitigating the effects of imper 
fections in that system. These imperfections, at times, produce 
involuntary unemployment for individual workers. Unemploy 
ment insurance enables the work force to endure those circum 
stances while enjoying the benefits of the system.
Similarly, the program helps to cushion the effects of changes in 
governmental policies with regard to such matters as taxes, spend 
ing, foreign trade, and defense production and procurement all 
of which could produce manpower dislocations and unemploy 
ment. It may be worth considering how the absence of unemploy 
ment insurance might affect public policies or private decisions 
(Blaustein 1968, p. 12).
This does not exhaust the list of objectives or values of unemploy 
ment insurance. Others have been set forth from time to time, but the
10. Short-time compensation provides to workers placed temporarily on reduced workweek 
schedules unemployment compensation for the lost work-time and its earnings, appropriately pro 
rated.
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objectives we have discussed are those which have most influenced the 
character of the program.
Concluding Observations
Alleviation of unemployment's hardships, prevention of unemploy 
ment, and promotion of reemployment are the major objectives of 
unemployment insurance discussed in this chapter. A few others have 
also been noted. While alleviation is here regarded as the most funda 
mental purpose of the program, the others are not insignificant; they 
are well worth pursuing.
In a multipurpose program as large and as extensive as unemploy 
ment insurance, it is not surprising that its various objectives engender 
debate over their comparative importance. In fact, their simultaneous 
pursuit can involve conflicting policies, such as adequate benefits to 
assure adequate alleviation and limited benefits to restrain work disin 
centives, thereby promoting reemployment. The problem is to find the 
appropriate balance among objectives.
To a large degree, the appropriate balance should be the result of a 
collective value judgment, but one that is enlightened by sound knowl 
edge about benefits and costs, about experience and the effects of 
changing conditions, and many other kinds of information. The policy 
choices are made politically, and properly so in the American system, 
but in the best sense of that process. Regardless of the debate, however, 
the discussion of the various objectives of unemployment insurance 
makes clear that this program is a key component in the nation's sys 
tem of social and economic security.
The Insurance Character 
of Unemployment Insurance
\Vhen proposals to establish unemployment insurance were debated 
in the early 1930s, some individuals argued that unemployment might 
be too unpredictable to be insurable. In the midst of the worst depres 
sion in history, unemployment had reached heights never before expe 
rienced. Critics pointed to the heavy debt incurred by the British 
unemployment insurance program during the 1920s and subsequent 
years to show that such a scheme could not be kept on a solvent basis. 
Fears of insolvency led to very conservative beginnings for unemploy 
ment insurance in the United States based on estimates that called for 
substantial payroll tax rates and limited benefits. As the years went by, 
especially after the accumulation of large benefit reserves during 
World War II, much greater confidence developed in the program's 
soundness and in the insurability of the unemployment risk. Payroll tax 
rates generally declined and benefits were improved. Except for a few 
state funds, the system encountered no serious financial problems until 
the 1970s. The more extensive insolvency experienced then and in the 
1980s among state funds generated efforts to improve financing and 
restrict benefits, but no demands to abandon the insurance approach. 
Despite its higher costs since 1970, the unemployment insurance sys 
tem as a whole still operates well within the 3 percent of total payroll 
level originally thought necessary and adopted by the system in 1935. 
The problems of serious insolvency so far have concerned about a 
dozen individual states rather than the total system. 1
Experience has shown that the risk of unemployment meets the 
tests of insurability. Unemployment insurance no longer needs to be
1. A total of fourteen states, including the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin 
Islands, had insolvent benefit reserve funds for seven or more years during the 1970s and 1980s; 
these were the only states with negative year-end fund balances which often exceeded 1 percent of 
total payrolls in the state. See discussion of the funding crisis of these years in the section "State 
Benefit Financing" in chapter 10.
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defended on these grounds. It is nevertheless desirable to review the 
insurance principles and the tests of insurability that apply to both pri 
vate and social insurance to gain a better understanding of unemploy 
ment insurance, especially in view of widespread misunderstandings 
about the nature of private and social insurance.
Another matter that needs discussion at the outset is whether unem 
ployment insurance can meet its social objectives and yet maintain its 
insurance character. Unemployment insurance is social insurance and 
so has some features that would not be written into a private insurance 
policy. Why such social features do not destroy the insurance charac 
ter" of the system needs to be explained and understood.
Pressures almost always exist to introduce features or administrative 
practices into the unemployment insurance system to safeguard it 
against abuse, since there is some "moral hazard" in compensating for 
unemployment.2 Some of these proposals would undermine the insur 
ance character of the system making it more of a welfare system rather 
than an insurance program.3 They tend to destroy one of the chief val 
ues of unemployment insurance that compensation can be claimed as 
a matter of earned right without any loss of self-respect by the claim 
ant. It is, after all, this value that is a principal justification for the use 
of the insurance approach in the first place and which remains of cen 
tral importance to workers who bear the risk of unemployment.
This chapter, then, is designed to do three things: (1) show that 
unemployment is an insurable risk; (2) discuss some of the features 
that make the program "social insurance"; and (3) indicate how adopt 
ing certain features or practices would tend to make unemployment 
insurance a welfare rather than an insurance program.
2. Moral hazard is common to all insurance plans, whether private or social, since they run the 
risk that the insured person may claim compensation on the basis of contrived conditions or false 
representation usually difficult and costly to detect.
3. The definition of welfare varies among those using the term. As used here, it means benefits 
conditioned on the applicant's income and assets. Benefits are either denied if such income or 
assets exceed a specified amount, or paid in amounts that vary inversely with the level of income 
or assets.
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Comparison of Social and Private Insurance
Social insurance and private or contractual insurance have certain 
distinctly different features, yet both are "insurance" in that they con 
tain common elements which reflect basic insurance concepts. As 
described by one observer, these elements include: "a widespread 
pooling of the risks against which protection is provided; specific, and 
generally complete, descriptions of all conditions pertaining to cover 
age, benefits, and financing; precise mathematical calculations of bene 
fit eligibility and amounts; and specific tax or contribution (premium) 
rates that are computed to meet the estimated costs of the system" 
(Myersl981,p. 12).
It is also useful at this point to list elements which generally distin 
guish private from social insurance, as noted by the same author:
1. Private insurance must be based on individual equity. Social insur 
ance. . .must generally contain a considerable degree of emphasis on social 
adequacy principles.
2. Private insurance is on a voluntary basis as to participation....Social 
insurance almost invariably is based on compulsory participation.
3. Private insurance involves complete contractual rights between the two 
parties (the insured and the insurer)...; social insurance does not involve a 
strictly contractual relationship, although the benefits involve a statutory right 
(but the statutory provisions can be changed.. .by the legislature).
4. Private individual insurance must be fully funded so that the rights of the 
insureds are protected... .Social insurance, because of its compulsory and stat 
utory nature, need not be fully funded in fact, it is generally thought that 
from an economic standpoint, full funding is undesirable (Myers 1981, p. 13). 
Concerning the first point, "individual equity" means that the 
insured individual is entitled to compensation, should the insured con 
tingency occur, which relates directly to the amount of premium the 
individual paid for the protection. Social insurance departs from that 
principle by imposing minimum or maximum compensation levels or 
by varying the compensation-premium relationship in other ways4 in 
order to achieve more adequate support of some standard of living so
4. In unemployment insurance, for example, these include paying low-wage earners a higher 
proportion of wage-loss compensation, and higher benefits to claimants with dependents.
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as to alleviate hardship, i.e., social adequacy. The degree to which a 
particular program of social insurance pursues the goal of social ade 
quacy is a controversial matter.5
The Unemployment Risk and Its Insurability
There are three types of risk against which insurance is issued: (1) 
personal loss, (2) property loss, and (3) liability for damage to a third 
person. Unemployment insurance is primarily insurance against the 
risk of personal loss (wage loss) due to unemployment.
Some difficulties have resulted from the mixture of liability and per 
sonal loss concepts in state unemployment insurance laws. In formulat 
ing an unemployment insurance program, one school of thought put 
the emphasis on the third type of risk, i.e., the liability of the employer 
for the damage done to workers by laying them off, and sought to con 
fine the insured risk only to unemployment for which the employer is 
directly responsible. Others, concerned with the personal wage loss of 
the unemployed worker, focused on compensating involuntary unem 
ployment, whatever its economic cause. Organized labor, for example, 
has stressed wage-loss insurance; employers generally have tended to 
stress the liability insurance concept.
In order for a risk to be insurable, it must meet the following six 
tests. Essentially, the risk of unemployment does meet these tests.
1. The Risk is Genuine, Involuntary
The risk must be real or actual, not speculative or created by the 
insured. In other words, insurance should cover only a genuine risk 
that already exists, and not an artificial risk that may be created, as, for 
example, a gambling loss. In order to be sure that the risk of unemploy-
5. In unemployment insurance, for example, opponents of dependent allowances have argued 
that these added benefits are unrelated to wages and discriminate among the insured unemployed 
on the basis of need, albeit presumed need, thereby injecting too much of a welfare element into 
the program and weakening the "earned right" basis. On the other hand, the program has been 
criticized for overly restrictive qualifying requirements and harsh application of other eligibility 
rules which result in denying benefits to many poor, marginal, or disadvantaged unemployed 
workers lacking any other means of support, thus limiting too severely the program's pursuit of its 
social adequacy objectives.
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ment being insured against is actual and not created by the insured, the 
state laws generally provide that benefits be paid only when the unem 
ployment is involuntary. No question is raised when the worker is laid 
off for lack of work the risk of so being laid off always exists.
Questions arise, however, in cases where unemployment may have 
been caused, or contributed to, by the worker's own actions. Unem 
ployment insurance generally restricts benefits in such cases, or denies 
them entirely. Unemployment insurance may depart somewhat from 
this principle by paying benefits when certain types of voluntary or 
quasi-voluntary action result in unemployment. An example is when a 
worker voluntarily quits a job for "good cause," such as compelling 
family reasons. As will be discussed later, this position can be justified 
in a social insurance program.
2. An Economic Loss is Involved
A second test of insurability of a risk is that an economic loss is 
involved. Unemployment involves wage loss. Therefore, there appears 
to be no problem in unemployment meeting this test. Questions occa 
sionally arise in some cases, but each goes to the basic issue of whether 
or not the individual worker is involuntarily unemployed and is able to 
work and available and looking for work. For example, a student who 
is laid off at the end of a summer vacation and returns to or starts 
school full time in the fall is deemed not to have suffered an economic 
loss. The reason is that the student is occupied fully with attending 
school and thus is not available for work. Suppose a woman, however, 
has worked for some years at a cannery though only during the canning 
season and has otherwise been occupied as a homemaker. When she is 
laid off by the cannery at the season's end, has she suffered a wage 
loss? If more employment were available, would she continue work 
ing? In this example, the answer is more difficult to determine. Such 
cases do occur and require careful judgment; the issue centers on 
whether the individual wants to work and is available for work. The 
majority of workers who are laid off would have kept on working if 
their jobs were not discontinued and thus they do suffer an economic 
loss. Their unemployment, therefore, meets the second test of insur 
ability.
3. The Risk is Verifiable 
Still another test is whether the occurrence of the risk in this case
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involuntary unemployment is verifiable. In other types of insurance, 
such as accident or life or old-age insurance, a high degree of objectiv 
ity is possible in verifying the occurrence of the hazard insured against. 
There is normally no difficulty in proving that a person is dead, 
although even life insurance companies at times have problems in ver 
ifying whether an insured person has actually died, as, for example, in 
a drowning when the body may not be recovered. In unemployment 
insurance, the reason given by a worker for the job separation that 
caused his or her unemployment can be verified through a report from 
the employer. But there still may be difficulty in determining whether 
the worker was separated for a reason that makes the unemployment 
compensatory. If the worker quit, was it for a good reason or good 
cause, such as sexual harassment? If the separation was involuntary, 
was it for misconduct on the job, or was the worker fired for poor per 
formance in the job?
Even more difficult is the problem of verifying whether an individ 
ual claiming unemployment insurance (a claimant) is still unemployed. 
Various techniques have been developed to determine whether a claim 
ant is working on another job. Difficulties also arise in determining 
whether the claimant who is not working is really available for work. 
For example, is the claimant genuinely looking for work or, in effect, 
taking a vacation?
It is true that a moral hazard may exist whereby a claimant misrep 
resents his or her situation to obstruct or falsify verification. Reason 
able administrative measures need to be applied to minimize the 
number of cases in which the hazard materializes. Moral hazard exists 
in all insurance; fires may be started by the insured in order to collect 
fire insurance, and even life insurance is sometimes taken out by a ben 
eficiary with the intent of killing the insured to collect the insurance. 
More akin to moral hazard in unemployment insurance, however, is the 
moral hazard in workers' compensation that an individual drawing 
compensation may malinger. Doctors will admit that it is often very 
difficult to determine whether an injured individual is able to return to 
work. It may be no more difficult to verify unemployment in borderline 
cases than it is to verify the occurrence of other risks in equally ambig-
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uous situations. In the large majority of situations, however, the genu 
ineness of the claimant's unemployment can be easily verified.6
4. The Law of Large Numbers
A fourth test is that the risk of unemployment must be subject to the 
Law of Large Numbers.7 This law holds that when a particular event or 
phenomenon occurs at random, its frequency or rate of occurrence will 
tend to conform with that expected in accordance with the theory of 
probability if the number of cases or observations among which the 
event may occur is large enough. The theory of probability is popularly 
illustrated by the random tossing of a coin. The probability is that 
"heads" will come up 50 percent of the times the coin is tossed. There 
is no certainty that this precise result will occur. But the larger the 
number of times the coin is tossed, the greater is the probability that 
the expected percentage will occur, and that the Law of Large Numbers 
will apply. This law can be applied to random human contingencies if 
enough cases are involved. Mortality tables have been constructed 
periodically based on the actual experience of a large number of deaths 
at given ages so that it can be predicted with considerable accuracy 
what proportion of 100,000 people can be expected to die at each year 
of age.
The rate of occurrence of unemployment can easily meet the Law 
of Large Numbers, since a sufficiently large number of workers are 
covered under every state unemployment insurance law to make the 
laws of probability operative. Even the Virgin Islands, the jurisdiction 
with the smallest labor force, averaged about 42,000 workers in cov 
ered employment in 1990, a much larger number than is necessary to 
meet the Law of Large Numbers. This law is also met in that, as a 
whole, the workers covered represent a random rather than a biased 
selection of all workers in terms of the contingency covered. Since 
some classes of workers experience a higher- and other classes experi 
ence lower-than-average risk of unemployment, limiting coverage to 
some classes might result in a distortion of the random quality of the
6. How to verify continued unemployment and identify improper claims are controversial sub 
jects. Research on these problem areas in the 1980s has shed some light, and some statutory and 
administrative improvements have ensued to better control improper claims.
7. See Malisoff (1961, chapter 2). Dr. Malisoff also discusses other aspects of the insurability of 
unemployment in a somewhat different manner than is done in this chapter.
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risk being insured against. The random nature of the insured group 
improves as employment is more broadly covered under the system, 
since the employment covered becomes more highly diversified. 8
5. Only a Limited Part is Unemployed at One Time 
Another test of insurability is that the contingency happens to only a 
portion of the insured population at any one time, so that the cost bur 
den of compensating for the loss is not excessive or unmanageable 
when spread across all the insured. A large proportion of the labor 
force never or rarely experiences any unemployment, and although a 
sizable number of workers may have some unemployment during a 
recession, only a limited proportion of all workers is unemployed at 
any one time. As already indicated, there were fears in the 1930s that 
unemployment was not insurable because of the unexpected and 
unprecedented large numbers of unemployed workers at that time. 
Since then, however, relative unemployment levels have been only a 
fraction of those in the Great Depression.
In the period 1947 through 1990, average weekly insured unem 
ployment in the nation exceeded 6 percent of covered employment in 
only three years, and exceeded 8 percent in some months of those 
years, but such peak figures are not significant from the point of view 
of insurability. More important is the level of unemployment over a 
period of time. Average insured unemployment over several years of a 
business cycle tends to be considerably lower than peak monthly or 
yearly levels. Although the proportion in some states is higher than in 
others, unemployment still affects only a limited proportion of work 
ers. Only in a few states has the annual average rate of insured unem 
ployment sometimes exceeded 7 or 8 percent, usually in severe 
recession years.9 Puerto Rico is an exception, with a rate that averaged 
from 10 to over 15 percent in most of the 1970s. 10 But even in states 
with the worst experience, unemployment meets the test that the risk 
happens to only a small portion of the covered workforce at any one 
time. Moreover, policy tendencies and cyclical safeguards built into
8. About 97 percent of all wage and salary jobs are now covered by unemployment insurance.
9. Based on statistics for post-World War II recession years in Unemployment Insurance Finan 
cial Data, 1938-1982 and annual supplements.
10. See table for Puerto Rico in Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, 1938-1982.
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the economy foster a fair degree of confidence that a depression such 
as that of the 1930s is unlikely to repeat.
It should be noted that the larger the base for pooling, (per the Law 
of Large Numbers), the more likely it is that the proportion experienc 
ing unemployment will range within narrower limits. While the 
insured unemployment rates of a few states have exceeded 8 percent in 
the worst recessions, other state rates were quite low. Long-term unem 
ployment extending beyond the regular duration limits of state laws is 
compensated during recessions, or high unemployment periods, 
through a 50-50 cost sharing arrangement half from the state and half 
from the federal government unemployment insurance funds. This 
sharing provides added manageability to the burden when heaviest and 
makes longer-term protection against the risk more acceptable at such 
times. Thus, state insured unemployment rates, including the unem 
ployed receiving extended benefits, are even higher than those indi 
cated above, yet still reflect a limited proportion of the covered 
population and well within insurable bounds.
The limited rate of occurrence of the risk and the pooling of its 
compensation costs make unemployment insurable by this test. Win- 
ston Churchill, with his remarkable ability to translate complex ideas 
into more simple understandable terms, once characterized social 
insurance as "bringing the magic of the averages to the rescue of the 
millions" (Czarnowski 1957, p. 22).
6. Unemployment is Predictable
The final and most important test of insurability is whether the rate of 
occurrence of the contingency (in this case unemployment) among the 
covered population can be predicted within reasonable limits. This test 
is critical since predictability is key to planning a sound financial 
arrangement to cover future needs for insurance outlays.
The pattern of unemployment during most of the last 50 years has 
also been sufficiently regular as to assure confidence in predictions of 
its incidence within a reasonable margin of error. That confidence was 
shaken somewhat by the severe unemployment experience of the mid- 
1970s and early 1980s. With perhaps some adjustment of the range of 
error, the predictability of unemployment nevertheless still remains 
reasonably reliable for insurance funding purposes.
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A vast amount of information on the characteristics and behavior of 
unemployment has accumulated as a by-product of the operation of 
state unemployment insurance programs. Detailed studies of individual 
state economies support projections of employment and unemploy 
ment trends. Techniques for estimating the cost of unemployment 
insurance have developed and are constantly improved. Given such 
data, research, and increasingly sophisticated methodology, the costs 
of unemployment insurance over a period of time can be predicted 
with sufficient accuracy so that the benefit reserve funds can be kept 
solvent, provided that the predictions are translated into appropriate 
and adequate financing policies.
The insolvency of many state funds in the 1970s was in part a fail 
ure to build sufficient reserves to cover projected needs. In part, how 
ever, the benefit cost experience of the 1970s also contained unusual 
elements for some states that may not have been reasonably predict 
able based on past trends and experience. Such unusual cost can be 
contained within the range of insurability by a broadening of the insur 
ance base, for example through some form of reinsurance.
As the basis for future cost estimates, predictions of insured unem 
ployment must be made over a period of years. Unemployment's fluc 
tuation with the business cycle does not invalidate the insurability of 
unemployment. Allowances must be made for recessions by making 
the estimates cover a long enough period of time to include at least one 
business cycle.
Unlike the case for private insurance, the rights to benefits can be 
changed in social insurance without the consent of the insured or of 
those who finance the program. If unemployment changes so that the 
estimates of fund needs do not work out, contributions or taxes can be 
increased or benefit entitlement reduced to take care of the changed sit 
uation. Nearly all of the states have provisions for automatic tax rate 
increases when reserves fall below a stated level. If these automatic 
measures prove inadequate, the state legislatures can increase the 
unemployment taxes. In this respect, social insurance has an advantage 
over private insurance which risks the loss of business if it raises rates. 
Unemployment insurance has a "captive" group of contributors whose 
only way of avoiding a necessary tax rate increase is by pressure on the 
state legislature or the Congress not to take such action or to reduce 
benefits instead. In the final analysis, the real test of the insurability of
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unemployment is whether the legislative bodies will make changes in 
the unemployment insurance statutes when increased cost necessitate 
such changes.
Pursuit of Social Objectives
Effect On Insurance Character
Many features in the unemployment insurance program would not 
be written into a conventional private insurance contract. In private 
insurance, the emphasis must be on individual equity, and benefit pro 
tection must be directly related to the amount of contributions or pre 
miums paid. In a social insurance program, emphasis is on "social 
adequacy," that is, on providing the insured with benefits related to 
their presumed needs. In the case of unemployment insurance, certain 
features applicable to setting the weekly benefit amount may be used to 
increase the likelihood of this result. Several examples illustrate the 
practice, but it should be understood that they represent exceptions 
from the usual pattern whereby most claimants receive weekly benefit 
amounts designed to replace a uniform percentage of their prior 
weekly wages, up to a weekly benefit ceiling. In some states, minimum 
weekly benefit amounts are set at levels that give insured unemployed 
workers with the lowest earnings (usually part-time workers) a higher 
proportion of their former earnings than higher-paid workers receive. 11 
Also weekly benefit formulas of some states "weight" benefits at the 
lower end of the wage scale, i.e., pay as a benefit a higher percentage 
of low wages than of high wages. All states set ceilings on their weekly 
benefit amounts; unemployed workers with wages high enough to 
place them at the benefit ceiling receive a progressively lower percent 
age of wage replacement, the higher the wage level. Such variations 
from private insurance practice are justified on the basis of the pre 
sumed relative needs of lower- and higher-paid workers. The presump-
11. Other states coordinate the minimum qualifying wage requirements with their minimum 
benefit amounts so that the same percentage of wage replacement results at that level as at higher 
wage levels.
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tion is that persons with low incomes must spend the higher proportion 
on necessities than do those with higher incomes.
Some states depart further from private insurance principles by 
adding dependent allowances to basic benefits, with no differentiation 
in premiums. But dependent allowances are justified as serving a social 
purpose in providing more adequate benefits where there are more 
mouths to feed and, presumably, the need is greater. The Actuary for 
the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company in the 1930s wrote: "Just as 
considerations of equity of benefits form a natural and vital part of 
operating private insurance, so should considerations of adequacy of 
benefits control the pattern of social insurance" (Hohaus 1948, p. 77). 
Not all unemployment insurance proponents agree fully with this 
viewpoint and worry instead about the program's tendencies to resem 
ble welfare more than insurance, an issue discussed in the next section.
Another variation from private insurance principles is the payment 
of benefits under certain circumstances for unemployment that is cre 
ated by the claimants' own actions. For example, benefits may be paid 
for unemployment which follows the voluntary quitting of a job if the 
claimant can establish a "good cause" for leaving. 12 A further differ 
ence from private insurance occurs when an unemployed worker who 
quit without good cause, or was discharged for misconduct, is allowed 
to draw benefits after a period of disqualification. The justification 
given for such benefit payments is that after a certain period following 
separation from a job, unemployment becomes involuntary if the 
claimant has been unsuccessful in genuine attempts to find a job. Few 
states now follow this practice.
Despite these differences, it must be noted that private insurance 
available in the areas of workers' compensation, health insurance, and 
automobile insurance does compensate for wage loss and medical 
costs in accidents caused by the insured. It may be said that with the 
spread of no-fault policies, private insurance has been evolving toward 
a form of social insurance. The contrasts between the two sometimes 
are not as sharp as theory may assume.
Except for the benefit amount ceiling, the variations from private 
insurance principles cited above for unemployment insurance are on
12. "Good cause" in most states has been restricted to causes attributable to the employer or 
connected with the work.
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the lenient side, that is, expansive of claimant benefits and entitlement. 
Certain departures, however are restrictive in nature. For example, 
most state laws vary the duration of benefits payable in proportion to 
the claimant's previous employment or earnings on which payroll tax 
contributions have been paid. In practically all types of private insur 
ance, the amount of indemnity is not limited by the length of time the 
contributor has been paying premiums; the full amount of insurance 
becomes effective from the moment the insured signs the insurance 
contract. In some forms of private insurance, however, the amount of 
indemnity payable may decline over time (decreasing term life insur 
ance), or the cash value of the insurance policy may increase with time 
(whole life insurance).
Another type of restriction not found in conventional private insur 
ance is that unemployment benefits are paid only to workers who have 
had a minimum amount of qualifying employment or earnings even 
though whatever employment or earnings they had was covered and 
subject to the unemployment tax. The minimum is required in order to 
establish evidence that the claimant has been genuinely and substan 
tially attached to the labor market. Such a test is more necessary than 
in other types of insurance because the fact of unemployment cannot 
be established as objectively as, for example, the fact of an accident or 
a death. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that such a qualifying 
requirement is not entirely unique to social insurance. Some kinds of 
private insurance specify a similar type of limitation, such as health 
insurance policies which exclude for a period of time coverage of pre 
vious health conditions of the insured, or life insurance policies which 
exclude coverage of suicide until the policy has been in force for a 
specified duration.
The important point about all these variations is that it is not legiti 
mate to fault unemployment insurance simply for departing from 
"pure" conventional private insurance principles or practices. For 
social insurance, such variations are necessary to achieve certain social 
purposes which are not pertinent to private insurance. Yet, the depar 
tures must not be so extensive as to impair the insurance character of 
the program.
One other fairly widely held view of the program's insurance char 
acter concerns its source of financing of benefit costs. That view holds 
that if any general government revenues are allocated to finance bene-
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fits in place of revenues from specific taxes imposed for the purpose on 
the wages of covered workers, then the program becomes more of a 
welfare than an insurance plan. Unemployed workers derive the sense 
that they receive benefits on the basis of "earned rights" from the fact 
that they (or their employers) have paid for them. Technically speak 
ing, the payment of insurance costs or premiums by persons or organi 
zations other than the insured does not invalidate the insurance 
character of the plan or policy. In other countries, contributions from 
government general revenues into social insurance funds are fairly typ 
ical. To the extent that general revenues do finance most or all benefit 
costs, however, the sense of "earned rights" may be diminished.
Does Unemployment Insurance Differ 
Enough From Welfare?
The concern of the insured unemployed may be whether there is 
much difference between unemployment insurance and welfare pro 
grams, not whether unemployment insurance departs from private 
insurance principles. One of the principal advantages of unemploy 
ment insurance is that the unemployed worker is not subject to a test of 
need such as is applied to a welfare applicant. It was to remove the 
indignity of the required proof by the unemployed of their need for 
support that in large part accounted for the acceptance of unemploy 
ment insurance in the first place. The application of a means test, as 
one writer has put it, is the "watershed" dividing social insurance from 
public assistance (Carlson 1962, p. 7). Objections to references to 
need, even to "presumed need," in relation to unemployment insurance 
is therefore understandable in this context, although such objections 
cannot obscure the fact that "presumed need" is an inherent character 
istic of social insurance. Care must be taken to avoid a stance that 
comes close to investigating individual need when the benefit provi 
sion varies compensation among the unemployed by some measure of 
presumed need, such as dependents, especially if that measure calls for 
personal information from the claimant.
A related advantage put forward for unemployment insurance over 
welfare is that unemployed workers feel that their benefits are paid "as
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a matter of right." But even this "right" may be undermined, as Profes 
sor Harry Malisoff (1961, pp. 25-27) pointed out, if the questions 
asked of an unemployment insurance claimant are so detailed or per 
sonal that the claimant feels his or her private life is invaded. The per 
sonal questioning about the economic needs of public welfare 
applicants is one of the reasons that some needy people avoid applying 
for relief. In the same way, some unemployed workers do not file for 
unemployment compensation where the practice of extensive personal 
questioning makes them feel that unemployment insurance is no better 
or no different from relief in this regard. As noted earlier in chapter 2, a 
substantial proportion of the public erroneously regards unemployment 
insurance as part of the welfare system. A fair number of eligible 
unemployed workers delay or avoid filing for unemployment benefits 
because of this perception.
That perception may be reenforced by local office harassment of 
claimants concerning the validity of their claims. Reasonable monitor 
ing of a claimant's availability for work and job search to confirm 
claims of current unemployment is a legitimate function of unemploy 
ment insurance administration. Close scrutiny may be justified if 
grounds exist to suspect malingering. All kinds of insurance, including 
private insurance, investigate questionable claims. Social insurance is 
probably more sensitive to public criticism of improper benefit pay 
ments, claimant abuse of the rules, and fraud, whether real or alleged. 
Unemployment insurance programs therefore apply certain measures 
to monitor claims more effectively. For example, they may concentrate 
greater attention on types of claimants who experience has shown tend 
to file higher-than-average proportions of improper or invalid claims. It 
is important, however, to avoid treating all claimants so typed as guilty 
of filing improper claims and then subjecting them to close, personal, 
and adversarial questioning to establish the evidence. Many eligible 
claimants are likely to retreat under these intimidating tactics and forgo 
filing further claims to avoid the discomfort and indignity of such 
interrogation. 13 For these unemployed workers, turning to unemploy 
ment insurance is as painful as resorting to welfare.
13. One study has estimated that during the years 1982 to 1987, less than 70 percent of persons 
unemployed and eligible for unemployment insurance benefits collected them, a lower proportion 
than in earlier years. Among vanous reasons that can be advanced for this result are stiffened eli 
gibility requirements and more rigorous administration in this period (Blank and Card 1991).
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Welfare is intended to be restrictive, confined to those actually in 
need. Unemployment insurance applies to a very broad population sub 
ject to the insured risk and presumes that most need the insurance sup 
port if the risk is incurred. The unemployment insurance system covers 
nearly all wage and salary workers; it is compulsory and it is universal 
since the risk is universal. By the same token, benefits are payable to 
all workers who incur the risk. Eligibility should not be so restrictive 
as to unreasonably diminish or eliminate benefit rights. To be sure, 
there are problems in assuring that the unemployment is insurable and 
real. Still, an overly restrictive stance by the program with respect to 
eligibility blurs the insurance-welfare distinction.
Foreign Experience with 
Unemployment Insurance
There was considerable European experience to draw upon when 
unemployment insurance began to be considered seriously in the 
United States. Before 1935, seventeen European nations had some pro 
vision for unemployment insurance (table 4.1). Seven had national 
compulsory programs, while ten provided for government subsidies to 
voluntary plans, which in most cases were organized and operated by 
trade unions and other private associations. Most of the latter group of 
countries have since adopted national compulsory schemes. Another 
three countries operated unemployment assistance programs, rather 
than unemployment insurance, before 1935.* As of 1989, there were 
thirty-four countries with national compulsory unemployment insur 
ance schemes and three countries with subsidized voluntary programs; 
5 countries provided unemployment assistance only (table 4.2).
The early subsidy programs for voluntary unemployment insurance 
were of interest to American planners in the 1930s mainly regarding 
the degree of national control over local plans and the methods of 
national assistance used. The experience under the compulsory sys 
tems of Great Britain and Germany was of most value in planning 
early federal and state legislation in the United States. 2
1. A report on foreign experience was prepared for President Roosevelt's Committee on Eco 
nomic Security as it developed its recommendation for unemployment insurance in 1934. See 
Social Security Board (1937).
2. This information, as of 1989, does not, of course, reflect the enormous political and economic 
transformations which began that year to reshape Central and Eastern Europe. By 1992, some 
changes had already altered the picture presented by table 4.2, most notably the unification of East 
(Democratic Republic) and West (Federal Republic) Germany and the breakup of Yugoslavia. 
New national unemployment insurance or assistance schemes are likely to emerge in these 
regions in ensuing years.
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Table 4.1 Nations with Public Unemployment Benefit Programs Before 
1935
Type of program
National compulsory unemployment 
insurance scheme1*
Subsidies to voluntary unemployment 
insurance plans
Unemployment assistance*
Nation"
United Kingdom
Ireland
Italy
Austria
Poland
Bulgaria
Germany
France
Norway
Denmark
Netherlands
Finland
Spain
Belgium
Czechoslovakia
Switzerland*1
Sweden
Luxembourg
Yugoslavia
New Zealand
Date of first law
1911
1911 C
1919
1920
1924
1925
1927
1906
1906
1907
1916
1917
1919
1920
1924
1924
1934
1921
1927
1930
SOURCE: Industrial Relations Counselors (1934); USDOL, Bureau of Labor Statistics (1931); 
International Labour Office (1955); Blaustein and Craig (1977); U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, Social Security Administration (1990). 
a. Within "type of program" category, listed in order of date of first law.
b. Not listed is the Soviet Union, which had a provision in its Labor Code for unemployment 
insurance from 1921 to 1930.
c. In 1922, after it gained independence from Great Britain (thereafter the United Kingdom), Ire 
land took over the insurance program in its own territory, based on the British National Insur 
ance Act of 1911, as amended, 
d. Also subsidized compulsory cantonal schemes.
e. Nations listed provided unemployment assistance only; others with unemployment insurance 
provisions may have also provided unemployment assistance.
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Table 4.2 Nations with Public Unemployment Benefit Programs, 1989 
National compulsory unemployment insurance schemes (34 nations)
Argentina8 Cyprus Hong Kong Netherlands 
Austria Ecuador Iceland Norway
Barbados
Belgium
Brazil
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
China, People's
Republic
Egypt
France
Germany, Federal
Republic
Ghana
Greece
Iran"
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg
Malta
Portugal
South Africa
Spain
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Subsidies to voluntary unemployment insurance plans (3 nations)
Denmark Finland Sweden
Unemployment assistance (5 nations)0
Australia New Zealand Tunisia Yugoslavia
Hungary
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1990).
a. Confined to construction workers only.
b. Implemented for three years on an experimental basis starting July 1987.
c. Nations listed provide unemployment assistance only; others with unemployment insurance
provisions may also provide unemployment assistance.
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Foreign Voluntary Plans
The first unemployment insurance plan appeared in Basel Town, 
Switzerland in 1789, but it lasted only a few years. Apparently there 
were no further attempts to create a public unemployment insurance 
plan during the next century. About the middle of the nineteenth cen 
tury, some trade unions began to pay benefits to their unemployed 
members and some mutual benefit or fraternal societies also operated 
unemployment benefit plans. Starting with Dijon, France in 1896, 
municipalities began to subsidize trade union funds for the purpose of 
increasing their benefits. Subsidies were granted annually on the basis 
of benefits paid the preceding year. This system of municipal subsidies, 
which became known as the "Ghent" plan, spread widely. 3 In the early 
part of the twentieth century, many provinces (and cantons in Switzer 
land) began to add their subsidies to those of the cities, and some 
national governments added grants. In only three countries with solely 
voluntary plans did employers make any contributions. In two of these, 
Switzerland and Spain, employers contributed to joint employer- 
employee plans; in Denmark, in 1921, employers were required to con 
tribute to a central fund to provide emergency benefits to those who 
had exhausted trade union benefits. Some communal voluntary plans 
were also established, notably in Switzerland, where they were subsi 
dized first by the cantons and eventually by the federal government. 
Where government subsidies were provided, government control var 
ied from practically none in Belgium and the other countries which 
used the Ghent system, to very detailed requirements and controls in 
Switzerland. In Belgium, during the depression of the 1930s, adminis 
tration became so loose that in 1933 the national government intro 
duced rigid controls, defining membership, contributions, and benefit 
requirements on a uniform basis.4
3. With some modifications, the Ghent plan was emulated by other municipalities in Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzer 
land.
4. The Belgian experience was studied in detail by Kiehl (1932), and the Swiss experience by 
Spates and Rabinovitch (1931).
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Foreign Compulsory Programs
The first attempt at a compulsory unemployment insurance system 
in the nineteenth century was made in the Swiss commune of St. Gall 
in 1894, but it ceased to function in 1897 after workers with stable 
employment began moving to other towns to avoid paying contribu 
tions. The first national compulsory system was enacted in Great Brit 
ain in 1911. The second was established eight years later in Italy, 
followed by compulsory systems legislated in several other countries 
during the 1920s. The German law of 1927 was the latest compulsory 
plan before the Social Security Act was passed in the United States in 
1935. Since the British and German systems were both the largest and 
most intensively studied and publicized, they had the most influence 
on the development of the American system. Their structure and expe 
rience therefore are described in some detail. 6
The British Experience
The original British unemployment insurance law was passed in 
1911. For about seventy-five years prior to this event, unemployed 
workers in Great Britain were treated largely under the reformed Poor 
Laws adopted in 1834. This system, which was operated locally, distin 
guished sharply between the able-bodied poor and those unable to 
work. The former were made "less eligible" for relief and subjected to 
the "workhouse test." If relief applicants could work but did not, they 
were required to accept institutionalization under harsh and punitive 
workhouse conditions, usually involving the breakup of families. 
Increasingly, urban industrial poverty towards the end of the nineteenth 
century made more apparent the severity of the Poor Laws and their 
inadequacy for dealing with the unemployed. Voluntary charities seek-
5. Besides those listed in table 4.1, there were compulsory subnational plans in 13 cantons in 
Switzerland and in Queensland, Australia.
6. For a description of foreign systems prior to the Social Security Act, see Industrial Relations 
Counselors (1934); USDOL, Bureau of Labor Statistics (1931). For later information, see Interna 
tional Labour Office (19S5); Blaustein and Craig (1977); and U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (1990).
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ing to offer an alternative to the workhouse were also inadequate to 
cope with the growing problem, as were the out-of-work benefit funds 
of the trade unions which covered only a small proportion of the labor 
force. Political unrest stirred as the socialist and labor movements 
focused heavily on the problem. It was the era of social critics and 
reformers who challenged the view underlying the Poor Law system 
that the able-bodied unemployed were responsible for their own desti 
tution, the result of their personal inadequacies. The emerging counter- 
view was that they were, instead, the victims of industrial and social 
insufficiency and, therefore, the responsibility of industry and society. 
In 1909, William H. Beveridge, publishing a summary of lectures he 
gave on the subject at Cambridge University, used the title "Unem 
ployment: A Problem of Industry," thereby emphasizing the new view 
point. 7
Appointed in 1906 to review the Poor Laws, a Royal Commission 
recommended reforms which responded to some of the new thinking 
("Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of 
Distress" 1909). Its Majority Report urged more vocational-oriented 
education, a public labor (employment) exchange system, and the pro 
motion of regularization of employment in industry. For the unem 
ployed who were unable to find work, the Majority Report urged 
"public assistance" benefits, instead of "Poor Law" relief, contingent 
on daily labor in work relief projects. The Majority Report recom 
mended the establishment of some form of unemployment insurance, 
especially among unskilled and unorganized labor. It recommended, 
however, that this be accomplished through encouragement of volun 
tary schemes by government subsidy.
A Minority Report, representing mainly the views of Beatrice and 
Sidney Webb, had a more profound impact on the "break-up of the 
poor law."8 It stressed prevention rather than relief of unemployment. 
The report urged a labor exchange system, plans for countercyclical 
public works, and restrictions on child labor, excessive work hours, 
and employment of mothers with young children. It argued against
7. For the treatment of the unemployed in Great Britain before 1911 and the criticism of that 
treatment, see de Schweinitz, (1943) and Lubove (1966).
8. Webb and Webb (1929). Prominent among social reformers of the period, the Webbs were the 
leading critics of the Poor Law system.
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national compulsory unemployment insurance because the problems of 
"repeaters" and "bad risks" were thought to make such a scheme finan 
cially hazardous. An unemployment insurance program might work for 
selected categories of workers, but that would not relieve much of the 
unemployment problem. If tried, it would be essential to have a labor 
exchange to apply a work test, in accordance with a definition of "suit 
able work" to prevent downgrading of workers. The Webbs did encour 
age government subsidies for trade union jobless benefit funds. For the 
hard-core unemployed, they recommended case-by-case treatment 
emphasizing restorative remedies training, medical treatment, and 
other forms of rehabilitation. While the views of the Webbs and the 
Minority Report of the Royal Commission greatly influenced the 
course of Poor Law reform, they were less significant for unemploy 
ment insurance developments.
William Beveridge (1930) also favored a public employment 
exchange to help bring about the "de-casualization" of labor and the 
readjustment of work patterns and earnings to make unattractive and 
unprofitable the use of the unemployed as a reserve pool of casual 
workers for limited labor needs. Since he believed that not all unem 
ployment could be prevented, he urged the adoption of unemployment 
insurance. Beveridge was a towering figure in unemployment insur 
ance in Britain during the first half of the 20th century. He left an 
enduring mark on the way modern industrial societies cope with invol 
untary unemployment.9
Many of the proposals in the reports of the Royal Commission 
found their way into law. A system of public labor exchanges was 
adopted in 1909. The government went further, however, by enacting 
the first national compulsory unemployment insurance program as part 
of the National Insurance Act of 1911 which also included sickness 
insurance. The unemployment insurance scheme was developed in the 
Board of Trade, then headed by Winston Churchill who, with his col 
league, David Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, saw 
the legislation through Parliament. Hubert Llewellyn Smith, in collab 
oration with William Beveridge, worked out the structure and details of 
the program. The chief elements of unemployment insurance were
9. For an account of his life and work, see his autobiography. Power and Influence (Beveridge 
1953).
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described by Smith in a speech in 1910 which, Beveridge noted, con 
tained an expression of "historical importance, as a record of the 
hopes, anxieties and purposes with which unemployment insurance 
came into the world" (Beveridge 1930, pp. 264-65). The heart of Mr. 
Smith's remarks are given in an appendix to this chapter.
The Original Law
The unemployment insurance portion of the 1911 Act covered only 
about 2.5 million workers in half a dozen industries that had a high 
incidence of unemployment. 10 These industries were building and con 
struction, shipbuilding, foundries, machine shops, construction of 
vehicles, and sawmilling. Seasonal industries, such as cotton manufac 
turing and coal mining, were excluded. The program was limited in 
coverage because it was considered to be experimental in nature.
The original program was also quite limited as to benefits. A modest 
flat-rate weekly benefit was payable. The duration of benefits was lim 
ited to a maximum of fifteen weeks in a twelve-month period and pay 
able on the basis of one week of benefit for each five weeks of 
contributions. The minimum requirement to qualify for any benefits 
was ten weeks of paid-up contributions. The insured worker had to be 
capable of work. Disqualification from benefits was imposed for six 
weeks if the worker lost a job because of misconduct or left work vol 
untarily without "just cause. Refusal of suitable work was also disqual 
ifying and not imposed if the job refused was vacant because of a labor 
dispute, or was less favorable in wages or other conditions than the 
worker "habitually obtained in his usual employment." These statutory 
conditions were applied in a process that provided for appeals of initial 
judgments by local administrative officers. Employers and workers 
contributed equal amounts, with a government contribution equal to 
one-fourth of the system's total revenue. Refunds of the surplus of con 
tributions over benefits received were to be made to workers at age 60 
who had made 500 contributions, and used for rebates to employers 
with good employment records.
The law also provided subsidies for voluntary plans covering work 
ers outside the insured trades. This provision induced very few new
10. For detailed information on the British experience under the national program prior to 1935, 
see Burns (1941) and Gilson (1931).
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plans. Plans already in existence covering workers in the insured trades 
were allowed to continue with a subsidy of one-sixth of benefit costs, 
and these plans expanded considerably.
The program was extended in 1916 to munitions workers (among 
whom unemployment was expected after the war) and to workers in 
certain other industries including the chemical, leather, metal, and rub 
ber industries. This extension enlarged the coverage to above 3.7 mil 
lion workers. The program was extended further in 1920, bringing 
most wage earners under its coverage.
Up to 1920, the program was financially solvent. In fact, with the 
low unemployment during World War I, a substantial surplus had accu 
mulated in the unemployment insurance fund by mid-1919. The 1920s 
saw a reversal of this favorable condition.
The 1920 Amendments
In 1920, coverage was extended to all workers between age 16 and 
65 except those in agriculture (covered by a separate scheme in 1936), 
and domestic service, civil servants, railway and public utility employ 
ees, and white-collar workers earning over a specified amount in a 
year. The flat weekly benefit amount was increased for men and a 
lower benefit was set for women. Insured unemployed workers under 
age 18 were paid at half these amounts. In 1921, dependents allow 
ances were added to the regular benefit amounts. One week of benefit 
was allowed for each six weeks, instead of five weeks, of contribu 
tions. Maximum duration remained at fifteen weeks. Contributions 
were increased.
Although the 1920 amendments were enacted in a favorable eco 
nomic climate, unemployment began to rise almost immediately after 
they took effect. By December 1920, the unemployment rate was 7.8 
percent; it rose to an average of 16.6 percent in the following year. 
During the next 10 years, the rate averaged 12.7 percent and fell below 
10 percent only in 1927. In 1931 it rose to 21.1 percent.
Early Relaxation of Eligibility Requirements
The British thus faced a continuing large volume of unemployment 
during the 1920s, with only local relief as an alternative to unemploy 
ment insurance to provide income for the unemployed. With a duration
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limit of fifteen weeks, many of the unemployed exhausted their insur 
ance benefits and remained jobless or unable to obtain sufficient work 
to qualify for further unemployment insurance. The conditions for 
receipt of local relief were onerous and the local governments were 
unable to finance it for the large numbers who were unemployed and 
uninsured. With constant hope that employment conditions would 
improve, the British temporarily but repeatedly expanded the unem 
ployment insurance system to provide for the unemployed who were 
not eligible for insurance benefits or who had exhausted their entitle 
ment. The result was a bewildering succession of relaxations of the 
conditions for benefits and extensions of the duration of "covenanted" 
and "uncovenanted" benefits. Surging unemployment led to such 
actions almost immediately after the expansion of coverage under the 
1920 amendments. Even that legislation had provided that, for a tem 
porary period, a worker could draw eight weeks of uncovenanted bene 
fits if contributions had been paid for only four weeks instead of the 
higher normal minimum often weeks required for covenanted benefits. 
Because increasing unemployment prevented many from meeting even 
this mild qualification, the law was again changed in the following 
month so that a worker could qualify for eight weeks of benefits with 
ten weeks of work after 1919, provided that such work would have 
been "insurable employment" if the 1920 amendments had been in 
force throughout 1920, or with four such weeks after July 4,1920.
Standard Benefits
In July 1921, the minimum eligibility requirements for standard or 
covenanted benefits were tightened to twenty weeks of contributions 
since the beginning of the last benefit year preceding the current year. 
Yet, this requirement was waived if it could be shown that the claimant 
was normally in insured employment and genuinely seeking full-time 
employment. By the Unemployment Insurance Act (No. 2) of 1924, 
the minimum qualifying requirements were further tightened to thirty 
weeks of contributions since the beginning of the second benefit year 
preceding the current one and twenty weeks in the immediately pre 
ceding benefit year. However, the Minister of Labor was authorized to 
waive the new condition of thirty contributions, first until October 
1925, and then, by two further authorizations, until the end of 1927. To
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complicate matters even more, the waiver rules issued by the Minister 
were progressively relaxed until, beginning in February 1925, a claim 
ant could qualify for standard benefits with eight contributions in the 
last two preceding insurance years or thirty contributions at any time. 
The statutory conditions for standard benefits were changed again by 
the Unemployment Insurance Act of 1927, effective in April 1928, by 
having only one requirement, namely, thirty contributions in the two 
years preceding application for benefit
The maximum duration of standard benefits varied from fifteen to 
sixteen weeks in a benefit year until November 1922, when it was 
changed to twenty-six weeks. From April 19, 1928, to November 11, 
1931, there was no statutory limitation on the duration of standard ben 
efits. The rule of one week of benefit for each six weeks of contribu 
tions had also been relaxed in various ways and then abolished by the 
Act of 1927, effective April 1928. The unrestricted duration of benefits 
was recommended by the so-called Blanesburgh Committee which 
took the position that the unemployed should draw benefits for an 
unlimited period provided that they were genuinely seeking work.
Concern about malingering led in 1924 to the application of a genu- 
inely-seeking-work requirement to claimants of standard benefits; it 
had applied for uncovenanted benefits since 1921. Much controversy 
surrounded this provision its interpretation, the verification proce 
dures required for evidencing job search, and its value or effectiveness 
when little or no employment was available. In March 1930, on the 
recommendation of the Morris Committee, the genuinely-seeking- 
work provision was replaced by one disqualifying a worker for failure 
or refusal to apply for or accept suitable work or failure to carry out the 
written directions of the public employment office. This later require 
ment was ineffective because of the limited number of job openings 
available. As a result, the number of persons drawing benefits 
increased considerably.
Uncovenanted Benefits
Even with the temporary relaxation of requirements for standard 
benefits in the early 1920s, large numbers of the unemployed could not 
meet the contributory rules. Additional benefits, called uncovenanted 
benefits (1921-24), "extended" benefits (1924-28), and "transitional"
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benefits (1928-31) were therefore paid to unemployed persons who 
could not meet the contribution conditions provided they met certain 
alternative conditions. The latter included proof that the claimant nor 
mally worked in insured employment and was genuinely seeking work 
on a full-time basis. For a time, such benefits were paid at the discre 
tion of the Minister of Labor when he deemed it in the public interest. 
The Minister used this discretion to exclude certain classes of the 
unemployed for whom the benefits were deemed unnecessary in view 
of their other resources, that is, by a rough test of need. This discretion 
was abolished by the Act of 1924 but later restored by the succeeding 
Conservative government. The Act of 1927 aimed to abolish uncoven- 
anted or extended benefits. However, because large numbers of work 
ers could not meet the contributory conditions for unemployment 
insurance (thirty contributions in the two preceding years) and unem 
ployment was still serious, transitional payments were provided. Only 
eight contributions in the preceding two years were required for such 
transitional payments, but even this requirement was repealed by the 
Act of 1930.
The maximum duration of uncovenanted benefits was first set at 
twenty-two weeks, but this was increased to forty-four in November 
1922, and then reduced to forty-one in October 1923. During this 
period, no benefits were paid during temporary gaps of from one to 
three weeks after benefits had been paid for specified periods. Workers 
who exhausted their standard or covenanted benefits were able to draw 
uncovenanted benefits for additional weeks to bring their combined 
benefits up to the statutory limits for uncovenanted benefits. Beginning 
August 1924, when the term uncovenanted benefits was changed to 
extended benefits, there was no statutory limit on their duration.
Retrenchment in 1931
The combination of extensions of benefits and other liberalizations 
in the program kept the unemployment insurance fund in financial dif 
ficulties. The surplus built up in the ten years preceding the expansion 
of the program in November 1920 was exhausted by the following 
July, when the Treasury was authorized to make interest-bearing loans 
to the fund. During the next ten years, expenditures exceeded receipts 
in all but two fiscal years. The debt rose especially rapidly beginning
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with the fiscal year 1930-31. During that year alone it practically dou 
bled. Six months later the debt rose by nearly 50 percent more. This 
occurred despite the payment of the entire cost of transitional benefits 
by the Treasury directly, instead of by the insurance fund, during fiscal 
years 1930 and 1931.
The heavy drains that unemployment insurance made on the Trea 
sury led to drastic revision of the unemployment insurance system in 
1931. Actions taken under the National Economy Act of 1931 
increased contributions, decreased the weekly benefit amount, limited 
the duration of standard benefits to twenty-six weeks and introduced a 
requalifying requirement after exhaustion of benefits. Transitional ben 
efits were terminated and replaced by transitional payments based on 
need. These payments were restricted to those unemployed who had 
exhausted standard benefits and would have been eligible for benefits 
under the 1927 qualifying requirements. Determination of need was to 
be made by the local assistance authorities. These changes resulted in 
drastic reductions in insurance fund expenditures. Although operating 
deficits were not entirely eliminated right away, the insurance opera 
tion showed an annual surplus after June 1933, and the debt began to 
decline.
The Unemployment Act of 1934
The British provisions for the unemployed were drastically changed 
by the Unemployment Act of 1934. The transitional payment system 
was abolished and an Unemployment Assistance Scheme substituted to 
provide support for the unemployed who were not drawing unemploy 
ment insurance and were in need. This scheme was nationally financed 
and administered. The unemployment insurance program was liberal 
ized by providing that all insured workers with at least thirty weeks of 
work (or contributions) in the prior two years would be eligible for 
twenty-six weeks of benefits in a year and that up to an additional 
twenty-six weeks of benefits would be paid to those with a good record 
of employment in the last five years. Weekly benefit amounts were 
increased considerably, so that most beneficiaries would not need sup 
plementary relief. Financing was equally divided among employees, 
employers, and the government. The insurance fund was relieved of its 
outstanding debt, but with provision for its repayment out of current
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contribution income at the rate of £5 million annually. After the 
reforms, the unemployment insurance system was kept on a sound 
financial basis and the debt was fully repaid.
Later Reforms 11
Following World War II, the 1946 National Insurance Act unified all 
types of social insurance in the United Kingdom into a comprehensive 
scheme. 12 In 1948, unemployment assistance was absorbed into a new 
national public assistance program by the National Assistance Act, 
which evolved further into a general supplementary benefit system in 
1966. The National Insurance scheme was subsequently restructured 
by the Social Security Act of 1975.
Unemployment insurance (as of 1989) covers all workers who earn 
at least £41 a week and are not self-employed, except that coverage is 
optional for married women and widows. Benefits are financed through 
an over-all wage-related contribution for all types of social insurance, 
payable by employers and workers, and supplemented by a govern 
ment contribution. The minimum qualifying requirement for benefits 
calls for contributions paid on earnings equal to at least twenty-five 
times the minimum weekly earnings limit (£41) in one of the last two 
years and contributions on earnings equal to at least fifty times the 
minimum weekly earnings limit in the last two years. To be eligible, 
the unemployed worker must also register at the employment office 
and be available for and seeking work. Benefit disqualifications apply 
for up to six weeks for voluntary leaving of work, discharge for mis 
conduct, and for refusal of suitable work or training opportunity. The 
weekly benefit amount is no longer varied by sex or age. In 1989, it 
consisted of a flat amount of £32.75 a week plus £20.20 for a depen 
dent spouse. 13 Benefits are payable after a three-day waiting period for 
up to a maximum of fifty-two weeks. An income-tested supplementary
11. This section is based on Blaustein and Craig (1977, pp. 224-234), and U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (1990).
12. The basis for the consolidation of all social insurance programs, including unemployment 
insurance, into a unified comprehensive system was the Beveridge Report (1942), a review and 
analysis of the experience under preexisting schemes, with recommendations.
13. Based on exchange rates in 1992 before the British pound began to fall, the U.S. dollar 
equivalents for the weekly benefit and dependent spouse addition were about $60 and $37, respec 
tively.
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benefit is payable to those in need, financed entirely by the govern 
ment.
Lessons from the British Experience
The British record of unemployment insurance was no argument for 
action in the United States in 1935. In fact, the British experience from 
1921 to 1931 was fully exploited by those opposed to legislation in this 
country. The British retrenchment of 1931, and the revamping of the 
system in 1934, did not have much counter-influence in the United 
States before the Social Security Act was passed. So far as the influ 
ence of the British plan on contemporary American opinion was con 
cerned, the story ended with the heavy debt built up by the 
unemployment insurance fund before the British National Economy 
Act of 1931. This record was cited by American opponents of unem 
ployment insurance as proof that such a program could not be kept sol 
vent. Moreover, the payment of benefits for ten years to large numbers 
of persons who had never contributed, or had a very tenuous attach 
ment to the unemployment insurance program was cited as an example 
of how an insurance system could deteriorate into a "dole."
Actually, the image of the British system as a dole, as opposed to an 
insurance program, developed because about one-fourth of its benefi 
ciaries in the ten years ending in 1931 had paid little or nothing in 
insurance contributions. About three-fourths of the beneficiaries during 
this period were eligible for and received standard benefits. It has been 
estimated that if there had been no changes in the 1920 Act, the system 
would have remained solvent. The estimated cost of uncovenanted, 
extended, and transitional benefits accounted for over 90 percent of the 
debt accumulated by mid-1931 (Burns 1941, p. 70). As for the contin 
ued extensions of benefits to those who had exhausted standard bene 
fits and to those who could not meet the qualifying conditions, the 
British experience constituted a warning of the political pressures that 
develop if an alternative method of caring for the unemployed who 
exhaust their unemployment insurance benefits is not available. The 
English local Poor Law system was harsh and antiquated and the Brit 
ish government sought to minimize the use of it for the unemployed. 
Also, if it had been used to care for those unable to qualify for standard
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unemployment benefits, the local governments that administered poor 
relief would have been bankrupted.
American planners of unemployment insurance legislation learned a 
great deal from the British experience. First, they were careful to pro 
pose strict qualifying requirements and definite limitations on the dura 
tion of benefits in order to avoid any charges that they were proposing 
a dole for all the unemployed. Second, they were extremely prudent, 
and perhaps too conservative, in the bensfits proposed in order to 
assure a solvent system. Finally, the British legislation, being the best 
known, was the most closely copied in drafting the detailed provisions 
of legislative proposals with respect to qualifying and disqualifying 
provisions and administrative arrangements.
The German System
The program established by the German Unemployment Insurance 
Act of 1927 differed markedly from the British scheme. 14 The experts 
who designed the German system had studied the British experience 
and endeavored to profit from its mistakes. Nevertheless, the German 
system had as hard going from 1929 on as did the British program after 
1920, and was subject to as frequent changes. The adaptations to heavy 
unemployment, however, were generally in the opposite direction from 
those taken by the British. Instead of using the unemployment insur 
ance system to provide for the great bulk of the unemployed as the 
British did, the Germans in most respects progressively restricted their 
program and changed it more and more into a relief system.
In spite of being the first country to establish a general social insur 
ance system (in 1889), Germany was late among European countries in 
adopting unemployment insurance. It had had experience, however, 
with national unemployment relief for almost ten years. Immediately 
after the end of World War I, a national emergency relief system was 
created. Although it was first enacted as a temporary measure, it was
14. For detailed information on the German experience prior to 1935, see Carroll (1930); 
National Industrial Conference Board (1932); and briefer and later accounts in the studies of for 
eign systems listed in footnote 6.
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continued up to the time the unemployment insurance law was 
enacted. In fact, by that time it had taken on some of the characteristics 
of unemployment insurance. Beginning October 1923, employers and 
workers contributed to relief financing. Administrative control had also 
gradually shifted from communal relief agencies to the employment 
exchanges.
Unemployment Insurance Law of 1927
This relief system was entirely superseded by the German unem 
ployment insurance law, enacted in July and made effective in October 
1927. The new law provided for a three-tier system of assistance to the 
unemployed. The top tier was an unemployment insurance program 
financed through employer and employee contributions. The second 
tier provided emergency benefits, based on a moderate needs test and 
financed four-fifths by the federal government and one-fifth by the 
local governments. The bottom tier consisted of local poor relief, 
which was originally intended to be financed exclusively by local gov 
ernments, but which was given substantial federal aid during the 1929- 
33 depression. The provision of emergency benefits recognized the fact 
that ordinary benefits would not give sufficient protection during 
depressions. It was planned as an intermediate stage between unem 
ployment insurance and poor relief, to be restricted or expanded 
according to economic conditions, with a needs test less severe than 
that required for poor relief. It was to be administered by the same 
organization as that paying regular unemployment insurance benefits.
Instead of flat-rate contributions and benefits, as under the British 
program, the German unemployment insurance law created 11 wage 
classes, both for contributions and benefits. The benefit amounts were 
proportionately varied by wage class so that relatively more generous 
amounts were payable to the lower wage workers. Dependents' allow 
ances were also provided. Duration of benefits was the same as under 
the British Act of 1927 up to twenty-six weeks with a qualifying 
requirement of twenty-six weeks of employment in the last year. Cov 
erage was almost universal from the start. Manual workers, between 
the school-leaving age and 65, and salaried workers, earning no more 
than a specified amount in a year, were covered. Only agricultural
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workers and domestic household workers were excluded from the sys 
tem.
The emergency unemployment benefits were payable for a maxi 
mum of 26 weeks during periods of exceptional unemployment, except 
that nonmanual workers over age 40 could receive such benefits for 
thirty-nine weeks. The benefits were payable to those who had 
exhausted regular insurance benefits or were unable to qualify for 
them. At first, the weekly rates of emergency benefits were the same as 
those for regular benefits, but the emergency benefit rates were low 
ered in late 1930.
Changes to Meet Heavy Unemployment
The German law of 1927 was enacted in a period of relative pros 
perity, but severe unemployment set in shortly thereafter. Beginning in 
1928, unemployment increased and, except for seasonal improve 
ments, continued to grow, until it reached a peak of 6 million workers 
in 1932. This represented almost half the workforce covered by unem 
ployment insurance. Although the system built up a surplus during its 
first six months of operation, large federal loans had to be made to the 
insurance fund in 1928 and 1929. Contributions were increased three 
times during 1930, more than doubling the original combined rate (3 
percent of wages) on employers and workers. Thereafter, the insurance 
fund had an annual surplus, even though in the fiscal year 1932-33 
there was a substantial transfer to the relief fund (Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company 1935, p. 39). Unemployment insurance had been 
cut back so drastically by then, both in the weekly amount payable and 
in the number of persons eligible, that the fund still had a surplus. 
Besides the steep increase in contributions, a whole series of new laws 
and presidential decrees were adopted beginning November 1929 in 
order to keep the insurance fund solvent. These laws and decrees 
adjusted coverage, extended the waiting period before benefits were 
payable, tightened the law against abuse, increased the eligibility 
requirements, and cut benefit amounts. In October 1931, the duration 
of benefits was reduced to twenty weeks and in June 1932, a needs test 
was imposed after the first six weeks of benefits. At the same time, reg 
ular weekly benefit amounts were reduced 23 percent.
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In contrast to the constant changes in extended benefits made by the 
British, major changes were made only twice in the German emer 
gency benefit scheme. In November 1930, insured unemployed per 
sons in all occupations other than manual workers in agriculture, 
domestic servants, and persons under 21 were made eligible for emer 
gency benefits, provided that they lived in places of 10,000 population 
or over and could satisfy the general conditions required for standard 
insurance benefits. On the other hand, the emergency benefit amount 
was reduced, and the duration shortened from thirty-nine to thirty-two 
weeks for nonmanual workers over 40 years of age, with extension in 
exceptional cases to forty-five weeks. A stricter proof of need was also 
required.
In October 1932, supplementary emergency benefits were made 
payable to persons with dependents, and benefits were continued for 
those who otherwise would have exhausted their duration entitlement. 
Intended as a temporary measure, these changes were continued indef 
initely in March 1933. Beginning in May 1933, the cost of emergency 
benefits was paid out of the contributory unemployment insurance 
fund. It is interesting that the British took the opposite course the fol 
lowing year, when they separated the financing of insurance benefits 
and unemployment assistance.
The proportion of the unemployed who drew insurance benefits was 
at a peak of over 80 percent in January 1929, and dropped almost to 30 
percent in January 1932. This decrease was probably due in large part 
to the exhaustion of benefits by an increasing number of the unem 
ployed. The peak number drawing unemployment insurance was 
almost 2.5 million in February 1932. In June 1932, when insurance 
benefits without a needs test were restricted to six weeks, the number 
receiving such benefits fell to below 1 million, or about 17 percent of 
the unemployed. A year later, in June 1933, only about 400,000 drew 
such benefits, although unemployment still hovered around 5 million. 
Figures after that date are not comparable. 15
The number drawing emergency benefits naturally increased as the 
depression wore on and workers exhausted regular benefits. In January
15. The only change made by the Nazi regime up to then was to exclude domestic servants in 
May 1933. Other restrictions later imposed were to withdraw protection from agricultural workers 
and all non-Aryans.
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1929, a total of 145,000, or only about 5 percent of the unemployed 
drew emergency benefits. The number increased steadily except for 
seasonal fluctuations until it reached a peak of 1.7 million, or about 29 
percent of the unemployed in March 1932. Thereafter, the number of 
emergency benefit recipients declined somewhat to 1.3 million in June 
1933.
Local relief had to take care of an increasing proportion of the 
unemployed. Comparable figures are not available before August 
1930, but in that month 450,000, or nearly 16 percent of the unem 
ployed received local relief. The number grew to 2.4 million, or about 
42 percent of the unemployed in December 1932. About 22 percent of 
the unemployed drew neither benefits or relief in December 1932 
(Industrial Relations Counselors 1934, pp. 278-81).
Post-War Changes
After World War II, the Allies froze all German government funds 
and, in connection with currency reform, wiped out accumulated funds 
so that a fresh start had to be made in accumulating insurance 
reserves. 16 A new unemployment insurance law was enacted in the 
western zones in October 1947. 17 The Federal Republic of Germany, 
1952, set up a new Federal Institution for Placement and Unemploy 
ment Insurance to administer unemployment insurance the pattern of 
administration used before the war for all of Germany. The 1947 law 
was amended in 1952,1953, and 1956, and completely replaced by the 
Employment Promotion Act of 1969.
The program's structure, based on the 1969 law, is similar to the 
original law of 1927. It is administered by the somewhat autonomous 
Federal Employment Institution (or Institute for Labor). Based on pro 
visions effective in 1989, coverage is practically universal. Employers 
and workers each pay contributions at an equal rate (2.15 percent) on
16. This section is based on Blaustein and Craig (1977, pp. 190-199), and U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration (1990, pp. 94-95).
17. An attempt was made in the Allied Control Council to develop a comprehensive social 
insurance system for all of Germany, but while it was being negotiated, the Russians issued an 
ordinance providing for a unified social insurance system, including unemployment insurance, for 
East Germany. The three western Allied powers then decided to let the West Germans develop a 
revised unemployment insurance law, subject to the approval of the occupying powers. Unem 
ployment insurance in East Germany continued until 1977 when it was abolished.
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wages up to a taxable wage ceiling (73.000DM); 18 employers, how 
ever, pay the worker share of contributions for employees earning less 
than 10 percent of the ceiling. The government makes up any deficit in 
financing insurance benefits. The minimum qualifying requirement is 
360 days of insured work (180 days for seasonal workers) in the three 
years prior to filing for benefits. In addition, the unemployed worker 
must register at the employment office and be available for work. Ben 
efit disqualification is imposed for up to twelve weeks for leaving work 
voluntarily, for a misconduct discharge, and for refusing an offer of a 
suitable job or training. Benefits are payable with no waiting period for 
up to sixteen to fifty-two weeks, depending on the amount of insured 
employment (for up to twenty-eight weeks for those over age 49). The 
wage-related weekly benefit amount is 68 percent of the worker's 
after-tax earnings (63 percent for single workers). Weekly unemploy 
ment assistance, subject to a means test, is payable after exhaustion of 
regular benefits at the rate of 58 percent of after-tax earnings (56 per 
cent for single workers). The federal government finances unemploy 
ment assistance costs.
German reunification after 1989 has produced some major unem 
ployment as an effect of the difficult process of economic integration, 
especially in the East. Years of transition may lie ahead for coping ade 
quately with the industrial dislocations in the former Democratic 
Republic. Meanwhile, the integrity of the unemployment insurance 
program appears protected by the government's legal obligation to 
underwrite any deficits that arise because of heavy benefit outlays, and 
by the availability of unemployment assistance.
Lessons from the German Experience
While the British badly damaged their unemployment insurance 
system before 1934 by using all sorts of devices to keep the unem 
ployed on the benefit rolls, thereby putting the program heavily in debt, 
the Germans almost destroyed their program by progressively restrict 
ing it in order to keep it solvent. While Germany kept unemployment 
insurance self-supporting, and also eventually supported emergency
18. Based on exchange rates in 1992, the U.S. dollar equivalent of the taxable wage base was 
about $46,000.
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benefits out of unemployment insurance income, practically all bene 
fits (except for the first six weeks) were placed on a needs basis.
The experience of the German system was also used by opponents 
of legislation in the United States to demonstrate that unemployment 
insurance could not meet the needs of a depression. There is little evi 
dence that much consideration was given to the German scheme during 
the framing of the Social Security Act. The rather favorable experience 
with emergency benefits might well have been considered, in view of 
the very modest program of unemployment insurance proposed in this 
country. The German system provided somewhat of a model for vary 
ing contributions and benefits with wages. Contributions by both 
employers and workers, as in Germany, were adopted at first by only 
ten states; employee contributions now exist in only a few states. This 
is largely due to the emphasis that has been placed in this country on 
employer responsibility for unemployment costs and experience rating. 
While the British briefly considered experience rating at the outset of 
their program, the Germans never have. It has remained an exclusively 
American practice in financing unemployment insurance.
Concluding Observations
Knowledge about European experience with unemployment insur 
ance prior to the passage of the Social Security Act was available in the 
United States and well noted by American protagonists on the subject. 
The smaller countries had largely relied on government subsidies of 
trade union plans, which were much more highly developed than in 
this country. Of the few countries that had compulsory unemployment 
insurance systems, the British and German schemes received the most 
attention.
That both these systems were tested and strained by heavy unem 
ployment in the 1920s and early 1930s was of particular interest to 
Americans during the depression in this country. The harshness and 
inadequacies of the English Poor Laws in coping with industrial unem 
ployment had so discredited such relief that governments felt politi 
cally compelled to stretch the new unemployment insurance system 
very far to avoid throwing unemployed workers on to local poor relief
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when their benefits ran out and sufficient employment could not be 
obtained to qualify for more benefits. Progressive relaxation of qualify 
ing conditions and repeated additions to or extensions of the durations 
of covenanted, uncovenanted and transitional benefits undermined and 
badly damaged the program's integrity with respect to both its basic 
principles and its financial solvency. American reaction to inadequate 
and demeaning local relief in the early 1930s also contributed strongly 
to broadened public preference for the insurance approach to deal with 
unemployment. Opponents of this approach, however, pointed tell 
ingly to the instability and disarray of the British system, to its fiscal 
morass, and to its image as a dole. As already noted, the response was 
to design a very conservative program for the United States.
German experience with unemployment insurance carried less influ 
ence in this country. Negative associations lingered from the American 
encounter with Germany in World War I. Because of a common lan 
guage and closer cultural ties, Americans generally could identify more 
readily with British experience, thus giving that country's program 
more weight in the debate and design of unemployment insurance in 
the United States. By 1934 and 1935, the character of the Nazi regime 
in Germany had become more widely evident, casting a shadow on 
anything that was German. Nevertheless, for what it was worth, oppo 
nents of the insurance approach could also point to the failure of the 
German system to meet its objectives as further evidence that unem 
ployment insurance could not work.
The key question about the feasibility of unemployment insurance 
as posed by the British and German experience was whether a program 
could navigate the turbulence of a massive and prolonged depression, a 
question perhaps less clear to those living in the middle of such a 
period. It was apparent that the limited program cautiously designed 
for the nation in the mid-1930s could not relieve much of the depres 
sion unemployment of the time. The national work relief programs 
then in place would continue to deal with the larger problem until the 
economy finally recovered. There was, however, no provision made at 
the time for a backup plan to cope with the burden of excessive long- 
term unemployment if and when it should again develop in the future. 
The British solution of 1934 was a national unemployment assistance 
program, finally overcoming its aversion to relief as practiced under
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the Poor Laws. This move came too late to offer any useful lessons for 
American planners of economic and Social Security in 1934 and 1935. 
The German approach had been to resort more and more to relief 
and even to needs-tested unemployment insurance, thereby compro 
mising basic insurance principles. The concept of relief payments as a 
back-up program to help cope in times of heavy prolonged unemploy 
ment was a lesson that might have been useful to learn from the foreign 
experience. Decades later, the American unemployment insurance sys 
tem was to confront that problem without such a backup program in 
place. The system's multiple extension of duration, frequent changes, 
and heavy costs leading to widespread state fund insolvency were rem 
iniscent of the British struggles with the problem a half century earlier.
APPENDIX
Excerpt from Speech in 1910 by Hubert Llewellyn Smith
(In this speech, Smith set forth the basis for unemployment insurance in 
Great Britain, the first national compulsory system ever adopted.)
The crucial question from a practical point of view is, therefore, whether it 
is possible to devise a scheme of insurance which, while nominally covering 
unemployment due to all causes other than those which can be definitely 
excluded, shall automatically discriminate as between the classes of unem 
ployment for which insurance is or is not an appropriate remedy.
We can advance a step towards answering this crucial question by enumer 
ating some of the essential characteristics of any unemployment insurance 
scheme which seem to follow directly or by necessary implication from the 
conditions of the problem as here laid down.
1. The scheme must be compulsory; otherwise the bad personal risks 
against which we must always be on our guard would be certain to predomi 
nate.
2. The scheme must be contributory, for only by exacting rigorously as a 
necessary qualification for benefit that a sufficient number of weeks' contribu 
tions shall have been paid by each recipient can we possibly hope to put limits 
on the exceptionally bad risks.
3. With the same object in view there must be a maximum limit to the 
amount of benefit which can be drawn, both absolutely and in relation to the 
amount of contribution paid; or, in oilier words, we must in some way or other 
secure that the number of weeks for which a workman contributes should bear 
some relation to his claim upon the fund. Armed with this double weapon of a 
maximum limit to benefit and of a minimum contribution, the operation of the 
scheme itself will automatically exclude the loafer.
4. The scheme must avoid encouraging unemployment, and for this pur 
pose it is essential that the rate of unemployment benefit payable shall be rela 
tively low. It would be fatal to any scheme to offer compensation for 
unemployment at a rate approximating to that of ordinary wages.
5. For the same reason it is essential to enlist the interest of all those 
engaged in the insured trades, whether as employers or as workmen, in reduc 
ing unemployment, by associating them with the scheme both as regards con 
tribution and management.
6. As it appears on examination that some trades are more suitable to be 
dealt with by insurance than others, either because the unemployment in these 
trades contains a large insurable element, or because it takes the form of total 
discharge rather than short time, or for other reasons, it follows that, for the
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scheme to have the best chance of success, it should be based upon the trade 
group, and should at the outset be partial in operation.
7. The group of trades to which the scheme is to be applied must, however, 
be a large one, and must extend throughout the United Kingdom, as it is essen 
tial that industrial mobility as between occupations and districts should not be 
unduly checked.
8. A State subvention and guarantee will be necessary, in addition to contri 
butions from the trades affected, in order to give the necessary stability and 
security, and also in order to justify the amount of State control that will be 
necessary.
9. The scheme must aim at encouraging the regular employer and work 
man, and discriminating against casual engagements. Otherwise it will be sub 
ject to the criticism of placing an undue burden on the regular for the benefit 
of the irregular members of the trade.
10. The scheme must not act as a discouragement to voluntary provision 
for unemployment, and for that purpose some well-devised plan of co-opera 
tion is essential between the State organisation and the voluntary associations 
which at present provide unemployment benefit for their members.
Our analysis, therefore, leads us step by step to the contemplation of a 
national contributory scheme of insurance universal in its operation within the 
limits of a large group of trades a group so far as possible self-contained and 
carefully selected as favourable for the experiment, the funds being derived 
from compulsory contributions from all those engaged in these trades, with a 
subsidy and guarantee from the State, and the rules relating to benefit being so 
devised as to discriminate effectively against unemployment which is mainly 
due to personal defects, while giving a substantial allowance to those whose 
unemployment results from industrial causes beyond the control of the indi 
vidual (Beveridge 1930, pp. 265-66).
American Forerunners
and Early Attempts
at Legislation
The United States did not entirely lack exposure to unemployment 
insurance before the wave of legislation in the mid-1930s. Discussion 
and debate about the subject began some thirty years earlier, ranging 
over a wide variety of issues including the need for such a program, its 
role, form, philosophy, and locus of responsibility. Some practical 
experience with voluntary unemployment benefit schemes had accu 
mulated through private trade union plans, joint agreement (employer- 
employee) plans, and company plans. Attempts to enact state unem 
ployment insurance legislation date back to 1916. As the depression of 
the 1930s deepened, an increasing number of progressive reformers 
and representatives sensitive to worker interests were elected to gover 
norships and state legislatures. During this period, a number of state 
commissions were created to study unemployment insurance and many 
bills were introduced at the state level. One state, Wisconsin, enacted a 
law as early as 1932. Some study of the question was also made in 
Congress and a few bills were introduced there as well. Reports of the 
state commissions, the resulting debates in state legislatures, and these 
early bills greatly influenced the character of the legislation that even 
tually passed. 1
This chapter briefly reviews the American experience with volun 
tary unemployment insurance schemes and traces the history of legis 
lative activity prior to the passage by Congress of the Social Security 
Actinl935.2
1. Nelson, (1969) provides a comprehensive treatment of this historic background for unem 
ployment insurance in the United States. Other details may also be found in Raushenbush and 
Raushenbush (1979).
2. For a more detailed description of American voluntary plans up to 1930, see Stewart (1930).
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American Voluntary Plans
Private voluntary schemes of cash support for workers during peri 
ods of unemployment never became widespread in the United States. 
A limited number of plans of various types developed prior to 1935 
through initiatives taken by trade unions, employers, or jointly by 
workers and employers. Several business leaders urged the voluntary 
approach, partly to forestall the need for compulsory government pro 
grams, but also in recognition of some employer responsibility for 
treating with the involuntary unemployment of their workers. Some 
trade unions viewed such plans as an appropriate element for collective 
bargaining. Few of the plans that developed before 1935 survived the 
early years of the Great Depression. Although voluntary plans did not 
become a major factor, the experience they provided and some of the 
individuals who designed and promoted them carried some influence 
in the discussions that shaped the unemployment insurance system that 
finally emerged.
Trade Union Plans
Unlike the experience in Europe, trade unions in this country devel 
oped very few formal unemployment benefit plans. The earliest known 
plan was established in 1831. During times of depression in the late 
1800s and the early part of the 1900s, practically all trade unions gave 
assistance to their unemployed members and many unemployment 
benefit or relief plans sprang up, only to be discontinued when employ 
ment conditions improved. In 1931, the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
could report only three national unions and forty-five local unions that 
had unemployment benefit plans of a more or less permanent and sys 
tematic character (USDOL, Bureau of Labor Statistics 1931). Of the 
local plans, eight had been established after the stock market crash of 
September 1929 when the depression began.
The three national unions with unemployment benefit plans had a 
total membership of only about 1,000. The oldest, the Deutsch-Ameri- 
kanishe Typographic started its plan in 1884, and the other two, 
siderographers and diamond cutters, in 1910 and 1912, respectively. 
The forty-five local unions with plans in 1931 had a total membership 
of about 45,000. They included: bookbinders; lithographers; electro-
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typers; photoengravers; pressmen and press assistants; typographical 
workers; bakery workers; lace operatives; brewery, flour, cereal, and 
soft drink workers; and wood carvers.
The plans varied widely both as to type and amount of contribu 
tions, which were paid entirely by union members. Contributions in 
some plans equaled a percentage of earnings (10 percent in one); in 
others a flat daily, weekly, or monthly amount was contributed (in sev 
eral plans as high as $2 a week per member); and in still others, assess 
ments were paid as needed. Benefits also varied widely. As reported in 
1931, the three national union plans, perhaps because they were started 
in a day of lower wages, paid only $5, $6, and $9 a week, but for max 
imum periods varying from 16 to 26 weeks of unemployment. The 
local union plans paid from $5.50 to $30 a week, with the highest 
amount being paid by the photoengravers and electrotypers. The dura 
tion limits of weekly benefit payments ranged from eight to thirty-two 
weeks, with ten plans having indefinite or unlimited duration. During 
1933, the latest year for which figures are available, trade union plans 
paid out a total of $3,700,000 in benefits, of which $2,150,000 was 
paid by the electrotypers and photoengravers (Metropolitan Life Insur 
ance Company 1935, p. 67).
Joint Agreement Plans
In 1931, thirteen unemployment benefit and three guaranteed 
employment plans, worked out by joint agreement between unions and 
management, covered over 65,000 workers. All were established in the 
1920s, except the wallpaper industry guaranteed employment plan 
which started in 1894. The thirteen benefit plans were all in the needle 
trades. These included the plans of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers 
in Chicago, New York City, and Rochester, New York, totaling 33,000 
workers, and the American Federation of Full-Fashioned Hosiery 
Workers, with 15,000 members. The guaranteed employment plans 
applied to workers in the women's clothing industry in Cleveland, to 
the wallpaper workers, and to equipment maintenance employees of 
the Seaboard Airline Railway (USDOL, Bureau of Labor Statistics 
1931, pp. 14-19). By 1931, a few of the plans, including that of the 
wallpaper industry, had been suspended or abandoned (Industrial Rela 
tions Counselors 1934, p. 66).
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Employer contributions alone supported five of the unemployment 
benefit plans and joint contributions the other eight plans. Contribu 
tions were usually expressed as a percentage of payrolls, or wages, the 
highest being the Amalgamated Clothing Workers plan in Chicago 
with a 3 percent employer and 1-1/2 percent employee contribution. 
Benefits were more limited than in the plans financed by trade unions, 
and they usually aimed at compensating seasonal unemployment. For 
example, the Chicago plan of the Amalgamated provided for a maxi 
mum duration of three-and-three-quarter weeks of benefits in two sea 
sons. The weekly benefit was equal to 30 percent of wages up to a 
maximum of $15 a week. The International Ladies' Garment Workers' 
Union plan in Cleveland guaranteed thirty-eight weeks of employment. 
The Seaboard plan guaranteed employment for a whole year for a min 
imum number of workers. The United Wall Paper Crafts plan guaran 
teed forty-five weeks a year at full pay.
Statistics are not available as to amounts paid out under these plans, 
except for the three Amalgamated Clothing Workers plans. Those plans 
disbursed a total of about $884,000 during the five years from April 
1929 to March 1934 (Metropolitan Life Insurance Company 1935, p. 
69).
Company Plans
Beginning with the Dennison Manufacturing Company in 1917, 
thirty-eight firms provided for some protection against unemployment 
through nineteen unemployment benefit plans, savings plans, or 
employment guarantee plans at some time between 1917 and 1933. 
When the BLS made its survey of voluntary plans in 1931, fifteen 
plans, including the fourteen-firm "Rochester Plan," had been adopted 
or were in operation3 . They covered about 80,000 workers. By the end 
of 1933, four new plans had been adopted, but four others had sus 
pended or ended operations. In addition, seven of the fourteen firms 
had withdrawn from the Rochester Plan (Industrial Relations Counse 
lors 1934, pp. 67-70 and appendix V; USDOL, Bureau of Labor Statis-
3. A dismissal payment plan of the Delaware and Hudson Railroad, which the BLS did not con 
sider as an unemployment benefit plan, was also reported in Metropolitan Life Insurance Com 
pany (1935).
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tics 1931 pp. 7-13; Metropolitan Life Insurance Company 1935, pp. 
69-75).
The best known of the guaranteed employment plans was Procter 
and Gamble's. When started in 1923, it guaranteed forty-eight weeks 
of employment at full pay for hourly employees whose annual earnings 
were less than $2,000, who were participants in the company's profit- 
sharing plan, and who had six months of service with the firm. Begin 
ning 1933, membership in the profit-sharing plan was no longer 
required, but one year of service was mandatory.
Typical of an individual savings plans was that of the J. I. Case 
Company of Racine, Wisconsin, which contributed an amount equal to 
5 percent of each employee's earnings, matched by a similar employee 
contribution until one year's earnings accrued in a savings account. 
During periods of depression, a laid-off employee could (after a 
ninety-day waiting period) withdraw 40 percent of his earnings up to a 
maximum of $40 for each semi-monthly period.
The General Electric Company, by far the largest employer to pro 
vide unemployment protection for its workers, put two types of plans 
in effect in 1930 and 1931: a guaranteed employment plan for 8,000 
electric light bulb employees in Schenectady, New York; and an unem 
ployment benefit plan for 40,000 out of 70,000 employees in the bal 
ance of the company's plants. Under the benefit plan, employer and 
employee contributions, each equal to 1 percent of earnings, were to be 
paid for three years. The original plan provided for a weekly benefit 
amount equal to 50 percent of an employee's normal full-time weekly 
earnings up to a maximum of $20 a week for up to 10 weeks in a 
twelve-month period. The plan was modified several times in the first 
three years of operation, but not fundamentally changed. Between 
1931 and 1934, the plan raised about $5 million in contributions and 
disbursed over $3.6 million in benefits (Nelson 1969, p. 61).
The Rochester Plan also merits a brief description. This plan was 
uniform for the participating companies, but each company adminis 
tered its own fund to which it contributed 2 percent of payrolls until the 
fund reached a total equal to five years of contributions. If the fund 
proved inadequate after January 1,1933, all employees of the company 
would be required to contribute 1 percent of their pay and the company 
would add an additional amount. Originally, weekly benefits were to 
be 60 percent of earnings, up to a weekly maximum of $22.50, payable
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to laid-off employees with a year or more of service and earnings not 
exceeding $50 a week. A two-week waiting period was required, with 
maximum benefit duration varying from 6 to 13 weeks for employees 
with from one to five years of service. In November 1932, weekly ben 
efits were temporarily reduced to 50 percent of average weekly earn 
ings, up to a maximum of $18.75.
It is interesting that officials of eight of the company plans testified 
favorably at one or more hearings on state and federal legislation. 
Their experience convinced them that unemployment benefits should 
be generally available, by legislation if necessary. As Marion B. Fol- 
som, Treasurer of the Eastman Kodak Company and a member of the 
Rochester Plan, testified with respect to the unemployment insurance 
provisions of the Social Security bill: "The employers who are on this 
Advisory Council you will recall they are Mr. Teagle, Mr. Swope, 
Mr. Lewisohn, Mr. Leeds, besides myself reached the conclusion that 
you must have legislation in order to provide security for the workers 
in general, which many companies are already providing, because vol 
untary action would be too slow."4
Early State Legislative Activity
Although the idea of government-supported unemployment insur 
ance in the United States was discussed in the early 1900s, there were 
no attempts at state legislation until 1916. The earliest known formal 
treatment of the subject was a paper on the "Ghent system" by Profes 
sor Henry R. Seager of Columbia University at the first annual meeting 
of the American Association for Labor Legislation (AALL) in 1907. 
Adoption of social insurance by Great Britain in 1911 to provide work 
ers with old-age and unemployment benefits had a profound effect in 
the United States on social reformers and others concerned with the 
problems of workers in this country. The AALL's annual meeting in 
1911 included a discussion of the new British unemployment insurance
4. U.S. Congress, Senate (1935, p. 555). The Advisory Council referred to was that appointed 
by the President as advisory to the Committee on Economic Security. Mr. Swope was president of 
General Electric Company and Mr. Leeds of Leeds-Northrup Company, both of which had private 
plans.
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law and a Committee on Unemployment was appointed to consider the 
problem. In 1913, the Association held the first American Conference 
on Social Insurance at which unemployment insurance was urged in 
the United States.
There was more widespread interest in unemployment insurance 
during the depression of 1914-15. In 1914, the American Association 
for Labor Legislation and its affiliated American Association on 
Unemployment held two national conferences on unemployment. At 
the second meeting, a tentative draft was presented, "A Practical Pro 
gram for the Prevention of Unemployment," principally authored by 
John B. Andrews, executive secretary of the AALL. This program 
included unemployment insurance, as well as expansion of public 
employment offices, countercyclical planning and construction of pub 
lic works, and greater efforts by employers to regularize employment. 
It was endorsed by the conference and supported by several emergency 
commissions on unemployment appointed during the depression.
The AALL program's emphasis on prevention rather than on relief 
of unemployment reflected in large measure the influence of Professor 
John R. Commons of the University of Wisconsin. Commons was a 
pioneer in applying academic study and knowledge to practical pur 
poses in the fields of labor problems and social reform. Assisted by 
some of his students, he was the principal designer of the 1911 work 
ers' compensation law in Wisconsin and became its first administrator. 
Noting that workplace safety improved after compensation costs were 
made the clear responsibility of individual employers, Commons rea 
soned that similar treatment of unemployment compensation costs 
would induce more stable employment. This view guided the thinking 
and efforts of many of his students in subsequent years with regard to 
unemployment insurance, or unemployment compensation as they pre 
ferred to call it. The "Wisconsin school" became a major influence in 
the evolution of unemployment insurance in this country that has left 
its imprint on the American system in ways that make it unique.5
John Andrews, who had been a student of Commons, carried the 
concept into the AALL's "Practical Program" of 1914. While some 
aspects of the British law of 1911 were adapted for the unemployment
5. For an account of Commons' life and career, see Myself, the Autobiography of John R. Com 
mons (1963).
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insurance section of the program, Andrews asserted that "of crowning 
importance in the movement toward regularization of industry is the 
careful development of this form of insurance with its continuous pres 
sure toward the prevention of unemployment" (as quoted in Nelson 
1969, p. 16). Interest in the Association's program, and in unemploy 
ment insurance in general, waned after 1915 as boom replaced depres 
sion.6
The first bill proposed to establish unemployment insurance was 
introduced in the Massachusetts legislature in 1916. In general, it cop 
ied the British law, with financing based on contributions by employ 
ers, workers, and the government. In 1921, a similar bill was proposed 
in New York by the Socialist Party. In the same year, a bill of quite a 
different character was introduced in Wisconsin.
The Huber Bill in Wisconsin
In February 1921, State Senator Henry A. Huber of Wisconsin intro 
duced a bill with the unique feature of varying employers' contribu 
tions according to the regularity of their employment of workers. The 
principal author of this bill was John Commons. Industries covered 
under the Huber bill were to be classified, and premium rates estab 
lished according to their experience with unemployment. The entire 
cost of the compensation paid to the unemployed would be borne by 
employers, who would be required to insure their liability for pay 
ments with a mutual insurance company controlled by the State Com 
pensation Insurance Board.
Although the Huber bill had the support of the Wisconsin State Fed 
eration of Labor and several employers with unemployment insurance 
plans of their own, there was a formidable list of employers in opposi 
tion to it. The bill was defeated in the Senate by a vote of nineteen to 
ten. However, the Huber measure was reintroduced in each succeeding 
session of the Wisconsin legislature through 1929, with different spon 
sors from 1925 on. In 1923, it lost by one vote in the Wisconsin Senate. 
Although several modifications were made in the bill in succeeding 
years, its essential features remained intact. 7
6. Most of the above information is drawn from Witte (1945, pp. 22-23), and Nelson (1969, pp. 
10-17).
7. For a detailed discussion and history of the Huber bill and its successors, see Ewing (1933).
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Other State Legislative Proposals
The Huber bill formed the pattern for bills introduced in other State 
legislatures during the 1920s. These included proposals in Connecti 
cut, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania. Altogether, twenty-two bills in 
seven states were introduced in the 1920s, including bills in five states 
in 1929 (Industrial Relations Counselors 1934, pp. 72-73).
Interest in unemployment insurance legislation during the 1920s, 
however, was weak. It was a period largely of prosperity and "nor 
malcy." Moreover, news of how poorly unemployment insurance fared 
in Great Britain in this decade of heavy unemployment, and in Ger 
many under its 1927 law, did nothing to encourage support. Whatever 
interest there was in combating unemployment in the United States 
centered at this time on the efforts of some businessmen to prevent it in 
the first place by applying "scientific management" to their operations 
thereby "regularizing" employment. It was in this period that most of 
the company or joint employer-employee plans for unemployment 
benefits or guaranteed employment appeared on the scene. The empha 
sis was on private, voluntary actions, not on public compulsory mea 
sures, an emphasis supported by the principal national leaders of 
organized labor as well, given their distrust of usually unfriendly gov 
ernment authorities.
Increased Legislative Activity in Depression
Interest in unemployment insurance revived with the onset of the 
depression of the 1930s and its mounting unemployment. Private vol 
untary efforts, limited as they were, fell far short of the need. Some 
compulsory measure now seemed more and more appropriate.
The Wisconsin Act
In 1931, two bills were introduced in Wisconsin that were quite dif 
ferent from the Huber bill. One was based on a bill called "An Ameri 
can Plan for Unemployment Reserves,"8 brought out by the American
8. For the text, see "Senate Passes Unemployment Bills" (1930).
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Association for Labor Legislation in 1930. This bill differed from the 
Huber bill in that it provided for a state fund with flat contributions of 
1.5 percent of payroll by employers. Provision was also made for 
insurance by industry and industry funds as an alternative to statewide 
pooling. This bill appealed to J. J. Handley and Henry Ohl, Jr., officers 
of the Wisconsin Federation of Labor, and they urged Robert Nixon, 
who had introduced the Huber bill in 1929, to use the Association 
draft. Early in 1931, Mr. Nixon introduced a bill in the Wisconsin leg 
islature following the Association plan in providing for a state fund, 
but including the principle of experience rating of contributions.
Professor Harold M. Groves (who had been elected to the state leg 
islature), with the assistance of Professors Paul Raushenbush and Eliz 
abeth Brandeis and others (all from the University and most of them 
former students of Commons), also drafted a bill with important differ 
ences from the Huber bill. The most important change was the provi 
sion of a state fund with individual employer reserve accounts to be 
financed through contributions by the employer. Benefits would be 
paid to an employee only from the employer's account and benefits 
were to be reduced or stopped if the employer's reserve was inade 
quate. This bill was introduced in February 1931.
Following hearings held jointly on the Nixon and Groves bills, the 
legislature authorized an interim committee to study unemployment 
insurance, and to report at a special session of the legislature in the fall. 
At the fall session, the majority of the committee recommended enact 
ment of an unemployment compensation bill with features quite simi 
lar to an amended bill that Groves had introduced later in the 1931 
regular session. Mr. Handley, Secretary of the Wisconsin Federation of 
Labor, who had encouraged the Nixon bill, signed the report ("'Report 
of the Wisconsin Legislative Interim Committee on Unemployment" 
1931).
The American Association for Labor Legislation joined forces with 
the supporters of the Groves bill. Governor Phil LaFollette, in his 
opening address at the special session of the legislature in November 
1931, disarmed much of the opposition by proposing that the unem 
ployment compensation bill would take effect "conditional upon 
industry's failure to establish a fair voluntary system in Wisconsin 
within a reasonable time (i.e., a year and a half)." When the Groves bill 
was reintroduced, it provided that the Act would not take effect if
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employers of at least 200,000 workers had adopted systems of unem 
ployment reserves that met stated requirements within the time limit. 
The bill passed the Legislature by large majorities and was signed by 
the Governor on January 29, 1932.9 The main provisions of the Wis 
consin Unemployment Compensation Act as passed were as follows: 10
1. A state fund with individual employer accounts, funds to be 
invested in government securities by the State Investment 
Board.
2. Contributions equal to 2 percent of payroll during first two 
years and thereafter until employer's account averages $55 an 
employee; thereafter 1 percent if the account is more than $55 
but less than $75; no contributions if more than $75. An addi 
tional 0.2 percent from all employers for administrative 
expenses and employment offices.
3. Coverage of employers with ten or more employees for four 
months or more in a year. Exemptions of farm workers, rail 
road employees in interstate commerce, logging workers, gov 
ernment employees and employees receiving more than $1,500 
a year.
4. Benefits, after two weeks waiting period, equal to 50 percent of 
weekly wages with a minimum of $5 and a maximum of $10. 
Benefits to be reduced $1 a week for each $5 that employer's 
reserve account is below $50 per employee. Benefits to be paid 
for a maximum of ten weeks in the proportion of one week of 
benefits for each four weeks of employment in the last year. 
Each company's liability limited to the amount in its reserve 
fund. Benefits of a worker employed by several companies 
would be charged to last employer first and then in inverse 
order to other employers.
5. Disqualifications from benefits in cases of discharge for mis 
conduct, voluntary leaving not attributable to the employer, 
refusal of suitable work, leaving employment because of a
9. It is of interest to note that Merrill G. Murray, a co-author of the 1966 forerunner of this book, 
traveled about the state in 1931 to explain the bill and develop support for it. Wilbur J. Cohen, a 
contributing author of this present work, was then a student of Paul Raushenbush at the University 
of Wisconsin and attended the debate on the bill in the Wisconsin Assembly.
10. For an authoritative contemporary discussion of the Act, see Raushenbush (1931).
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labor dispute, unemployment due to an act of God, unemploy 
ment by student if he worked only during vacations.
6. Qualifying requirements: two years' residence in the state and 
forty weeks of employment during the period.
The minimum number of employees required to be covered under 
private voluntary plans adopted by their employers in order to prevent 
implementation of the law was reduced to 139,000, but relatively few 
employers adopted voluntary plans. The law took effect July 1, 1934 
with respect to contributions. Benefits became payable July 1, 1936, 
twenty years after the first state unemployment insurance bill was 
introduced in Massachusetts.
Legislative Activity in Other States
In the meantime, efforts were stepped up in other states to pass 
unemployment insurance legislation. Altogether, fifty-two bills were 
introduced in seventeen states in 1931. 11 In addition to the interim 
committee in Wisconsin, study commissions were appointed in Cali 
fornia, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York, and Ohio. Four of them 
reported favorably regarding unemployment insurance.
Also in 1931, Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York invited 
the governors of six other states to meet with him to explore the possi 
bilities of simultaneous action by the states. 12 As Governor Roosevelt 
put it in his opening talk to the governors, "All must act, or there will 
be no action." His remark indicated how a state's reluctance to place its 
industries at a competitive disadvantage inhibited the state from adopt 
ing employer-financed unemployment insurance without assurance of 
similar action elsewhere. As a result of the conference, an Interstate 
Commission on Unemployment Insurance was created, to which each 
of the governors appointed a member. Members included Professor
11. For a state-by-state tabulation of bills from 1916-33, see Industrial Relations Counselors 
(1934, pp. 72-73). A bill authorizing private insurance companies to sell private plans of unem 
ployment insurance was passed by the New York Legislature in 1931, but vetoed by Governor 
Franklin D. Roosevelt.
12. Represented at the conference were Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. New York Labor Commissioner, Frances Perkins, later to 
be President Roosevelt's Secretary of Labor, planned the conference with the assistance of, 
among others, Professor Paul Douglas of the University of Chicago and later U.S. Senator from 
Illinois.
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Leo Wolman of Columbia University as chairman; A. Lincoln Filene, a 
large retail employer of Boston, who strongly supported unemploy 
ment prevention as the prime rationale for unemployment insurance; 
and Professor William M. Leiserson of Antioch College, who favored 
pooling of funds as better assurance of relief. 13 This Commission 
issued its report in February 1932, unanimously recommending com 
pulsory legislation of the individual employer reserves type, very simi 
lar to the Wisconsin law that had just been passed. 14
Of the state study commission reports, the one made by the Ohio 
Commission in 1932 was the most significant because of the wide 
attention it received in proposing a different type of plan than that 
passed in Wisconsin. 15 The Commission recommended a state pooled 
fund, rather than individual employer reserves. Employees were to 
contribute 1 percent of their earnings, and employers 2 percent of their 
payrolls, although provision was made for variation of employer con 
tribution rates based on experience. All workers who qualified for any 
benefits would be entitled to receive payments while unemployed for 
up to a flat or uniform duration limit of sixteen weeks, regardless of the 
amount of their prior employment. The weekly benefit amount recom 
mended was half the wage up to a maximum of $15, benefits to begin 
after a three-week waiting period designed to cut out many seasonally 
unemployed workers. I. M. Rubinow, a long-time advocate of social 
insurance and a member of the Commission, was mainly responsible 
for the estimate that a combined 3 percent contribution rate would be 
sufficient to finance such a benefit program over a period of years 
which included an occasional mild recession and a more severe depres 
sion about once a decade. The Ohio plan received substantial acclaim 
and became a model for a number of bills introduced in other state leg 
islatures.
13. The other members were Charles R. Blunt, Commissioner of Labor, New Jersey; Charles A. 
Kulp, University of Pennsylvania; and W. J. Couper, Deputy Commissioner of Labor, Connecti 
cut.
14. Professor Leiserson, although he signed the report, took "exception to any implication in it 
that an insurance system with pooling of contributions may not be better than a plan of separate 
plant reserves."
15. Ohio Commission on Unemployment Insurance (1932). Professor William Leiserson, who 
eventually chaired the Commission, asserted effective leadership in producing this favorable 
report.
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The plan gave significant stature to a point of view about unemploy 
ment insurance that contrasted sharply with the unemployment preven 
tion focus so strongly established by the Wisconsin school. Much of 
the intellectual base for the suggested approach was provided by Pro 
fessor Douglas out of a study of unemployment begun at Swarthmore 
College in 1930. Douglas and his associate, Aaron Director, reviewed 
the European unemployment insurance plans, the voluntary plans in 
the United States, and the Commons approach embodied in the Huber 
bills in Wisconsin. From this review, along with their analysis of the 
causes and effects of unemployment, especially the effects on workers, 
they concluded that the only feasible means for dealing with the effects 
of the problem was through a pooled insurance fund. They saw allevia 
tion of individual distress and countercyclical support of purchasing 
power as the key objectives for unemployment insurance. Only a genu 
ine funded, pooled insurance plan, not individual employer reserves, 
could provide assured and adequate compensation for wage loss. They 
believed that, by and large, unemployment was beyond the control of 
individual employers. While experience rating of employer contribu 
tions might encourage some prevention of unemployment, "...it is 
probable that its efficacy has in the past been overstressed by advocates 
of unemployment insurance. There are already strong financial incen 
tives to regularize and it may be argued that a saving of some 2 percent 
on the payroll may not be decisive" (Douglas and Director 1931, p. 
489).
Since 1932 was an "off legislative year (most legislatures did not 
meet in even-numbered years), bills were introduced in only five 
states. High hopes were entertained, however, for state legislation in 
1933, given the favorable interstate and state commission reports. 
Altogether, 68 bills were introduced that year in twenty-five states, 
with several types of bills being introduced in some state legislatures. 
According to a tabulation of the American Association for Labor Leg 
islation, its American Plan (for a state fund but with funds by industry 
and dividends to employers) was introduced in sixteen states and in 
Congress. 16 Bills for individual employer reserves, such as the Wis-
16. In June 1933, the Association brought out a new model bill providing for individual 
employer accounts in a state fund, but providing also for pooling by industry when the administra 
tor finds this desirable to safeguard the reserves. Senator Robert Wagner introduced a bill (S. 
1943) for the District of Columbia embodying this new model bill with minor modifications.
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consin Act, were proposed in twelve state legislatures and bills for 
industry pools in six state legislatures. The Ohio plan for a single state 
pooled fund was introduced in sixteen states. No state passed a law in 
1933, but a bill passed one house in seven states. Of these seven states, 
four passed bills for a state pooled fund, one for individual employer 
reserves, one for industry funds, and one for both establishment funds 
and industry pooled funds. 17
Of eleven state study commissions appointed in 1933 and 1934, ten 
made favorable reports (Witte 1936, p. 158). Most of these commis 
sions recommended either the Wisconsin or Ohio type of laws. The 
Virginia Commission recommended individual employer reserves, but 
with a part of each employer's contribution going to a state guaranteed 
fund. The Connecticut Commission recommended a dismissal wage. 
Although no laws besides Wisconsin's were passed until 1935, these 
state commissions no doubt influenced the legislation eventually 
passed in their states. Despite the lack of legislative success in the 
years prior to 1935, the efforts made in the states had served to educate 
the public and illuminate the issues. The major result was to elevate the 
objective of relief of unemployment distress over that of unemploy 
ment prevention, as exemplified in the employer reserves-type pro 
gram of Wisconsin. Labor had clearly moved to support those 
proposals most designed to achieve the former purpose. Support for the 
conservative prevention approach eroded in the gloom of the depres 
sion and general disillusion with business leadership.
Federal Studies and Proposals
Early Considerations
The federal government gave very little attention to unemployment 
insurance until shortly before the depression of the 1930s. The earliest 
known official recommendation was that of the United States Commis 
sion on Industrial Relations, appointed by President Woodrow Wilson 
in 1913 to investigate labor unrest. In its final report, the Commission
17. Memorandum prepared by the American Association for Labor Legislation, published in 
U.S. Congress, House (1934, pp. 102-6).
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recommended the study and preparation of plans for insurance against 
unemployment "in such trades and industries as may seem desir 
able." 18
In February 1916, Representative Meyer London of New York, a 
Socialist, introduced a resolution in the House of Representatives for 
the establishment of a national commission to study social insurance 
and develop proposals for public programs. The House Committee on 
Labor held hearings in April. Although there were favorable witnesses 
representing insurance, social legislation, and research organizations, 
labor opposed action. Samuel Gompers, president of the American 
Federation of Labor, took a stand against the proposal, but said that if a 
commission was established: "I would have them investigate the sub 
ject of social insurance of a voluntary character and how far it can be 
established in the United States with such aid as the Government can 
give. I am more concerned, as I have tried to indicate, with the funda 
mental principles of human liberty and refusal to surrender rights to 
government agencies, than I am with social insurance" (U.S. Congress, 
House 1916, p. 172). This remained his position and the official posi 
tion of the American Federation of Labor until 1932. The London bill 
was killed in Committee, but it aroused considerable interest.
In 1921, President Warren Harding called a national conference on 
unemployment, under the chairmanship of Secretary of Commerce 
Herbert Hoover. In his opening statement, Mr. Hoover spoke of "direct 
doles" to individuals as "the most vicious of solutions" and hoped the 
conferees would find solutions that do not "come within the range of 
charity." After reviewing private plans in this country, the Economic 
Advisory Committee on Unemployment and Depression Insurance, 
appointed at the conference, said that "any form of unemployment 
insurance which would create an economic motive to regularize 
employment is worthy of consideration." It recommended that reserve 
funds be created and used in depressions, not to pay unemployment 
compensation to idle workers but to keep them employed in such activ 
ities as making repairs or improvements on equipment and facilities,
18. U.S. Congress, Senate (1916, Vol. 2, p. 1160). It is interesting to note that the research staff 
of the Commission included a number of economists from the University of Wisconsin, associates 
or students of John Commons who was a member of the Commission.
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and to continue production for inventory ("Business Cycles and Unem 
ployment" 1923).
In 1928, the first federal unemployment insurance bill (H.R. 12205) 
was introduced in Congress by Representative Victor Berger. It 
received no attention, but in May 1928 the Senate adopted Senate Res 
olution 219, introduced by Senator James Couzens of Michigan, "pro 
viding for an analysis and appraisal of reports on unemployment and 
systems for prevention and relief thereof." The Senate Committee on 
Education and Labor held hearings on the subject. Professor Com 
mons, one of the principal witnesses, testified at length on how unem 
ployment compensation could serve to stabilize employment. Other 
testimony covered voluntary benefit plans, employment exchanges, 
and European unemployment insurance. In its report the Committee 
thought that government should encourage private industry in its 
responsibility to stabilize employment. Its second recommendation 
was that: "Insurance plans against unemployment should be confined 
to the industry itself as much as possible. There is no necessity and no 
place for Federal interference in such efforts at this time. If any public 
insurance scheme is considered, it should be left to the State legisla 
tures to study the problem" (U.S. Congress, Senate 1929, p. xv).
As the depression deepened in the early 1930s, Senator Robert F. 
Wagner, a liberal Democrat from New York, obtained the adoption of 
Senate Resolution 483 in February 1931, providing for the appoint 
ment of a Select Committee on Unemployment Insurance. Senator 
Wagner had been asserting increasing leadership in pressing for gov 
ernment action in the crisis. He was the prime sponsor of legislation 
calling for a strong public employment service, public works planning, 
improved unemployment statistics, and study of unemployment insur 
ance. His Employment Exchange bill finally passed in February 1931, 
only to be vetoed by President Hoover. His employment services bill 
did become law in June 1933 (the Wagner-Peyser Act). The system of 
employment offices created by this law was to provide the vital frame 
work for the federal-state unemployment insurance program that 
emerged from the Social Security Act of 1935.
Senator Felix Hebert of Rhode Island was appointed chairman of 
the Select Committee, and Senator Otis F. Glenn of Illinois and Sena 
tor Wagner were the other two members of the Committee. Hearings 
were held in April and the last three months of 1931. The Committee
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obtained the services of Hugh S. Hanna of the Bureau of Labor Statis 
tics who supplied members with extensive information on foreign sys 
tems and American plans. In a rather comprehensive report, Senators 
Hebert and Glenn, both conservative Republicans, took the position 
that a federal system of unemployment insurance would be unconstitu 
tional and undesirable. Although they favored voluntary plans, they 
recognized that these were being established so slowly that state com 
pulsory legislation might be necessary. They suggested (as was done in 
the Wisconsin law) that state legislation fix a period during which 
employers could formulate their own plans. Their only recommenda 
tion for federal action was that "the Federal Government contribute to 
such systems of private unemployment reserves to the extent of per 
mitting employers who maintain them to deduct some portion, if not 
all, of the contributions thereto out of their income for tax purposes" 
(U.S. Congress, Senate 1932b,pp. 51-52).
In a minority report, Senator Wagner concluded that "unemploy 
ment insurance or wage reserves, to be successful, should be inaugu 
rated under compulsory State legislation and be supervised by State 
authority"; that "each system should be organized to provide incen 
tives to the stabilization of employment"; and that the federal govern 
ment should allow employers to deduct from income tax their 
payments into unemployment reserves or insurance plans (U.S. Con 
gress, Senate 1932a, p. 26). He differed from the majority in recom 
mending that 30 percent of such payments be deductible directly from 
the tax itself, rather than from gross income. Senator Wagner intro 
duced his income tax credit proposal in the same session of Con gress. 19
Besides these bills, Senator Wagner also introduced a bill in January 
1931 (S. 5634), to apportion $100 million among the states in propor 
tion to each state's contributions to unemployment reserves. In 1933, 
two bills on unemployment insurance were introduced in Congress and 
four bills were introduced the following year. Of these, the identical 
bills introduced by Senator Wagner and Congressman David J. Lewis 
of Maryland are discussed below in detail because of their influence on 
the unemployment insurance features of the Social Security Act.20
19. S.J. Res. 26, 72d Cong. In December 1930, Senator Wagner had introduced a bill (S. 5350), 
71st Cong., which was similar to the recommendations of the majority of the Select Committee.
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The Wagner-Lewis Bill
The failure of any state to enact an unemployment insurance law in 
1933, despite the widespread and intensive effort in the states, pointed 
to the necessity of federal action.21 The strongest obstacle to state 
action was the argument that legislation by individual states would 
place industry in such states at a competitive disadvantage with indus 
try in states without legislation. It should also be noted that conserva 
tive forces, especially business groups, vehemently opposed 
governmental programs of this type as being in gross conflict with 
basic American values of individual liberty and free private enterprise. 
Unemployment insurance was often represented as a manifestation of 
socialism. This treatment proved quite effective in discouraging sup 
port for that approach, particularly at the state level. 22
A type of federal legislation that would induce state action was sug 
gested by Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis while his daughter, 
Elizabeth, and her husband, Paul Raushenbush, of Wisconsin were vis 
iting him on Cape Cod during the summer of 1933. His idea was to 
apply the method used in the Federal Estate Tax Act of 1926. The State 
of Florida had been encouraging wealthy persons to move to the state 
by publicizing that it had no inheritance tax law. The Federal Estate 
Tax Act imposed a federal inheritance tax, but with a provision that 80 
percent credit would be given for taxes paid under a state inheritance 
tax law. Although the federal estate tax was passed in order to induce 
Florida to pass a similar law and thus remove its competitive advan 
tage with other states, raising thereby some question of the federal 
law's constitutionality, the Supreme Court of the United State unani 
mously declared the federal law to be constitutional.23
20. These bills, H.R. 7659 and S. 2616, were introduced on February 5, 1934. Lewis had also 
introduced one of the bills proposed in 1933.
21. In fact, during 1933, resolutions were introduced in the Maine, Minnesota, Montana, and 
Wisconsin legislatures calling upon Congress to enact unemployment insurance legislation.
22. William Haber, a contributing author of this book, recalled his experience of speaking pub 
licly at various locations in Michigan during the early 1930s to advocate unemployment insurance 
legislation, always to be opposed on the spot by a spokesman of the state manufacturers' associa 
tion who lumped together proponents of unemployment insurance as "Communists and college 
professors."
23. Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12.
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Justice Brandeis* suggestion that the estate tax credit approach 
might serve as a model for federal unemployment insurance legislation 
was discussed in early January 1934 in Washington with several key 
individuals, including Senator Wagner and Secretary of Labor, Frances 
Perkins, who responded favorably to the idea. Secretary Perkins then 
assigned Thomas H. Eliot, Associate Solicitor of the Department of 
Labor, to work with Paul Raushenbush to draft a bill along the lines of 
the Federal Estate Tax Act. The bill was introduced early in 1934 by 
Senator Wagner and Congressman Lewis. 24
The Wagner-Lewis bill, as it came to be called, imposed a federal 
excise tax of 5 percent of payrolls on employers similar to those types 
covered by the Wisconsin Act. An employer covered by the federal act 
could receive 100 percent credit against the federal tax for contributing 
into a state unemployment insurance fund or reserves as required by a 
state law that met prescribed conditions, even if the contributions were 
lower than the federal tax because of favorable unemployment experi 
ence. It is significant to note that the bill had minimum benefit stan 
dards. In order for its employers to receive federal tax credit, a state 
law would have to provide compensation of not less than $7 a week or 
not less than average earnings for twenty hours of work. Partial bene 
fits would have to be paid to supplement actual earnings of partially 
unemployed workers up to the weekly benefit amount for total unem 
ployment. Benefits would have to be payable for a maximum duration 
of at least ten weeks in a year or, if paid in proportion to previous 
weeks worked, for a maximum of at least fifteen weeks. The state law 
could not deny workers benefits for refusing to accept new work if (1) 
it was made available because of a labor dispute; (2) it provided sub 
standard wages, hours, or working conditions; or (3) it would require 
joining a company union, or interfere with joining or retaining mem 
bership in a bona fide labor organization. 25 Under the Wagner-Lewis 
bill, a state could choose either the pooled fund or the employer 
reserves approach, a difference heatedly contested between adherents 
of the Ohio and Wisconsin schools.
24. The story of the origin of the federal tax credit approach idea for unemployment insurance 
and its development into the Wagner-Lewis bill is told in Raushenbush and Raushenbush (1979).
25. This last provision was the only standard regarding benefit rights that was contained in the 
Social Security Act when it was passed the following year.
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At hearings held on the Lewis bill (H.R. 7659) in March 1934 by a 
subcommittee of the House Committee on Ways and Means, an 
impressive array of witnesses, including several employers, testified in 
favor of the bill. Opposition was voiced mainly by employer organiza 
tions. The bill also had the blessing of the administration, with Presi 
dent Roosevelt writing a letter of endorsement and Labor Secretary 
Perkins serving as the leading witness. Nevertheless, no action was 
taken on the bill. The opposition, which came mainly from employers, 
had grown stronger than had appeared at the hearings on the bill. In 
addition, various people apparently had approached the President to 
point out weaknesses in the Wagner-Lewis bill and urge that it be given 
further study. The President was particularly impressed by the argu 
ment that the large unemployment reserves that would accumulate 
might increase the severity of the depression unless the reserves were 
under federal control. He was also not completely satisfied with a bill 
providing for subsidies of state old-age pensions, which had passed the 
House. Accordingly, during May 1934, the President informed a num 
ber of supporters of these two bills that he thought it best to delay 
action and prepare a comprehensive program for presentation at the 
beginning of the first session of the next Congress (Witte 1962, pp. 4- 
5). In June 1934, the President sent Congress his special message on 
economic security and soon after created his Committee on Economic 
Security.
Concluding Observations
The development of private unemployment benefit plans in the 
United States was too limited to spread the unemployment insurance 
concept very broadly or build much of a base of support for it. Perhaps 
the major contribution the plans made was to demonstrate that such 
voluntary action was unlikely to respond adequately to the needs of the 
unemployed, given the dimensions of the problem. A few of the 
employers who did establish plans became important advocates of a 
public program despite the vigorous and widespread opposition of 
their fellow employers. They provided useful input into the evolution 
of the system that eventually did emerge.
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The negative position of organized labor prior to 1932 regarding 
public unemployment insurance may seem strange, looking back from 
the post-New Deal era. It is understandable, however, considering the 
largely hostile attitudes of government towards unions before and dur 
ing the first third of the twentieth century. As the depression took hold 
and worsened, the political climate changed; labor sensed a growing 
responsiveness by government to worker needs and interests. Orga 
nized labor reversed its stand and placed its support behind a compul 
sory unemployment insurance program.
The character of the program, its basic purposes and form, became 
issues of wider concern as legislative hearings and study commissions 
on the subject proliferated in the early 1930s. Previously, these matters 
were mainly of interest in academic circles, particularly at the Univer 
sity of Wisconsin where the subject received early and creative atten 
tion. Its long lead helped give the approach developed by the 
Wisconsin school considerable influence in ensuing national develop 
ments, influence especially strengthened when its views became 
embodied in the first state unemployment insurance law in Wisconsin 
years before successful action elsewhere. The Wisconsin emphasis on 
individualizing employer responsibility for unemployment benefit 
costs has had a lasting and profound impact on the American unem 
ployment insurance system through its experience rating method of 
financing. Different viewpoints, articulated most cogently in the Ohio 
Study Commission's report of 1932, did contend for attention. These 
stressed assurance of adequate benefit payments from pooled funds 
combining contributions of all employers and employees. The Ohio 
and Wisconsin ideas were central in the creation process that led to the 
national unemployment insurance proposals of 1935.
One other factor had to be recognized in order to engage that pro 
cess energetically at the federal level. The perceived threat of competi 
tive disadvantage was proving an effective barrier to individual state 
action on unemployment insurance, leaving unfulfilled the hopes and 
expectations raised by the accelerated efforts at that level in the early 
1930s. Beginning in 1933, the focus shifted increasingly to Washing 
ton, where a new administration and a new Congress took charge of the 
federal government with a willingness to use its power and resources 
to deal with the huge problems of the depression. How to encourage 
and help the states overcome their inhibitions to act on unemployment
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insurance was still the main concern of congressional legislative pro 
posals. The Wagner-Lewis bill of 1934, utilizing the tax-credit concept 
suggested by Justice Brandeis, appeared to be the likely vehicle to 
accomplish that end. While the administration supported this approach, 
it adopted a strategy to carefully plan and assemble a broad program of 
economic and Social Security, including unemployment insurance that 
would deal comprehensively with the nation's problems.

The Social Security Act of 1935
Breakthrough
By 1934, it had become clear that few, if any, states would adopt 
unemployment insurance laws unless federal action occurred first. 
High hopes had been entertained for the 1934 Wagner-Lewis bill, pas 
sage of which would have stimulated the enactment of state legislation. 
While disappointed that the bill did not pass, the supporters of unem 
ployment insurance had their hopes revived when the President 
appointed the Committee on Economic Security in June 1934. The dis 
cussions and debates on the Wagner-Lewis bill, including the congres 
sional hearings, went far towards illuminating the issues and widening 
the understanding of unemployment insurance. This result was impor 
tant as preparation for the next phase, since very few people in the 
United States were truly knowledgeable about unemployment insur 
ance at the time. Also of great significance was the increasingly evi 
dent commitment by President Roosevelt to federal legislation to bring 
about unemployment insurance, a commitment he had reached while 
governor of New York.
Soon after the Committee on Economic Security began its delibera 
tions, strong differences emerged among proponents of legislation as 
to what directions a federal law should take regarding the kind of sys 
tem to establish for unemployment insurance in the country. Foremost 
among these were whether the proposed arrangement should be a 
wholly national or a joint federal-state system. If it were to be the lat 
ter, there was controversy as to the federal role in the system. These 
disagreements stemmed from conflicting views about the extent of fed 
eral control that should be provided and the political and constitutional 
implications of different plans. The particular federal-state arrange 
ment chosen at the outset was critical, and it has continued as a central 
issue during much of the program's development. 1
1. For a comprehensive treatment of that arrangement and how it has evolved, see Rubin (1983).
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The alternatives presented to the Committee on Economic Security 
by its Technical Board, Advisory Council, and staff, and the process by 
which decisions were reached are described in some detail in this chap 
ter. The chapter also highlights the congressional considerations of the 
unemployment insurance proposals and the changes made as those 
proposals were fashioned into law.
Deliberations of the Committee on Economic Security
On June 8, 1934, in a special message to the Congress, President 
Roosevelt listed what he considered to be the unfinished legislative 
goals of his administration. Among these were the "furthering of the 
security of the citizen and his family through social insurance." He 
held that the various types of social insurance were interrelated and 
difficult to solve piecemeal. "Hence, I am looking for a sound means 
...to provide at once security against several of the great disturbing 
factors in life especially those which relate to unemployment and old 
age" (H. Doc. No. 397, 73d Cong., 2d sess. 1934).
Formation of the Committee
The President followed this message with an Executive Order (No. 
6757) on June 29, creating the Committee on Economic Security. The 
Order directed the Committee to "study problems relating to the eco 
nomic security of individuals." It was clearly understood that these 
problems would include unemployment and insecurity in old age, and 
that social insurance would be the major approach for dealing with 
them.
The Committee on Economic Security consisted of the Secretary of 
Labor (Frances Perkins), the Secretary of the Treasury (Henry Mor- 
genthau, Jr.), the Attorney General (Homer Cummings), the Secretary 
of Agriculture (Henry Wallace), and the Federal Emergency Relief 
Administrator (Harry Hopkins). Secretary Perkins was designated to 
chair the Committee. The Executive Order also provided for an Advi 
sory Council, a Technical Board of qualified representatives from fed 
eral agencies, and an executive director of the Committee.
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A 23-member Advisory Council was chaired by Frank P. Graham, 
president of the University of North Carolina and later elected a U.S. 
Senator. High-ranking representatives of labor and management were 
appointed to the Council, as were other national figures from interested 
groups. Dr. Arthur J. Altmeyer, then second Assistant Secretary of 
Labor and subsequently Commissioner of Social Security, was named 
chairman of the Technical Board, which consisted of 21 members. Dr. 
Edwin E. Witte, professor of economics at the University of Wiscon 
sin, was appointed executive director.2 A staff of experts in many fields 
was assembled, including Dr. Bryce M. Stewart, research director of 
Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc., who was appointed director of 
the Committee's unemployment insurance staff. 3
Proposals for National and Federal-State Systems
Soon after the Technical Board and Committee staff began their 
work, disagreement became evident as to what type of unemployment 
insurance program should be recommended. The President had stated 
his views in his congressional message of June 8, but they were rather 
general:
I believe there should be a maximum of cooperation between 
States and the Federal Government. I believe that the funds neces 
sary to provide this insurance should be raised by contribution 
rather than by an increase in general taxation. Above all, I am con 
vinced that social insurance should be national in scope, although 
the several States should meet at least a large portion of the cost of 
management, leaving to the Federal Government the responsibil 
ity of investing, maintaining and safeguarding the funds constitut 
ing the necessary insurance reserves (H. Doc. No. 397,73d Cong., 
2d sess. 1934).
This language implied that the President was thinking in terms of a 
federal-state system.
2. Altmeyer was also from Wisconsin. Both he and Witte had been students of John Commons 
and had served in administrative positions in the Wisconsin Industrial Commission. Wilbur J. 
Cohen, a contributing author of this book, was chosen by Witte from among the young recent 
graduates at the University to come to Washington as his research assistant.
3. One of the authors of the 1966 forerunner of this book. Dr. Merrill G. Murray, another Uni 
versity of Wisconsin alumnus, was appointed associate director of the unemployment insurance 
staff. The other members of the staff are listed in Social Security Board (1937, p. 521).
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Dr. Witte reported that late in August 1934, the President "expressed 
decided preferences for state administration of unemployment insur 
ance, but again stressed that the reserve funds must be handled by the 
federal government; also, that unemployment insurance should be set 
up to give encouragement to the regularization of employment" (Witte 
1962, p. 18). However, Witte said the President did not insist that the 
Committee necessarily recommend his ideas.
Despite the President's views, Dr. Stewart, director of the unem 
ployment insurance staff, made a preliminary report in September rec 
ommending a uniform national system because of his belief that most 
unemployment was due to national rather than local causes. The plan 
he recommended, however, would have permitted entire industries 
and, perhaps, large nationwide employers to have their own funds. 
This report was presented to the Technical Board, together with recom 
mendations by Witte for a federal-state plan along the lines suggested 
by the President.
The arguments for a national system that were put forward in Stew- 
art's report and in subsequent discussions included the following: (1) it 
would provide uniformity of protection to all covered employees 
throughout the country exposed to the same risk of unemployment; (2) 
it would provide an easy and uniform method of handling the problem 
of employees who worked in more than one state; (3) it would also 
avoid burdening employers who operated across state lines with hav 
ing to pay taxes and make reports under a multiplicity of state laws and 
regulations, as would occur under a federal-state system; (4) it would 
permit the pooling of reserves on a national basis, with a lower reserve 
fund level required for adequate financing than that required for sepa 
rate state reserves in the aggregate; and (5) it would provide a superior 
basis for actuarial estimates, since state statistics on unemployment 
were practically nonexistent.
On the other hand, the arguments of those who favored a federal- 
state system included the following: (1) a national system would be 
cumbersome to operate, and centralization of administration might par 
alyze action; (2) a national system would require immediate decisions 
on such controversial issues as employee contributions, methods of 
experience rating, and variable versus uniform duration of benefits, 
whereas under a federal-state system these could be left for discussion 
and decision by individual states; (3) a federal-state system would per-
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mit wide latitude for experimentation by the states which would be 
desirable in the absence of experience with unemployment insurance 
in the United State; and (4) if mistakes were made in individual states 
in their legislation, they would not have as serious repercussion in a 
federal-state system as mistakes made in legislation for a national sys 
tem.
The Technical Board set up an unemployment insurance committee, 
to which it referred the question of whether a national or federal-state 
system should be recommended.4 This committee reported to the exec 
utive committee of the Technical Board a few days later in favor of a 
national system, differing in some details from Dr. Stewart's plan. In 
October, the executive committee, in turn, presented a statement of 
principles regarding unemployment insurance to the Committee on 
Economic Security. One of these principles read: "If constitutional, a 
nationally administered system of unemployment insurance is to be 
preferred to a State system, but the Committee should be satisfied that 
a nationally administered system is constitutional before commitments 
in favor of such a system are made to the public" (Witte 1962, p. 114). 
Eventually, however, the Technical Board's unemployment insurance 
committee reversed its position and voted unanimously for a federal- 
state plan similar to that in the Wagner-Lewis bill of 1934.
Subsidy or Tax Credit for Federal-State System
The Wagner-Lewis bill provided for a Federal Unemployment Tax 
against which tax credits could be taken for contributions paid under a 
state unemployment insurance law. The executive committee of the 
Technical Board, however, was divided on what type of plan to recom 
mend. During the Technical Board's discussions in October, a "subsidy 
plan" was suggested under which a federal tax would be collected from 
employers, with proceeds from each state to be returned to that state if 
it met federally prescribed standards for unemployment compensa 
tion.5 This subsidy plan would have met the conditions laid down by
4. This committee included Alvin H. Hansen, Chief Economic Advisor, Department of State, as 
chairman; William M. Leiserson, Chairman of the National Mediation Board; Jacob Viner, Assis 
tant to the Secretary, Treasury Department; Thomas Eliot, Associate Solicitor, Department of 
Labor; and E. Willard Jensen, Executive Secretary, Business Advisory Council, Department of 
Commerce.
5. According to Dr. Witte's recollection, this approach was suggested by Mr. Emerson Ross of 
the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (Witte 1962, p. 115).
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President Roosevelt and was the second choice of those who favored a 
wholly national system. The subsidy plan was seen as having the 
advantages of a national plan in that it would permit the writing of def 
inite standards on benefits into the federal law without endangering its 
constitutionality. The lawyers feared that if federal standards were put 
in a tax-credit type of law, its constitutionality would be endangered. 
The subsidy plan was opposed, however, by some members of the staff 
and Technical Board who did not think it wise, without practical expe 
rience, to prescribe standards for the state laws.
A report made to the Committee on Economic Security on Novem 
ber 9, 1934 set forth the pros and cons for the three alternatives: a 
national system, a federal-state system based on a tax-credit plan of the 
Wagner-Lewis type, or a federal-state subsidy plan. The Committee 
voted unanimously to cease further consideration of a national plan, 
but reached no conclusions on the relative merits of a tax-credit or sub 
sidy plan for a federal-state system.
The Committee's decision for a federal-state system was conveyed 
to the President. A few days later, a National Conference on Economic 
Security was held, attended by about 150 experts and representatives 
of various interests. In his address to this conference, President 
Roosevelt said that in the program recommended to Congress, unem 
ployment insurance would be proposed as "a cooperative federal-state 
undertaking," but he was no more specific than this. The alternatives of 
a tax-credit plan, such as that of the Wagner-Lewis bill, or a subsidy 
plan continued to be discussed. 6
Advisory Council Views
The Advisory Council held its first meeting on November 15 and 16, 
immediately following the National Conference on Economic Security. 
The Council's discussion was taken up entirely with unemployment 
insurance at this meeting. In view of the President's announcement that 
unemployment insurance would be on a federal-state basis, discussion 
of the type of system was confined to the tax-credit and subsidy plans. 
The Advisory Council appointed a committee to consider this issue and
6. The Conference provided an airing of many, often conflicting ideas. It was not expected to 
reach any conclusions or offer recommendations, and did not do so (Witte 1962, pp. 41-47).
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other questions discussed at its meeting.7 This committee held several 
meetings during the next month but made no formal report to the 
Council. Instead, it presented individual views and a mass of other 
material. The Council voted nine to seven in favor of the subsidy plan, 
but since six members were absent or did not vote, it indicated that the 
vote represented individual views, that the tax-credit and subsidy plans 
each had their good features, and that the issue should be decided by 
the Committee on Economic Security. The Advisory Council com 
pleted its report on December 15.
The Committee Adopts Tax-Credit Plan
The Committee on Economic Security, worried about the delays in 
reaching decisions on unemployment insurance, had gone ahead with 
final consideration of its recommendations. By the time it made its 
final decisions, it had the report of the Advisory Council but not the 
report of Bryce Stewart and his unemployment insurance staff. The 
Committee, however, knew his views favoring a national system as a 
first choice and the subsidy federal-state plan as a second choice. The 
Committee once more thoroughly reviewed the alternatives of a sub 
sidy or tax-credit plan and voted for the latter.
The history of the discussions regarding the three alternative 
approaches for establishing an unemployment insurance system has 
been given in some detail to show the considerable division of opinion 
as to the degree of participation by the federal government in the sys 
tem. The decision to recommend a federal-state system was in accord 
with the President's own predilections, and so was reached more 
readily than was the decision on the type of federal-state plan to be rec 
ommended. Moreover, passage of the Wagner-Peyser Act the year 
before, which mandated a federal-state network of employment service 
offices, may have helped to set the choice of a federal-state scheme for 
unemployment insurance rather than a wholly national one. What 
tipped the scales in favor of the Wagner-Lewis type tax-credit plan 
over the subsidy alternative was the belief that the tax-credit approach
7. The members who served on the committee were Frank P. Graham, Chairman of the Advisory 
Council; Grace Abbott of the University of Chicago; Marion B. Folsom, assistant treasurer of 
Eastman Kodak Company; Morris E. Leeds, president of Leeds and Northrup Company; and Wil 
liam Green, president of the American Federation of Labor.
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stood a better chance of being approved by the Supreme Court as con 
stitutional. It was also recognized that a subsidy plan with federal ben 
efit standards was likely to have a better chance with the Supreme 
Court than a tax-credit plan with the standards. But since the Commit 
tee had already decided to have as few standards as possible, a tax- 
credit plan with few standards faced little or no disadvantage in the 
arguments over the comparative constitutionality of the tax-credit and 
subsidy approaches, even though this issue remained in doubt. More 
over, under the tax-credit plan, the states would have their own self- 
sustaining laws that could continue even if the federal legislation was 
declared unconstitutional.
Political considerations also contributed to the decision. The Wag 
ner-Lewis approach had come to be seen as a middle course between 
two strongly opposing camps. On one side were those who favored a 
limited plan of individual employer reserves with emphasis on unem 
ployment prevention, such as embodied in the Wisconsin law. Led by 
Paul and Elizabeth Brandeis Raushenbush and a number of business 
leaders, this group wanted federal legislation to overcome the interstate 
competition barrier to state action, but without federal control over 
state policy. At one extreme, of course, were those opposed to any fed 
eral legislation mostly employer groups. The other side favored a 
plan more focused on adequate compensation and more assured financ 
ing with emphasis on unemployment relief. This group, which 
included Paul Douglas, Abraham Epstein, William Leiserson, I. M. 
Rubinow, and Bryce Stewart, believed that only a program with strong 
uniform federal standards and multiple financing sources would suf 
fice. It is to the credit of Witte, Altmeyer, and Secretary of Labor Per- 
kins that they adhered to the pragmatic line in steering the Committee 
on Economic Security toward the Wagner-Lewis type of tax-credit 
approach as the only alternative that was likely to make it through the 
Congress as well as conform with the President's views and, by mini 
mizing federal standards, also survive the challenge of constitutional 
ity. 8
8. For views of a much later observer on these deliberations, see Nelson (1969, pp. 204-211).
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Other Issues
The Committee dealt with a number of questions relating to unem 
ployment insurance financing. These included whether to have 
employee and government contributions, whether to permit the Wis 
consin system of individual employer reserve accounts or to allow 
experience rating, and what the rate of employer contributions should 
be.
Employee and Government Contributions.
After extended discussion, a majority of the Advisory Council voted 
against employee contributions. However, four of the employer mem 
bers of the Council along with a public member, Raymond Moley,9 felt 
so strongly about employee contributions that they wrote a separate 
statement advocating them. They believed that employee contributions 
would make it possible to have more adequate benefits, as well as a 
more effective administration, since the workers would have a clearer 
conception of their responsibilities. 10 The consensus of the Council 
was that there should not be government contributions, especially in 
view of the large outlays being made by the government for general 
relief at the time. 11 In keeping with its recommendation to avoid fed 
eral standards, the Committee made no specification on these matters 
for the states.
Experience Rating.
The President's desire to encourage stabilization of employment 
through the experience rating of unemployment insurance contribu 
tions was generally accepted. The difficulty was in deciding how to do 
it. Bryce Stewart, who supported the subsidy plan, argued that "merit 
rating," as it was called then, could be accomplished under a subsidy 
plan through federal tax refunds to "any insurance unit" that had built 
up a sufficient reserve. (As insurance units, he proposed individual
9. Moley, a professor of public law at Columbia University and a trusted adviser of President 
Roosevelt, was a public member of the Advisory Council who kept in close touch with the work 
of the Committee on Economic Security.
10. Statement presented to U.S. House Ways and Means Committee (U.S. Congress, House 
1935, pp. 873-74).
11. Paul Kellogg, editor of The Survey magazine and a member of the Advisory Council, felt so 
strongly that there should be government contributions that he urged them at every opportunity.
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employers, groups of employers, or industries.) The issue of pooled 
funds versus individual employer reserve accounts was not settled until 
the final meeting of the Committee on Economic Security (Witte 1962, 
p. 127). Several members of the Committee were opposed to individ 
ual employer accounts, such as were provided for in the Wisconsin 
law, but it was finally agreed to permit state laws to have such 
accounts, provided the state required employers to contribute at least 1 
percent of their payrolls to a central pooled fund a recommendation 
of Dr. Altmeyer.
Rate of Employer Tax.
Although there was general agreement that employers should con 
tribute, it was felt that the imposition of an employer tax should be so 
timed as not to impede industrial recovery. The Advisory Council 
thought that the tax rate of 5 percent of payrolls proposed in the Wag 
ner-Lewis bill of 1934 was too high, and agreed to recommend a 3 per 
cent rate. 12 The Technical Board's unemployment insurance 
committee recommended that the proposed rate of contributions be 
achieved in stages over a three-year period by steps geared to the level 
of the Federal Reserve Board index of industrial production to assure 
that increases in the tax would take effect only as business recovered. 
The Committee on Economic Security adopted this idea, along with 
the level of 3 percent for the full rate. It should be noted that this rate 
applied to the total payrolls of covered employers, unlike the rate for 
old-age insurance contributions which was to apply to the first $3,(XX) 
in wages paid to an employee during the year.
12. Adequate employment and unemployment statistics were not available as a sound basis for 
cost estimates. Some national estimates were prepared nevertheless by staff statisticians of the 
Committee on Economic Security under the direction of Robert Nathan. These indicated that 
about 5 percent of payrolls would be needed over a period of years to finance a relatively modest 
unemployment benefit program (Social Security Board 1937, ch. 4). These estimates were not 
regarded as official, and Professor Witte (1962, p. 34) believed they overstated the real unemploy 
ment problem. As noted in chapter 5, the Ohio Commission Report of 1932 had estimated that a 3 
percent rate of contnbutions would finance a modest program in Ohio over a 10-year period.
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Report of the Committee on Economic Security
In its report to the President, formally submitted January 15, 1935, 
the Committee stressed the need for federal legislation on unemploy 
ment insurance in order to remove the chief obstacle to state action, 
namely, the fear each state had that imposing a tax on its employers 
would place them at a competitive disadvantage with employers in 
other states which did not impose such a tax. The Committee recom 
mended that this fear be removed through a uniform federal excise tax 
on payrolls, with a tax credit to employers for insurance contributions 
they made under a compulsory state unemployment insurance law. The 
uniform tax would remove the obstacle to state legislation, while the 
tax credit would encourage each state to act to enable their employers 
to qualify for it. The second major recommendation of the Committee 
was that the federal government grant the states sufficient funds for 
proper administration of their unemployment insurance laws. The spe 
cific legislative recommendations of the Committee were directed to 
these two major proposals.
Unemployment Tax, Tax Credit, and Trust Fund
The Committee recommended a federal excise tax on employers 
who employed four or more workers for 13 or more weeks in a year. It 
advised setting this tax equal to 1 percent of total payrolls in 1936 and 
3 percent by 1938, with increases in the interim tied to increases in the 
Federal Reserve Board index of industrial production. Although the 
Committee recommended that no industries be exempted, it favored a 
separate federal system for railroad employees and maritime workers.
The Committee would allow employers credit, up to 90 percent of 
the federal tax, for contributions paid under a state unemployment 
insurance law, provided the state cooperated with the federal govern 
ment in the administration of the program, deposited contributions it 
collected into a trust fund set up for the purpose in the federal Treasury, 
and used such contributions solely for paying unemployment benefits. 
These were the only conditions mentioned in the Committee report that 
a state would have to meet.
The Committee further recommended that if a state allowed 
employers to contribute at rates below the maximum credit allowed
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against the federal tax because they had stable employment, additional 
credit toward the federal tax be allowed for the taxes that otherwise 
would have been paid under the state law. The Committee urged stiff 
requirements for such additional credit. In states with plans based on 
individual employer reserve accounts, such as that adopted in Wiscon 
sin in 1932, which would be permitted, an accumulated reserve equal 
to at least 15 percent of annual payrolls would be required before an 
employer could qualify for an additional tax credit because of a 
reduced rate. In addition, employers contributing to such accounts 
would have to contribute at least 1 percent of their payrolls to a state 
pooled fund. 13 Employers contributing solely to state pooled funds 
would not be allowed lower rates until the state law had been in opera 
tion for five years.
The Committee recommended that all money collected by the states 
to finance unemployment benefits be deposited in a special trust fund 
in the federal Treasury to be called the Unemployment Trust Fund, 
with an account to the credit of each state. The Secretary of the Trea 
sury would invest the money in the trust fund as a whole. Interest on 
the amount in each state account should be allowed at the average rate 
of interest on primary obligations of the United States. Also recom 
mended was that the collection of the Federal Unemployment Tax as 
well as the investment of state reserves be under the control of the Sec 
retary of the Treasury, and that other federal aspects of the legislation 
be administered by a three-member social insurance board housed in 
the Department of Labor.
Grants to States for Administration
The other major recommendation of the Committee was for the fed 
eral government to grant the states money for administration of their 
laws "under conditions designed to insure competence and probity." 
Among these conditions, the Committee considered it vital that the 
selection of administrative personnel be on a merit basis, which at that
13. Under the Committee proposals, state could also provide an option to employers to maintain 
guaranteed employment accounts instead of reserve funds to pay their employees unemployment 
benefits, and such accounts would need to accumulate to at least 7.5 percent of annual payroll 
before the employer could qualify for additional tax credit. The option was provided in the Social 
Security Act, but apparently no one ever made use of it.
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time was a practice in very few states. Another condition was that the 
states accept the provisions of the Wagner-Peyser Act for a federal- 
state employment service system and pay unemployment benefits 
through employment offices. It was assumed that the funds for admin 
istrative grants would be financed from the portion (10 percent) of the 
Federal Unemployment Tax that would be retained by the federal gov 
ernment after allowance of the tax credit. For constitutional reasons, 
however, it was not recommended that the taxes be earmarked for this 
purpose.
Although, in his congressional message of June 8, 1934, the Presi 
dent had suggested that "the several states should meet at least a large 
portion of the cost of management," the Committee recommended that 
the federal government pay the entire cost of administration. It did so, 
evidently, because of a fear based, in part, on workers' compensation 
experience that state legislatures would not provide adequate funds for 
administration and that standards of administration would not be high 
enough to insure successful operation of the program. Yet the Commit 
tee trusted the state legislatures fully with respect to providing proper 
benefits and benefit conditions.
State Latitude and Federal Standards
In its report, the Committee justified the proposed federal-state sys 
tem on the grounds that it would permit variations in state laws "so that 
we can learn through variation what is best." The Committee recog 
nized that a uniform national system would be superior in some 
respects, particularly in relation to workers who move from state to 
state. It also recognized that in other respects, "state administration 
may develop marked inadequacies." If experience showed that a 
national system was desirable, the Committee rather blithely stated: "It 
is always possible by subsequent legislation to establish such a sys 
tem." Against this possibility, the Committee recommended that the 
states be required to include in their laws a reservation of power to 
modify or repeal the law and that the federal law contain a similar res 
ervation.
With respect to its choice of the tax-credit type of federal-state legis 
lation in preference to the subsidy type, the Committee said:
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We prefer a tax credit device to one in which the tax would be 
wholly collected and then remitted, as grants-in-aid, to the States, 
because under the latter system the States would not have self- 
supporting laws of their own, and as with all compensation having 
its source in Federal grants there would be great and constant 
pressure for larger grants exceeding the money raised by the tax, 
with a subsequent confusion of compensation and relief ("Report 
to the President of the Committee on Economic Security" 1935, p. 
17).
The prevailing position of the Committee was thus to allow the states 
considerable leeway in evolving the kind of unemployment insurance 
programs they deemed appropriate. As noted earlier, very few federal 
standards were recommended, in keeping with this position. Those rec 
ommended dealt with the control and use of state benefit funds, with 
matters relating to administration, and with requirements to qualify 
employers given reduced tax rates by their state for additional federal 
tax credit. No standards were recommended regarding how much of a 
benefit a state should pay to unemployed workers, or for how long, or 
what the requirements should be for benefit eligibility.
The Committee recommendations were incorporated in a bill to be 
sent to the Congress along with the Committee's final report. Not men 
tioned in the Committee report, but included in the bill was the so- 
called "labor standards" provision that would have to be included in 
the state law in order for it to be approved for tax-credit purposes. This 
standard was designed to protect claimants from benefit disqualifica 
tion for refusing to accept offers of work that entailed certain employ 
ment conditions disadvantageous to themselves or to their labor 
union. 14 It was the only standard relating to benefit rights included in 
the bill. Although any standard as specific as this might be construed to 
give the tax a regulatory purpose and thus endanger the constitutional 
ity of the law, it was included to allay labor's fear that unemployment 
insurance might be used to break unions or weaken labor standards. It 
was chiefly this fear that had caused the American Federation of Labor 
to oppose compulsory unemployment insurance until its convention of
14. The standard was included in the Social Security Act. See condition (5) for approval of state 
laws under "Title IX" given in the appendix to this chapter.
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1932. Inclusion of the standard helped to produce strong labor support 
for the measure in 1935.
Congressional Consideration of Proposals
The Committee on Economic Security's report was promptly sub 
mitted to the Congress with a special message in which the President 
urged that legislation "should be brought forward with a minimum of 
delay." The hope was that Congress would pass the legislation in time 
for the states to act in their 1935 legislative sessions, since only a few 
states would hold sessions in 1936. Congress proceeded, however, 
with what might be termed deliberate speed. Practically all of the state 
legislatures had gone home by the time a bill was passed.
The Legislative Process
A bill had been drafted by Thomas Eliot, Associate Solicitor of 
Labor, which was immediately introduced as the Economic Security 
Act in the Senate by Senator Wagner, and in the House by Congress 
man Lewis and Congressman Robert L. Doughton of North Caro 
lina. 15 Since Doughton was chairman of the House Committee on 
Ways and Means, the hearings were conducted on his bill (H.R. 4120). 
The bill was referred to his Committee and to the Senate Finance Com 
mittee because of its tax provisions. 16 The bill contained titles on a 
number of other measures besides unemployment insurance, including
15. Although Lewis had been a chief sponsor of the 1934 Wagner-Lewis bill, Doughton was 
accorded that honor for the 1935 bill because he was chairman of the key committee and because 
he was from the South where opposition to the proposed legislation was expected to be the heavi 
est. He became an influential supporter of the bill and of Social Security legislation in later years. 
Senator Pat Harrison of Mississippi, Senate Finance Committee chairman, similarly lent his influ 
ence with southern colleagues to help bring about passage of the bill.
16. The chairman of the House Labor Committee, Congressman William P. Connery, Jr., tried to 
get the bill referred to his Committee. When this was not done, his Committee held hearings on 
the "Lundeen bill" (H.R. 2827) which provided for unemployment compensation equal to the dif 
ference between earnings, if any, and average local wages for as long as a person ab le and willing 
to work was unemployed or underemployed. Such benefits were to be paid out of federal general 
funds, to be increased if necessary through increases in inheritance and income taxes. This bill 
was reported favorably by the Labor Committee but was never acted upon by the House.
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old-age insurance; public assistance for the aged, dependent children 
and the blind; other child care services; and public health measures. As 
a result, only a fraction of the time was devoted to unemployment 
insurance. In fact, during the entire congressional consideration of the 
bill, major attention was given to the old-age assistance and old-age 
insurance titles of the bill.
Both committees promptly began hearings on the bill in January. 17 
The House Ways and Means Committee hearings continued almost 
daily until February 12. Most of the next two months was occupied 
with executive sessions of the Committee and meticulous work by its 
legislative counsel, Middleton Beaman, and his staff in redrafting parts 
of the bill, with much consultation with Thomas Eliot. 18 The Commit 
tee reported out a revised bill in early April refilled as the Social Secu 
rity Act. The House passed it two weeks later by the overwhelming 
vote of 371 to 33.
The Senate Finance Committee's hearings on the Wagner bill (S. 
1130) ran for about a month beginning in January. After the Social 
Security bill passed the House, the Finance Committee reviewed it 
thoroughly and made a number of changes. The Committee reported 
the bill to the Senate on May 20. About a month later, after some delay 
due to the precedence of other bills on the calendar and several days of 
debate, the Senate passed it also by an overwhelming vote of 77 to 6.
Differences between the two bills remained to be reconciled by a 
Conference Committee of the House and Senate. Because of a contro 
versial amendment added in the Senate to the old-age insurance provi 
sions of the bill, the Conference Committee was deadlocked for 
weeks. 19 The Conference finally reached agreement and reported its 
bill. Congress approved it shortly thereafter early in August. The bill 
was signed into law by the President on August 14, 1935 in a signing
17. The extensive hearings held by the two committees were published and included all testi 
mony, supporting materials, and written statements that were submitted. They reflected the broad 
range of viewpoints held at the time by representatives of all segments of society throughout the 
nation regarding unemployment insurance, as well as other programs included in the proposed 
legislation. See: U.S. Congress, House (1935); and U.S. Congress, Senate (1935).
18. An amusing but informative account of his participation in the drafting of the bill was given 
by Eliot (1960).
19. The impasse was over the so-called "Clark amendment," which would have exempted work 
ers under employer pension plans from coverage under the old-age insurance program if those 
plans met certain standards.
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ceremony in the White House with the congressional leaders and 
Labor Secretary Perkins in attendance. The provisions of the 1935 
Social Security Act relating to unemployment insurance are summa 
rized in an appendix to this chapter.
Congressional Modifications of Administration Proposals
The principal change made by the House in the Federal Unemploy 
ment Tax part of the bill was to strike out the provisions for additional 
credit to employers paying state tax rates that were lowered because of 
experience rating. During the hearings of the Committee on Ways and 
Means, Congressman Jere Cooper had perceived the inconsistency 
between the proposal for a uniform federal tax on all covered employ 
ers throughout the country in order to meet the problem of interstate 
competition posed by unequal state tax costs and the proposal to permit 
variation of contributions in the states through experience rating, 
which would eliminate such uniformity. He was able to persuade the 
Committee to report the bill without the additional credit provisions.
At the Senate Finance Committee hearings, employer witnesses had 
strongly advocated the additional credit provisions in the bill, stressing 
the desirability of permitting experience rating in state laws. 20 These 
provisions were subsequently restored by the Senate Committee 
through an amendment proposed by Senator Robert LaFollette, Jr., of 
Wisconsin. The amendment was accepted by the Senate without much 
debate and agreed to in the House-Senate conference. In the process, 
the requirement in the bill, as introduced in the House, of a minimum 
contribution of 1 percent of payroll to a state pooled fund was elimi 
nated. Moreover, the requirements for experience rating under individ 
ual reserve accounts and state pooled funds were eased. The proposal 
to tie the increase in the federal tax from 1 to 3 percent of payroll to 
increases in the index of industrial production was eliminated, and 
increases to 2 percent for 1937 and to 3 percent beginning in 1938 
were substituted.
The bill emerged from Congress with much more restricted unem 
ployment insurance coverage than that proposed by the administration.
20. See especially the testimony of Marion B. Folsom, representing the employer members of 
the Advisory Council to the Committee on Economic Security in U.S. Congress, House (1935, p. 
557 ff).
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The Committee on Ways and Means had changed coverage to employ 
ers with ten or more employees in twenty weeks. The Senate changed 
it back to the original bill's coverage of employers with four or more 
employees in thirteen weeks. The Conference Committee agreed to a 
compromise coverage of eight or more in twenty weeks. The Commit 
tee on Ways and Means also restricted unemployment insurance cover 
age by excluding agricultural workers, domestic servants, employees 
of nonprofit organizations, members of the immediate family of the 
employer, and government workers. These exclusions remained in the 
bill finally adopted. The Committee on Economic Security's recom 
mendation that railroad workers and maritime workers be covered by a 
separate system was not followed. Maritime workers employed on the 
navigable waters of the United States were exempted, but railroad 
workers were covered.
Finally, although one of the principal objectives of the Committee 
on Economic Security in providing for federal administrative grants to 
the states was to be able to require the employment of state personnel 
on a merit basis, Congress specifically excepted the "selection, tenure 
of office, and compensation of personnel" from the methods of admin 
istration that the Social Security Board could require of the states.21
Although these and a few other changes were made by Congress in 
the unemployment insurance features of the Social Security Act, the 
basic structure followed the recommendations of the Committee on 
Economic Security and the administration. The labor standards provi 
sion included by the administration in the bill sent to Congress was 
retained in the Act. While there were many witnesses critical of the 
proposals, according to Dr. Witte (1945, pp. 31-32): "the members of 
Congress throughout took it for granted that if anything was to be done 
about unemployment insurance, the Administration's proposals would 
have to be approved."
21. This provision was amended in 1939 to give the Board authority to require merit-based 
employment within prescribed limits, as described in the next chapter.
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Concluding Observations
The passage of the Social Security Act with its unemployment 
insurance provisions was the key step toward the establishment of a 
system in the United States. Action by the states remained to complete 
the structure and bring it to life. Despite vigorously contested and often 
closely divided viewpoints on several basic issues within the Commit 
tee on Economic Security and its supporting components and staff, and 
among various interest groups, conflicts that were thoroughly aired in 
both House and Senate Committee hearings, the Social Security Act 
was approved in the Congress by very wide margins. In the congres 
sional debate, more controversy seemed to focus on issues in old-age 
insurance than in unemployment insurance. The solid result is a tribute 
to the political skills of administration and legislative leaders, and to 
the broad appreciation accumulated over prior years of the need for 
unemployment insurance and for its value, concepts, and alternative 
designs.
Although decided in 1935, the critical question of a national or a 
federal-state system was to fester for many years. The idea of a federal 
subsidy to the states instead of the tax credit approach soon faded, but 
the relative roles of the two levels of government within the system 
was to be a major and evolving element affecting the program's devel 
opment and operation. Nor was the issue of experience rating put to 
rest in 1935, a subject yet to develop at the state level and to attract 
persistent argument, pro and con. Unemployment insurance began in 
controversy; it was never to be free of controversy. For a vital program 
of considerable magnitude that was to become firmly imbedded in the 
nation's social and economic fabric, that condition should be neither 
surprising or unwelcome.
It is worth noting that strong early initiatives, under the right cir 
cumstances, can carry a large idea to fruition many years later while 
still reflecting much of the influence of its first proponents. The intel 
lectual force of Wisconsin professor John Commons, both directly and 
through his students, clearly led the way to a particular formulation of 
unemployment insurance which materialized in the first American law 
to establish a program, that in Wisconsin, several years before the 
Social Security Act. That success added further weight to this source of
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influence as it contributed heavily to help shape the program to be pro 
vided for the nation. It was not accidental that individuals from Wis 
consin were prominent among the people responsible for designing the 
unemployment insurance provisions of the Social Security Act. To be 
sure, others also contributed significantly to the process. But the Wis 
consin imprint was unmistakable and lasting.
APPENDIX
Unemployment Insurance Provisions 
of Social Security Act of 1935
The Social Security Act as passed contained two titles regarding unem 
ployment insurance: Title IX providing for the Federal Unemployment Tax 
and its related provisions; and Title III providing for federal administrative 
grants. A summary of these titles follows:
Title IX
Title IX provided for an excise tax on employment by employers of eight 
or more persons in twenty or more weeks in a year. The tax would be equal to 
1 percent of total payroll in 1936; 2 percent in 1937; and 3 percent in 1938.
Employment excluded from the tax were:
(1) agricultural labor;
(2) domestic service in a private home;
(3) services by the crews of vessels on navigable waters of the United 
States;
(4) service by specified immediate members of the family of the employer;
(5) service for the federal government or federal instrumentalities;
(6) service for state and local governments and instrumentalities;
(7) service for nonprofit organizations of a religious, charitable, scientific, 
literary, or educational nature or for the prevention of cruelty to chil 
dren or animals.
Employers making contributions to approved state unemployment com 
pensation laws could receive credit for such contributions up to 90 percent of 
the federal tax, if the state law met the following conditions:
(1) All compensation is to be paid through public employment offices or 
such other agencies as the Social Security Board (established by the 
Act) might approve.
(2) No compensation is to be paid for two years after contributions com 
mence.
(3) All money received in the state unemployment fund is to be immedi 
ately deposited in the Federal Unemployment Trust Fund created by 
the Act, (to be credited to the state's account in the fund).
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(4) All money withdrawn from the Trust Fund is to be used solely in the 
payment of unemployment compensation.
(5) Compensation will not be denied to any otherwise eligible unemployed 
worker for refusing to accept new work under any of the following 
conditions:
(A) if the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or 
other labor dispute;
(B) if the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work offered are sub 
stantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing for 
similar work in the locality;
(C) if as a condition of being employed the individual would be 
required to join a company union or to resign from or refrain from 
joining any bona fide labor organization.
(6) All the rights, privileges and immunities created by the state law are 
subject to the power of the legislature to amend or repeal the law at any 
time.
"Additional credit" would be given against the federal tax for state contri 
butions not made because of a lower experience rate under the following con 
ditions:
(1) If the employer was contributing to a state pooled fund, he has had 
three full years of "compensation experience";
(2) if he is contributing to a guaranteed employment account, he has ful 
filled the guarantee (at least thirty hours of wages for at least forty 
weeks in the preceding year) and his account equals at least 7-1/2 per 
cent of his total payroll in the preceding year; or
(3) if he is contributing to a separate reserve account in the state fund for 
one or more employers,
(A) compensation was payable from the account throughout the pre 
ceding year;
(B) the account is not less than five times the largest amount of com 
pensation paid out of the account in any of the last three preceding 
years;
(C) the account is equal to 7-1/2 percent of total wages payable in the
preceding year.
The Unemployment Trust Fund was created in the Treasury of the United 
States. The act provided that deposits in the fund must be invested in federal 
securities that would yield the average rate of interest paid on all federal secu 
rities. It also provided that funds could be invested in special obligations 
issued to the Trust Fund that yielded such average rate of interest.
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Title IX would be administered by the Treasury Department, except that 
the Social Security Board would determine whether the state unemployment 
compensation laws met and continued to meet the prescribed conditions. The 
Board was required to give reasonable notice and a fair hearing to the state 
before it refused to certify a state that did not meet the conditions.
Title in
Grants were authorized to be made to each state in such amounts as the 
Social Security Board determined to be necessary for the proper administra 
tion of its unemployment compensation law. The Board's determination was 
to be based on (1) the population of the state; (2) an estimate of the number of 
persons covered by the state law and of the cost of proper administration of 
such law; and (3) such other factors as Uie Board found relevant. Dollar limi 
tations were placed on the amounts that could be granted not more than $4 
million for the fiscal year ending June 30,1936, and not more than $49 million 
in any fiscal year thereafter.
In order for a state to receive administrative grants, its law had to be 
approved under Title IX, and also had to include provisions for:
(1) Such methods of administration (other than those relating to selection, 
tenure of office, and compensation of personnel) as were found by the 
Board to be reasonably calculated to pay benefits when due;
(2) an opportunity for a fair hearing, before an impartial tribunal, for unem 
ployed workers whose claims for benefits were denied;
(3) the making of such reports as the Social Security Board might require; 
and
(4) making available upon the request of any federal agency charged with 
public works or assistance through public employment information 
under the state law.
In addition to these conditions, the first three conditions listed above for 
approval under Title IX were also included in Title III.
The state law not only had to meet these conditions but a state could also 
be denied administrative grants if the Board after reasonable notice and oppor 
tunity for hearing found that the state had failed to comply substantially with 
the specified conditions or had denied compensation in a substantial number 
of cases to persons entitled to it.
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The System Takes Shape
Following adoption of the Social Security Act, efforts concentrated on 
obtaining passage of state unemployment insurance legislation that 
met the conditions laid down in the federal law. These efforts and their 
successful results are described in this chapter, along with the compo 
sition of the first state laws and the early experience under them. The 
nation's conversion to a wartime footing in the early 1940s completely 
altered the economic atmosphere with profound and unexpected 
effects on the unemployment insurance system. These developments, 
worries about reversion to depression conditions after the war, and the 
relatively quick and easy reconversion of the economy to a civilian 
peacetime basis by 1947 are also traced in this chapter.
The Social Security Board
In accordance with the Social Security Act, the President appointed 
a bipartisan three-member Board to administer its provisions. 1 The 
Board was established and staffed quickly. John G. Winant, a Republi 
can and former governor of New Hampshire, was named its first chair 
man. Arthur J. Altmeyer, one of the other two members who were 
both Democrats was appointed to the Board in 1935 and succeeded 
Winant as chairman in 1936; he was to head the Board, later the Social 
Security Administration, until 1953. A number of bureaus were 
formed, including the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation. 2
1. For an authoritative account of the establishment and early operation of the Social Security 
Board, see Altmeyer (1966, ch. 2).
2. The Bureau was headed by R. Gordon Wagonet, who remained in charge of unemployment 
insurance in the federal government for about twenty-five years. Wilbur J. Cohen and Merrill G. 
Murray were members of the original staff of the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation.
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A major function of the Social Security Board was to provide tech 
nical assistance to the states in developing appropriate unemployment 
insurance legislation. Although some states had given considerable 
thought and study to the subject, particularly those that had study com 
missions, most states were ill-prepared for the task. The Committee on 
Economic Security anticipated this problem and in its report had sug 
gested some considerations the states should take into account. The 
Committee provided various actuarial cost estimates for several com 
binations of benefit provisions under different assumptions about 
unemployment. It emphasized the importance of requiring adequate 
reserves in the accounts of individual employers before experience rat 
ing was permitted, so as to assure that benefit liabilities could be met. 
The Committee also had draft bills prepared setting forth alternative 
provisions under pooled fund and individual employer reserve account 
laws.3 Social Security Board staff subsequently revised these model 
bills. They were used extensively by the states, in some cases with on- 
site assistance by Board staff in adapting them to particular state needs. 
As a result, most of the early laws were very similar in language, 
although there was nevertheless substantial variation in content. Board 
staff also assisted states in setting up administrative machinery.4
The Board, operating through its Bureau of Unemployment Com 
pensation, assumed and carried out its responsibilities for reviewing 
state unemployment insurance laws to determine their conformity with 
federal requirements, for examining state administrative budgets as the 
basis for allocating federal administrative grants, and for setting poli 
cies and procedures designed to assure proper state program adminis 
tration. In the latter category, for example, the Board decided at the 
outset to approve payment of unemployment benefits only through 
public employment offices that were affiliated with the United States 
Employment Service. Since the federal authority and responsibility for 
the employment service system was then located in the U.S. Depart 
ment of Labor, the Board and the Department agreed formally, in 1937,
3. These draft bills were prepared by Merrill G. Murray with the assistance of Arthur J. Altm- 
eyer and Paul A. Raushenbush. They were printed in U.S. Congress, Senate (1935, pp. 591-632).
4. In a few states, such recognized authorities as Professor William Haber of the University of 
Michigan drafted or helped to draft the initial laws. An example of Social Security Board assis 
tance was the participation by Wilbur J. Cohen in the drafting of the District of Columbia and 
North Carolina laws.
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to coordinate and integrate their activities insofar as these involved 
both unemployment insurance and employment service matters. In 
most states, the responsibility for both functions was joined in a single 
agency.
Constitutionality of Unemployment 
Insurance Laws Upheld
A major concern overhanging the unemployment insurance provi 
sions of the federal law was that they might be ruled invalid by the 
courts, as had been the fate of some other New Deal legislation (U.S. 
Congress, Senate (1937). The critical choices of a federal tax offset 
approach to bring about state action and of a federal-state system with 
as few federal requirements as possible were, in large measure, dic 
tated by that concern. Whether the new program could withstand the 
constitutional challenges that were sure to be made was a question con 
fronted soon enough.
The challenges came at both the state and federal levels. Tests of 
state laws appeared in a number of states. One of these involved the 
Alabama unemployment insurance statute. The case was carried even 
tually to the U.S. Supreme Court, as was a challenge of the federal law. 
The Court handed down its decisions on both these cases on the same 
day May 24, 1937. In both, the Court affirmed the validity of the 
laws.
In the test of the federal law, specifically of Titles III and IX of the 
1935 Social Security Act, the arguments made against these provisions 
covered a number of points. Perhaps the most significant of these was 
that the purpose of the Federal Unemployment Tax with its tax credit 
provision and conditions was not to raise revenue but rather to force 
state action. As such, the tax constituted an unlawful invasion of 
reserved state powers, and the states unlawfully surrendered their 
responsible functions by yielding to that coercive tax. In delivering the 
opinion of the Court, Justice Cardozo rejected this argument by indi 
cating that a state enacting a law which met the prescribed conditions 
and thereby reaped a federal tax advantage for its employers was not
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acting under duress but exercising a choice it was free to make and 
unmake.5
In the case involving the Alabama law, the principal constitutional 
arguments made against the statute were that it violated the due pro 
cess and equal treatment clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
that it represented an invalid surrender of state power to the federal 
government induced by a coercive federal tax imposed for the purpose. 
Justice Stone, in delivering the Court's opinion, referred to the Court's 
decision that day regarding the challenge to the federal law which dis 
posed of the latter argument also made against the validity of the fed 
eral tax. The fact that the state tax applied only to employers with eight 
or more workers and excluded many categories, as was true of the fed 
eral tax, was not seen as infringement of the due process and equal 
treatment clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Taxes were fre 
quently imposed in this way for good reasons that were not at all capri 
cious, arbitrary, or unreasonable. Administrative factors were noted as 
prominent in the restrictions on coverage; it was not for the Court to 
question the reasonableness of the specific exemptions made by the 
state legislature. 6
With these decisions, the constitutionality of the unemployment 
insurance system itself and of the right of the states to establish a pro 
gram within it were no longer in doubt. In anticipating the kinds of 
basic legal issues that would be raised, the designers of the system had 
framed it well.
Adoption of State Laws
Although all the states, the District of Columbia, and the Territories 
of Alaska and Hawaii had unemployment insurance laws by July 1937, 
this result was not achieved without some heel-dragging. Besides Wis 
consin, four states had adopted unemployment insurance laws (all in 
1935) before the Social Security Act passed: California, New Hamp-
5. Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). The Court ruled 5 to 4 to validate the 
federal law.
6. Carmichael v. Southern Coal and Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937). The Court's decision was 5 
to 4 to uphold the Alabama law.
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shire, New York, and Utah. Late in 1935, four more states Alabama, 
Massachusetts, Oregon, and Washington enacted legislation, and 
Congress passed a law for the District of Columbia.7
During the first 11 months of 1936, only nine more states adopted 
unemployment insurance laws. Few state legislatures had regular ses 
sions that year. It was an election year with the Social Security Act as a 
center of political controversy in the presidential and many congres 
sional campaigns; governors were thus reluctant to call special ses 
sions. The first Federal Unemployment Tax payment was due January 
31,1937 on 1936 wages, and only states with unemployment insurance 
laws approved by the end of 1936 could qualify their employers for the 
90 percent tax credit. The Social Security Board indicated late in 1936 
that it could not extend the time for approval. As a result, there was a 
great flurry of legislative activity after the general election in Novem 
ber as many states called special sessions to pass the required legisla 
tion in order to "get it under the wire." A total of eighteen state 
unemployment insurance laws passed in December 1936. By the close 
of the year, the Board had approved thirty-six state laws for the tax 
credit offset. Congress subsequently authorized tax offset refunds cred 
ited to the accounts of the remaining states which passed their first 
laws after the deadline. A few states had continued to hold out in the 
hope that the federal law would be ruled unconstitutional. After the 
Supreme Court handed down its decisions in May 1937, upholding 
both the federal law and the Alabama unemployment insurance law, 
the remaining states passed the required legislation. Illinois was the 
last to do so, its law being signed on June 30,1937.
Content of Early Laws
Since most states made use of the model draft bills and other techni 
cal assistance provided by the Social Security Board in developing 
their legislation, the laws enacted at the outset were probably more
7. The Washington law was invalidated by that state's Supreme Court and had to be reenacted 
later. Congress enacted the law for the District of Columbia, as well as all its subsequent amend 
ments, since the District had no self-governing legislative authority.
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alike than at any other time. The principal differences were in the fund 
ing and financing provisions, for which the model bills offered some 
options.8
Type of Fund
The most hotly contested issue in the formation of the original state 
laws was whether to have the Wisconsin type of individual employer 
reserves or a completely pooled fund. It was argued that individual 
employer reserves gave maximum incentive to stabilization of employ 
ment. The pooled-fund advocates, on the other hand, maintained that 
individual reserve accounts could easily be exhausted; they urged 
pooling of funds to give maximum protection to the worker. Many of 
the pooled-fund proponents also opposed experience rating. The model 
draft bills offered compromises between the two extremes. One bill 
provided for individual employer reserve accounts within the state 
unemployment insurance fund, but with a partial pooling of contribu 
tions. The other bill provided for a completely pooled fund, but with 
experience rating of contributions of individual employers. Both bills 
proposed a reduction of the contribution rate from 2.7 percent to 1.8 
percent if the accumulated surplus of contributions by an employer 
over benefits paid to former employees exceeded 7.5 percent of annual 
payroll, and a reduction of the rate to 0.9 percent if the surplus was 10 
percent or more of payroll. 9 Experience rating methods for adjusting 
the unemployment insurance tax rates of individual employers may use 
other approaches for the purpose as long as the method applied reflects 
in some way the unemployment experience of the employer's former 
workers. (State experience rating provisions are described more fully 
in chapter 8.)
Despite the early example of the Wisconsin law, only six other states 
adopted the individual employer reserves approach, of which two pro 
vided for partial pooling of contributions. The remaining jurisdictions 
established fully pooled funds, all but eleven of them with experience 
rating of employer contributions; nine of these eleven made provision
8. Information about early state provisions is drawn primarily from: Federal Security Agency 
(1940); and Federal Security Agency (1947).
9. The rate of 2.7 percent was generally regarded as the "standard" rate; it represented the max 
imum credit allowed against the federal tax.
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to study experience rating. Four states also allowed for guaranteed 
employment plans and three for "contracting out" of employers who 
provided benefits equal to or larger than those provided by the state 
law. There is no record of these latter provisions ever having been 
used, and they were subsequently repealed. Eventually, all states 
adopted completely pooled funds with experience rating. 10
Contributions
From the beginning, every state required contributions from 
employers to finance benefits since employers, subject to the Federal 
Unemployment Tax, would otherwise lose the possibility for tax cred 
its and have to pay the full federal tax. Except for five states in 1937, 
the standard rate at which employers contributed (that applicable 
before experience rating took effect) was equal to the maximum tax 
credit allowed 90 percent of the federal tax rate of 3.0 percent. In the 
five states, it equaled the full federal rate. 11
Only nine states adopted employee contributions at the outset. New 
Jersey joined this group in 1938, but three states repealed employee 
contributions that year. The contribution rates which applied at the 
time ranged between 0.5 and 1.5 percent. Except for New Jersey, all 
the other states that had them have since abandoned worker contribu 
tions. Alaska adopted employee contributions beginning in 1955, and 
Pennsylvania and West Virginia did so in the 1980s, making four states 
in all as of 1990. The original District of Columbia law was the only 
one that provided for a government contribution to the state fund. 
Appropriations of $100,000 were made in 1936 and $125,000 in 1937. 
The provision was repealed thereafter.
With few exceptions, all contribution rates, both federal and state, 
applied to total wages paid in the first few years of the program. 12 A 
federal taxable wage base limit was not imposed for unemployment 
insurance until a 1939 amendment specified one, to become effective 
January 1,1940.
10. Puerto Rico, which entered the federal-state system in 1961, did not authorize experience 
rating until 1992.
11. By 1940, only Michigan, New York, and the District of Columbia continued to apply the full 
3.0 percent as the standard rate, rather than 2.7 percent which was standard elsewhere.
12. In Michigan, New York, and South Carolina (in 1939), contribution rates applied to the first 
$3,000 paid.
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Coverage
The federal law spelled out the extent of coverage indicating 
employment subject to the Federal Unemployment Tax and the specific 
exemptions from that coverage. State laws did the same with regard to 
state unemployment insurance contributions. There would be little or 
no purpose served if a state did not cover employment covered by the 
federal tax, since no tax credit could be taken. States may, however, be 
more extensive in their coverage if they so choose, and many have 
been. A small majority of the state laws originally covered the same 
size of firms as was covered by the Federal Unemployment Tax  
employers with eight or more employees at some time in each of 
twenty or more weeks in a year. The District of Columbia law went the 
whole way in covering employers with one or more at any time, while 
nine other states covered employers of one or more in twenty weeks. 
Coverage in the other states scattered between these extremes, with a 
small concentration of states covering employers of four or more, the 
level recommended originally by the Committee on Economic Secu 
rity. As experience was gained in administering the collection of con 
tributions, additional states covered smaller employers, many covering 
employers of one or more workers.
By and large, the original state laws matched the other coverage 
provisions of the federal law. These mostly concerned certain specified 
exclusions, such as agricultural labor, domestic service, maritime 
employment, service for relatives, government employment, and ser 
vice for nonprofit organizations. Apart from the intent to widen cover 
age, as with the coverage of small firms in many states, several state 
laws deviated somewhat from federal exclusion specifications or in 
their definitions of employment. In time, these deviations tended to 
increase and proliferate, leading occasionally to problems of disputed 
interpretation. Many were addressed by amendments of the federal law 
to alter or clarify the coverage provisions.
Benefit Entitlement Provisions
Most of the original state unemployment insurance laws specified 
qualifying requirements and methods for determining the weekly 
amounts and duration of benefits payable in ways which were soon 
recognized as administratively unfeasible. The aim of qualifying
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requirements, which all states have, is to confine eligibility to only 
those individuals claiming benefits who have had substantial attach 
ment to the labor market and to exclude those who have worked only 
casually or intermittently. Many of the earliest laws generally required 
a minimum number of weeks of employment in a base period one or 
two years preceding the first claim to qualify. The weekly benefit 
amount was usually set at half the claimant's full-time weekly wage up 
to a $15 maximum, 13 and the number of weeks payable was most com 
monly figured on the basis of one week of benefit for four weeks of 
work during the base period up to a maximum of sixteen weeks of ben 
efits.
Obtaining and maintaining information from employers about 
weeks of work and weekly earnings of their employees, in addition to 
handling data from the quarterly earnings reports employers had to file 
with their contributions, proved too cumbersome for most state agen 
cies in those days long before the general use of automatic data pro 
cessing equipment, let alone electronic computers. It was also 
burdensome for employers. 14 "Full-time weekly wage" was often a 
vague measure difficult to develop for workers with variable work and 
pay patterns. As a result, efforts turned toward simplification of these 
first provisions. Within a short period, most states adopted formulas for 
these three key elements the qualifying requirement, the weekly ben 
efit amount, and duration which were closely interrelated. The for 
mulas were based on quarterly and annual earnings rather than on 
direct measures of employment or the weekly wage. The objective of 
the new formulas was to produce results that were reasonably equiva 
lent to those based on direct measures of employment and the weekly 
wage. The first change many states made before they began paying 
benefits was to set the weekly benefit amount as a fraction of high- 
quarter earnings, that quarter of the base period in which the claimant 
earned the most, instead of trying to measure the full-time weekly 
wage more directly. The high-quarter formula usually specified half of 
one-thirteenth of the earnings of that quarter, assuming that those earn-
13. The District of Columbia provided only 40 percent of the weekly wage, but added depen 
dents' allowances; until 1945, it was the only law to provide dependents' allowances.
14. Wisconsin eased this problem by requesting employers to supply the additional required 
information for only those employees who had filed a claim for benefits.
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ings reflected thirteen weeks of employment, or one-twenty-sixth of 
the quarterly earnings total. Some states used a fraction somewhat 
larger than one-twenty-sixth so as to allow for workers with a little less 
than thirteen weeks of employment in the high quarter.
Given this change for calculating the weekly benefit, the qualifying 
requirement was generally converted from a direct measure of weeks 
of employment to a measure of total base-period earnings by specify 
ing the requirement in terms of the latter as a minimum multiple of the 
weekly benefit amount. Thus, for example, a requirement that total 
earnings equal at least thirty times the weekly benefit would be equiva 
lent to fifteen weeks of work if the high-quarter weekly benefit formula 
produced an amount equal to half the claimant's weekly wage.
The method of calculating the duration of benefits allowed was also 
changed by many states to a formula using base-period earnings 
instead of weeks of work. The formula usually provided a fraction of 
total earnings as the dollar limit for the total amount-of benefits pay 
able during the period of eligibility (benefit year), with the fraction 
specified as a third or less in the first applications of this approach. By 
dividing the weekly benefit amount into the resulting total allowed, the 
number of weeks payable could be determined, but always subject to 
an overall maximum number of weeks. Some states substituted a uni 
form number of weeks allowed for all eligible claimants in place of 
one that varied by prior employment or earnings. The uniform duration 
concept, however, was more than a matter of simplifying administra 
tion; for many, it became a desired feature of unemployment insurance 
as a means of assuring adequate protection. Ohio had adopted a uni 
form duration provision at the outset; by October 1940, another ten 
states had joined this category.
Some states went much further in their drive to simplify administra 
tion of these aspects of the law. A number of them adopted a minimum 
flat base-period earnings qualifying requirement, making no attempt to 
approximate length of employment. Several states calculated the 
weekly benefit amount as a fraction of total base-period wages, aban 
doning entirely the concept of relating the benefit to the weekly wage. 
By March 1940, fifteen states required simply a flat amount of earnings
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in a year to qualify, and four of these states also used a schedule based 
on a fraction of annual wages to set the weekly benefit amount. 15
State provisions specify limits on the weekly amount as well as for 
the duration of benefits payable. At the end of 1937, all but two states 
set $15 as the maximum weekly benefit amount 16 Maximum duration 
at that time ranged from twelve to twenty weeks among the states, with 
most at sixteen weeks. 17 All states also imposed waiting periods cer 
tified weeks of unemployment which were not compensated before 
benefits became payable. The original laws generally provided three- 
or four-week waiting periods; by 1940, most states specified two 
weeks. The waiting period allowed time to process the claim, assemble 
the necessary information, and determine the entitlement. It also con 
served benefit funds. The cost estimates provided to the states by the 
Social Security Board along with the draft bill benefit provisions used 
the number of waiting weeks as well as duration allowed as key vari 
ables for alternative combinations of provisions likely to be support 
able at given contribution rates.
At the beginning, all but six states provided benefits for partial 
unemployment during a period of less than full-time work. In such 
cases, the benefit normally paid for a week of total unemployment is 
reduced by earnings in partial employment. Partial benefits are paid to 
motivate a claimant to accept minor or temporary low-paid or part- 
time jobs by disregarding some of the wages earned when they are 
used to reduce the full weekly benefit amount.
15. At this date, a dozen states also specified a uniform base period for all claimants as the cal 
endar year preceding the first claim regardless of when filed, as opposed to individual base peri 
ods which varied by when the first claim was filed and which reflected more recent experience. 
All but one of these states also applied a uniform, rather than individual, benefit year during 
which the benefits allowed could be drawn, in many cases severely curtailing the time available 
for drawing these benefits.
16. The draft bills recommended this level for the maximum weekly benefit, which was about 
60 percent of the average weekly covered wage in the United States in 1938. The weekly maxi 
mum was $16 in Michigan and $18 in Wyoming.
17. Five states also provided additional weeks of benefits based on a past record of long-term 
employment which had not been used previously to establish entitlement to benefits. Such a pro 
vision was suggested by the Social Security Board to allow one added week of benefit for every 
two weeks of work in the prior five years. These provisions were repealed, however, before they 
could be used.
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Eligibility Rules and Disqualifications
To be eb'gible for benefits, claimants are required to be unemployed 
involuntarily and to be able and available for work. These conditions 
have been imposed by all states from the beginning; failure to satisfy 
them results in benefit denial or disqualification. Several reasons for 
disqualification relate to separation from the previous employer. These 
include voluntary leaving of work without good cause, discharge from 
a job for work-connected misconduct, and involvement in a labor dis 
pute. Other reasons unrelated to the job separation include refusal to 
apply for or accept a suitable job, and fraudulent misrepresentation to 
obtain benefits. Claimants who initially qualify for benefits may later 
be denied benefits because of failure to meet the continuing eligibility 
requirements. If they are unable to work or are not available for work, 
they are denied benefits as long as the restricting circumstances con 
tinue. States require claimants, with certain exceptions, to register for 
work at the local employment office as evidence of their availability, 
and to expose them to job openings which employers may list this 
process is part of the so-called "work test".
The majority of the original laws generally followed the provisions 
recommended on these matters in the draft bills, but there was a fair 
amount of variation in some of the details. For example, "good cause" 
in the case of leaving work originally appeared in the laws as a general 
term and was interpreted to include good personal causes for leaving 
which therefore were not disqualifying. A few states, however, specifi 
cally restricted good cause to circumstances attributable to the 
employer or connected with the work. Leaving a job for any other 
cause, however reasonable or understandable, was disqualifying in 
these states. By 1940, this group had grown to seven states. Over half 
the states, in keeping with the Social Security Board's draft bills, began 
with disqualification for voluntary leaving that postponed the payment 
of benefits for the week during which the claimant left work and from 
one to five weeks (plus the waiting period) thereafter; other states post 
poned benefits for longer periods. Only Wisconsin, in addition, can 
celled benefit rights. In 1940, a larger number of states postponed 
benefits for less than six weeks, usually not including the waiting
18. New York had no disqualification for voluntary leaving.
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period, but five states denied benefits to disqualified claimants for the 
duration of their unemployment and 12 states also reduced or cancelled 
benefit rights.
Discharge for misconduct was usually interpreted as meaning mis 
conduct "connected with the work," although this wording was not 
originally included in the draft bills. The disqualification period of ben 
efit postponement suggested for a misconduct discharge was longer  
nine weeks than was recommended for voluntary leaving. Most 
states, however, considered nine weeks too severe; only seventeen 
states adopted this period. Some states (eleven) used the same one-to- 
five-week period as for voluntary quits, while most of the others 
ranged between five and nine weeks of postponement. Washington 
applied a duration-of-unemployment disqualification, and Wisconsin 
cancelled benefit rights. By 1940, a dozen states reduced or cancelled 
benefit rights of claimants disqualified for misconduct discharges.
Issues regarding disqualifications for refusal of suitable work with 
out good cause often turn on what is meant by "suitable work." The 
Social Security Act specified certain conditions (the so-called labor 
standards) under which a state, in order for its law to be approved, can 
not disqualify a claimant for refusal of new work. 19 These conditions 
are designed to enable a worker to refuse a job where a labor dispute 
exists; where wages, hours, or working conditions are substandard; or 
where the right to join a bonafide labor union would be restricted. All 
state laws contain such conditions. In addition, state laws may also list 
certain criteria for testing the suitability of the work. These usually 
include the degree of risk to the claimant's health, safety, or morals; the 
claimant's physical fitness for the work; and prior training, experience, 
and earnings. Some states take into consideration the length of the 
claimant's unemployment and, after a certain period, may require 
acceptance of a less suitable job than previously held. Some states 
specify that the claimant's prospects of obtaining local work in a cus 
tomary occupation and the distance of available work from home must 
be taken into consideration in determining suitability. These factors 
entered into many of the early state laws.
19. Title DC of the Social Security Act. For the wording of this provision, see the appendix to 
chapter 6, Condition (five) among conditions state laws must meet to enable employers to receive 
federal tax credit.
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The draft bills suggested the same period of benefit postponement 
when disqualification was for refusal of suitable work as for voluntary 
quitting without good cause from one to five weeks plus the waiting 
period. Thirty-one states followed this recommendation while most of 
the other states postponed benefits for shorter periods. Four states dis 
qualified claimants who refused suitable work for the duration of their 
unemployment, and two states cancelled all benefit rights. By 1940, 
there were eight states with duration disqualifications for refusals and 
11 states that reduced or cancelled benefit rights.
It is generally agreed that a worker idled by and a party to a labor 
dispute should not receive benefits during that dispute. All but three 
states originally disqualified workers for any week of unemployment 
due to a labor dispute in which they were involved. The three states 
that were exceptions disqualified for a stated period: New York for ten 
weeks, Rhode Island for eight weeks, and Pennsylvania for three 
weeks. By 1940, three more states had adopted a limited period dis 
qualification: Tennessee for four weeks, Alaska for six weeks, and 
Louisiana for ten weeks.20 Most states did not disqualify workers 
unable to work because of a labor dispute if they were not involved in 
the dispute in any way, such as through participation, financing, or 
direct interest. How these details were specified in the law grew 
increasingly complex and varied over time.
Originally, all but four of the states relied upon criminal prosecution 
in cases of fraudulent misrepresentation to obtain benefits. The range 
of fines and maximum periods of imprisonment were specified in the 
laws. Convictions and penalties were so difficult or took so long to 
obtain that states added statutory benefit disqualifications. By 1940, 
such provisions existed in fourteen states. These disqualifications did 
not free the claimant from repayment of the benefits unlawfully 
obtained or absolve the claimant from possible fine and imprisonment 
if convicted.
Forty-five of the states originally followed the draft bills' recom 
mendations, with minor variations, for reducing benefits by the amount 
of income a claimant received in the form of wages in lieu of advance
20. In time, all of these states repealed their limited period disqualification provisions except 
New York which, as of 1990, remained the only state that paid benefits, after a disqualification 
period of seven weeks.
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notice of separation, workers' compensation for temporary partial dis 
ability, or old-age insurance benefits paid under the Social Security 
Act. By 1940, the number of states that counted one or more of such 
types of income as disqualifying had declined to thirty. Most reduced 
the unemployment benefit payable by the amount of income received; 
several applied total benefit disqualification regardless of the income 
amount.
None of the original state laws contained specific disqualifications 
aimed at individuals who left work because of family obligations, the 
need to accompany a spouse to another location, or because of preg 
nancy. However, if the separation occurred for one of these reasons, 
the claimant could be denied benefits on the ground of being unable to 
work or unavailable for work, and often were. By 1940, one state had 
adopted a pregnancy disqualification provision and four had specified 
marital or family circumstances as the basis for benefit denial. In time, 
such discriminatory provisions were to spread, although some were 
eventually struck down by the courts.
Determinations of eligibility in cases involving issues raised under 
any of the rules or disqualification provisions discussed above depend 
on adequate development of the facts and appropriate decisions based 
on the facts. Not all cases are clear-cut, and some result in contested 
decisions. This area of administration was and remains a major func 
tion of the administrative agency. It requires considerable care, skill, 
and fairness on the part of the assigned personnel. From the outset, all 
states provided for appeals from initial determinations with procedures 
that assure fair hearings, as required by federal law. Questions relating 
to eligibility rules and disqualifications have been, since the beginning, 
among the most complicated and controversial that the unemployment 
insurance program has had to encounter.
Early Experience
After enacting its unemployment insurance law, each state had to 
establish administrative machinery to carry it out. Staff had to be 
recruited, supervision assigned, premises obtained and equipped, pro 
cedures developed, forms prepared, and personnel trained for specific
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functions. With no experience in hand, and little or no time to plan or 
prepare, beginning operations were bound to be rough, even chaotic in 
some locations. In time, the state agencies took increasing hold of their 
functions, learned from their experience, by adjusting quickly and con 
tinually improving their procedures. Regular day-to-day operations 
became reasonably smooth and efficient for the most part.
Contributions and Benefit Operations
Certain aspects of the program came into play right away, others not 
until later. The first program function to be undertaken was the collec 
tion of contributions from employers, and employee contributions 
where applicable. Wisconsin began collecting contributions in July 
1934, most states in 1936, and the rest in 1937. The Federal Unem 
ployment Tax first applied to 1936 covered payrolls and was payable 
by January 31, 1937. Employers in states with federally-approved 
unemployment insurance laws in 1936 could offset the state contribu 
tions they paid that year against the federal tax up to the allowed 90 
percent limit of that tax.21
Total covered wages were subject to the federal tax until 1940, as 
was the case for state tax contributions in almost all states. The states 
usually adopted as their standard employer contribution rate 90 percent 
of the federal rate, the level of the full tax credit22 . Benefits were not 
payable until at least two years after contributions began, as required 
by federal law, allowing state funds to accumulate some reserves 
beforehand. The first benefit payment was made in Wisconsin in July 
1936. Other states did not begin paying benefits until 1938 or 1939; 
over twenty states did so in January 1938.
The prolonged depression continued throughout the 1930s with 
some variation in its severity, but the nation never satisfactorily over 
came its serious unemployment problem in this period. Some eco 
nomic recovery occurred about the middle of the decade, enabling 
many workers to gain employment in jobs covered by the new unem-
21. The total Federal Unemployment Tax rate for 1936 was 1.0 percent (2.0 percent for 1937); 
after the maximum offset, the net federal tax payable came to 0.1 percent of payrolls for 1936 (0.2 
percent for 1937). Beginning in 1938, the federal tax rate was 3.0 percent and the net rate payable 
was 0.3 percent after the full 90 percent offset was taken.
22. The District of Columbia, Michigan, and New York set their rates equal to the full federal 
tax rate of 3.0 percent. Wisconsin's standard rate was 2 percent in 1936 and 1937 and 2.7 in 1938.
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ployment insurance program. Recovery faltered, however, during the 
last half of 1937 as the first large group of states was preparing to start 
their benefit operations. When many states opened claim offices for 
business in January 1938, a full flood of recently laid-off workers 
immediately overwhelmed the staff and facilities in many locations. 
With difficulty and some temporary disarray, the program's machinery 
managed to function through these first hectic months. As the year pro 
gressed, business conditions improved and unemployment subsided. 
States that began paying benefits later in 1938 and in 1939 generally 
faced an easier task of establishing their claims and benefit payment 
operations.
This early experience led quickly to two major conclusions. One 
was to confirm doubts about the feasibility of administering the origi 
nal benefit entitlement provisions enacted by the states. Many had 
already begun to simplify their formulas, as described above, even 
before benefits became payable. The move to simplification quickened 
as the result of actual experience, with many more states acting in 
1939.
The other conclusion was that revenues produced by the standard 
contribution rates substantially exceeded benefit costs in most states 
even after taking account of the heavy unemployment experience of 
1938. Unemployment benefits were paid throughout that year in 
twenty-three states; in only five of them did benefit costs amount to 3 
percent or more of covered payrolls. With unemployment and benefit 
outlays down in 1939, the reserve funds grew rapidly. By the end of 
that year, they totaled more than $1.5 billion, about 5.3 percent of cov 
ered payrolls or nearly twice the level of contributions for the year. 
Pressures were building to reduce contributions or to improve benefits, 
or both. A major focus at the state level was on experience rating 
which required at least three years of benefit experience for pooled 
funds before it could take effect.
Interstate Cooperation
Beginning late in 1935, representatives of some of the states that 
had already enacted unemployment insurance laws held occasional 
informal meetings with each other and Social Security Board staff to 
discuss common problems. Representation at these meetings expanded
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as more states adopted legislation. Most of the discussion naturally 
centered on technical and administrative problems at the time. With the 
system becoming increasingly universal, a permanent organization of 
state agency directors formed under the title of Interstate Conference 
of Employment Security Agencies. Its first official annual meeting was 
held in October 1937. Federal staff cooperated with the Interstate Con 
ference, and the Board officially participated in its activities by supply 
ing an executive secretary. The Conference became an important factor 
in the future development of unemployment insurance as well as the 
employment service.
A major early contribution of the Interstate Conference was its 
development of a plan under which an unemployed worker who moves 
away from the state where previously employed can still file for unem 
ployment benefits after the move based on the wages earned before the 
move. Under the plan, the state to which the worker moves, acting as 
an agent for the state liable for the benefits, takes the claim and for 
wards it to the liable state. Eventually, all states agreed to this plan. The 
Interstate Conference also developed other interstate plans to coordi 
nate or combine qualifying wages and employment so as to produce 
the appropriate benefit entitlement for a claimant who has worked on 
jobs in more than one state. Many years later, the federal law was 
amended to require all states to participate in these plans.
Early Federal Legislative Changes
Besides being subject to change through state legislation, the fed 
eral-state unemployment insurance system has also been modified by 
amendments to the federal law. Several important federal changes 
occurred in 1938 and 1939.
Railroad Unemployment Insurance
Although the Committee on Economic Security had recommended 
that railroad workers be covered by a separate federal program, they 
were originally covered under the federal-state system. In 1938, how 
ever, a federal railroad unemployment insurance program was created 
under a bill worked out jointly between the railroads and the railroad
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unions, with the assistance of Murray W. Latimer, chairman of the 
Railroad Retirement Board. The new program became effective in 
1939 (P.L. 75-722). It is administered in conjunction with a pension 
program by the Railroad Retirement Board. Since all the states had 
covered railroad workers, the 1938 Act provided for the transfer to a 
new unemployment insurance account in the Unemployment Trust 
Fund of the excess of contributions by the railroads over benefits paid 
to railroad workers from the state funds. All the states passed the nec 
essary legislation to implement the Act.
The 1938 Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act was less liberal 
than most state laws, but by subsequent amendments became much 
more liberal in time, at least until the 1970s. The basic principles of the 
1938 Act, however, have been retained. Because railroad employment 
operates on a full seven-day-a-week basis, the benefit provisions of the 
Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act are considerably different from 
those of state unemployment insurance laws. Railroad unemployment 
benefits are figured on a daily basis and paid biweekly. The daily bene 
fit rate is based on annual earnings in railroad employment in the base 
year. Benefit duration allowed is uniform for 130 days (twenty-six 
weeks) in a year.23 Employer contributions finance railroad unemploy 
ment insurance. Unlike the state programs, however, there was no 
experience rating until some financing reforms were made in the 
1980s. Hie original contribution rate was 3 percent of the first $300 of 
monthly earnings, which paid for both benefits and administration. 
Sickness benefits were added later, along with extended long-term 
unemployment benefits; these additions required raising the contribu 
tion rate. The taxable wage base also increased.
Social Security Amendments of 1939
Many significant changes were made in 1939 in the old age insur 
ance provisions of the Social Security Act, but only a few changes 
were made affecting unemployment insurance. One proposed unem 
ployment insurance amendment passed one house but not the other; it 
evoked some stormy controversy concerning federal minimum benefit 
standards, an issue that continued to beset the program over the years.
23. Additional benefits were provided later for workers in railroad employment for ten or more 
years.
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The two most important changes regarding unemployment insur 
ance were setting a $3,000 limit on the covered wages paid in a year to 
an employee that were subject to the Federal Unemployment Tax, and 
adding the requirement that states use the merit system for staffing 
their agencies. Other amendments clarified coverage exclusions relat 
ing to agricultural labor, nonprofit organizations, and certain salesmen 
and other agents who worked on a commission basis. The federal tax 
provisions in Title IX of the Social Security Act were replaced by the 
Federal Unemployment Tax Act which incorporated those provisions 
in the Internal Revenue Code.
The Federal Unemployment Tax base was changed from total pay 
rolls to the first $3,000 paid each employee in order to match the tax 
base used for the old age insurance contributions, thereby simplifying 
federal employer tax collections for both programs. It also simplified 
tax payment procedures for employers covered by both programs. At 
the time, the change was not considered to be important, aside from the 
increased convenience, since it reduced the total of covered wages sub 
ject to the unemployment tax by only about 8 percent. No one, of 
course, could foresee the dramatic increase in wages which would 
develop in later years, reducing significantly the proportion of payrolls 
taxable under the $3,000 limit. Employers strongly supported the 
change; no opposition was in evidence. The $3,000 limit had been 
applied for old age insurance from the beginning because that pro 
gram's benefits were based on earnings up to that level, and with 
employees also contributing, it was thought that the tax and benefit 
base should be the same.
The added merit system requirement for staff selection applied for 
state personnel administering unemployment insurance and public 
assistance. Recommended originally by the Committee on Economic 
Security and urged strongly by the Social Security Board, this standard 
was not popular with those who favored the political patronage system 
for the appointment of public office holders. Support by state program 
administrators, who emphasized the need for the most highly qualified 
staff possible to handle the difficult, technical work involved, was an 
important factor in gaining approval for this amendment.
The House of Representatives adopted an amendment proposed by 
Congressman John McCormack of Massachusetts to permit states to 
reduce their contribution rates below the 2.7 percent level, without loss
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of federal tax credit, sooner than allowed by the minimum of three 
years delay required by the existing experience rating provisions in the 
federal law. His proposal was a response to the current rapid accumula 
tion of reserves in many states. To lower rates sooner, however, or to 
allow its average rate to fall below 2.7 percent, a state would have to 
adhere to certain benefit standards and a reserve solvency standard. 
The latter would require a state fund equal to at least 1.5 times the 
highest annual benefit outlay of the last ten years. The benefit standards 
specified floors for weekly benefit maximum ($15) and minimum ($5) 
amounts, and for maximum duration (sixteen weeks), and a ceiling for 
a waiting period (two weeks). 24 Considerable opposition to the 
McCormack amendment surfaced at the Senate Finance Committee 
hearings, chiefly from employer representatives and state agency 
administrators. The former mainly opposed any weakening or qualify 
ing of the experience rating concept. The latter opposed the addition of 
standards that would further circumscribe state discretion in the pro 
gram. The Senate Committee eliminated the amendment and the House 
accepted this deletion. Thus ended the first attempt to establish federal 
benefit and fund solvency standards.25
Employment Service-Unemployment Insurance Merger
Despite efforts to coordinate actions and policies at the federal level, 
the states continued to experience difficulties in dealing with two sepa 
rate federal agencies on unemployment insurance and employment ser 
vice matters. Recommendations by the states and by others to merge 
the two were finally realized in 1939. The President's Reorganization 
Plan No. 1 of 1939 established the Federal Security Agency, a new 
broad grouping of a number of independent federal units that had 
emerged in preceding years, including the Social Security Board. 26 As
24. Social Security Board Chairman Altmeyer had objected to McCormack's original proposal 
simply to allow states to lower rates in 1940 rather than wait another year or two. He objected 
because of the lack of state experience and suggested at least adding such standards as a condi 
tion, although the benefit standards adopted by the House were more modest than he had in mind. 
See Altmeyer (1966, p. 104).
25. Altmeyer (1966, p. 104) reluctantly agreed to the elimination of the McCormack amend 
ment because of the possibility that the minimum benefit standards might become the maximum 
provisions in state laws.
26. Other components included were the U.S. Public Health Service, Office of Education, 
National Youth Administration, and Civilian Conservation Corps.
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part of this reorganization, the United States Employment Service was 
transferred to the Board from the Department of Labor. There it was 
joined with the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation to form a new 
Bureau of Employment Security.27
War and Reconversion
The year 1940 was the first in which the unemployment insurance 
system was fully operational throughout the year in all states. Most 
states had amended their original laws to make their provisions easier 
to administer. The $3,000 taxable wage base took effect in 1940 for the 
federal tax rate, and for state rates in all but eight states. 28 Experience 
rating was applied in five states that year, all of them individual 
employer reserve systems; thirty-four other states had experience rat 
ing provisions scheduled to take effect during the next few years. Rev 
enues exceeded benefit outlays in 1940 by wide margins in most states, 
despite high levels of unemployment. Benefits in 1940 totaled 1.6 per 
cent of total covered payrolls, a benefit cost rate equaled or exceeded 
by the system as a whole in only five of the next fifty years. 29 By the 
end of 1940, reserves aggregated $1.8 billion, about 5.6 percent of total 
covered payrolls that year.
The War Years (1940-1945)
During 1940, the economy began its increasing conversion to mili 
tary production. As time went on, especially after the U.S. entry into 
World War II in December 1941, unemployment almost disappeared 
and was replaced by labor shortages. Conversion to a war economy 
produced some temporary dislocations and short-term unemployment.
27. Altmeyer coined the name "employment security" to embrace the two programs; many 
states adopted it for their agencies in ensuing years.
28. By 1941, only Idaho and Nevada continued to tax total payrolls; Idaho adopted the $3,000 
limit in 1943 and Nevada in 1945.
29. Includes benefits paid under the regular state unemployment insurance program only; if the 
extended benefits that were provided later are included, the combined benefit cost rate may have 
reached 1.6 percent or more in one or two additional years. See Unemployment Insurance Finan 
cial Data, 1938-1982, and annual supplements.
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To help replace the millions of young men drawn into the armed 
forces, large numbers of women and older persons entered the civilian 
labor force. In January 1942, the state employment services were fed- 
eralized for the duration of the war to concentrate on the task of nation 
wide manpower mobilization and allocation.
During the war years, the unemployment insurance program shrank 
sharply in terms of its benefit operations. From a peak of $519 million 
in 1940, aggregate annual benefit outlays declined to $62 million by 
1944 (table 7.1). In no state did benefits paid exceed 0.2 percent of 
payrolls in 1944. With expanding employment and payrolls, contribu 
tion revenues rose until 1943 and continued high despite the spreading 
application of lower rates through experience rating and the limitation 
of the taxable wage base. The total of all state reserves grew to $6.1 
billion by the end of 1944 and to $6.9 billion by the end of 1945, equal 
to more than 10 percent of total covered payrolls in the latter year. At 
no other time has the year-end reserve ratio been even close to this 
high level.
Several factors influenced the course of state and federal unemploy 
ment insurance legislation during the war period. The sizable accumu 
lation of reserves accelerated the spread of experience rating to forty- 
five states by the end of 1945. For an approach as controversial as 
experience rating to become almost universal within a few years was 
surely due, in large measure, to the huge reserve buildup and to the fact 
that it was the only way permitted to reduce unemployment insurance 
taxes.30 The drive to lower taxes through experience rating overcame 
arguments for keeping taxes up as a counterinflationary measure and as 
a means of strengthening reserves to meet heavy benefit liabilities 
which many anticipated would become payable after the war ended.
High reserves also supported demands to improve benefits, and sev 
eral states did move in this direction. The most important gains came in 
reductions of waiting periods, rising weekly benefit ceilings, and 
increased duration of benefits (table 7.2). More states also extended 
coverage to smaller firms. On the other hand, disqualification provi 
sions became more restrictive and severe in many states, reflecting
30. Except for Wisconsin, no state could begin experience rating before 1941. During the years 
after the war when wage levels rose rapidly, the maintenance of the taxable wage limit at $3,000 
also served to keep taxes lower.
Table 7.1 Selected Unemployment Insurance Statistics, United States, Selected Years 1940-1947
Item
Average monthly covered employment (millions) 
Total covered payrolls (billions) 
Total taxable payrolls (billions)
Ratio of taxable to total payrolls
Average state UI tax rate (percent)*
Total state UI taxes collected (millions)
Total benefit outlays (millions)
Benefit outlays as percent of total payrolls
Total state reserves at year end (billions)
Reserves as percent of total payrolls1*
Average weekly covered wage
Average weekly benefit paidc
Number of first payments (millions)
Average actual duration of benefits (weeks)
Estimated exhaustion ratio d
1940
23.1 
$32.4 
$30.1
.93
2.7
$854
$519
1.6
$1.8
5.6
$27.02
$10.56
5.2
9.8
50.6
1944
30.0 
$69.1 
$60.6
.88
1.9
$1,317
$62
0.1
$6.1
8.8
$44.25
$15.90
0.5
7.7
20.2
1945
28.4 
$66.6 
$58.5
.88
1.7
$1,162
$446
0.7
$6.9
10.4
$45.11
$18.77
2.8
8.5
18.1
1946
30.2 
$73.4 
$63.7
.87
1.4
$912
$1,095
1.5
$6.9
9.4
$46.69
$18.50
4.5
13.4
38.7
1947
32.3 
$86.6 
$73.0
.84
1.4
$1,096
$775
0.9
$7.3
8.4
$51.59
$17.83
4.0
11.1
30.7
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SOURCES: Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, 1938-1982 and annual supplements.
a. Applicable to taxable wages.
b. Also known as reserve ratio.
c. For week of total unemployment.
d. Total number exhausting benefits during the year as a percent of total first payments during the twelve months ending September 30 of that year.
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stiffening attitudes toward claimant behavior that raised doubts about 
ready availability for work when the need for full productive effort was 
so great. The increased employment of women also led to more spe 
cific benefit eligibility restrictions in many state laws applicable to 
periods of pregnancy, to wives who quit jobs to follow their husbands 
transferred elsewhere, and to working mothers who limited their avail 
ability for work to certain shifts or locations because of child-care 
problems. Becoming increasingly sensitive to benefit charges as expe 
rience rating took greater hold, employers mounted more pressure for 
wider adoption of provisions to suspend benefits of disqualified claim 
ants for the duration of their unemployment and to reduce or cancel 
their benefit rights. By the end of 1945, there were fourteen states that 
imposed a duration disqualification and twenty-six states that reduced 
or cancelled benefit rights for one or more of the three major reasons 
for disqualifications voluntary leaving, misconduct discharge, and 
refusal of suitable work (Federal Security Agency 1947).
During the war, national considerations overrode state concerns. 
The momentum created by New Deal era programs and by the vast 
machinery of the federal government assembled during the early 1940s 
to direct the nation's war efforts seemed to encourage tendencies to 
seek comprehensive national solutions for most problems. The federal- 
ization of the state employment services was the most prominent effect 
of this orientation on employment security.31 The Social Security 
Board moved far in the direction of supporting a national unemploy 
ment insurance system. In a report issued in 1942, the Board stated that 
it "is convinced that nothing less than a national uniformly operated 
employment service, sustained by an adequate and soundly financed 
Federal unemployment insurance system will meet the needs of the 
period immediately following the war and the longer-range objectives 
of Social Security."32
In January 1942, the administration proposed a national war dis 
placement benefits program to supplement state unemployment insur 
ance benefits. Opponents suspected that the proposal was aimed at 
federalization of the state programs. Hearings were held on a bill cov 
ering a version of this proposal, but the bill died in the House Ways and
31. The employment services were restored to state control in 1946.
32. Social Security Board (1942, p. 17). The Board reiterated this position in succeeding years.
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Means Committee. State employment security administrators effec 
tively organized opposition to such proposals. In the process, consider 
able friction developed between state and federal officials which had 
long-lasting effects on federal-state relationships in the system.
Table 7.2 Distribution of States by Selected Unemployment Insurance 
Coverage and Benefit Provisions October 1940 and December 
1945
Number of states
Provision
Total
Size of firm covered (no. of workers)
8 or more
4-7 or more
2-3 or more
1 or more
Waiting period (no. of weeks)
3
2
1
0
Maximum weekly benefit amount
$15
$16419
$20-$24
$25 or more
Maximum duration8 (no. of weeks)
12-15
16
17-19
20
21-25
26
October 1940
51
25
12
3
11
3
27
21
0
41
10
0
0
13(4)
29(7)
3
5
0
1
December 1945
51
22
10
3
16
0
13
37
1
10
14
22
5
2(1)
12(5)
5
21(6)
6(1)
5(1)
SOURCE: Federal Security Agency (1947, pp. 18, 20, 29, and 40).
a. Counts of states include the number (shown parenthetically) of states with uniform duration 
a total of eleven in October 1940 and fourteen in December 1945.
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Other recommendations emerged for a comprehensive federal 
Social Security system which incorporated unemployment insur 
ance.33 Legislation introduced in the Congress from 1942 to 1945 was 
designed to establish such a system.34 Though supported by the Social 
Security Board and by organized labor, these bills never received any 
serious consideration by the Congress.
Postwar Planning
As the war's outlook turned favorable for the Allies in 1943 and 
1944, more attention focused on planning for the postwar period. The 
principal expectation, and fear, was that the economy would slide back 
into its prewar depressed state once the stimulus of military production 
was gone. Simultaneous demobilization of the armed forces and recon 
version of industry to civilian production would presumably raise 
unemployment to massive proportions. Various states appointed study 
commissions to consider the potential impact of such postwar disloca 
tions and the possible remedies. It was widely held that these problems 
were likely to be so severe and widespread that the individual states 
would be unable to cope with them entirely on their own. A dozen 
states did enact provisions for special "war-risk" contributions to sup 
plement the regular unemployment insurance contributions. They were 
applicable, in most cases, to large employers who had experienced 
substantial increases in payrolls during the war. These provisions 
resulted in rates higher than those yielded by the regular experience 
rating schedules or in an added flat rate on "excess" payrolls. Overall, 
taxable payrolls rose from about $30 billion in 1940 to over $60 billion 
in 1944 (table 7.1).
In 1944, Congress moved to deal with some of the anticipated post 
war problems. The Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 (the GI 
Bill) was enacted in June. Title V provided federal servicemen's read 
justment allowances (SRA) for World War II veterans unemployed 
after discharge. SRA was paid at a uniform weekly rate of $20 for up to
33. These included recommendations contained in "Security, Work, and Relief Policies," a 
report issued in 1942 by the Committee on Long-Range Work and Relief Policies of the National 
Resources Planning Board. William Haber was Chairman of the Committee.
34. Most prominent among these were the Wagner-Murray-Dingell bills of 1943 and 1945; in 
the latter year, S. 1161 and H.R. 2861, 78th Cong., 1st sess.
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fifty-two weeks. State weekly unemployment insurance payments in 
1944 averaged only $16, and over half the states that year still limited 
duration to less than twenty weeks. Although the SRA program was 
administered nationally by the Veterans Administration, the state 
employment security agencies paid the benefits as agents of the federal 
government. The program lasted from 1944 to 1950. It was criticized 
in some quarters as the "52-20 club," because many veterans returning 
to their small home towns received the benefits for fifty-two weeks 
without a strict enforcement of the work test to assure current avail 
ability for work.
Later, as part of the Social Security Amendments of 1946, Congress 
also provided a temporary program of readjustment benefits for sea 
men on ships controlled by the War Shipping Administration. After the 
war, unemployment was heavy among seamen formerly employed on 
such vessels. The federal-state unemployment insurance system had 
not covered maritime workers prior to the 1946 Act. The temporary 
program provided benefits under the terms of the law of the state where 
the seaman filed a claim, but the federal government paid the cost. This 
special program continued until 1950.
Various federal proposals emerged in 1944 to provide special unem 
ployment benefit protection for employees engaged in war production 
on federal jobs, such as those in shipyards, munitions plants, and 
atomic energy facilities, as well as for maritime workers, or to expand 
the regular unemployment insurance program to cover them. Other 
approaches were suggested to supplement state benefit provisions to 
make them more adequate, or to impose federal minimum benefit stan 
dards on the state programs. Some proposals offered federal financial 
backing to cover the expected added costs of unemployment benefits 
through reinsurance or loans. Special provisions for retraining and 
relocation of the unemployed were also advanced. All these measures 
were designed to be temporary to help get the country through the 
reconversion period.
In the end, Congress took only limited action in these areas. By and 
large, it decided that the major responsibility for unemployment insur 
ance during the reconversion period rested with the states. Moreover, 
the prevailing congressional view regarded the administration's 
gloomy predictions of the reconversion problem as overdrawn. The
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result was the passage of the War Mobilization and Reconversion Act 
of 1944.35
The Act's chief feature with regard to unemployment insurance was 
the provision for interest-free federal loans to state funds that fell 
below specified levels. The loans would cover benefit costs exceeding 
2.7 percent of taxable payrolls in a calendar quarter. They would be 
financed by appropriations to a new loan fund account in the Unem 
ployment Trust Fund from excess revenues of the Federal Unemploy 
ment Tax that were not used for administrative grants. Loans were to 
be available through 1947. The provision was extended twice, but 
allowed to expire March 1952. During its life, no appropriation was 
ever made to the loan fund, nor was any application ever made for a 
loan. Other provisions in the Act included those for retraining and 
reemployment of workers laid off because of war production cutbacks, 
but no others that significantly affected unemployment insurance.
One other action taken by Congress in this period should be noted, 
although it did not relate directly to the unemployment insurance sys 
tem. In 1945 and 1946, Congress debated and finally passed legislation 
designed to commit the government to an annual review of the nation's 
economy (P.L. 304) The bill originally introduced in 1945 was more 
specific in its aim a guarantee of full employment, mainly through 
federal fiscal policies if the rest of the economy failed to achieve it. 
Congress backed away from that firm a commitment because of con 
cerns raised over difficulties in defining the full employment goal in 
measurable terms, controversy about the efficacy of fiscal policy 
manipulations, worry about potential inflation, and general resistance 
by many to deliberate government interference in the economy. The 
Employment Act of 1946, however, did retain emphasis on unemploy 
ment as a major problem to be avoided or minimized as much as possi 
ble. It called for the President to report annually on the state of the 
economy and to recommend actions to keep it in good health or restore 
it if faltering. The Act established a Council of Economic Advisers to 
assist the President in this task. To the extent that the exercise of this 
function has contributed to the prevention of serious mass unemploy-
35. Known as the George bill, after Senator Walter George, chairman of the Senate Finance 
Committee; the bill became law in October 1944. The unemployment insurance loan fund pro 
vided by this law became known as the "George Fund."
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ment of the dimensions of the depression years, it has helped the 
unemployment insurance system operate within a feasible range.
Reconversion (1945-1947)
Demobilization and the termination of war production following the 
end of hostilities in 1945 did lead to high levels of unemployment soon 
afterwards and during 1946. Unemployment benefit outlays rose 
sharply, reaching to over $400 million in 1945 and over $1 billion in 
1946 (table 7.1).36 The latter year was the first in which the federal- 
state system overall operated at a current deficit, although the interest 
earned by the reserves closed most of the gap. Compared with the pre 
vious high unemployment year of 1940 when the number of new bene 
ficiaries (first payments on table 7.1) was even higher, the average 
weekly benefit paid in 1946 was almost 80 percent larger and pay 
ments lasted three-and-six-tenths weeks longer, on average. Improved 
benefit provisions in state laws, as well as higher wages and steady 
base-period employment contributed to the higher amounts and longer 
protection in 1946.
The unemployment insurance system had weathered a fairly severe 
test. In 1947, unemployment headed downward and employment 
reached new peaks even exceeding wartime levels. No state had expe 
rienced any financial difficulty. None had need to resort to federal 
loans. By mid-1947, the economy was well through its reconversion to 
a civilian peacetime economy.
Yet, despite statutory gains made since 1940, program inadequacies 
were evident with regard to coverage and benefits. As of September 
1947, about half the states still only covered firms with eight or more 
workers. Few states covered other major excluded employment catego 
ries. All but four states had higher maximum weekly benefit levels than 
in 1940, but wage levels generally were rising rapidly, so that claim 
ants were less likely to be compensated for half their wage loss. About 
70 percent of all benefit payments in 1946 were made at the statutory 
ceilings. Gains in duration provisions had been notable. Forty states 
paid up to twenty or more weeks of benefits as of September 1947,
36. In addition, readjustment allowances totaling about $1.5 billion were paid out of federal 
general revenues in 1946 to more than 5 million veterans under the Servicemen's Readjustment 
Act of 1944 (the GI Bill).
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compared with only six states in 1940. The number providing uniform 
duration had increased from eleven to fifteen. Even so, the average 
potential duration (the average number of weeks for which claimants 
qualified) in 1947, was less than twenty weeks in about thirty-five 
states and below sixteen weeks in almost half of them.37
Criticisms leveled at the unemployment insurance program and at 
the broader Social Security system, along with a need for a general 
evaluation, led the House of Representatives, in 1945, to authorize a 
technical staff to investigate and review problems and issues in Social 
Security programs. Staff findings were expected to guide the House 
Ways and Means Committee considerations of proposed Social Secu 
rity amendments. With respect to unemployment insurance, the 1946 
staff report covered much of the historical background, objectives, 
experience, and program issues, but avoided making any evaluations 
or recommendations.38 The Ways and Means Committee held exten 
sive hearings on the subject during the first half of 1946 which again 
revealed the conflicting positions on unemployment insurance of 
employers, labor, the Social Security Board, and state employment 
security agency officials. The Social Security Amendments enacted 
that year made no basic changes in unemployment insurance. Under 
the Amendments,39 Congress formally authorized the states to cover 
maritime workers employed on American vessels operating on naviga 
ble waters within or without the United States, with the proviso that 
they would receive equal treatment with other workers covered by 
state laws. Employment of maritime workers was covered by the Fed 
eral Unemployment Tax, but Congress exempted employment on fish 
ing vessels, unless they were fishing for salmon or halibut, or were 
vessels weighing more than 10 net tons. Congress also exempted ser 
vice by crews of foreign vessels while in ports of the United States. 
Except for this provision and the temporary program of readjustment 
benefits for seamen employed in war shipping, described above, no 
other provisions applied to unemployment insurance.
37. These data are from Federal Security Agency (1947).
38. Issues in Social Security, a report to the Committee by its Social Security Technical staff, 
established pursuant to H. Res. 204, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1946. The study was directed by 
Leonard J. Calhoun, a former assistant to Senator Pat Harrison of Mississippi.
39. P. L. 79-719, Social Security Amendments of 1946, Public Law 79-719, Title III, approved 
August 10,1946.
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Concluding Observations
The federal-state unemployment insurance system came through its 
first decade of operations well established and in good working order. 
It also appeared to have gained the general acceptance of employers, 
workers, and the public as a whole. The fundamental objections to the 
very concept of unemployment insurance and its feasibility, raised pri 
marily by employers prior to 1937, were heard no longer. No political 
leaders urged repeal or major changes in the philosophy or structure of 
the system. Unemployment insurance had become an essential part of 
the American economy.
Considering that the program had to weather depression conditions 
at the outset and the economic gyrations of war and reconversion, its 
solid position in 1947 spoke well of the wisdom and strength of the 
design adopted in 1935 and of the conservative approach pursued at 
the start. At no time during the first decade did the overall system, or 
any individual state program for that matter, experience any financial 
strain. Indeed, reserve funds were far more than ample, and as experi 
ence rating spread and took hold, contribution rates declined steadily. 
The shadows cast by the earlier financial fiascos of the British and Ger 
man unemployment insurance programs on the prospects for unem 
ployment insurance in the United States were long gone by 1947.
To be sure, it was the combination of minimal benefit outlays of the 
war years and the high levels of contribution income that swelled 
reserves so greatly, not simply the initial conservative approach. Since 
experience rating was the only means for reducing employer rates, the 
standard rate (usually 2.7 percent) tended to become the maximum rate 
in state tax schedules, as long as reserves continued high. Moreover, 
with the taxable wage base fixed at $3,000, rising wages worked year 
by year to reduce the proportion of total payrolls subject to the tax. 
Again, with reserves high, no inclination developed to increase the tax 
base. The benefit cost experience of 1940 and 1946, the heaviest years 
of unemployment and claims encountered by the program in the first 
decade, gave indication that the initial cost estimate for unemployment 
insurance of 3 percent of total payrolls was much too high.
The conservative approach recommended to the states also led them 
to adopt modest benefit provisions in their first laws. The early cost
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experience and rapid reserve accumulation supported some improve 
ments, particularly in the duration of benefits allowed by the states, and 
reduced waiting periods. Weekly benefit amounts, on the other hand, 
began to lose ground as legislative adjustments of benefit ceilings 
tended to lag behind the pace of rising wage levels. The adequacy of 
weekly benefit protection was lacking in the eyes of some critics who 
urged stronger efforts to improve state provisions or federal minimum 
benefit standards to assure that end. While more states were gradually 
extending their program's coverage to employment in smaller firms, 
few had broadened protection to include other major categories of 
employment exempted from coverage under the federal tax.
With the employment services restored to the states after World War 
II, the state employment security agencies were in a firm and settled 
position by 1947 to carry on the normal operations of their programs. 
The agency was one of the most important elements in the state gov 
ernment, and the program often attracted major attention and conten 
tion in the state legislature. Within this framework, employers and, in 
many states, labor unions were usually organized to advance their 
interests regarding the program. The Social Security Board continued 
to offer guidance to the states in further development of program poli 
cies, extending the active role it played at the outset in helping to set up 
their laws. By 1947, however, the states had accumulated their own 
experience and expertise, and points of view as well, which did not 
always coincide with federal positions. Conflict was sometimes the 
result. States generally resented and resisted federal efforts to control 
or dominate the program and usually succeeded in avoiding legislation 
designed to foster such control, as in the case of proposed federal ben 
efit standards. The federal-state system had become a more equal and 
mature partnership which would require reasonable working relations 
to maintain a proper balance.
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The System Develops 
(1947-1969)
The 1950s and 1960s constituted a period of unprecedented expansion 
of the American economy. Several temporary setbacks (recessions) 
occasionally slowed this long climb of the nation's output and income. 
Here and there, a few pockets of stagnation remained, residues of the 
tides of structural economic change. Overall, however, the American 
scene was one of strong growth, widening affluence, and rising confi 
dence in the nation's ability to overcome such problems as poverty, 
discrimination, declining industries and regions, and possibly even the 
business cycle.
Throughout this time, the unemployment insurance program served 
its function of tiding workers over periods of temporary unemploy 
ment. It drew most attention and was most used during economic 
recessions, of which there were four between 1947 and 1969. Table 8.1 
provides an idea of how the economic trends of the times affected the 
program, and some perspective against which to view the unemploy 
ment insurance legislation of the period. The table shows the same 
kind of aggregated data given for earlier years in table 7.1. Added here 
are insured unemployment rates, which were not available before 
1947, and total unemployment rates. The data are presented for two 
groups of selected years: (A) three prerecession years when unemploy 
ment rates were relatively low, and two other low unemployment years 
in the 1960s; and (B) the four recession years of the period. It should 
be noted that at no time during the entire period covered, even in the 
worst recession years, were the overall unemployment rates close to 
the range of about 15 to 25 percent of the labor force estimated for 
rates in the depression years prior to World War II. 1
1. Estimates of unemployment rates for the years 1931 through 1940 range from 14.3 to 24.9 
percent of the civilian labor force, as published in Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1954.
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Table 8.1 Selected Unemployment Insurance Statistics, United States, Selected Years: 1948-1969 VOo
(A) Low unemployment years ^
Item
Total unemployment rate8 (percent)
Insured unemployment rate (percent)
Average monthly covered employment (millions)
Total covered payrolls (billions)
Total taxable payrolls (billions)
Ratio of taxable to total payrolls
Average employer UI tax rate (percent)13
Total state UI taxes collected (millions)
Collections as percent of total payrolls
Total benefit outlays (millions)
Benefit outlays as percent of total payrolls
Total state reserves at year end (billions)0
Reserves as percent of total payrolls'1
Average weekly covered wage
Average weekly benefit paid6
Number of first payments (millions)
Average actual duration of benefits (weeks)
Estimated exhaustion ratiof
1948
3.8
3.0
33.1
$96.1
$78.5
.82
1.2
$1,000
1.0
$790
.8
$7.6
7.9
$55.85
$19.03
4.0
10.7
27.5
1953
2.9
2.7
36.7
$139.2
$99.6
.72
1.3
$1,348
1.0
$962
.7
$8.9
6.4
$72.98
$23.58
4.2
10.1
20.8
1957
4.3
3.6
39.7
$173.6
$112.8
.65
1.3
$1,544
.9
$1,734
1.0
$8.7
5.0
$84.18
$28.17
5.6
11.5
22.7
1965
4.5
2.9
45.1
$257.9
$144.0
.56
2.1
$3,054
1.2
$2,166
.8
$8.2
3.2
$109.99
$37.19
4.8
12.2
21.5
1969 |
3.5 &
2.1
52.4
$365.7
$181.8
.50
1.4
$2,545
.7
$2,126
.6
$12.6
3.5
$134.31
$46.17
4.2
11.4
19.8
(B) Recession years
Item
Total unemployment rateb (percent)
Insured unemployment rate (percent)
1949
5.9
6.2
1954
5.5
5.2
1958
6.8
6.5
1961
6.7
5.7
Average monthly covered employment (millions)
Total covered payrolls (billions)
Total taxable payrolls (billions)
Ratio of taxable to total payrolls
Average employer UI tax rate (percent)6
Total state UI taxes collected (millions)
Collections as percent of total payrolls
Total benefit outlays (millions)
Benefit outlays as percent of total payrolls
Total state reserves at year end (billions)*1
Reserves as percent of total payrolls'
Average weekly covered wage
Average weekly benefit paidf
Number of first payments (millions)
Average actual duration of benefits (weeks)
Estimated exhaustion ratio8
31.7
$93.9
$76.3
.81
1.3
$987
1.1
$1,736
1.8
$7.0
7.5
$56.95
$20.48
7.4
11.8
29.1
35.4
$137.1
$96.5
.70
1.1
$1,136
.8
$2,027
1.5
$8.2
6.0
$74.52
$24.93
6.6
12.8
26.8
38.1
$171.4
$109.2
.64
1.3
$1,471
.9
$3,513
2.0
$6.8
4.0
$86.49
$30.54
7.8
14.8
31.0
40.1
$199.0
$119.3
.60
2.1
$2,450
1.2
$3,423
1.7
$5.6
2.8
$95.53
$33.80
7.1
14.7
30.4
SOURCES: Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, 1938-1982 and annual supplements.
NOTE: Unemployment insurance data reflect state programs only; they exclude federal programs for railroad workers, veterans, ex-servicemen, federal
employees, and extended benefits. Figures shown for covered employment, payrolls, tax collections, regular benefit outlays, average weekly covered
wage, and average weekly benefit paid relate to taxable employers and exclude data for reimbursable employers.
a. From chapter 1, table 1.1.
b. Applicable to taxable wages.
c. Net of outstanding loans.
d. Also known as reserve ratio.
e. For week of total unemployment
f. Total number exhausting benefits during the year as a percent of total first payments during the twelve months ending September 30 of that year for
ratios through 1959, and thereafter as a percent of first payments during the 12 months ending June 30. vo
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Employment covered by the state unemployment insurance pro 
grams rose by about 60 percent from 1948 to 1969, while payrolls 
nearly quadrupled. Average weekly covered wage levels were up 
almost 150 percent, outstripping the approximately 50 percent rise in 
the Consumer Price Index over this period. Taxable payrolls increased 
much less than total payrolls because of the continued wage base limi 
tation at $3,000 in most states.2 By 1969, only about half of all wages 
were taxable. While employer tax rates averaged between 1.1 and 1.5 
percent of taxable wages in most of the 1950s, and higher through 
much of the 1960s, the revenues collected were a considerably smaller 
proportion of total payrolls, averaging 1.0 percent over the whole 
period. The difference between recession and low unemployment years 
can be seen most in the levels of benefit outlays and the numbers of 
unemployed workers who received first benefit payments. The aggre 
gate of state reserve funds, as a percentage of total payrolls, continued 
a steady decline from high war-time levels, reaching to less than 3 per 
cent in the early 1960s. Several states experienced financial problems 
during the 1950s. The average duration of benefits paid to claimants 
and benefit exhaustion ratios also reflect the impact of recessions. 
Widespread benefit exhaustion was a problem that drew much legisla 
tive attention in this period.
Both federal and state legislation contributed to the system's devel 
opment and shaped its responses to the challenges of the times. This 
chapter reviews the major federal legislative actions of the period 
through 1969; the following chapter carries that review through the 
next two decades. State unemployment insurance legislation is the sub 
ject of chapter 10. Federal unemployment insurance laws enacted 
between 1947 and 1969 concerned chiefly the areas of coverage, bene 
fit duration, and financing. Other legislation, especially in the 1960s, 
centered on manpower policy and the role of the employment service, 
which also had effects on the unemployment insurance program. Some 
proposals to establish federal minimum benefit and solvency standards 
had promising prospects in Congress but, in the end, were rejected or 
pigeonholed.
2. Beginning in 1954, an increasing number of states applied higher taxable wage bases, ranging 
by 1969 from $3,300 to $3,600 in sixteen states and higher in six.
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Before reviewing the federal legislation of the period, a brief 
account is provided of how the federal responsibilities for unemploy 
ment insurance were managed during this time.
Federal Administration of Unemployment 
Insurance Functions
Soon after World War II ended, the United States Employment Ser 
vice (USES) was transferred back to the Department of Labor from the 
dissolved War Manpower Commission, which had operated it as a fed 
eral service during the war period. It was from the Labor Department 
that the USES had been shifted to the Federal Security Agency in 1939 
to merge with the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation of the 
Social Security Board to form the. Bureau of Employment Security. 
The USES continued at the Labor Department until July 1948, when 
the Congress transferred it back to the Federal Security Agency to be 
again part of the Bureau of Employment Security. In 1949, the Presi 
dent's Reorganization Plan No. 2 transferred the entire Bureau of 
Employment Security, including both its unemployment insurance and 
employment service components, to the Department of Labor where 
those operations have remained.3 The frequent shifting and subsequent 
reorganizations of the USES were not without unsettling effects on its 
staff and functional capacities at the national level.
The Unemployment Insurance Service component of the Bureau of 
Employment Security continued to carry out the federal responsibili 
ties of the federal-state system, other than the collection of the Federal 
Unemployment Tax and the maintenance of the Unemployment Trust 
Fund. The latter functions have been carried out by the U.S. Treasury 
Department.
Technical assistance to the states with respect to unemployment 
insurance legislation and review of state laws for their conformity with
3. Robert C. Goodwin became director of the Bureau of Employment Security in 1948 and con 
tinued to head the Bureau after its transfer to the Labor Department until a reorganization that 
occurred about twenty-five years later. Prior to this appointment, Goodwin had held regional posi 
tions in Ohio for the Social Security Board before World War II, then served with the War Man 
power Commission, and was director of the USES after the war.
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federal law remained major activities of the federal Unemployment 
Insurance Service. Although the states became increasingly more self- 
sufficient in this regard and the recipients of advice from various inter 
est groups, federal advice was still welcome by and large. The earlier 
model bills were revised from time to time; the last was issued in 1950 
and continued to be useful to the states (USDOL, Bureau of Employ 
ment Security 1950a). Amendments of the federal law required 
changes in state laws, and Bureau guidance in these areas was helpful. 
The Bureau issued various legislative policy guides as statements, usu 
ally in the form of program letters to all states, or as manuals.4 Federal 
staff review of state legislation generally sought to forestall conformity 
problems. Such problems occasionally did materialize, however, lead 
ing to negotiations and, if necessary, to formal hearings and rulings by 
the Secretary of Labor. These cases represented the ultimate testing of 
the federal-state relationship in the system and sometimes became 
sources of serious friction.5
The Unemployment Insurance Service also supplied assistance to 
states on technical administrative matters. Drawing on state experi 
ence, federal staff (some of them former state agency employees) 
sought to distill and spread those practices that exhibited merit and 
success in application. The emphasis was on cooperation with the 
states in developing the best procedures and the most efficient and eco 
nomical operations possible. Bureau staff worked closely with com 
mittees of the Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies 
on these matters, held regional meetings with state technicians, and 
consulted directly with individual states on specific problems to the 
extent staff resources permitted. The Bureau maintained technical 
manuals and issued other types of written materials for the states. It 
operated a network of regional offices through which it kept in close 
touch with the states on these as well as other matters. Review of state 
agency administrative budget requests as part of the annual federal
4. For example, in 1947 the Bureau of Employment Security issued "Unemployment Insurance 
Legislative Policy, 1947," Supplement to Manual of State Employment Security Legislation 
(1947), and USDOL, Bureau of Employment Security 1962.
5. For a description of the types of conformity cases that arose during the first 45 years of the 
program and of the legislative review functions of the Unemployment Insurance Service, see 
Rubin (1983).
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grants process has been a powerful control in federal hands and a 
source of contention, putting strains on the federal-state relationship.
Special federal unemployment compensation programs came into 
being over the years, some temporary and a few permanent. These" 
include programs providing benefit protection for unemployed war 
veterans and federal civilian employees, and temporary extensions of 
benefits. Although the state agencies operated these programs as agents 
for the federal government, the Unemployment Insurance Service had 
to assume additional administrative responsibilities of a more direct 
nature with respect to them than it did for the state unemployment 
insurance programs.
The Unemployment Insurance Service also carried out research and 
actuarial activities to meet needs at the national level and assisted the 
states in such activities at their level. A system of statistical reporting 
developed whereby data compiled by the states on their program oper 
ations and finances flowed regularly to the national office where they 
were summarized and published. These data provided a source of vital 
intelligence about insured unemployment and the workings of the state 
programs that permitted significant analyses and evaluations in support 
of national legislative policy developments. As financial problems 
began to emerge in a few state programs, analyses of financial statistics 
and actuarial methods for estimating costs and revenue needs assumed 
increasing importance at both the federal and state levels. The Bureau 
provided for special training in such work for state technicians. 6 It also 
supported and helped to develop special studies in particular problem 
areas, such as the adequacy of weekly benefits and experience of 
claimants after exhaustion of benefits. 7
In 1949, a new Federal Advisory Council on Employment Security 
was organized to make recommendations to the Secretary of Labor
6. For example, under contract with the Department of Labor, Professor William Haber helped 
to organize and stage a number of training programs at the University of Michigan during the 
1960s for state personnel on actuarial and financial analysis, as well as on other aspects of unem 
ployment insurance.
7. From 1955 to 1967, Saul J. Blaustein was heavily involved in much of the program research 
activity of the Unemployment Insurance Service and headed up this work in the last half of that 
period.
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regarding unemployment insurance and the employment service.8 It 
was constituted as a tripartite body with members representing 
employers, labor, and the public. The members were appointed by the 
Secretary and served for a period of two years, but were often reap- 
pointed. The Council usually met two or more times a year to review 
program developments and problem areas, with the assistance of 
Bureau staff reports. Various committees were also formed to study 
and report on specific aspects of the employment security program.9
Unemployment Insurance Service staff provided significant input 
and supporting material in the process of developing federal legislative 
proposals for the administration. During the course of congressional 
consideration of proposed unemployment insurance bills, staff assem 
bled available and relevant material to assist the legislative process at 
that stage as well. The staff also assisted by supplying materials to 
technical and advisory groups authorized by congressional committees 
to study and report on unemployment insurance policy issues. The first 
of these (the Calhoun report) was made to the House Committee on 
Ways and Means in 1946, as already noted in chapter 7. The second 
report was made in 1949 to the Senate Finance Committee by the 
Advisory Council on Social Security (U.S. Congress, Senate 1950, pp. 
137-80). Neither of these reports played any significant role in subse 
quent unemployment insurance legislative proposals or congressional 
debates.
Coverage Legislation
Most of the significant federal extensions of unemployment insur 
ance coverage did not take place until after 1969. Those changes are 
discussed in the next chapter. Several important amendments of the
8. Before 1949, the Federal Advisory Council had a checkered history as a statutory body. It was 
provided originally by the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933 to deal with employment service matters. 
Its scope was widened in 1939 to include unemployment insurance, but because of frequent shift- 
ings of the USES, the Council did not function effectively or regularly.
9. William Haber was chairman of the Council from 1948 to 1954 and served on it in later years. 
Merrill G. Murray was for many years the Council's executive secretary.
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federal law were enacted in the 1947-1969 period, however, and these 
did broaden the coverage and scope of the federal-state system.
Smaller Firms
A major advance in coverage through federal law came in 1954 
when Congress extended the application of the Federal Unemployment 
Tax from employers of eight or more to employers of four or more 
employees in any twenty weeks in a year, effective January 1956 (P.L. 
83-767). Thus, it took twenty years after the federal tax first applied to 
reduce the size of firms covered. Many states had already covered 
employers of four or more workers, and even smaller firms. Still, about 
1.4 million additional jobs became covered under state laws as a result 
of the amendment.
Definition of Employee
Another coverage matter that received some, though inconclusive, 
legislative attention was the meaning of "employee" for purposes of 
the Federal Unemployment Tax, a term not defined in the 1935 act. The 
problem concerns workers who fall between the clear status of a wage 
or salaried employee and that of a self-employed person or indepen 
dent contractor. These include, for example, outside salesmen or agents 
who work on a commission basis; barbers, beauticians, taxi and truck 
drivers who own their own equipment; and home workers of various 
kinds. 10 Early federal regulations had applied a narrow construction to 
the term based on the common-law "master-servant" relationship. In 
1947, the Supreme Court ruled that the language of the 1935 act per 
mitted a broader interpretation, which meant that "employee" could 
include a wider range of workers than as construed under the common- 
law rule. 11 Congress then passed a "status quo" amendment in 1948 to 
confine the definition to the common-law rule. 12 Although many states 
had adopted a broader definition of employee for their own laws, sev 
eral hundred thousand workers were excluded by the 1948 status quo
10. The problem also related to the Social Security tax, since its application and rates also vary 
between employees and the self-employed.
11. U.S. v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 712-14 (1947).
12. P.L 80-642. This law was passed over President Truman's veto. See Cohen and Calhoun 
(1948). Cohen helped to draft the veto message.
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amendment in those states with laws that followed the federal defini 
tion.
Federal Civilian Employees
One of the largest expansions of the system occurred in 1954, when 
federal civilian employees obtained coverage. 13 Beginning January 
1955, a separate federal program was provided for them in a new title 
(Title XV) of the Social Security Act. Although financed entirely by 
the federal government out of general revenues, the benefits were to be 
paid in accordance with the law of the state in which the federal 
employee last worked. Federal employee unions objected strongly to 
this feature because it meant different levels of protection in different 
states for employees with identical salaries and employment records. 
The unions, however, accepted and supported the legislation when it 
became clear that they could get nothing better. The legislation pro 
vided for the states to pay the benefits under agreements with the Sec 
retary of Labor. The law covers service in the employ of the United 
States or its wholly owned instrumentalities, with certain specified 
exceptions, principally elected officials and aliens working for the gov 
ernment outside the United States. A total of almost 2.2 million federal 
civilian jobs were covered under the new program in 1955, a number 
which rose in later years as federal employment expanded. Only a 
small percentage of federal employees filed claims for benefits, averag 
ing about 25,000 to 30,000 insured unemployed weekly during the new 
program's first 10 years (USDOL, Manpower Administration 1968, pp. 
97 and 127).
Ex-Servicemen
Workers who have withdrawn from the civilian labor force for a 
period of military service often have a difficult time finding civilian 
work upon their return. This is particularly true of the young person 
who may never have had a civilian job. Congress took action on sev 
eral occasions to meet this problem. The first was the Servicemen's 
Readjustment Allowances (SRA) program provided under the G.I. Bill 
of Rights enacted in 1944 for World War II veterans (described in
13. P. L. 83-767, the same legislation that extended coverage to smaller firms.
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chapter 7). The next program, also temporary, provided unemployment 
compensation for veterans of the Korean war period. Finally, Congress 
adopted a permanent program for persons discharged from the armed 
forces at any time.
Unemployment Compensation for Veterans
In 1952, a program of Unemployment Compensation for Veterans 
(UCV) was enacted for veterans of the Korean conflict 14 This pro 
gram was more closely coordinated with state unemployment insur 
ance than was the earlier SRA program. UCV provided benefit 
payments of $26 a week for up to twenty-six weeks, a maximum total 
of $676. However, if a veteran qualified for other unemployment bene 
fits under either federal or state law, these were subtracted from the 
UCV entitlement. While the 1944 law set its own eligibility and dis 
qualification provisions for SRA, the 1952 act specified the application 
of such provisions in the law of the state in which the veteran was 
drawing benefits. The only exception was that if the state law cancelled 
all benefit rights under a disqualification provision, this provision 
would not apply to claimants under the UCV program. The program 
terminated at the end of January 1960. UCV claims peaked in 1954 
when they averaged about 80,000 weekly. A total of nearly $108 mil 
lion was paid out in UCV benefits that year (USDOL, Manpower 
Administration 1968, pp. 129 and 142).
Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Servicemen
In 1958, while the UCV program was still in existence, Congress 
passed the Ex-Servicemen's Unemployment Act (P.L. 85-848). The 
Act amended Title XV of the Social Security Act, the title created four 
years earlier to establish unemployment compensation for federal 
civilian employees. The 1958 amendment provided the same protec 
tion for ex-servicemen. The new program was adopted because it had 
become evident that for the indefinite future, large numbers of persons 
would serve a period of military service and many of them would face 
unemployment after discharge. Benefits are paid according to the law 
of the state in which the ex-serviceman files a claim. 15 The weekly 
benefit amount payable is based on the claimant's military pay grade
14. Title IV, Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952, P. L. 82-550.
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and a schedule of remuneration provided to the state agencies by the 
federal government. Costs are federally financed out of general reve 
nues. The armed forces covered by the new program numbered about 
2.6 million at the time it took effect. Claims for benefits averaged 
about 55,000 per week during the first years of the program (USDOL, 
Manpower Administration 1968, pp. 98 and 128).
Puerto Rico
The inclusion of Puerto Rico as a "state" in the federal-state system 
is noted here, although this act was more than an extension of cover 
age. Puerto Rico enacted an unemployment insurance law in June 
1956. The government of this Commonwealth wanted its law to come 
under the federal-state system, but Congress did not give it this status 
until 1960 (P.L. 86-778). In 1961, its first year in the system, Puerto 
Rico's average monthly covered employment was larger than that of 
fifteen other states. Its average weekly covered wage level has been 
lower than that of any other state and its insured unemployment rate is 
usually at or near the highest among the states. Until 1992, Puerto Rico 
was the only "state" in the system that did not provide for experience 
rating.
Temporary Extended Benefit Programs
State benefit duration provisions were improving from their modest 
beginnings as experience made clear that longer protection was finan 
cially feasible. Maximum duration of twenty-six weeks of benefits, for 
example, became more common among the states in the 1950s. Never 
theless, recession experience demonstrated that unemployment at such 
times lasted so much longer for so many laid-off workers that even the 
more liberal duration provisions could not forestall large-scale and 
widespread exhaustion of benefits with the mounting hardships that 
entailed. The principal remedy that developed was to extend tempo-
15. Changes adopted in the 1980s specified more federal rules to govern what benefits would be 
paid, for example, reducing the duration of benefits payable to some ex-servicemen as compared 
with other claimants in the same state (see chapter 9).
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rarity the usual or regular duration of benefits during recession periods. 
State response to the problem was limited. Pressures rose for action at 
the federal level.
Temporary Unemployment Compensation Act of 1958
The recession of 1958 resulted in an unprecedented number of 
insured unemployed workers exhausting their benefits. To respond to 
this urgent problem, Congress enacted a temporary program of 
extended benefits which was signed into law in June 1958 (P.L. 85- 
441). The legislation provided that federal funds would be advanced to 
those states that entered into agreements with the Secretary of Labor to 
pay extended benefits to unemployed workers who had exhausted their 
regular benefits. Extended benefits would be payable up to a maximum 
duration equal to one-half the duration of the regular benefits paid each 
exhaustee. The extended benefits would be reduced by the amount of 
any temporary extended benefits payable to an individual under a state 
law. 16 The weekly benefit amount would be the same as that paid for 
regular benefits. Any unemployed worker in a participating state who 
had exhausted regular benefits after June 1957 would be eligible for 
extended benefits for unemployment occurring after the program took 
effect. Payments of extended benefits could be made for weeks of 
unemployment beginning fifteen or more days after enactment of the 
legislation and not later than the end of March 1959. 17
The extended benefits were financed by advances out of federal gen 
eral revenues, but a state agreeing to^pay such benefits would have to 
restore these advances to the United State Treasury either by a transfer 
from its Unemployment Trust Fund account or out of other state ftinds. 
If such restoration was not made by November 10,1963, the full credit 
of 2.7 percent allowed against the Federal Unemployment Tax paid by 
employers in the state would be reduced progressively each year 
beginning in 1963 until the full amount advanced to the state for
16. Several states had adopted temporary extended benefit provisions of their own about the 
same time.
17. The program was extended in 1959 so that persons who had filed claims before April 1959, 
but had not used up all the extended benefits to which they were entitled, would have until the end 
of June 1959 to draw them (P. L. 86-7, approved March 31, 1959).
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extended benefits was restored. 18 No interest was charged on the 
advances.
State participation in the program was voluntary. Only seventeen 
states chose to enter it fully. Another five states had adopted similar 
programs of their own and decided to remain independent of the fed 
eral program. Together, these twenty-two states accounted for about 70 
percent of all claimants who exhausted their regular benefits during the 
period of the program. 19 Throughout this time (June 1958 through 
June 1959), about two million persons received a total of $600 million 
in extended benefits in the twenty-two states. They drew, on average, a 
benefit of $30 per week for nearly ten weeks. About 60 percent 
exhausted their extended benefits as well (USDOL Bureau of Employ 
ment Security 1959).
Temporary Extended Unemployment 
Compensation Act of 1961
When President Kennedy took office in January 1961, a recession 
had been under way for some months and exhaustions of regular bene 
fits were again on the rise. Within three weeks, he transmitted a bill to 
Congress for another federal temporary extension program. A bill was 
passed and signed into law only seven weeks later (P.L. 87-6).
In many respects the new act was similar to the 1958 act. Unem 
ployed workers who had exhausted regular benefits after June 1960 
were eligible for extended benefits. The extended weekly benefit 
amount was the same as for regular benefits. Extended benefits were 
payable for up to one-half the duration of regular benefits, except this 
time the extended duration was limited to a maximum of thirteen 
weeks, and the combined maximum duration of regular and extended 
benefits was thirty-nine weeks. These limitations were made because 
nine states were then paying regular benefits in excess of twenty-six
18. The tax credit was reduced to 2.55 percent in 1963, to 2.4 in 1964, and then was to decline to 
2.25 in 1965, and so on. P. L. 88-173, approved November 7, 1963, amended this arrangement by 
providing that the reduced tax credit shall continue to be 2.4 percent each year after 1964 until the 
advance was repaid.
19. Some of the other states agreed at least to provide the extended benefits to unemployed vet 
erans or former federal employees, or both, who had drawn regular benefits under the separate 
federal programs described earlier since the states incurred no liability for these wholly federally- 
financed benefits.
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weeks; without the thirty-nine-week limitation it was thought that reg 
ular plus extended benefits might be unnecessarily long in those states. 
The new act provided for termination of the program on April 1,1962, 
except for those who began receiving extended benefits before that 
date; the latter were allowed another three months to draw on their 
remaining entitlement. Again, the benefits were to be administered by 
the states under agreements with the Secretary of Labor.
The principal change from the 1958 approach was in the method of 
financing. The new act called for payment of the entire cost of the 
extended benefits by the federal government rather than by the individ 
ual states through repayment of federal advances, as provided in the 
1958 act. The costs were to be covered by a temporary increase in the 
Federal Unemployment Tax. The proceeds of this increase were pooled 
nationally and used to finance the extended benefits wherever they 
were paid. Thus, there would be a truly federal program of extended 
benefits, although the states would administer it.
The national pooling of these added funds was not accepted without 
a struggle. The bill, as it passed the House, provided for a Federal 
Unemployment Tax addition of 0.4 percent of taxable payrolls for the 
calendar years 1962 and 1963. 20 The bill was amended by the Senate 
Finance Committee to allocate the tax increase instead to the states in 
accordance with their shares of all taxable wages. At the end of the 
program, any excess of the tax increase allocated to a state over 
extended benefits paid by that state would be transferred to the state's 
account in the Unemployment Trust Fund. On the other hand, if a state 
paid out more in extended benefits than its allocated federal tax 
increase, that state's employers would have to make up the deficit 
through future reductions in their federal tax credits. Thus, the Senate 
Finance Committee's bill, in effect, called for individual state financ 
ing of the proposed program. When the bill came before the Senate, the 
biggest battle was waged over this amendment, which was narrowly 
defeated by a vote of 46 to 44. The House version for financing the 
program prevailed.
20. Since it became evident that the 0.4 percent federal tax increase for 1962 and 1963 would 
leave a surplus estimated at $172 million over the costs of the program, Congress in 1963 reduced 
the 1963 increase from 0.4 percent to 0.25 percent (P. L. 88-31, approved May 29,1963).
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Since benefits were to be financed on a nationwide basis, another 
important difference from the 1958 act was to provide for state reim 
bursement of benefit payments in excess of twenty-six weeks in any 
state paying more than twenty-six weeks in benefits under its own law, 
whether regular or state-extended benefits. 21 It was considered only 
fair to do so to avoid penalizing states that were more generous than 
most in their duration provisions.
Another feature of the 1961 law was to reduce the claimant's 
extended weekly benefit by the amount received as a pension if the 
pension was provided or contributed to by the claimant's base-period 
employer (Social Security pensions were excluded). Thus a federal 
standard of a negative character regarding receipt of pension was 
added to the bill. In all other respects, however, benefits were to be 
paid according to state law.
Finally, because charges were made that a large portion of the bene 
fits would go to "secondary" workers, that is to nonheads of families 
who allegedly did not need them, an amendment was added by the 
Senate Finance Committee requiring each state to collect data, on a 
sample basis, on the personal and family characteristics, employment 
background, and benefit experience of those who drew extended bene 
fits under the act. The amendment's primary purpose was to furnish 
ammunition for those who might wish to restrict extended benefits in 
any future program. The amendment resulted in the collection of the 
most comprehensive statistics on the long-term insured unemployed 
ever obtained up to that time.22
In view of the method adopted for financing the new program, it was 
a foregone conclusion that all states would enter into agreements to 
pay the benefits the principal objective of the financial arrangements. 
Only a minority of states had participated fully under the 1958 tempo 
rary extension act. A total of 2.8 million persons drew extended bene 
fits under the 1961-62 program, averaging about $31 a week for nine 
weeks. Extended benefit outlays aggregated about $800 million. 
Approximately 60 percent of those who drew these benefits exhausted 
them. The special sample surveys conducted during the life of the pro-
21. Besides the nine states with a maximum duration for regular benefits of more than 26 weeks, 
six states provided for their own temporary extensions.
22. For a more detailed history of the passage of this act, see Booth, (1961, pp. 909-21).
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gram indicated that the majority (over 60 percent) of the claimants 
were the primary or sole earners of their families or lived alone, about 
75 percent had been in the labor force for at least thirty-six months 
prior to filing for extended benefits, and about 60 percent were in their 
prime working years age 25 to 54. Overall, the surveys did not reveal 
any serious or extreme distortions in patterns of characteristics, as 
compared with workers generally, except that the extended benefit 
claimants had been unemployed for a long time.23
Aborted Proposals for Extended Benefits
During the mid-1960s, two competing proposals for permanent 
extended benefit programs were considered. One, advanced by the 
Johnson administration, was introduced in 1965 as part of a broad set 
of unemployment insurance reforms and termed Federal Unemploy 
ment Adjustment Benefits.24 It would provide up to twenty-six weeks 
of added benefits with an overall maximum of fifty-two weeks of regu 
lar and extended benefits. The federal government would finance the 
entire cost of the extended benefits partly out of an increase in the Fed 
eral Unemployment Tax and partly by a government contribution from 
general revenues. The extended benefits would be payable at all times, 
not only during recessions. They would be payable to claimants who 
exhausted regular state benefits and who had at least twenty-six weeks 
of employment in the base period and seventy-eight weeks in the three 
years preceding the regular benefit year (or the equivalent in earnings). 
A claimant could be disqualified for refusing to attend or make satis 
factory progress in a retraining program to which he or she had been 
directed. In other respects, state unemployment insurance provisions 
would apply.
The rival proposal, developed by the Interstate Conference of 
Employment Security Agencies was also introduced in 1965 (H.R. 
7476 and H.R. 7477). It provided for federal financing of half the cost 
of any benefits paid by a state in excess of twenty-six weeks during a 
"state recession period." Such a period would begin, or "trigger on"
23. Data about the program and claimant characteristics from a report on a study of claimants 
under the Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation Program of 1961-1962 (USDOL 
Bureau of Employment Security (1963).
24. Contained in H.R. 8282; these reform proposals are described more fully below.
206 Growth
when the state's insured unemployment rate, averaged over thirteen 
successive weeks, was at least 120 percent of the average for the corre 
sponding weeks of the two prior years, and "trigger off when it fell 
below that level. Provision for payment of benefits beyond twenty-six 
weeks would be optional: a state could pay such benefits on a regular 
basis, or as a temporary extension in recession periods, or not at all. 
The federal sharing of cost would be limited to thirteen weeks of bene 
fits. An additional 0.1 percent Federal Unemployment Tax would 
finance the federal share.
The House Committee on Ways and Means, after lengthy hearings, 
discussion, and debate, reported out a comprehensive unemployment 
insurance bill in 1966 that included an extended benefit program in 
which all states would have to participate. The federal government 
would cover half the cost of such benefits. They would be payable dur 
ing high unemployment periods triggered on and off on a national and 
state basis. Extended benefits would trigger on nationally when the 
seasonally adjusted national rate of insured unemployment was at least 
5 percent for three consecutive months and the number of claimants 
exhausting their benefits during those months totaled at least 1 percent 
of covered employment. The national extension would end when either 
of these two conditions was no longer satisfied. A state extended bene 
fit period would trigger on when the state's insured unemployment rate 
for thirteen weeks averaged 3 percent or more and was at least 120 per 
cent of the corresponding rate averaged for the two prior years. The 
state extension would trigger off when either requirement was no 
longer met. Extended benefits would be paid for up to half the claim 
ant's regular benefit duration not to exceed thirteen weeks and with a 
combined maximum of thirty-nine weeks for regular and extended 
benefits. All other state provisions would apply. An additional 0.2 per 
cent Federal Unemployment Tax would finance the federal share of the 
cost of extended benefits.
The bill containing this program passed both the House and Senate 
but with differences affecting, mostly, other provisions; there was 
essential agreement on the extended benefit provisions. A conference 
committee failed to reach agreement on other disputed features of the 
bill resulting in the demise of the entire bill. An extended benefit pro 
gram similar to that contained in this bill was enacted in 1970 and is 
described in the next chapter.
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Changes in Financing
The basic financial structure of the federal-state unemployment 
insurance system was not changed in any fundamental way during the 
period under review in this chapter. The only important addition to it 
during this time was the permanent provision for advances to states 
from a federal loan fund. Several changes were made affecting federal 
standards on experience rating, and some action was taken with respect 
to administrative financing arrangements. A few other proposals 
addressing problems of fund solvency and experience rating were 
advanced and debated, but rejected.
Prior to 1947, the only significant change in the federal tax provi 
sions was the adoption of the $3,000 taxable wage base limit in 1939, 
which remained unaltered through 1971. As can be seen in table 8.1, 
this limit had become increasingly restrictive as wage levels rose 
steadily, so that by 1969 only half of all payrolls were subject to the tax 
even though some states had raised their own tax bases somewhat. 
None of the increases proposed before 1970 for the federal tax base 
was adopted despite the erosion.
Experience Rating
Only minor changes were made in the "additional credit" (experi 
ence rating) provisions of the Federal Unemployment Tax before 1954. 
One, for example, came in 1947, when an amendment permitted states 
to take account of voluntary contributions made by employers to their 
accounts so as to promote the computation of reduced rates (P.L. 80- 
226).
In 1954, a more important change was made affecting experience 
rating. Until then, the federal law required that an employer must have 
had at least three years of unemployment experience before being eli 
gible for a lower state tax rate with full credit against the federal tax 
based on that experience. The change in 1954 permitted a state to 
shorten the experience period to one year. It was applicable not only to 
newly covered employers, but also to new employers just starting in
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business.25 The change was not mandatory for the states and some 
states did not take advantage of it.
State experience rating provisions have been among the most trou 
blesome from the point of view of conformity with federal require 
ments. They tend to be very technical and detailed. Their review, the 
conformity questions they evoke, and the resolution of those questions 
have occupied a disproportionate amount of time of the federal staff 
assigned to the process. They have also been a source of friction 
between the federal and state agencies. In 1965, the administration pro 
posed to alleviate this problem by deleting from the law all federal 
requirements pertaining to experience rating and allowing the states 
complete freedom to set their taxes as they chose. 26 The idea was 
strongly opposed by those who favored experience rating and who 
feared that some states would abandon it without the federal require 
ments that did not permit reduced rates on any other basis. The sug 
gested change was eliminated from consideration.
Federal Loan Fund
In 1944, as described in chapter 7, Congress established a special 
Federal Unemployment Account (the so-called George Fund) in the 
Unemployment Trust Fund from which loans could be made to states 
with reserves almost depleted because of heavy benefit outlays which 
were widely expected to follow World War II. The loan provisions 
were temporary; after two extensions they were allowed to expire in 
March 1952. During their existence, no appropriation was ever made 
to the loan account and no state ever applied for a loan.
Discussion continued, however, concerning ways of assisting states 
in financial distress. Besides loans, the concept of reinsurance grants 
had been considered through the years, even by the Committee on Eco 
nomic Security. One factor that influenced the discussion was the 
growing surplus of Federal Unemployment Tax revenues over the 
amounts appropriated to cover the administrative costs of the system.
25. P. L. 83-767. The same act extended federal coverage to smaller firms with four or more 
employees.
26. The proposal was part of the comprehensive package of unemployment insurance reforms 
introduced into the Congress as H.R. 8282.
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A portion of this surplus, it was suggested, could be used to finance 
grants or loans to states needing financial help.
As part of the Employment Security Administrative Financing Act 
of 1954 (The Reed Act), the federal loan fund was reactivated and a 
new permanent set of loan provisions adopted.27 The new law called 
for the automatic appropriation of the receipts of the Federal Unem 
ployment Tax to the Unemployment Trust Fund. The excess of Federal 
Unemployment Tax receipts over federal and state administrative 
expenses was to be placed in the Federal Unemployment Account 
(loan fund) until it reached $200 million. From this account, an inter 
est-free federal advance could be made to a state reserve account if at 
the end of any calendar quarter the state's account had a balance that 
was less than the state's total benefit payments over the preceding four 
calendar quarters. The amount of the advance might not exceed the 
state's highest benefit expenditures in any of the four preceding calen 
dar quarters. Since it was assumed that a state would normally need an 
advance during an economic recession, the state could delay repay 
ments for four years. If not repaid by then, the loans would be recov 
ered through a reduction in the Federal Unemployment Tax credits 
allowed to the state's employers. The reduction would equal 0.15 per 
cent of taxable payrolls in the first year, 0.30 percent in the second 
year, and so on, progressively, until the loans were repaid.
Advances were made from the Reed Act loan fund to Alaska 
between 1955 and 1960, and to Michigan and Pennsylvania in 1958 
and 1959, respectively. The latter two states exhausted the loan fund's 
resources of $200 million available at the time. 28 Neither actually 
needed the borrowed funds to pay benefits then, although Pennsylvania 
finally did in 1961. The three borrowing states did not fully repay their 
loans until the mid-1960s.
The requirements for the receipt and repayment of federal advances 
were tightened by amendments enacted in 1960 (P.L. 86-778). These 
amendments provided that a state would not be eligible for an advance 
unless its reserve account was so low that it could not meet the benefit
27. P. L. 83-567, named for Representative Daniel Reed, chairman of the House Committee on 
Ways and Means.
28. Pennsylvania also borrowed smaller additional amounts in 1960 and 1961. Three other 
states (Delaware, Oregon and West Virginia) met the requirements for loans during or soon after 
the 1958 recession but did not borrow.
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payments estimated for the current month or the next month. More 
over, the state would be advanced only sufficient funds to carry it 
through the month. The advances would be repayable in two years, 
rather than four, before recovery through federal tax credit reductions 
began. The annual credit reductions would be at double the rates speci 
fied in the 1954 act. To assure that the state would increase its taxes so 
as to get its fund in a sounder financial position, the amendments also 
provided that while a state has an outstanding advance it must have 
average contribution rates of 2.7 percent for the third and fourth years 
after the advance is made; thereafter, average contribution rates must 
equal the state's average cost rate, or 2.7 percent, whichever is higher, 
until the advance is repaid. Paradoxically, at the same time the stiff 
ened requirements seemed to eliminate the likelihood of any advances 
being made, the maximum size of the loan fund was increased to $550 
million or 0.4 percent of all taxable wages, whichever was a greater 
amount. No further borrowing occurred until the 1970s.
Administrative Financing
Although the net Federal Unemployment Tax was always regarded 
as the source of revenue to cover the administrative costs of the pro 
gram, the original Social Security Act expressed no connection 
between the two in order to avoid any constitutional issue that might be 
raised. The Reed Act of 1954, for the first time, earmarked these reve 
nues for employment security purposes only. The funds were to be 
automatically deposited in the Unemployment Trust Fund and used 
first for administrative expenses. Tax receipts exceeded these expenses 
by substantial amounts at the time and during the next several years. 
As described above, the excess went into the federal loan fund, which 
was authorized to accumulate to a ceiling of $200 million, and rapidly 
did so. The continuing excess in these years was distributed to the 
states; most have used these "Reed Act" distributions to finance the 
construction of new offices.
By 1960, however, the federal loan fund was depleted by the 
advances drawn by Michigan and Pennsylvania. Moreover, administra 
tive costs had increased in the states to where the margin of tax receipts 
over such costs was narrowing rapidly. Taking both these factors into 
account, Congress in 1960 raised the Federal Unemployment Tax rate
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from 3.0 to 3.1 percent, but kept the maximum credit allowed employ 
ers against the tax at 2.7 percent, thus increasing the federal share from 
0.3 to 0.4 percent of taxable payrolls.29 At the same time, a ceiling of 
$350 million was placed on annual grants to the states for administra 
tive costs. In 1963, this ceiling was replaced by a flexible limit of 95 
percent of estimated receipts from the net Federal Unemployment Tax 
(exclusive of the temporary increases in the tax for 1962 and 1963 to 
finance the Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation pro 
gram) (P.L. 88-31). The combination of the persistent rise in state 
administrative costs and the ever heavier restraint that the constant 
$3000 taxable wage base placed on federal tax revenues produced 
chronic strains and problems for financing administrative costs.
Legislative Efforts of 1965-1966
Several allusions have already been made to proposals for unem 
ployment insurance reforms in 1965 and 1966, including those for a 
permanent program of extended benefits. A general description of the 
legislative efforts that took place appears appropriate, since they cen 
tered on the most extensive set of proposals to be made for unemploy 
ment insurance since passage of the Social Security Act. Much of what 
was proposed did pass in 1970.
In 1965, the Johnson administration submitted its unemployment 
insurance proposals, introduced as H.R. 8282 in the House and S. 1991 
in the Senate. Their scope was comprehensive. Included were provi 
sions to extend coverage to employers with one or more employees, to 
nonprofit organizations, to large farm employers, and other excluded 
groups. Provision for a program of Federal Unemployment Adjustment 
Benefits for workers who exhaust regular benefits was described 
above, along with a rival proposal for a triggered extended benefits 
program for state recession periods.
The most controversial proposals in H.R. 8282 were for minimum 
benefit standards, particularly as applied to the weekly benefit amount.
29. P. L. 86-778, which also increased the loan fund ceiling and stiffened lending and repayment 
provisions.
212 Growth
To qualify its employers for the full federal tax credit, a state would 
have to provide a weekly benefit amount of no less than half the claim 
ant's weekly wage up to a maximum equal to at least two-thirds of the 
state's average weekly wage in covered employment. It was the latter 
requirement that created the most reaction; except for Hawaii, no state 
at the time came close to meeting it. The proposal would allow states to 
reach the required ceiling in stages over a period of years. The required 
weekly benefit maximum was deemed necessary to assure that the 
great majority of insured workers would be able to receive a weekly 
benefit of half their weekly wage if unemployed. Another proposed 
standard would require each state to provide up to at least twenty-six 
weeks of benefits to every claimant with twenty or more weeks of 
base-period employment. If a state failed to meet these benefit amount 
and duration standards, its employers would be eligible for a tax credit 
equal to its average annual benefit cost rate of the last four years, or 2.7 
percent, of their taxable payrolls, whichever was lower. Other propos 
als would prohibit states from imposing very long disqualifications or 
from reducing or cancelling benefit rights because of disqualification.
To strengthen financing, the Johnson administration urged increases 
in the taxable wage base, in two steps, to $6,600 by 1971. It also pro 
posed a new program of federal grants to high-cost states covering 
two-thirds of a state's benefit costs in excess of 2 percent of total pay 
rolls, regardless of the financial condition of that state's fund. The state 
would have to meet the benefit standards to be eligible. The grants 
would be financed by funds raised from the Federal Unemployment 
Tax and allocated from general revenues.
These were the principal proposals advanced by the administration 
in 1965.30 The House Committee on Ways and Means held extensive 
hearings on them throughout the month of August that year (U.S. Con 
gress, House 1965). The Committee met again the following March to 
hear additional testimony from representatives of the Interstate Confer 
ence.31 The Interstate Conference had met in January 1966 to discuss 
these and other proposals and had polled its members with respect to 
them. The majority of the state agencies favored the coverage exten-
30. For a full description and discussion of the proposals, see Murray (1966).
31. These hearings, held solely for Interstate Conference recommendations and testimony, were 
published as a sixth volume of U.S. Congress, House (1965).
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sions with some modifications; opposed the administration's Federal 
Unemployment Adjustment Benefits proposal and favored the trig 
gered federally shared state extended benefits in state recession peri 
ods; and opposed the benefit standards and requirements specified in 
H.R. 8282. The majority did accept a recommendation for a federal 
requirement that the state weekly benefit ceiling be at least half of the 
statewide average weekly covered wage. The majority opposed the 
idea of federal grants to states for excess costs, but favored increasing 
the taxable wage base to $3,900 and then setting it at 70 percent of the 
annual average wage.
In June 1966, the Ways and Means Committee reported out a bill 
(H.R. 15119) which included the proposed coverage extensions (some 
what modified), a federally shared extended benefits program for peri 
ods of high unemployment triggered on a national or state basis, and a 
two-stage increase in the taxable wage base to $4,200 by 1972, as well 
as several other amendments. None of the proposed minimum benefit 
standards or federal grants for excess costs was included. The House 
passed the bill and sent it to the Senate.
The Senate Finance Committee held hearings on the bill in July 
1966 at which administration officials urged amendments to restore 
some of the original proposals, particularly for the higher taxable wage 
base and benefit standards (U.S. Congress, Senate 1966). The Senate 
did adopt a bill with the benefit standards, although in a form different 
from that proposed.32 At the ensuing House-Senate conference in 
October, House conferees refused to accept the benefit standards provi 
sions. Administration and other proponents of standards felt so 
strongly about this issue that they opposed giving up standards in order 
to assure passage of the rest of the legislation. As a result, no agree 
ment was reached, and Congress adjourned shortly thereafter. It is 
ironic, perhaps, that several important provisions that could have been 
enacted in 1966 extensions of coverage, a triggered federal-state 
extended benefits program, and a taxable wage base increase were 
* adopted four years later, without benefit standards.
32. The Senate Finance Committee recommended that states be required to set their maximum 
weekly benefit amounts at 50 percent of the state average covered weekly wages or, as an alterna 
tive, at a level that assured 65 percent of covered workers half their weekly wage if unemployed.
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Other Federal Legislation
Additional legislative actions took place in the 1960s which did not 
focus on unemployment insurance but which affected the program to 
one degree or another, especially with respect to its relationships with 
other programs. Some of the laws enacted are noted briefly so as to 
provide a more complete account of the federal legislative background 
of this period.
Manpower Training and Retraining
Several acts of the early 1960s addressed the problems of persistent 
unemployment associated with technological and other structural 
changes, depressed areas, and import competition. The first to pass was 
the Area Redevelopment Act of 1961, followed by the Manpower 
Development and Training Act of 1962 and the Trade Expansion Act of 
1962. Each of them provided for federally subsidized assistance to 
uneir^loyed workers who were dislocated from jobs under certain con 
ditions or who met specific eligibility requirements. The assistance 
included training or retraining and other forms of reemployment aid to 
help make the workers more employable in other jobs. Cash training 
allowances were made available for some. Under the Trade Act, 
weekly Trade Readjustment Allowances were payable to workers laid 
off by firms certified by the Tariff Commission as adversely affected by 
increased imports due to lowered trade barriers. The Tariff Commis 
sion, however, did not make any adverse effect certifications under the 
Act during the 1960s. In 1965, the Automotive Products Trade Act was 
passed to provide similar assistance to workers adversely affected by 
trade agreements with Canada relating to automotive products. Rulings 
of adverse effects were made the responsibility of a special board, and 
such certifications were issued. The Trade Readjustment Allowances 
paid were more generous than unemployment insurance benefits, both 
in weekly amount and duration.
State unemployment insurance provisions at that time generally 
held that claimants in school or in training were not available for work 
and therefore were ineligible for unemployment benefits. Those who 
qualified for training allowances were paid an amount equivalent to
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their unemployment insurance benefit Others on training allowances 
received the average weekly benefit paid in the state.
These laws were passed originally as temporary measures and mod 
estly funded. Subsequent amendments extended and expanded them 
until they constituted a major element in federal employment and train 
ing policy. The federal-state employment security system was involved 
to the extent that the employment services were given the responsibil 
ity for identifying workers eligible for assistance and counseling them 
with respect to their training and job search needs. The state agencies 
also handled the disbursement of cash allowances provided by these 
programs through the payment machinery established for unemploy 
ment insurance. While the allowances, training costs, and other assis 
tance provided were financed by federal general funds and some state 
general funds, administrative costs were not always fully covered.
Antipoverty Program
Also in the 1960s, another stream of federal legislation aimed at 
reducing and eradicating poverty. A major approach emphasized 
efforts to enhance the employ ability of low-income persons disadvan- 
taged by the lack of education and skills and by discrimination. The 
programs established provided for training and other job preparation 
assistance, usually accompanied by cash allowances. As the decade 
wore on, legislative amendments affecting these programs and those 
under the Manpower Development and Training Act shifted the priori 
ties more and more to employment and training assistance for the poor 
and disadvantaged, particularly youths and minorities. Unemployment 
among experienced workers had been declining, reaching very low 
levels in the late 1960s. Increasingly, the Employment Service was 
drawn into broader manpower roles and then oriented more fully 
toward serving the low-income, unskilled and marginal members of 
the labor force. This shift weakened and, to a large extent, discon 
nected its relationship to unemployment insurance, which dealt prima 
rily with experienced unemployed workers.
Federal Budget Reform
Prior to 1967, the official federal budget, known as the "administra 
tive budget," did not include the transactions of the various trust funds
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held by the government. Those funds are not available for general pur 
poses of the government; therefore, they were not included in the bud 
get. They were shown separately, however, and presented with the 
budget as part of a statement of consolidated cash receipts from and 
payments to the public. In the 1960s, these trust funds, which included 
the Unemployment Trust Fund, as well as those of other Social Secu 
rity Act programs and the interstate highway program, had grown to 
significant proportions, together accounting for about 25 to 30 percent 
of total federal receipts and outlays. Increasing attention focused on the 
consolidated cash statements because of their growing significance and 
economic impact. Discussions of different budgets led to some general 
confusion.
In 1967, a Commission on Budget Concepts, appointed by the Pres 
ident, recommended a single unified budget as the official budget of 
the federal government. The unified budget would include the transac 
tions of the trust funds. This approach was adopted beginning with the 
budget for the fiscal year 1969. The inclusion of the Unemployment 
Trust Fund meant not only that the federal accounts in this Fund (for 
administrative expenses and the loan fund account) would be part of 
the federal budget, but the state benefit reserve accounts as well even 
though the latter reflect tax and benefit provisions of state laws.33
At the time the change was made, little or no objection was raised. 
Trust funds were then generating surpluses which had the overall effect 
of offsetting some of the heavy military expenditures on the Vietnam 
war, and, thus, were politically welcome for that reason. The change, 
however had very different impacts years later when trust fund sur 
pluses disappeared and turned into deficits and when unified budget 
deficits grew so large despite trust fund surpluses.
33. For a full account of the change described here, see Henle (1980).
The System Under Financial Strain
(1970-1990)
As the 1960s ended, so did the era of strong postwar growth and 
spreading prosperity. The closing years of that decade represented a 
high peak of economic expansion and relatively full employment. Yet, 
signs of a change appeared as 1970 loomed ahead. A new administra 
tion took hold in Washington in 1969 and pressed for restraints on fed 
eral spending, especially for military procurement. The resulting sharp 
cutbacks in aerospace and other defense industries helped to precipi 
tate a recession soon after the 1970s opened. Inflation became a serious 
problem in that decade, reflecting some of the effects of deficit financ 
ing in the Viet Nam War build-up of the 1960s. The Arab oil embargo 
of late 1973 and the subsequent skyrocketing of fuel prices sent shock 
waves through the national and world economies.
The recession of the early 1970s was followed by the more severe 
recession of the mid-1970s. Recovery from each was slow and falter 
ing. Youngsters from the maturing postwar baby boom generation 
flooded into the labor market at a time of curtailed expansion of job 
opportunities. Continued growth in the rate of labor force participation 
by women, and reduction in the armed forces following the phase- 
down of military activity in Viet Nam also swelled the supply of labor. 
The recessions and limping recoveries combined further to raise unem 
ployment to well over usual post-World War II levels and rates. At the 
same time inflation persisted even worsened despite sluggish busi 
ness, prompting the use of the term "stagflation" to describe the condi 
tion of the economy.
Some improvement took place in the late 1970s. Before that decade 
closed, however, deterioration began again and recession conditions 
returned by 1980. This slump was more confined to a few areas of the 
country and appeared to be ending in 1981. In 1982, recession became 
full-blown and nationwide. Unemployment rose to the highest levels
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seen, both in number and rate, since the depression years of the 1930s 
and 1940.
Insured unemployment reflected the changing economic scene, 
especially the impact of recessions and long-term unemployment. The 
1960s had concluded with about seven consecutive years of relatively 
moderate-to-low levels of unemployment insurance claims and benefit 
outlays, which encouraged a certain amount of complacency about 
reserves and financing. With the recessions of the early and mid-1970s, 
many of the state funds became insolvent and were forced to borrow 
from the federal loan fund. 1 After a few years of some recovery, the 
successive and deep recessions of the early 1980s did more damage to 
state unemployment insurance funds. By mid-1983, the majority were 
insolvent. For the first time, the entire federal-state system was in a net 
negative balance position with regard to the aggregate of all state and 
federal unemployment insurance trust funds. When 1983 closed, 
twenty-three state funds owed a total of $13.4 billion.
Table 9.1 presents data which convey some idea of how the unem 
ployment insurance system reacted to the changed economic picture 
after 1970. The data are comparable to those provided previously for 
earlier periods (see tables 7.1 and 8.1). Sharp increases in covered 
employment levels after 1971 and 1975 reflected mostly the significant 
coverage extensions provided by federal laws. Total covered payrolls 
also rose for this reason and because of wage inflation as well, espe 
cially after 1975.2 State taxable wage base increases expanded taxable 
payrolls substantially in 1972, 1978, and 1983 because of increases in 
the federal taxable wage base in those years. 3 These gains, however, 
were soon eroded in the 1980s, as seen in the falling ratio of taxable to 
total payrolls. Regular benefit outlays far exceeded tax revenues in
1. It is possible too that since advances were available from the federal loan fund without inter 
est at the time, some states were inclined to avoid the hard policies required to prevent insolvency 
or to restore depleted reserves quickly. Noting this behavior may in turn have weakened the 
resolve of other hard-pressed states that were striving to maintain solvency.
2. Besides the covered employment and payrolls of taxable employers shown on table 9.1, addi 
tional employment and wages were covered representing payrolls of reimbursing emptayers 
brought under the program by the coverage extensions in the 1970s to state and local government 
and nonprofit employers most of whom cover 19 million in average employment and $418 billion 
in total wages, but only about $564 million in benefit outlays.
3. State taxable wage bases, if lower, rose to at least the level of the federal taxable base when 
the latter rose from $3000 to $4200 in 1972, to $6000 in 1978, and to $7000 in 1983.
The System Under Financial Strain 219
some years, resulting in the widespread insolvency and debt already 
noted. Despite the rapid increase in wages, average weekly benefit 
amount levels more or less kept pace throughout this period. What is 
also noteworthy is the persistently high average duration of regular 
benefits and the high exhaustion ratios in most of these years. The new 
federal-state extended benefit program came into play in these two 
decades, supplying important added income support during high unem 
ployment periods. Not shown in table 9.1 are outlays under the tempo 
rary federal emergency and supplemental benefit programs which 
added further long-term support during these times.4
Following the recession of 1982-83, the economy began a slow, 
gradual recovery that continued for the rest of the decade. Unemploy 
ment rates declined to pre-1974 levels, reaching 5.2 percent of the 
civilian labor force by 1989. Insured unemployment rates fell even 
more sharply, precipitating a debate over reasons for the significantly 
lower proportions of insured-to-total unemployment in the 1980s com 
pared with those of the 1970s.5 The long recovery period enabled the 
states to pay off their debts and restore their funds to solvency. By the 
end of 1988, no state fund was insolvent. (One state, Michigan, still 
owed some old interest-free loans, but had more than enough reserves 
to repay them.)6 The level of reserves, however, did not appear ade 
quate in most cases to withstand the impact of a severe recession and 
avoid the need to borrow.
Financial crisis was the dominating element in unemployment 
insurance since about 1975. Federal legislation concerned itself repeat 
edly with this problem. Provision of extended benefit support beyond 
the duration limits of state laws also prominently occupied the atten 
tion of the federal partner in the system during recession periods and 
their aftermaths. Legislation in 1970 and 1976 broadened the coverage
4. The additional benefits are not reported in table 9.1, since they were funded entirely by the 
federal government rather than from state reserve funds. These benefits totaled over $500 million 
in 1972, over $6 billion in 1975-77, about $6.3 billion in 1982-83, and about $3 billion in 1984- 
85. These temporary programs are discussed in a later section in this chapter.
5. See the discussion of this issue in chapter 1 in the section on "The Insured Unemployed."
6. These loans dated back to before 1981 and were being repaid from reserves each year in 
amounts equal to the aggregate of the reductions in Federal Unemployment Tax credits that would 
have otherwise occurred for Michigan employers, an optional means of repayment provided by 
federal loan repayment provisions. The absence of any interest burden on this debt gave Michigan 
no incentive to repay it faster.
Table 9.1 Selected Unemployment Insurance Statistics, United States, Selected Years: 1970-1989
(A) From the 1970s H
Item
Total unemployment rate* (percent)
Insured unemployment rate (percent)
Average monthly covered employment (millions)
Total covered payrolls (billions)
Total taxable payrolls (billions)6
Ratio of taxable to total payrolls
Average state UI tax rate (percent)0
Total state UI taxes collected (millions)
Collections as percent of total payrolls
Total regular benefit outlays (millions)
Regular outlays as percent of total payrolls
Total state reserves at year end (billions)d
Reserves as a percent of total payrolls6
Average weekly covered wage
Average weekly benefit paidf
Number of first payments (millions)
Average actual duration of benefits (weeks)
Estimated exhaustion ratio8
Total extended benefit outlays (millions )h
1971
5.9
4.1
52.1
$403.4
$182.8
.45
1.4
$2,637
.7
$4,952
1.2
$9.7
2.4
$148.96
$54.35
6.6
14.4
30.5
$664
1973
4.9
2.5
59.9
$510.0
$254.9
.50
2.0
$4,996
1.0
$4,006
.8
$10.9
2.1
$163.71
$59.00
5.3
13.4
27.6
$143
1975
8.5
6.1
58.6
$579.5
$261.9
.45
2.0
$5,211
.9
$11,754
2.0
$3.1
.5
$190.28
$70.23
11.2
15.7
37.8
$2,494
1978
6.0
2.8
68.5
$830.0
$411.9
.50
2.8
$11,212
1.4
$7,710
.9
$4.6
.6
$232.90
$83.67
7.6
13.3
26.8
$692
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(B) From the 1980s
Item
Total unemployment rate" (percent)
Insured unemployment rate (percent
Average monthly covered employment (millions)
Total covered payrolls (billions)
Total taxable payrolls (billions)b
Ratio of taxable to total payrolls
Average state UI tax rate (percent)0
Total state UI taxes collected (millions)
Collections as percent of total payrolls
Total regular benefit outlays (millions)
Regular outlays as percent of total payrolls
Total state reserves at year end (billions)*1
Reserves as a percent of total payrolls"
Average weekly covered wage 
Average weekly benefit paidf 
Number of fust payments (millions)
Average actual duration of benefits (weeks) 
Estimated exhaustion ratio8
Total extended benefit outlays (millions )b
1980
7.1
3.9
71.3
$1,026.0
$458.6
.45
2.4
$11,415
1.1
$13,768
1.3
$6.6
.6
$276.89 
$98.95 
10.0
14.9 
33.2
$1,763
1982
9.5
4.7
70.7
$1,183.9
$479.1
.40
2.5
$12,112
1.0
$20,358
1.7
-$2.6
-
$321.95 
$119.34 
11.6
15.9 
38.5
$2,455
1985
7.1
2.8
77.8
$1,477.3
$613.2
.42
3.1
$19,258
1.3
$14,101
1.0
$10.1
.7
$365.38 
$128.23 
9.4
14.3 
31.3
$75
1989
5.2
2.1
86.2
$1,918.0
$738.5
.38
2.2
$16,452
.9
$13,642
.7
$36.9
1.9
$428.03 
$151.76 
7.4
13.2 
28.0
$12
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SOURCES: Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, 1938-1982, and annual supplements.
NOTE: Unemployment insurance data reflect state programs only; they exclude federal programs for railroad workers, veterans, ex-servicemen, federal 
employees, and extended benefits. Figures shown for covered employment, payrolls, tax collections, regular benefit outlays, average weekly covered 
wage, and average weekly benefit paid relate to taxable employers and exclude data for reimbursable employers.
Table 9.1 (continued) &
K>
a. From chapter 1, table 1.1. H
b. As determined by the taxable wage bases of each state. n
c. Applicable to taxable wages. «<
d. Net of outstanding loans. ft
e. Also known as reserve ratio. 5,
f. For week of total unemployment D 
g. Total number exhausting benefits during the year as a percent of total first payments during the twelve months ending June 30 of that year. gj
h. Paid under federal-state shared extended benefit programs, including federal share. £p
D
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of the program so that almost all wage and salary workers were now 
included. Several other reforms were also enacted and a national com 
mission was established to review the program comprehensively for 
the first time. As the financial crisis grew, federal legislation covering 
state borrowing and repayment rules increased in volume and detail, 
along with tendencies toward restrictions affecting the application of 
state eligibility and benefit provisions.
This chapter summarizes the principal changes produced by federal 
legislation enacted after 1969 as they affected major aspects of the 
unemployment insurance program. These include coverage, eligibility 
and disqualifications, benefit duration, and financing. Other relevant 
legislation is also reviewed.
Federal Administrative Changes
Before reviewing the legislative record, a brief account of how the 
federal administration of unemployment insurance evolved is in order. 
Some significant changes occurred during the period which affected 
the development of unemployment insurance policy and legislation.
The Bureau of Employment Security, which combined the unem 
ployment insurance and employment service functions, had operated 
continuously as a combined unit since 1948, and as part of the Depart 
ment of Labor since 1949. Programs stemming from the Manpower 
Development and Training Act greatly expanded the responsibilities of 
the Department in the 1960s. Some of these affected the Bureau of 
Employment Security, especially its employment service component. 
A separate Manpower Administration was established to coordinate 
most of these new functions, which soon grew in size and scope. In 
1966, the Manpower Administrator was elevated to the position of 
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Manpower Administration. The fol 
lowing year, the various related functions were more tightly organized 
under that position, including those of the Bureau of Employment 
Security. At this stage, the regional offices of the component units were 
consolidated, with emphasis on decentralization of authority to the new 
regional administrators.
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In a subsequent reorganization of the Manpower Administration in 
1969, the Bureau of Employment Security was abolished, and the 
Unemployment Insurance Service was kept as a separate unit headed 
by an Associate Manpower Administrator. Increasingly, policy and leg 
islative matters relating to unemployment insurance came under the 
influence of officials outside the group that had been more directly 
involved in the program's administration at the federal level for many 
years. Moreover, after long careers of public service dedicated to the 
unemployment insurance program, many of the most experienced and 
able officials were ending their careers, mainly through retirement. The 
hold of tradition and of the authority and philosophy of the past weak 
ened, opening the program to greater effects of such external factors as 
employment and training concerns and fiscal policy considerations. 
Another consequence of the reorganization was to further loosen the 
already weakened linkage between unemployment insurance and the 
Employment Service. Federal relations with the states with regard to 
unemployment insurance went less smoothly, especially as the reori 
ented regional offices were often more absorbed by manpower or 
employment and training problems and programs. National administra 
tions of the period tended toward less federal and more state and local 
control in domestic programs and policies. This stance, generally 
termed the New Federalism, worked to reduce the vigor of the federal 
influence and leadership with respect to unemployment insurance mat 
ters at the state level. These changes clearly affected the nature of fed 
eral legislation as well as the program's administration.
Coverage
The major gaps in coverage that remained through the 1960s were 
closed, for the most part, by the legislation enacted in 1970 and 1976. 7 
All but a small fraction of wage and salary employment is now pro 
tected by unemployment insurance in this country. The most important
7. The Employment Security Amendments of 1970 became law in August 1970 as P.L. 91-373. 
The Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976 were enacted in October 1976 as P.L. 
94-566.
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segments of the workforce brought under coverage by these laws were 
employees of small firms, nonprofit organizations, state and local gov 
ernment, and large farm employers. The only significant paid employ 
ment that remains uncovered is that for small farm employers and for 
domestic household service.
Small Firms
The size of employers subject to the Federal Unemployment Tax 
was reduced by the 1970 amendments from four or more to one or 
more employees in at least 20 weeks of the year, or with at least $1,500 
in payroll in one calendar quarter. Nearly half the states had already 
covered employers of one or more by 1969. The extension, effective in 
1972, brought an estimated 1.3 million jobs under the program.8
Nonprofit Organizations
Few states covered employment in nonprofit organizations before 
the 1970 amendments extended coverage to most employment in this 
category, effective 1972. The federal provision required states to cover 
such organizations that employ four or more workers, but continued to 
exclude churches, religious organizations, and primary and secondary 
schools. Nonprofit employers were exempted from the Federal Unem 
ployment Tax. The coverage became a federal requirement for 
approval of state laws to enable other employers to qualify for the fed 
eral tax offset. The states were required to offer nonprofit employers 
the option of covering their unemployment benefit costs either through 
application of the usual state unemployment insurance tax provisions 
or by reimbursement of charges, i.e., self-insurance. Nonprofit employ 
ers who choose reimbursement may form groups to pool their costs 
and reimburse the state fund for benefit charges through their pooled 
funds. Over 2 million additional jobs were covered as a result of this
8. Estimates for 1971 indicated that 1.6 million jobs in small firms were not covered; for 1972, 
the estimate of noncovered employment in small firms was down to about 300,000. See USDOL, 
Manpower Administration (Revised 1972 and 1973, chart 1).
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extension. The 1976 amendments eliminated the exclusion from cover 
age of nonprofit elementary and secondary school employees.9
State and Local Government
The largest segment of the wage and salary labor force not covered 
by unemployment insurance at the start of the 1970s was employed by 
state and local government, estimated at 9.4 million in 1971. It was 
also the fastest growing segment at the time. Most states provided for 
some coverage, but it was usually limited or spotty, some mandatory 
and some on an elective basis for local units.
The 1970 amendments required the states to cover all state hospitals 
and state institutions of higher education. Since nonprofit hospitals, 
colleges, and universities were also being covered, this provision 
equalized the treatment of employment in almost all such institutions. 
For constitutional reasons, the Federal Unemployment Tax cannot 
apply to covered state and local government payrolls. States may 
finance benefit costs of public employers through contributions by 
employing units to the state unemployment insurance reserve funds or 
through reimbursement of the funds by such units for benefits paid and 
charged. The 1970 federal provision extended coverage to about 1.5 
million jobs in state hospitals and state institutions of higher education 
(USDOL, Manpower Administration, Revised 1972 and 1973, chart 1).
Another associated provision in the 1970 amendments prohibited 
eligibility for benefits of college faculty and other school professionals 
during the summer or between terms if they had a contract to return to 
work. Under certain conditions, states could exclude from coverage 
employment by schools of students and their spouses and the employ 
ment of patients by hospitals.
In 1976, coverage was extended to all state and local government 
employment, with a few minor exceptions. This provision alone 
increased covered employment by over 8 million. Another amendment 
in 1976 broadened the scope of the prohibition on benefit eligibility 
between terms of professional staff of higher educational institutions to
9. Noncovered employment by nonprofit organizations was estimated at 2.8 million for 1971 
and about 600,000 for 1972. In 1975, the estimated number not covered was 700,000; by 1978, 
this number had been lowered to 400,000 (USDOL, Manpower Administration, Revised 1972 and 
1973, chart 1, and 1978 edition).
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apply it to such employees at all educational institutions, including pri 
mary and secondary schools, if the employee had a contract or reason 
able assurance of employment in the coming term. States were given 
the option to apply the same between-terms denial conditions to non- 
professional school employees. This option was removed by a 1983 
amendment which made denial of benefit mandatory in these cases. 10
Agricultural Coverage
The 1970 amendments eliminated the federal exclusion from cover 
age of certain categories of agricultural processing employment. The 
major move in agriculture, however, came in 1976 when coverage, 
effective in 1978, was extended to hired farm labor of large employ 
ers those with ten or more workers in at least twenty weeks of the 
year or with payrolls of at least $20,000 in a calendar quarter. 11 The 
provision temporarily excluded (until 1980) the employment of aliens 
admitted as farm labor on a limited time basis. This exclusion has been 
extended several times, the last by legislation adopted in 1986 continu 
ing the exclusion until 1992. Such aliens are not eligible for benefits 
since they may not remain in the country legally when not employed.
Other Coverage Extensions
The 1970 amendments extended coverage to previously excluded 
employment of outside salesmen and agents and commission drivers. 
The 1976 amendments covered domestic household workers of 
employers who paid wages totaling at least $1,000 for such work in 
any calendar quarter.
The 1976 extensions became effective in 1978, including those 
noted above for state and local government employment and farm 
labor. Emergency legislation enacted at the end of 1974, however, 
established a Special Unemployment Assistance program to provide 
benefit support during the recession period ahead to jobless workers 
unable to draw unemployment insurance for certain reasons, including
10. Social Security Amendments of 1983, adopted in April 1983 as P.L. 98-21.
11. These extensions in 1970 and 1976 brought under coverage about a half million jobs in agri 
culture, an estimate derived from USDOL, Manpower Administration (Revised 1972 and 1973, 
chart 1).
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their exclusion from coverage. 12 As a result, these workers were able 
to obtain benefits on a basis quite similar to that for unemployment 
insurance until 1978 when coverage became effective for many of 
them. The Special Unemployment Assistance benefits were financed 
by federal general revenues.
The 1976 amendments also admitted the Virgin Islands unemploy 
ment insurance program into the federal-state system, effective 1978. 
That year, covered employment in the Virgin Islands averaged only 
about 20,500; no other state averaged less than 100,000.
When the 1976 amendments took effect in 1978, an estimated 97 
percent of all wage and salary employment was covered by unemploy 
ment insurance (USDOL, Manpower Administration 1978 ed., chart 
16). The objective of universal coverage had come near full achieve 
ment.
Permanent Extended Benefit Program
As described in chapter 8, the temporary federal extensions of bene 
fits during the recessions of 1958-59 and 1961-62 stimulated proposals 
during the 1960s for permanent provision of long-term benefit support. 
Some states had raised their regular duration limits beyond the usual 
twenty-six-week maximum; others established provisions to extend 
benefits during high unemployment periods only. The latter approach 
was the one finally adopted as the national policy by the 1970 amend 
ments. The program was altered somewhat during the 1970s with 
respect to its trigger specifications. Many more amendments signifi 
cantly modified this program in the 1980s.
The establishment of a permanent program for extended benefits 
when unemployment is high, carrying the combined regular and 
extended length of protection up to a maximum of thirty-nine weeks, 
did not eliminate a perceived need for even longer income support dur 
ing recession periods. In the recessions of the 1970s and early 1980s, 
various forms of temporary emergency federal legislation provided for
12. Emergency Jobs and Unemployment Assistance Act, adopted December 1974 as P.L. 93- 
567.
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supplemental benefits carrying the total duration of all unemployment 
benefit support during such times to, in one period, as much as sixty- 
five weeks.
Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970
The permanent program adopted in 1970 was about the same as that 
agreed to as part of the 1966 legislative package which failed to pass 
because of the impasse on federal benefit standards. The program 
called for a 50 percent extension of the duration of regular benefits 
allowed to a claimant, up to thirteen more weeks, but not in excess of 
39 weeks in all. 13 Extended benefits became available (triggered on) 
during periods when insured unemployment rates reached specified 
levels and terminated (triggered off) when the rates fell below those 
levels. Extensions could become payable on a statewide or nationwide 
basis with separate trigger specifications for each. Under the 1970 law, 
extended benefits were payable in a state when its insured unemploy 
ment rate averaged 4.0 percent or more over a thirteen-week period 
and was at least 120 percent of the average rate for the corresponding 
periods of the two previous years. 14 The state extended benefit period 
ended when its current thirteen-week average rate fell below either of 
these two trigger points. If the seasonally adjusted national insured 
unemployment rate was 4.5 percent or more for three consecutive 
months, extended benefits became payable in all states and remained 
so until the trigger-on requirement was not met. Once triggered on, 
however, an extended benefit period continued for at least thirteen 
weeks, and was off a minimum of thirteen weeks as well.
Claimants who exhausted their regular benefits could draw extended 
benefits, when payable, unless they became eligible for regular benefits 
in a new benefit year. Extended benefits were paid at the same weekly 
rate as regular benefits. All other state provisions applied at first, but 
later amendments specified certain departures from this rule.
13. This program was adopted as part of the Employment Security Amendments of 1970.
14. Weekly insured unemployment rates varied seasonally in some states, often to exceed 4.0 
percent about the same period each year. Since the state rate was not then seasonally adjusted, the 
required increase of at least 20 percent over the levels of the two prior years was incorporated into 
the trigger mechanism so as to confine the extended benefit response to recession rather than to 
seasonal unemployment as well.
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Financing provisions called for federal and state unemployment 
insurance funds to share extended benefit costs on a 50-50 basis. The 
Federal Unemployment Tax was raised by 0.1 percent of taxable pay 
rolls with proceeds to go into a new Extended Unemployment Com 
pensation Account in the Unemployment Trust Fund, out of which the 
federal share is paid. A state's share is financed by its trust fund 
account. The state has the option of experience rating its extended ben 
efit costs or pooling them uniformly among all covered employers. The 
federal fund also reimburses a state for half the cost of any regular ben 
efits it pays a claimant beyond the twenty-sixth week during an 
extended benefit period, subject to the thirty-nine-week overall maxi 
mum.
The 1970 Act required all states to adopt the necessary extended 
benefit provisions to become effective by January 1972, but allowed 
them to start earlier if they chose. A total of twenty-two states did so as 
recession conditions emerged and spread, triggering on extended bene 
fits, in a few cases as early as October 1970. The national trigger went 
on in January 1972. During 1971 and 1972, extended benefit outlays 
totaled over $1 billion, adding about 12 percent to total regular benefit 
outlays for these two years. In the recession of the mid-1970s, when 
benefits paid out were much heavier, extended benefits totaled about 
$2.5 billion in 1975 and $2.3 billion in 1976, about 22 percent of regu 
lar benefit outlays. 16 The federal extended benefit account had to bor 
row funds from the U.S. Treasury to help finance its share of these 
costs, and the Federal Unemployment Tax was increased by 0.2 per 
cent of taxable payrolls to pay off the debt of this account.
Amendments to Relax Trigger Requirements in the 1970s
The changes made in the extended benefit program during the 1970s 
nearly all related to state triggers and tended to ease their restrictive- 
ness. Those made in the 1980s were more drastic, affecting not only 
the triggers but also the program's basic structure and some of the con 
ditions for benefit eligibility. These later changes served mainly to 
restrict the availability and outlays of benefits.
15. There is no federal sharing of extended benefits paid to state and local government workers 
as no federal tax is paid on the wages of these workers.
16. Based on data from Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, 1938-1982.
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The first change applied to that part of the state trigger requiring that 
the current thirteen-week average insured unemployment rate be at 
least 20 percent higher than the corresponding average for the two 
prior years. In some states, high rates persisted well after the worst 
early recession months so that a year later, those early peak rates began 
to raise the prior two-year averages. In time, even though they contin 
ued high in many of these states, the current thirteen-week averages 
slipped below the 20 percent requirement and triggered off extended 
benefit periods. The higher two-year average base sometimes pre 
vented extended benefits from triggering on when unemployment lev 
els turned up again. To avoid these effects, Congress acted repeatedly 
to suspend this requirement temporarily, or to ease the combination of 
the two state trigger requirements. The first such action came in Octo 
ber 1972 and permitted the states to suspend the 120 percent require 
ment for triggering off until June 30, 1973. 17 Congress then allowed 
the states to continue that suspension for triggering both on and off 
until the end of 1973, but the state's current thirteen-week rate had to 
be at least 4.5 percent to trigger on. Congress continued the suspension 
through 1974 but dropped the required thirteen-week current rate back 
to the 4.0 percent minimum. This temporary suspension was renewed 
by Congress several times until late 1976. Beginning 1975, the states 
were also permitted to pay extended benefits if the national insured 
unemployment rate was 4.0 percent or more (P.L. 92-572). Finally, in 
October 1976, a permanent change was made allowing states to sus 
pend the 120 percent requirement if their current thirteen-week aver 
age rate was at least 5.0 percent (P.L. 94-566). Most states adopted this 
option.
The October 1976 amendments also changed the basis of the 
national trigger from a 4.5 percent insured unemployment rate (season 
ally adjusted) for three consecutive months to a current thirteen-week 
average, also seasonally adjusted, so as to coincide with the basis for 
the state trigger rate. The minimum off period of thirteen weeks under 
the national trigger was eliminated.
17. The first suspension of the 120 percent requirement came in P.L. 92-599 (October 1972).
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Restrictive Amendments of 1980-1981
A number of changes made in 1980 restricted the outlays for 
extended benefits under certain circumstances. One limitation was to 
deny federal sharing of the first week of extended benefits if the claim 
ant had not served a noncompensable waiting week for regular benefits 
(P.L. 96-499). Most states did apply a waiting week, but some had 
eliminated it; the amendment served as an incentive for the latter states 
to reestablish one.
Another restrictive approach taken was to impose federal standards 
to require the states to deny extended benefits to certain claimants. One 
prohibits payment of extended benefits, after the first two weeks, to a 
claimant who has filed an interstate claim from a state not currently in 
an extended benefit period (P.L. 96-364). Other standards require states 
to deny extended benefits to claimants who do not actively seek work, 
or who refuse to apply for or accept suitable work offers or referrals, 
provided that the refused job offer or referral is in writing or listed with 
the employment service (P.L. 96-499). Under the amendment, unless 
the claimant has good prospects for obtaining customary employment 
reasonably soon, "suitable work" means any work within the claim 
ant's capabilities that pays at least the legal minimum wage or more 
than the weekly benefit amount. To avoid disqualification for failure to 
seek work, the claimant must furnish tangible evidence of a systematic 
and sustained effort to seek work each week for which a claim is made 
for extended benefits. This requirement is more demanding than the 
usual state work search rules for regular benefits. The disqualification 
for extended benefits for job refusal and failure to seek work applies 
for the duration of the claimant's unemployment and until the claimant 
has been reemployed at least four weeks, with earnings of at least four 
times the weekly benefit amount, and is again unemployed under qual 
ifying conditions.
Another federal standard called for by the 1980 amendments 
requires states to deny extended benefits to claimants disqualified and 
denied regular benefits for voluntary leaving, misconduct discharge, or 
suitable work refusal if they had not disqualified such claimants for the 
duration of their unemployment and required them to satisfy a mini 
mum reemployment test (P.L. 96-499). Most states had adopted the lat 
ter type of disqualification for regular benefits, but some still imposed
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a temporary suspension instead. After 1980, more states moved toward 
the duration disqualification in their regular benefit provisions. Claim 
ants denied benefits for the same reasons while drawing extended ben 
efits are also subject to the duration disqualification and a 
reemployment test.
Several amendments adopted in 1981 went much further in restrict 
ing the availability of extended benefits by modifications of the trigger 
requirements and calculations (P.L. 97-35). The most significant 
change was to eliminate provisions to pay extended benefits on a 
nationwide basis. Since August 1981, only state triggers have con 
trolled the start and termination of extended benefit periods. In addi 
tion, the count of the insured unemployed used in determining each 
state's trigger rate was revised so that it no longer included, as it had 
previously, claimants filing for extended and supplemental unemploy 
ment benefits. The effect of their exclusion from the calculation was a 
lower rate, especially after extended benefit periods had begun, tending 
to terminate such periods sooner. Only claimants of regular benefits are 
counted. Another change raised the trigger points needed to begin and 
terminate a state extended benefit period. The thirteen-week average 
insured unemployment rate required to trigger on extended benefits 
was increased from a 4.0 percent minimum to a 5.0 percent minimum. 
The option to disregard the comparison between the current and the 
prior two-year rates was made to depend on a 6.0 percent minimum 
current rate rather than 5.0 percent. The effect was to begin extended 
benefit periods later and terminate them sooner, or to fall short of trig 
gering on at all.
Yet another amendment adopted in 1981 set a separate federal mini 
mum qualifying requirement for extended benefits at twenty weeks of 
base-period employment, or the equivalent in a minimum base-period 
earnings measure (forty times the weekly benefit amount or one-and- 
one-half times high-quarter earnings). Previously, state qualifying 
requirements applied, many of which were less stringent. This amend 
ment took effect in September 1982.
Most, though not all of these changes and restrictions were fully 
implemented throughout 1982; by 1983, all were in effect. Some idea 
of how these changes affected extended benefit experience may be 
gained from data in table 9.2, which compares such experience for 
1975 and 1976 with that for 1982 and 1983. Both 1975 and 1982 were
Table 92 Comparison of Extended Benefit Experience in 1975-1976 and 1982-1983, United States
Item
Total unemployment rate (percent)
Insured unemployment rate (percent)
Benefit outlays (millions)
Regular benefits
Extended benefits
Average extended weekly benefit amount
Exhaustions of regular benefits (thousands)
Extended benefit first payments (thousands)
1975
8.3
6.1
$11,754
2,494
$66
4,195
4,012
Percent 
change 
1976 1975 to 1976 1982
7.7
4.4
$8,973
2,298
$70
3,270
3,253
-7
-28
-24
-8
6
-22
-19
9.5
4.7
$20,358
2,455
$121
4,175
2,193
Percent 
change 
1983 1982 to 1983
9.5
3.9
$17,720
1,767
$129
4,180
1,402
0
-17
-13
-28
7
a
-36
n>
VI
B
C
o
D.
a
1oSi
00I
D
SOURCES: Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, 1938-1982, and annual supplement for 1983. 
a. Less than 0.5 percent increase.
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severe recession years. Total unemployment showed some improve 
ment in 1976 but not in 1983; insured unemployment was down in 
both these years from previous year highs. The major contrast between 
the two recession periods is seen in extended benefit outlays and first 
payments. While the number exhausting regular benefits was about 4.2 
million in 1975 and 1982, the number who began drawing extended 
benefits in 1982 was only a little more than half the exhaustee count 
compared with over 95 percent in 1975. Extended benefit outlays in 
1982 were somewhat below 1975 levels, even though the average 
weekly amount paid was 83 percent higher in the later year. Extended 
benefit first payments and outlays fell off substantially more, in propor 
tion, from 1982 to 1983 than from 1975 to 1976 even as regular benefit 
exhaustions totaled about the same in each of the two later years, com 
pared with a 22 percent decline from 1975 to 1976. The statutory 
changes adopted in the early 1980s had cut back the extended benefit 
program significantly.
Federal Supplementation 
of Unemployment Benefits
Since the enactment of the federal-state extended benefit program in 
1970, each recession except that in 1980 has been the occasion for the 
provision of additional weeks of benefit support through temporary 
emergency federal programs. The heavy long-term unemployment at 
such times resulted in hundreds of thousands of jobless workers 
exhausting both their regular and extended benefits, many with little or 
no further means of financial assistance available. Simply waiting for a 
recovery of uncertain strength and timing to solve the problem was 
generally unacceptable. Each of the three supplemental programs 
adopted during these years had significant differences from one 
another, but all had certain features in common. They were temporary, 
wholly federally financed, provided compensation for weeks of unem 
ployment beyond the thirty-ninth week, and were tied in one way or 
another to state insured unemployment rates as triggers. The states 
administered the programs as agents for the federal government and,
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except as specified otherwise in the federal law, the regular state eligi 
bility and benefit provisions applied.
Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1971
With extended benefits triggered on in almost half the states during 
1971, exhaustions of these benefits began to mount late in the year 
spurring the enactment of the emergency legislation (P.L. 92-224). The 
Act provided another 50 percent of the individual's regular benefit 
entitlement up to thirteen more weeks for an overall maximum of fifty- 
two weeks for all benefits. These added benefits became payable when 
a state's specially computed unemployment rate averaged 6.5 percent 
or more over a thirteen-week period. This rate was calculated by add 
ing together the state's insured unemployment rate, as computed for 
the federal-state extended benefit program, and an exhaustion rate, rep 
resenting one-fourth of the total number exhausting regular benefits in 
the state during the last twelve calendar months taken as a percent of 
the state's average monthly covered employment. Originally planned 
to operate for only the first half of 1972, the program was extended 
through March 1973 (P.L. 92-329). The added benefits were to be 
financed out of the federal Extended Unemployment Compensation 
Account with U.S. Treasury advances to that account providing the 
necessary funds. When the program was extended beyond June 1972, 
an increase of 0.08 percent of 1973 taxable payrolls was added to the 
Federal Unemployment Tax to pay for the resulting further costs of the 
temporary compensation.
A varying number of states paid the temporary emergency compen 
sation at different times during 1972 and early 1973 up to nineteen 
states in late June 1972. Because of differences between the triggers 
used for extended benefits and the emergency compensation, some 
states had triggered off extended benefits because their trigger rates 
failed to meet the 120 percent requirement, but they did pay the emer 
gency compensation to claimants who exhausted their regular benefits. 
More than one million claimants drew over $500 million in these 
added benefits during 1972, more than paid out in extended benefits
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that year and equal to about 10 percent of all regular benefits paid in 1972 18
Federal Supplemental Benefits, 1975-1977
Recession, long-term unemployment, and benefit exhaustions 
reemerged as serious problems in late 1974 prompting Congress to 
pass another Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act at the end 
of that year (P.L. 93-572). Like its predecessor, this Act also provided 
for added benefits up to 50 percent of regular entitlement, with a thir 
teen-week limit and an overall fifty-two-week maximum. Unlike the 
earlier program, the supplemental benefits were payable only to 
exhaustees of both regular and extended benefits, and only when 
extended benefits were payable. Federal Treasury advances to the 
Extended Unemployment Compensation Account provided the funds 
needed. The advances were to be repaid out of future unemployment 
tax revenue allocations. The program was to run through March 1977.
Amendments changed the program several times before it finally 
expired. One amendment, adopted in March 1975 (P.L. 94-12), dou 
bled the duration of supplemental benefits by allowing up to twenty-six 
added weeks and sixty-five weeks in all. This increase, applicable at 
first only for the next six months, was extended for the rest of 1975 by 
further legislation enacted in June (P.L. 94-45). That amendment also 
specified an added state trigger requirement for federal supplemental 
benefits starting in 1976. The state trigger rate had to be at least 5.0 
percent; if it was less than 6.0 percent, up to thirteen weeks of supple 
mental benefits were payable; if 6.0 percent or more, up to twenty-six 
weeks were payable. In April 1977, a last-minute extension passed to 
continue the program through January 1978, but it reduced the maxi 
mum from twenty-six to thirteen weeks of supplemental benefits (P.L. 
95-10). Moreover, all remaining costs incurred under the program were 
financed directly by general revenues and not by the Unemployment 
Trust Fund. These amendments also established special job search and 
disqualification rules applicable to claimants of federal supplemental 
benefits so that failure to actively seek work or refusal of suitable
18. For a summary of the experience under the temporary emergency unemployment compensa 
tion program of 1971, see Murray (1974, pp. 37-39).
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work, as defined for the purpose, would discontinue eligibility for 
these benefits.
The federal supplemental benefits program paid out over $6 billion 
during the 1975-77 period, almost as much as paid out by the extended 
benefit program in these years. They accounted for about 15 percent of 
all benefit outlays of the regular, extended, and supplemental programs 
combined for this period. Over 2 million claimants began drawing sup 
plemental benefits in each of the first two years, and about 1.2 million 
did so in 1977. 19
Federal Supplemental Compensation, 1982-1985
No supplemental program was adopted during the brief and less 
widespread recession of 1980. The 1982 recession period was well 
advanced before another temporary program of added benefits was 
enacted in September 1982 (P.L. 97-248). The Federal Supplemental 
Compensation program established then was quite different from its 
predecessors. It was more complex in design, circumscribed by more 
special eligibility requirements, and it was to be amended much more 
often. Its costs were financed entirely by federal general revenues.
At the outset, supplemental compensation was payable for up to six, 
eight, or ten additional weeks, depending on the level of the state's 
extended benefit trigger rate. Half of a claimant's regular duration, but 
only up to ten weeks, could be paid to claimants who exhausted their 
benefits in states that triggered on extended benefits any time after May 
1982. The minimum rate to trigger on extended benefits was 5.0 per 
cent by then. In other states, up to eight weeks of supplemental benefits 
were payable if the state's extended benefit trigger rate was at least 3.5 
percent for three consecutive weeks, and six weeks of benefits were 
payable elsewhere. Thus, some federal supplemental compensation 
was payable everywhere, regardless of whether extended benefits were 
also payable.
The changes made in the federal-state shared extended benefit pro 
gram with regard to how the insured unemployment rate was calcu 
lated and to eligibility rules applied here as well. To be eligible for 
federal supplemental compensation, a claimant must have worked for
19. Based on data in National Commission on Unemployment Compensation (1980, pp. 60-61, 
tables 2 and 3).
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at least twenty weeks during the base period, or had the equivalent in 
earnings. Similarly, the requirements adopted in 1981 for extended 
benefits relating to active job search and refusal of suitable work offers 
or referrals were applied to supplemental compensation, as were the 
disqualifications imposed. The program, as first enacted, was to run 
through March 1983. As with the previous federal supplemental benefit 
programs, subsequent amendments extended its life well beyond the 
original expiration date.
The first significant change made in the program came a few months 
after it began. An amendment adopted in December 1982 raised the 
amount of supplemental compensation payable from 50 percent to 65 
percent of the claimant's regular benefit entitlement up to maximums 
ranging from eight weeks to sixteen weeks, instead of six to ten weeks 
(P.L. 97-424). In a state that had triggered on extended benefits, the 
maximum supplement could be as high as sixteen weeks if its insured 
unemployment trigger rate was at least 6.0 percent, making the maxi 
mum for all benefits combined a total of fifty-five weeks. In a state 
with no extended benefits triggered on and a rate below 3.5 percent, the 
maximum supplement was eight weeks, making its overall duration 
limit thirty-four weeks, assuming its regular duration maximum at 
twenty-six weeks. Three other maximum levels of supplemental com 
pensation applied between these two extremes for intermediate trigger 
rate thresholds. The amended structure became effective in January 
1983. No change was made in the program's March 1983 expiration 
date at this time.
Amendments adopted a few months later extended the program 
through September 1983 (P.L. 98-21). Whether a state had triggered on 
extended benefits was eliminated as a factor determining the maximum 
amount of supplemental compensation allowed; only the level of the 
trigger rate was to govern. The maximum level of sixteen weeks was 
dropped; the maximum range then ran from eight to fourteen weeks, 
depending on the trigger rate.
Early in October 1983, Congress extended the program for a few 
weeks until it could determine its final positions regarding several 
other changes (P.L. 98-92). It did so near the end of that month, at 
which time the Federal Supplemental Compensation Program was 
extended for a year and a half, through March 1985 (P.L. 98-135). The 
existing structure involving maximums of eight, ten, twelve, or four-
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teen weeks, depending on the level of the state extended benefit trigger 
rate was retained. The amendments added a new element to the design, 
however, based on a long-term average rate. If the state's insured 
unemployment rate since January 1,1982 averaged at least 4.5 but less 
than 5.5 percent, the maximum supplemental weeks payable would be 
twelve weeks, regardless of that state's current rate. If it averaged at 
least 5.5 percent, the maximum would be fourteen weeks. A claimant's 
individual entitlement to supplemental compensation remained 
unchanged once established, and the maximum for a state could not 
change more than once every thirteen weeks. All claimants who 
exhausted supplemental compensation between April 1,1983 and mid- 
October 1983 were eligible for five more weeks of such benefits if still 
unemployed, regardless of the state's trigger rate; fewer added weeks 
were available to previously eligible claimants who exhausted after 
mid-October 1983.
The program was finally allowed to expire in March 1985.20 During 
its existence, it paid out a total of more than $9.3 billion in supplemen 
tal compensation. Most was disbursed ($6.7 billion) from the pro 
gram's beginning in September 1982 through the end of 1983 while the 
nation's unemployment rate continued to range well above 8.0 per 
cent.21 It is ironic that as amendments restricted the permanent 
extended benefit program in the 1980s, federal supplemental compen 
sation continued to be paid to exhaustees of regular benefits. During 
1983, supplemental compensation outlays totaled more than three 
times those of extended benefits. By the closing months of 1983, only 
Puerto Rico and West Virginia were paying extended benefits. In 1984, 
the supplemental program continued to pay out a total of about $2.3 
billion, while outlays of extended benefits, payable in only a few 
states, came to about $43 million (Unemployment Insurance Financial 
Data 1938-1982). One result of the extended benefit program restric 
tions and the provision of federal supplemental compensation was to
20. Claimants already qualified for supplemental compensation before March 31 were permitted 
to draw on their remaining entitlement during the three-month phaseout period ending June 30, 
1985.
21. Corson, Grossman, and Nicholson (1986, p. 24, Table 113). The total of $9.3 billion cited in 
the text omits a small amount paid during the calendar quarter following the program's termina 
tion in March 1985 when claimants were permitted with previously established entitlement to 
draw remaining benefits if eligible.
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shift much of the cost of long-term support from employer taxes to 
general revenues.
Federal Standards
The period after 1969 saw a rising number of federal requirements 
imposed on state unemployment insurance laws. Many of them 
affected their regular eligibility and disqualification provisions. Other 
requirements, as already noted, were added to the federal-state 
extended benefit program and to the later temporary federal supple 
mental benefit or compensation programs; they superceded regular 
state provisions which otherwise applied for these programs. Adminis 
tration-backed federal minimum standards for the regular weekly ben 
efit amount, similar to those advanced in the mid-1960s, were 
proposed in 1975 but were turned aside.
This section reviews the more significant of these new federal 
requirements applied to regular state laws, apart from those related to 
financing which are covered in the following section. The few federal 
program standards adopted before the 1970s or contained in the origi 
nal law were designed primarily to protect the rights of claimants or to 
expand the protection provided against wage loss. Those adopted since 
have included several that are restrictive in nature, aimed at eliminat 
ing or reducing benefit entitlement in certain circumstances which 
came more and more to be regarded as of questionable validity or the 
result of abuse. These matters have been extremely controversial. An 
important factor that helped to overcome resistance to such restrictive 
standards was the cost-reduction imperative to which both state unem 
ployment insurance fund insolvency and federal budget deficits gave 
increasing force in the Congress.
Coverage Standards
These were noted earlier in the section describing federal extensions 
of coverage. Since the Federal Unemployment Tax was not applied to 
nonprofit organizations or to state and local government, coverage of 
their employees was accomplished by making it a requirement for state 
law. Failure to meet the requirement would sacrifice federal approval
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of the law as the basis for the credit offset allowed against the Federal 
Unemployment Tax for all other employers in the state who are subject 
to it.
The other significant standard adopted in relation to coverage exten 
sion required states to deny benefits to professional school personnel 
between terms if they had a contract or other assurance for resuming 
employment in the next term. Its application was broadened as cover 
age of school personnel broadened. It was amended to apply for holi 
day and other recess periods as well as between academic terms. 
Finally, in 1983, the benefit-denial requirement was made mandatory 
for all school employees, including nonprofessional staff, a matter pre 
viously left to each state to decide for itself. 22
Protective Standards
Several standards adopted with the 1970 amendments aimed at pro 
tecting or enhancing the unemployed worker's benefit entitlement. One 
of these represented an important shift of policy reflecting the growing 
emphasis placed on training for the unemployed throughout the previ 
ous decade. In general, an unemployment insurance claimant who 
entered school or a formal training program was held to be unavailable 
for work and denied benefits on that ground. The new federal standard 
prohibited states from denying benefits to claimants because they were 
taking training if the training was approved by the state agency.
Another standard adopted in 1970 ruled out state provisions that 
cancel or eliminate all benefit rights of a claimant because of a disqual 
ifying act, except for a work misconduct discharge, fraud related to the 
claim, or receipt of disqualifying income. A number of states had pro 
visions that totally cancelled benefit rights in the case of disqualifica 
tions for voluntary leaving or refusal of suitable work. Since the 
federal prohibition, several states have provided for cancellation of all 
but a minimal amount of benefits, such as one week, in these cases.
One standard from the 1970 amendments outlawed state provisions 
that reduce or deny benefits when claimants have filed interstate 
claims, and another required all states to participate in interstate plans 
for combining wage or employment credits of a claimant who worked
22. This option was restored to the states by legislation adopted by 1991 (see Epilogue).
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in more than one state in a base period. These requirements eliminated 
discriminatory practices in several states that penalized interstate 
claimants and multistate workers. A standard adopted in the 1976 
amendments prohibited states from denying benefits solely on the basis 
of pregnancy, as some state provisions did. The Supreme Court had 
ruled against such provisions.
Restrictive Standards
The 1970 amendments included a prohibition against paying bene 
fits in a new benefit year to a claimant who had no employment since 
the start of the preceding benefit year. The problem addressed was one 
which can arise in a state with a lag between the start of a benefit year 
and the end of the relevant base period. Most states have such a lag, 
lasting from one to two calendar quarters. Employment and wages in 
the lag period can be sufficient to qualify a claimant for benefits in a 
second benefit year without further employment. Where allowed, such 
cases were criticized as the "double dip." The standard required states 
to specify some minimum employment beyond the lag period to qual 
ify for benefits.
Several other restrictive standards were adopted with the 1976 
amendments. One required states to deny benefits to professional ath 
letes between playing seasons if they have reasonable assurance of 
reemployment. Another prohibited the payment of benefits to aliens 
not legally admitted into the country or not legally permitted to work 
when admitted. The need for these two standards does not appear to 
have been established at the time. Considering the administrative bur 
dens they entail for the states, if properly enforced, and the potential 
inequities that can result, their value is in some doubt.24
A third and more significant standard first specified in the 1976 
amendments, and later modified, required the states to reduce a claim 
ant's weekly benefit amount by the amount of certain pension income 
received, as prorated on a weekly basis. The treatment of pensions by 
unemployment insurance had been a longstanding issue for the pro-
23. Mary Ann Turner v. Department of Employment Security and Board of Review of the Indus 
trial Commission of Utah, 96 S. CT. 249 (1975).
24. For a further discussion of these and other restrictive standards, see Rubin (1983, pp. 83-94).
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gram, both as to whether and how to take account of them.25 The appli 
cation of this standard was postponed and then amended in 1980 
before taking effect (P.L. 96-364). It requires the states, as a minimum, 
to reduce the weekly unemployment benefit by the prorated weekly 
amount of any pension received by a claimant if the pension was based 
on employment by a base-period employer and financed wholly or in 
part by that employer. While the required reduction also applies for 
Social Security and Railroad Retirement pensions received, the condi 
tion restricting the reduction to pensions related to base-period 
employers does not apply. States have the option to adjust the amount 
of the pension deducted from the unemployment benefit by taking 
account of contributions made toward the pension by the claimant.
Financing Legislation
Unemployment insurance financing was a major concern of Con 
gress in the 1970s and 1980s, especially from 1975 on. That concern 
arose largely over two problems. One was the shortage of federal reve 
nues produced by the net Federal Unemployment Tax to meet the cost 
responsibilities of the federal partner in the system. The other was the 
spreading and deepening insolvency of state benefit reserve funds and 
their increasing dependence on advances from the federal loan fund. 
Legislative proposals in these areas grew to an almost constant stream, 
many of them representing efforts to obtain relief for states in the most 
serious financial difficulty. Proposals enacted did address the federal 
revenue shortage, at least until the next crisis. Legislation which dealt 
with loan and repayment requirements blended some relief with pres 
sure on states to initiate significant improvements of their own finan 
cial conditions. This section summarizes federal legislation enacted 
during the period in both these areas and a few other changes.
Federal Unemployment Tax Revenues
By the end of the 1960s, it was apparent that administrative costs of 
the program, swollen by inflation, were outstripping their federal
25. For an early treatment of this issue, see Murray (1967).
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source of funding. Although the Federal Unemployment Tax rate was 
increased in 1960 by 0.1 percentage point to help relieve a similar 
strain at that time, the fixed tax base and inflation combined to renew 
the problem later in the decade. The adoption in 1970 of the federal- 
state extended benefit program added new federal cost obligations.
The 1970 amendments included an increase in both the tax rate and 
the taxable wage base to resolve the problem. The rate was raised from 
3.1 to 3.2 percent, increasing the net federal tax retained from 0.4 to 
0.5 percent of taxable payrolls. The rate increase was made effective in
1970. and its proceeds for 1970 and 1971 were allocated entirely to the 
new extended benefit account in the Unemployment Trust Fund. After
1971. 10 percent of net federal tax revenues were to be so allocated. 
The taxable wage base was raised to $4,200, effective 1972. It was the 
first change from the $3,000 base since 1940. The impact of this 
increase was also felt by state tax structures, since all but five states 
had wage bases for their own taxes below $4,200 in 1971, most at 
$3,000. In that year, only somewhat more than 45 percent of total cov 
ered payrolls were taxable by the states, a proportion that rose to 
almost 52 percent with the tax base increase in 1972. Between these 
two years, taxable payrolls expanded by about 29 percent, compared to 
a 13 percent increase in total payrolls.26
Since many states adopted and triggered on extended benefits in late 
1970 and 1971, and all states were paying extended benefits in 1972, 
the federal extended benefit account had no chance to build up a 
reserve. Repayable U.S. Treasury advances from general revenues into 
this account were required to cover the costs of the added temporary 
emergency benefits, also financed from this account. In June 1972, 
when the emergency benefit program was extended to run beyond June 
and into 1973, the Federal Unemployment Tax was raised by 0.08 per 
cent of taxable payrolls, for 1973 only, to pay for the resulting addi 
tional benefit costs (P.L. 92-329). The advances covering the 
temporary emergency benefits paid earlier were to be repaid out of 
Federal Unemployment Tax revenues if any remained after all pre 
scribed allocations were made to the extended benefit, loan, and 
administration accounts, a prospect that seemed quite remote at the 
time.
26. Based on data in Unemployment Insurance Financial Data 1938-1982.
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The continuing inflation and the recession of the mid-1970s put fur 
ther strains on Federal Unemployment Tax revenues. By late 1974, the 
extended benefit account had accumulated some reserves, but also car 
ried about $600 million in debt for advances made to cover emergency 
benefits paid earlier. The drains of extended benefits in the mid-1970s, 
along with the costs of another temporary federal supplemental benefit 
program, required substantial additional advances from general reve 
nues into the extended benefit account. More advances were also flow 
ing into the loan fund, which had been exhausted by the heavy 
borrowing by insolvent state funds. Rising administrative costs were 
again becoming hard to cover from existing federal tax revenue alloca 
tions.
The 1976 amendments attempted to resolve these problems by rais 
ing again both the tax rate and the taxable wage base. The rate increase 
was 0.2, effective 1977, with proceeds going into the extended benefit 
account. With this increase, the net federal tax was 0.7 percent of tax 
able payrolls, including 0.25 percent allocated to the extended benefit 
account. When all advances owed by this account were repaid, the 0.2 
rate increase was to terminate. The taxable wage base was lifted from 
$4,200 to $6,000, effective 1978. In 1976, over half the states had a 
$4,200 base for their own taxes; the base was $6,000 or more in fifteen 
states. The ratio of taxable to total wages had declined since 1972 to 
about 46 percent (Unemployment Insurance Financial Data 1938- 
1982). The 1976 amendments also modified loan fund provisions, to be 
discussed below.
More inflation and a return of recession conditions in 1980 again 
eroded the adequacy of Federal Unemployment Tax revenues. The 
response came in 1982, with another rise in both the rate and tax base 
(P.L. 97-248). The rate increased by 0.1 which made the net federal tax 
rate 0.8 percent, including the temporary 0.2 increase adopted in 1976 
for extended benefits. The taxable wage base was raised from $6,000 
to $7,000. Both increases became effective in 1983. The changes also 
provided that 40 percent of the net federal tax be allocated to the 
extended benefit account. The 1982 legislation, in addition, specified a 
major change in the gross Federal Unemployment Tax rate and in the 
tax credit provisions, effective 1985. These mainly affect experience 
rating and are described below.
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The next action affecting Federal Unemployment Tax revenues 
came near the close of 1987. In May of that year, the debt owed to the 
U.S. Treasury by the extended benefit account was finally repaid in 
full. The 0.2 percent addition to the federal tax, adopted in 1976 to help 
repay this debt, was therefore due to terminate at the end of 1987. The 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, however, extended this tax compo 
nent for three more years through 1990 (P.L. 100-203). The contin 
ued added revenues were to bolster further the reserve accounts 
accumulated for extended benefits and loan funds against the potential 
demands of the next recession. A major motivation for retaining these 
revenues, however, was to help offset some of the current federal bud 
get deficit. Besides equally dividing the revenues of the continued 0.2 
percent tax component between the extended benefit and loan 
accounts, the Act altered the allocation of the permanent 0.6 percent 
net federal tax. The share going into the administration account, from 
which appropriations are made to cover the program's administrative 
costs, was raised from 60 to 90 percent; the share to the extended bene 
fit account was reduced from 40 to 10 percent. Additionally, the ceil 
ings on the extended benefit and loan accounts were increased 
substantially.27
Loan and Repayment Provisions
By 1969, the loan fund had built up to its current statutory ceiling of 
$550 million. No loans had been drawn under the revised provisions 
adopted in 1960, and all prior loans had been repaid. Borrowing began 
in 1972; the loans were interest free. Only three states drew loans 
before 1975, but that year a total of sixteen states did so. The loan fund 
was soon exhausted, but was replenished as needed by U.S. Treasury 
advances. Through the end of 1979, twenty-five states had borrowed 
more than $5.6 billion; at that time, thirteen states still owed about $3.8 
billion (National Commission on Unemployment Compensation 1980, 
p. 96; Unemployment Insurance Financial Data 1938-1982).
27. Each account's ceiling had been set at 0.125 percent of total wages. The extended benefit 
account ceiling was raised to three times that level (0.375 percent), and the loan fund ceiling made 
five times higher (0.625 percent). Total covered payrolls in 1987 exceeded $1.7 trillion; the new 
ceilings thus came to about $6.4 billion and $10.6 billion, respectively, at that time.
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Repayment provisions called for a reduction in the federal tax credit 
allowed to employers in a state that had not repaid a loan in two to 
three years after it was made.28 The reduction applied each year the 
debt remained unpaid and the amount of the reduction was progres 
sive 0.3 percent of taxable payrolls the first year, 0.6 the second year, 
0.9 the third year, and so on. In addition, in the third and fourth years 
of tax credit reduction, the tax credit was to be further reduced by the 
amount, if any, by which the state's average tax rate fell short of the 2.7 
percent level. In later years, other added tax credit reductions were to 
apply if the state had not stepped up its own tax rates adequately to 
match past cost rates. (These further reductions were later waived if the 
state met certain criteria.) The resulting additional federal tax paid 
went to reduce the state's debt.
The first tax credit reduction applied to 1974 taxable payrolls in 
Connecticut, which had initially borrowed in 1972. An amendment of 
the repayment provision in 1975 allowed a temporary three-year defer 
ral of the tax credit reduction if the state met certain criteria prescribed 
by the Secretary of Labor designed to promote fund solvency. 29 The 
temporary deferral applied for tax credit reductions that were due for 
the years 1975 through 1977. In 1977, the deferral provision was 
extended for another two years (P.L. 95-19).
After some improvement in state benefit reserves in the late 1970s 
(only three states borrowed relatively small amounts in 1979), another 
surge in borrowing began in 1980 and continued heavily for several 
years. By mid-1983, twenty-nine states owed a total of more than $13 
billion (USDOL, Employment and Training Administration, August 
1983a, p. 12).
The temporary deferrals of tax credit reductions provided for the 
late 1970s had expired. A number of states in the meantime had liqui 
dated their earlier debt from accumulated reserves. Others began 
repayment through reduced tax credits. In 1981, Congress amended the 
repayment process to offer some relief to debtor-state employers from 
the ever-mounting federal tax in return for greater state effort to restore
28. If not repaid by November 10 of the second calendar year following the year in which the 
loan was made, the tax credit reduction applied for that second year.
29. P.L. 94-45, adopted June 1975. To qualify for the deferral, the state's average tax rate, as a 
percent of total payrolls, had to exceed the average benefit cost rate of the preceding ten years, 
and the minimum tax rate had to be at least 1.0 percent. 58. P.L. 95-19, adopted April 1977.
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solvency (P.L. 97-35). The new provision allowed a state to avert con 
tinuing larger reductions in the tax credit after the second year of 
reduction in any year that the state satisfied specified conditions with 
respect to its tax effort and debt position. A state could thus "cap" the 
reduction at 0.6 or at a higher level if it met those conditions. Tempo 
rary at first, this capping provision was made permanent by subsequent 
amendments.
Also in the 1981 legislation, loan provisions were amended so that 
loans made after March 1981 were subject to interest30 The interest 
rate was 10 percent, or that paid by the U.S. Treasury on positive state 
accounts, if less. Payment of interest may not be made directly from 
state benefit reserves, or indirectly through manipulation of the state's 
unemployment insurance tax rates. This prohibition is a federal stan 
dard with which a state must conform or lose certification of approval 
of its unemployment insurance law. Loans made before April 1981 
remained interest-free. The repayments made through federal tax credit 
reductions or from state reserves in place of the credit reduction are 
applied first to the oldest loans outstanding. 31
Amendments adopted in 1982 and 1983 included provisions allow 
ing a state to defer a major part of interest due and pay it in install 
ments. Under one provision, a state could do so if its insured 
unemployment rate, as used to trigger on extended benefits, averaged 
at least 7.5 percent for the first six months of the calendar year preced 
ing the interest due date (P.L. 97-248). If qualified, a state can pay as 
little as 25 percent of the interest when due and another 25 percent in 
each of the next three calendar years. This provision represented a per 
manent change in the interest-payment rules. Other amendments added 
another option applicable only during fiscal years 1983, 1984, and 
1985 which allowed a state to defer 80 percent of the interest due, to be 
paid subsequently in four equal installments, and to obtain a dis 
counted interest rate if it undertook certain measures and achieved
30. No interest applied on loans made after that date if they were repaid before October 1 of the 
same year in which they were made, provided no further borrowing occurred during the last quar 
ter of the year; these are so-called cash-flow loans.
31. P.L. 97-248, adopted September 1982, gave a state the option, under certain conditions, of 
making a repayment equivalent to the amount of the tax credit reduction out of its own reserves, 
including those raised through experience rated taxes, instead of through a uniform net federal tax
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results in improving fund solvency as specified.32 The amendments 
also allowed a state, as a temporary option, to defer interest due up to 
nine months if its recent annual average total unemployment rate was 
at least 13.5 percent. The amendments of 1982 and 1983 provided, also 
on a temporary basis, further conditions for capping tax credit reduc 
tions or for limiting an added tax credit loss to a partial reduction; the 
earlier capping provisions were made permanent. Gradual recovery of 
the economy after 1983 and the absence of further recession during the 
rest of the 1980s enabled the states to liquidate their accumulated debt 
and to bring about some rebuilding of their reserves. Federal legisla 
tion in this area finally subsided.
Other Financing Changes
In 1970, when significant extensions of coverage were enacted, the 
federal requirements for experience rating were amended to allow 
states to assign tax rates as low as 1 percent to newly covered employ 
ers on a "reasonable basis" other than individual experience. Those ini 
tial rates apply until the employers are subject to the state law long 
enough to qualify for rates based on their experience.
A major change, adopted in 1982 and made effective in 1985, was to 
raise the gross Federal Unemployment Tax rate from 3.5 to 6.2 percent 
(P.L. 97-248). The maximum credit allowed for state unemployment 
insurance taxes, including the additional credit for experience rating 
reductions, was increased to 5.4 percent, doubling the previous maxi 
mum credit of 2.7 percent. The net federal tax remained at 0.8 percent, 
including the temporary 0.2 percent segment imposed to repay general 
revenue advances to the extended benefit account. With the maximum 
tax credit set at 5.4 percent, any state tax rate assigned to employers 
below that level must be set on the basis of experience rating. Thus, no 
maximum state tax rate may be less than 5.4 percent. As of 1983, the 
majority of the states could assign maximum tax rates below that 
level.33 This change was made largely to force those states to raise the
32. P.L. 98-21, adopted April 1983. This law also made the failure to pay interest when and as 
due grounds for withholding approval of the state for administrative grants.
33. USDOL, Employment and Training Administration (1983b, pp. 2-39 to 2-42, Table 206). 
Under the most favorable tax schedules, maximum rates were under 5.4 percent in 36 states; 
under their least favorable schedules, maximum rates were below 5.4 percent in 27 states.
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upper limits of their rate schedules and thereby encourage a potential 
source of added revenues for state funds. Another intended result was 
to broaden the application of experience rating and increase the share 
of the benefit cost burden borne by high-cost employers.
Authority to use surplus Federal Unemployment Tax revenues that 
were distributed to the states in the 1950s, as provided by the Reed Act 
of 1954, was scheduled to expire in the early 1970s. These funds were 
available to cover administrative and benefit costs. Authority for con 
tinued use of these funds was extended until 1983 by legislation 
adopted in 1971 and for another 10 years by 1982 legislation (P.L. 92- 
224 and P.L. 97-248).
Reinsurance Proposals
When financial crisis became a dominant theme in unemployment 
insurance in the mid-1970s, proposals for reinsurance and cost equal 
ization schemes emerged. Because so many state funds experienced 
insolvency, these ideas aroused considerable debate and more serious 
interest than usual. A major development was a plan advanced by the 
Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies. Several other 
plans were put forward during the late 1970s. All of these ideas varied 
in their mix of reinsurance and cost equalization elements, in the 
degree of national pooling provided, and in the mechanisms to be 
applied to determine a state's eligibility for a reinsurance or equaliza 
tion grant, and the amount of the grant. Some of these schemes found 
their way into legislative proposals.34 None, however, attained suffi 
cient support to be enacted. Interest in the subject waned in the early 
1980s, despite the continued financial crisis.
Other Federal Legislation
Some of the changes adopted in the 1970s and 1980s affected unem 
ployment insurance in ways different from those noted. Several of
34. The most prominent bills were introduced by Congressman William Brodhead of Michigan 
in 1977 (H.R. 8292) and 1979 (H.R. 3937) and by Senator Jacob Javits of New York, also in 1977 
(S. 1853) and 1979 (S. 825).
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these are significant and are summarized here more or less in the chro 
nological order of the legislation enacted.
Judicial Review
The 1970 Employment Security Amendments allowed states to 
appeal to the courts a decision by the Secretary of Labor holding a state 
unemployment insurance law out of conformity with federal require 
ments. Heretofore, the Secretary's ruling was final. A state may now 
carry its case to the U.S. Court of Appeals and beyond to the Supreme 
Court.
Revised Advisory Council
The 1970 amendments also replaced the Federal Advisory Council 
on Employment Security by two separate councils, one on unemploy 
ment insurance and the other on the employment service. While they 
functioned during the 1970s, they had little or no impact on these pro 
grams. Although some new council members were appointed after the 
Reagan administration took office in 1981, the Council never met and, 
in time, simply ceased to function.
National Commission
The 1976 Unemployment Compensation Amendments authorized 
the establishment of a National Commission on Unemployment Com 
pensation to review the program and make recommendations. Such a 
comprehensive study had been urged for many years. The Commission 
was appointed in 1978, some members by the President and others by 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro 
Tempore of the Senate. Wilbur J. Cohen served as Chairman. The 
Commission issued its final report in mid-1980 when a new recession 
had emerged. The report expressed deep concern about the current and 
future soundness of the state unemployment insurance reserve funds 
and of the federal loan fund. More generally it recommended that 
"government, business, and labor work cooperatively to develop and 
implement political, monetary, fiscal, and other economic policies that 
will reduce unemployment" (National Commission on Unemployment 
Compensation 1980, pp. xii-xiii).
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Taxing Unemployment Benefits
Legislation enacted in 1978 amended the personal income tax provi 
sions of the Internal Revenue Code to include unemployment insur 
ance received in adjusted gross income for tax purposes if the 
claimant's family income was at least $25,000, or at least $20,000 if 
the claimant filed as a single individual (P.L. 95-600). In 1982, these 
income thresholds were lowered to $18,000 and $12,000, respectively 
(P.L. 97-248). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated the thresholds 
altogether (P.L. 99-514).
Deduction of Child Support
A 1981 amendment requires state unemployment insurance agen 
cies to deduct and withhold from unemployment benefits paid to a 
claimant amounts owed by that individual for child support. The 
amounts owed are those agreed to by the claimant or specified as 
legally obligated by the state or local child support enforcement 
agency (P.L. 97-35). Withheld amounts are forwarded to that agency.
Restrictions on Unemployment Compensation 
for Ex-servicemembers (UCX)
As part of the move to tighten benefit eligibility and reduce benefit 
outlays, federal legislation adopted in 1981 and 1982 included changes 
affecting the UCX program. An amendment in the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1981, adopted August 1981 (P.L. 97-35), dis 
qualified claimants for UCX if they terminated their military service 
after a period of enlistment instead of reenlisting when they were eligi 
ble to do so. Such terminations were treated as equivalent to voluntary 
leaving without good cause. The application of this new rule, however, 
made clear that some service personnel who chose not to reenlist after 
having completed several periods of duty in order to pursue a civilian 
career were financially disadvantaged by the benefit denial when they 
needed time to find suitable civilian employment.
The next year, Congress returned to UCX with several amendments 
in the Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1982, enacted October 1982 (P.L. 
97-362). One amendment, in effect, eliminated the disqualification 
provision adopted in 1981 for UCX benefits of service personnel 
choosing not to reenlist. Another specified a noncompensatory waiting
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period of four weeks following the week in which the UCX claimant's 
service termination occurred. A third amendment limited the maximum 
duration of benefits payable to UCX claimants to thirteen weeks, 
including extended benefits or any federal supplemental unemploy 
ment benefits. These last two amendments were repealed nine years 
later (see Epilogue).
Work Sharing
A special provision enacted in 1982 undertook to encourage and 
assist states in adopting short-time compensation or work sharing ben 
efits through their unemployment insurance laws (P.L. 97-248). The 
federal provision called for the Department of Labor to develop model 
legislation and otherwise assist states wishing to provide such benefits, 
and to evaluate experience. The objective was to augment or change 
existing partial benefit provisions of state laws to permit the payment 
of reduced weekly benefits to workers placed on reduced weekly work 
schedules pursuant to agreed plans designed to avoid full layoffs. The 
proportionate reduction in the weekly benefit amount would generally 
correspond with the proportionate reduction in normal weekly hours of 
work. Several states have adopted work sharing which is widely used 
in other countries. An evaluation of the experience was reported in 
1986. The findings were not encouraging. The evaluation concluded 
that work sharing led to more, not less, unemployment, as employers 
used the work sharing provision to reduce further their effective work 
forces (Kerachsky, Nicholson, and Hershey 1986).
Health Insurance for the Unemployed
A provision, adopted in 1983, represents a very limited response to 
the problem of the termination of job-related health insurance of work 
ers following layoff. Loss of such insurance by unemployed workers 
grows to serious proportions during recessions and generates legisla 
tive proposals to extend, preserve, or replace this important form of 
group protection. In many, perhaps most cases, the worker's family is 
also left unprotected. The lost health insurance is much more expen 
sive to purchase on an individual basis than on a group basis. Legisla 
tive proposals made after the mid-1970s recession attracted substantial 
but insufficient support. They were in the forefront again with the 1982
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slump. The provision enacted in 1983 merely permits states to deduct 
amounts from unemployment insurance benefits, as elected by claim 
ants, to pay for health insurance premiums under plans approved by 
the Secretary of Labor (P.L. 98-21).
Required Reporting of Quarterly Wages
Information available in state employment security agency records 
about workers and unemployment insurance claimants can be useful in 
the administration of other federal or federally funded programs, such 
as Aid to Families with Dependent Children, food stamps, and other 
welfare programs. These programs apply income and employment cri 
teria for eligibility. Federal law has directed that state agencies cooper 
ate with administrators of these programs by supplying relevant 
information about individual welfare applicants to help check their 
claims and eligibility. The major source for individual worker employ 
ment and earnings data has been the quarterly wage reports most states 
have required employers to file for unemployment insurance purposes. 
By and large, these states use the data to determine claimant entitle 
ment to benefits, applying formulas based on quarterly wages. Not all 
states required such reports, however; some requested needed informa 
tion from employers only after claimants filed for benefits and only for 
the claimants, not for all employees. These states, therefore, were 
unable to provide the basis for the more extensive verification desired 
for the other entitlement programs. To remedy this shortcoming, a pro 
vision was included in the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-369) 
to require all states to obtain the quarterly information. All states have 
complied and, as a result, more states have adopted unemployment 
benefit entitlement formulas based on quarterly wages. 35
Unemployment Insurance Support 
for Self-Employment Experiments
Proposals are advanced occasionally for using trust fund reserves to 
assist the unemployed in ways other than compensating weeks of
35. While all states provide the required information, a few obtain the data from a source other 
than unemployment insurance wage reports, such as Social Security. As of 1992, only Massachu 
setts, Michigan, and New York still requested employers to report employment and wage data 
only for claimants after they filed for benefits.
256 The System Under Financial Strain
insured unemployment, their only allowed use under existing federal 
law. It can be argued that the standard adopted in 1970 prohibiting 
states from denying benefits to claimants in approved training was a 
breach in this stance and a precedent for other deviations. The deple 
tion or near depletion of benefit reserves in the 1970s and 1980s 
largely discouraged serious consideration of other uses.
One idea, however, did attract sufficient support at least for some 
testing of its potential and feasibility. The idea was to permit the con 
tinued payment of benefits to claimants who were trying to establish a 
small business or to become self-employed, rather than search for paid 
employment. New, especially small businesses had been shown to 
account for a substantial proportion of all new jobs (Birch 1981, pp. 3- 
14; encouraging small business for the unemployed thus offered poten 
tial multiplier effects for employment. British and French experience 
with such use of unemployment benefits indicated some modest 
though positive results, stimulating more interest in the idea in this 
country. The provision authorizing the experiments was included in 
the Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987. It called for demonstrations in 
up to three states. The design for these projects provides a waiver of 
the work-search requirement for claimants participating in the demon 
stration who are starting their own small businesses. As of 1990, only 
one state, Massachusetts, had undertaken a demonstration project of 
this design. Another self-employment demonstration, funded sepa 
rately by the U.S. Department of Labor in the State of Washington, has 
a somewhat different design. In that demonstration, participants are 
paid a lump sum equal to the remainder of their unemployment insur 
ance entitlement once an acceptable business plan has been submitted. 
Each of these demonstrations offers substantial assistance, including 
training and counseling, to the participants in the planning and devel 
opment of a small business plan.37
36. Bendick and Egan (1987, pp. 528-542). For a summary and evaluation of foreign experience 
with the use of unemployment insurance to encourage self-employment, see Leigh (1989, pp. 
126-131).
37. Information about these demonstration projects made available by Stephen A. Wandner of 
the Unemployment Insurance Service (U.S. Department of Labor) from a report prepared for the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
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Railroad Unemployment Insurance Reforms
Ever since its separation from the federal-state system in 1939, the 
railroad unemployment insurance program has operated independently 
though in administrative association with the Railroad Retirement sys 
tem. Temporary disability benefits were added to the unemployment 
insurance program in 1946 so that railroad employees were protected 
against wage-loss interruption due to temporary nonwork-connected 
illness or injury as well as unemployment. Benefit amount, duration, 
and eligibility provisions generally have been more liberal than corre 
sponding provisions of state unemployment insurance laws, except that 
in the 1970s, the maximum benefit amount paid to railroad workers 
began to slip and eventually fell below most state benefit ceilings. The 
equivalent maximum weekly benefit amount in the railroad program in 
1984 was $125 (benefits are based on days of unemployment in a two- 
week period); basic benefit ceilings were lower in only three states that 
year. Nearly all railroad claimants received the maximum benefit, since 
all but a few earned more than the maximum wages taxable under the 
program ($600 per month), which would qualify them for it. By 1988, 
the average weekly benefit paid by the states was $145.
Since 1946, the maximum normal duration of benefits allowed has 
been twenty-six weeks. Since 1959, extended benefits have been pay 
able at all times for up to thirteen or twenty-six more weeks to unem 
ployed railroad workers with ten-to-fourteen and fifteen or more years 
of service, respectively. As in the federal-state system, temporary 
extended benefits were paid, up to thirteen weeks, during the reces 
sions of the late 1950s and early 1960s to lower seniority railroad 
workers (less than ten years of service) who are more vulnerable to 
layoff. In 1975, a permanent program was adopted to pay extended 
benefits to such workers during periods of high unemployment as 
determined by the national trigger rate used by the federal-state 
extended benefit program, until the national trigger was abolished in 
1981, or by the railroad unemployment rate.
Benefit and administrative costs of the railroad program are 
financed entirely by employer payroll taxes. A separate trust fund
38. Much of the description of the railroad program and its development is based on the Report 
of the Railroad Unemployment Compensation Committee established by the Railroad Retirement 
Solvency Act of 1983; the Report was issued June 21, 1984.
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account is maintained for the program to handle revenues and dis 
bursements. From the outset, employers have paid a uniform tax rate 
applied to taxable wages until 1984, the first $400 paid an employee 
each month and since then, the first $600. The tax rate assigned, 
depending on the level of the fund, rose over the years from less than 1 
percent before 1955 to the statutory maximum of 8 percent by 1977 
where, except for two years, it remained. It should be noted that tax 
able wages accounted for only about 20 to 25 percent of all wages after 
1984. Feeling the severe effects of the recessions of the mid-1970s and 
early 1980s, trust fund reserves diminished rapidly and then were 
depleted entirely, making necessary the sustained high tax rate as well 
as heavy borrowing from the Railroad Retirement fund. The latter was 
permitted by legislation adopted in 1959.
The financial crisis of the early 1980s, affecting both the unemploy 
ment insurance and retirement programs, grew to emergency propor 
tions by 1983. Congress passed the Railroad Retirement Solvency Act 
of 1983 (P.L. 98-76) to address the immediate problem. With respect to 
unemployment insurance, the Act increased the monthly taxable wage 
base to $600 and instituted an additional tax to pay off the debt and 
interest owed to the retirement fund. In 1984, Congress set this repay 
ment tax rate to begin at 4.3 percent in 1986, rising to 6.0 percent by 
1988. The 1983 Act also set up a Railroad Unemployment Compensa 
tion Committee, combining railway labor and management representa 
tives, to review the program's problems and recommend longer-range 
remedies.
The Committee's 1984 report offered a consensus package of 
reforms which it believed would restore the program to solvency and 
maintain its continued independent operation on a sound basis. In con 
trast, the Reagan administration proposed that the program be absorbed 
by the federal-state system. After discussion and debate, the legislation 
that finally emerged the Railroad Unemployment Insurance and 
Retirement Improvement Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-647) followed the 
Committee recommendations for unemployment insurance for the 
most part. The financing reforms included the introduction of experi 
ence rating, beginning 1990; extension of the loan repayment tax at the 
4 percent level until all of the debt and interest were repaid; and the 
addition of a surcharge rate schedule geared to low fund levels and
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indebtedness in the future. Other changes made in the program were 
relatively modest.
Special Benefits Outside Unemployment Insurance
Aside from unemployment insurance payments, unemployed work 
ers may be eligible for wage-loss compensation as well as other kinds 
of assistance under various programs established by federal laws. 
Chapter 8 noted Trade Readjustment Allowances provided by the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 for workers adversely affected by 
changes in national trade policies. By and large, these types of pro 
grams were adopted to compensate workers displaced from jobs 
because of some government action or policy, such as the urging of 
consolidation or reorganization of railroad and airline carriers, airline 
deregulation, expansion of a national park (restricting harvesting of 
redwood trees), among others. Most of these programs were designed 
for specific industries, and some were in effect for a limited period. 
The compensation provided usually went well beyond the levels nor 
mally paid by unemployment insurance. Assistance with the costs of 
relocation, job search, and training was often included as well. The 
approach was generally viewed as a means for indemnifying workers 
for damage suffered as the direct result of federal actions. It also served 
to reduce labor opposition to government policies likely to have those 
effects. The approach was applied as early as the late 1930s to accom 
modate consolidations promoted by the federal government in the rail 
road industry. Special programs of this type multiplied in the 1960s 
and 1970s, only a few of which were of substantial proportions.39
The most significant of these was the program of Trade Readjust 
ment Allowances which, unlike the usual pattern, was not confined to a 
single industry. Stringent rules under the 1962 Trade Expansion Act 
made it virtually impossible to certify any industry or firm as adversely 
affected so as to enable displaced workers to qualify for the allow 
ances. Certification rules were considerably relaxed by the Trade Act 
of 1974 (P.L. 93-610). Thereafter, many thousands of workers qualified 
for allowances, and some also received training and relocation assis 
tance. Under the 1974 Act, the weekly allowance was 70 percent of the
39. See Rubin (1980, pp. 791-807).
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worker's wage up to a maximum of $250, which could be drawn for 
twenty-six weeks or as much as fifty-two weeks if the recipient was 
age 60 or more or was in training. General revenue appropriations 
financed these benefits. The program was administered for the federal 
government by the state employment security agencies. In a four-year 
period from 1975 to 1979, total outlays exceeded $700 million (Rubin 
1980, p. 804). The liberal provisions under the 1974 act were cut back 
in 1981 by amendments in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
that year (P.L. 97-35). The weekly amount was made the same as that 
paid under state unemployment insurance. Workers could not draw 
allowances until they had exhausted their unemployment insurance 
entitlement first and could not receive more than fifty-two weeks in all 
for unemployment insurance and trade allowances combined unless 
they needed more time to complete training; longer duration of allow 
ances for older workers was eliminated. In general, the stricter eligibil 
ity rules adopted concerning job search and acceptable suitable work 
criteria to apply to recipients of extended unemployment insurance 
benefits were also to apply for trade allowance recipients. The volume 
of trade allowances paid declined sharply once these provisions went 
into effect.
Disaster Unemployment Assistance
One other program outside the unemployment insurance system was 
established permanently by the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (P.L. 93- 
288). In case of a major natural disaster which strikes a particular area 
or region and which, in response to a request from the state's governor, 
is declared a major disaster area by the President, workers rendered 
unemployed as a result may receive disaster unemployment assistance 
if they are not eligible to receive unemployment insurance. The weekly 
amount payable is that payable under state unemployment insurance 
had the worker's wages been fully covered, or the average weekly 
unemployment insurance benefit amount paid under the state law, 
whichever is larger. The assistance is available over a twenty-six-week 
period beginning with the date of the disaster declaration. State agen 
cies administer this program, which is federally financed. Since 1974, 
unemployment insurance coverage has become more universal, dimin 
ishing the importance of this program.
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Concluding Observations
Taking a broad overview of the approximately four decades after 
1947, federal unemployment insurance legislation enacted in the first 
half of this period differed distinctly from that of later years in its char 
acter, scope, and impact. Before 1970, Congress successfully resisted 
the urge to assert a more dominant federal role in the system. The 
states enjoyed a relatively free hand to develop their programs as they 
deemed appropriate, while the economy followed a pattern of long- 
term expansion with occasional temporary interruptions for recessions.
Extensions of coverage were among the major federal actions before 
1970. The most significant of these covered workers state laws could 
not cover federal employees, veterans, or military personnel. Of 
greater influence on the system was the federal response to the reces 
sion-spawned long-term unemployment of the late 1950s and early 
1960s. Most states by then had greatly improved their benefit duration 
provisions, raising the maximum allowed up to twenty-six weeks. Fed 
eral action in 1958 aimed to encourage states to increase by half the 
duration allowed during the current recession period. Interest-free U.S. 
Treasury advances were offered to the states to fund the added benefits, 
with repayments extended over many years. All regular state provi 
sions would apply except for the increased duration. Participation was 
at each state's discretion. The majority chose not to participate, 
although the large industrial states did and several had similar tempo 
rary extensions of their own independent of the federal program. The 
federal temporary extension program of 1961 was more insistent in 
that the added benefits were financed by an increase in the Federal 
Unemployment Tax; all states agreed to pay these federal benefits. 
Again, regular state benefit provisions applied, except that certain pen 
sion income received by claimants was subtracted from the extended 
benefit amount, regardless of how the state normally treated such 
income.
Most other federal unemployment insurance legislation adopted 
before 1970 was designed to ease matters for the state programs. A 
1954 amendment, for example, permitted the states to experience rate 
newly covered firms after one year rather than three years as previ 
ously required. The federal loan fund established by 1950 legislation
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was protective of state programs that encountered financial difficulty. 
Borrowing requirements were mild, no interest applied, and repayment 
was easy and could be prolonged.
While state unemployment insurance programs were left generally 
unencumbered by federal statutory rules beyond those established at 
the outset in 1935, there were repeated attempts before 1970 to expand 
on the original requirements. All failed despite powerful advocates; the 
sentiment in Congress to preserve state control continued strong 
enough to repel these efforts, though the one in 1966 was a close call.
The Employment Security Amendments of 1970 finally overcame 
the resistance to federally mandated changes in the system. They 
included broad extensions of coverage which most states had been 
unable or unwilling to adopt on their own. The permanent program of 
federal-state shared extended benefits for high unemployment periods 
was created. The 1970 Amendments also established a number of new 
specific federal rules governing state disqualification provisions appli 
cable to claimants in training and filing interstate claims, and limiting 
states in canceling or reducing all benefit rights of disqualified claim 
ants. The Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976 added 
more federal initiatives that affected the state programs as well as the 
system as a whole.
Congress was now less hesitant about asserting and expanding the 
federal role in unemployment insurance. It tinkered repeatedly with the 
trigger mechanism of the federal-state extended benefit program and 
added temporary all-federal supplemental programs for more benefits 
during recessions. When financial crisis threatened the system's viabil 
ity, the federal loan, interest, and repayment provisions were amended 
and embellished almost constantly to coax or virtually force the debtor 
states to alter their tax and benefit entitlement provisions so as to 
improve their fund positions.
In the late 1970s and in the 1980s, federal unemployment insurance 
legislation took a relatively new turn. Previously, the objectives of 
such legislation had almost always been to expand the program or to 
protect claimant rights. The policy that had guided federal relations 
with the states was throughout the years one of encouraging the states 
to improve their programs, to widen their scope and coverage, to pay 
better and longer benefits, and to avoid harsh disqualifying provisions. 
That policy now shifted, a change driven by financial crisis, by the
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need to contain the huge federal budget deficits, and by the accumu 
lated perceptions of claimant abuse and lax administration. Federal 
unemployment insurance legislation became more restrictive. Eligibil 
ity rules for extended and supplemental benefits were toughened by 
amendments adopted in these later years, often stiffer than those apply 
ing under many state laws. Some of these states changed their regular 
provisions to match the stricter federal rules though they were not 
required to do so for regular benefits. Other federal amendments did 
set several restrictive standards applicable directly to regular state ben 
efit provisions. The extended benefit program was narrowed by alter 
ing the trigger requirements so that extended benefit periods began 
later and ended sooner, or did not begin at all; the national trigger was 
eliminated entirely. The result of all this restrictive legislation was to 
reduce significantly the total of benefit outlays and the proportion of 
the unemployed receiving unemployment insurance support.
As recession abated after 1983, the financial crisis eased. Sustained 
economic recovery and stability throughout the rest of the decade 
enabled the states to repay their loans and accumulate positive 
reserves. New federal unemployment insurance legislation diminished 
accordingly; proposals for farther reform were usually set aside as if 
Congress and the nation were weary of the subject.
The financial crisis, however, left its mark. It is unlikely that the 
expansiveness that characterized the federal amendments of 1970 and 
1976 will return any time soon. The specter of high cost and financial 
nonviability that haunted the program's planners in the 1930s had 
shown its face again. After so many years over which the costs of the 
program averaged little more than 1 percent of total payrolls, the 
heavier costs incurred in the recession-ridden 1970s and early 1980s 
may have colored the nature of federal as well as state unemployment 
insurance legislation for years to come. It is interesting to note, how 
ever, that in only one year, 1975, did the total cost of the system as a 
whole, including all extended and supplemental benefit outlays, 
approach 3.0 percent of all payrolls, the level of tax originally esti-
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mated as needed over time to support a modest unemployment insur-
40ance program.
At the end of the 1980s, all state unemployment insurance funds 
were solvent, but few of them met the standard formerly used as a 
measure of minimum fund adequacy.41 Without significant additional 
fund accumulation, a new serious recession with slow recovery is 
likely to result in insolvency and debt in many states. Unemployment 
insurance would reemerge as an active subject for federal legislation.
40. Regular state plus extended and supplemental benefit outlays totaled $16.3 billion in 1975, 
equal to about 2.8 percent of total payrolls of $580 billion that year. The system's administrative 
costs would have raised that rate to about 2.9 percent.
41. This measure specifies that a state's reserve ratio (reserves as a percent of total payrolls) 
should equal at least one-and-one-half times the state's highest twelve-month benefit cost rate 
(total benefit outlays during a twelve-month period as a percent of total payrolls of that period). 
Thus, the state fund should be adequate to finance at least one-and-one-half times of its worst rel 
ative twelve-month benefit cost experience. At the end of 1989, only four states had adequate 
reserves by this measure; eighteen states had funds at less than half this level of adequacy includ 
ing half of the 10 largest (Unemployment Insurance Financial Data 1938-1982 and annual sup 
plement for 1989).
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State Laws Evolve
1948-1990
Federal law sets the basic framework and a few of the specifics of the 
unemployment insurance system, but it is state law that defines most of 
the details the "flesh and bones." State law spells out the terms and 
conditions unemployed workers confront when they file for benefits, 
and the basis of the payroll taxes employers pay into state unemploy 
ment insurance reserve funds.
This chapter reviews patterns and trends of state statutory provi 
sions since 1948. The review covers the program's major elements, 
including benefit financing, but makes no attempt to trace legislative 
changes over the years in any great detail. Chapter 7 described the ear 
lier state provisions and some of the modifications made soon after the 
programs began. A summary of where the states stood with regard to 
several key provisions in 1940 and 1945 is presented in table 7.2.
In reviewing subsequent provisions, this chapter focuses chiefly on 
three years 1948,1971, and 1990. 1 The first of these years, 1948, fol 
lows the first complete round of state legislative sessions after World 
War II and the nation's reconversion to a civilian economy. The next 
year, 1971, reflects the position of the state programs soon after the 
start of the 1970s when the long postwar economic expansion appeared 
to falter seriously and just prior to when the federal Employment Secu 
rity Amendments of 1970 took full effect. The last year, 1990, 
describes state unemployment insurance provisions at the conclusion 
of the long period of recovery following the serious recession of the
1. Specific information about state provisions for these years and at other times is drawn from 
Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws, published by the U.S. Department of Labor 
after 1948. The Comparison has been issued and revised or updated periodically over the years. 
Information for 1948 is from the Comparison issued by the Social Security Administration (Octo 
ber 1948). For 1971, it is from the Comparison issued by the Manpower Administration (August 
1971). For 1990, it is from the Comparison issued by the Employment and Training Administra 
tion (January 1990).
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early 1980s. Until 1960, the "states" consisted of 51 jurisdictions the 
50 states (including Alaska and Hawaii while they were still territories) 
and the District of Columbia. In 1960, Puerto Rico became the 52nd 
"state" in the system; the Virgin Islands made the total 53 in 1978.
Factors Affecting State Legislation
Before turning to a review of how state unemployment insurance 
provisions have evolved, some perspective on the subject may be 
gained by considering a few of the many factors that tend to influence 
the course of state legislation. The impact of federal law is an obvious 
and fairly direct factor. Prior discussions of federal legislation have 
pointed out many of these effects and need no further elaboration. Eco 
nomic forces are also important influences. Chapter 1 discusses some 
of these, such as cyclical changes in business activity, longer term 
industrial developments, seasonal patterns of employment, changes in 
labor force composition, changes in the character of labor markets, and 
how these affect unemployment insurance. The discussions in Chapter 
1 also cover regional and state differences with respect to a few of 
these factors. A state's unemployment insurance provisions will reflect 
to some extent certain distinctive aspects of its economy.
The Large States
How large or small a state is or, more precisely, the size of its pro 
gram does not strongly affect the kind of provisions it has. Large states 
show about as much statutory diversity as do other states. Because they 
are large, however, they tend to be interested in each other's experi 
ence with respect to certain approaches; large states do share some 
common problems, particularly with regard to administration. The sig 
nificance of the large state programs is that together, although a limited 
number out of all the states, they dominate the national unemployment 
insurance scene, and they account for a large share of the total system 
however it is measured.
Table 10.1 presents one measure of that concentration the amount 
of employment covered by state laws. In each of three selected years 
during the long period under review, the table lists the ten states with
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Table 10.1 Ten Largest States, by Level of Average Monthly
Employment Covered by Unemployment Insurance 1948, 
_______1971,1990_____________________________
Average monthly covered employment 
(thousands)1*
State"
U.S. - total
California
New York
Texas
Florida
Illinois
Pennsylvania
Ohio
Michigan
New Jersey
North Carolina
Massachusetts
Indiana
Total - ten largest
(% of U.S. total)
Total - ten smallest
(% of U.S. total)
1948
33,084
2,515
4,369
1,189
d
2,383
3,103
2,216
1,605
1,305
e
1,463
908
21,057
(63.7)
642
(1.9)
1971
52,080
5,149
5,309
2,619
1,601
3,134
3,298
2,861
2,304
2,046
e
1,686
f
30,006
(57.6)
1,226
(2.4)
1990C
106,333
12,919
7,932
6,780
5,275
5,078
4,906
4,672
3,822
3,476
3,024
8
f
57,885
(54.4)
3,010"
(2.8)
SOURCES: Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, 1938-1982 and annual supplements.
a. Ten largest states arrayed from largest to smallest as of 1990.
b. Excludes employment covered under federal unemployment insurance programs for railroad
workers and federal civilian and military services.
c. Includes employment by nonprofit employers and by state and local governments handling
benefit costs on a reimbursable basis.
d. Florida was 25th in size in 1948.
e. North Carolina was 13th in size in 1948 and 12th in 1971.
f. Indiana was llth in size in 1971 and 14th in 1990.
g. Massachusetts was llth in size in 1990.
h. Excludes the Virgin Islands, smallest "state" in the unemployment insurance system with
average monthly covered employment in 1990 of about 42,000, much less than the next smallest,
Wyoming, with about 183,000.
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the highest average levels of covered employment. Although fewer 
than a fifth of all the states, they collectively have accounted for over 
half of the covered employment in the system. The degree of concen 
tration declined over these years, ranging from about 64 percent in 
1948 to about 54 percent in 1990. Except for Indiana, which Florida 
replaced among the "big ten" by the end of the 1960s, and North Caro 
lina, which replaced Massachusetts in 1990, all states in this group 
have been the same in all years through 1990, a remarkable record of 
stability. Table 10.1 also shows the contrastingly small concentration 
of covered employment in the ten smallest states in each of these 
years between about 2 and 3 percent of the total. The composition of 
this group has been more varied over the years.
When one applies other measures, such as the average level of 
insured unemployment or the total of state benefit outlays, the large 
state concentrations are even more pronounced. For insured unemploy 
ment in the same three years, the ten largest states accounted for 72 
percent of the U.S. total in 1948, 63 percent in 1971, and 59 percent in 
1990. In each year, at least eight of the ten states listed in table 10.1 
were consistently among the largest by this measure as well. By 
amount of regular benefit outlays, a similar picture emerges with con 
centrations ranging from 77 percent in 1948, to 71 percent in 1971, to 
66 percent in 1990. Among the states listed in table 10.1, only Florida, 
Indiana, North Carolina, and Texas do not appear in all three years 
among the ten largest when measured by insured unemployment or 
benefit outlays. Subsequent discussions review and analyze state 
unemployment insurance provisions for all states in the three focus 
years 1948, 1971, and 1990, and also for the ten largest states as a 
group as identified in table 10.1 for the same years.
The Wage Factor
Variation in wage levels among workers in a state is important for 
the unemployment insurance program, since its benefits are function 
ally related to wages. Wage levels in general differ considerably across 
states, as can be seen in comparisons of statewide average weekly 
wages in covered employment.2 Most of the high-wage states have
2. These averages are calculated for each year, by state, and are published in Unemployment 
Insurance Financial Data 1938-1982 and annual supplements.
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been in regions where heavy industry is most concentrated along the 
mid-Atlantic seaboard, the Great Lakes, and the West Coast. The states 
with the lowest average wages have been more prevalent in the South 
and in the western plain and mountain regions where industry has 
tended to be light and less developed, although industry expanded 
greatly in much of the South in later years, raising wage levels substan 
tially.5
Table 10.2 gives some idea of wage-level variations and trends over 
the years. Five of the ten highest-wage states shown on the table were 
the same in each year shown. These five were also among the ten larg 
est in each year. Because of this concentration of large states (at least 
six in each year), the national average weekly covered wage has 
exceeded the averages of most of the states. In 1948, all ten states with 
the lowest average weekly covered wages were in the South. The num 
ber in the South dropped to four by 1971 and to three by 1990. In the 
later years, western plains and mountain states replaced most of the 
early low-wage southern states in the bottom ten. Weekly wage devel 
opments influence unemployment insurance legislation, especially pro 
visions applying to the weekly benefit amount formula and the 
qualifying requirement.
Level of Unemployment
Certainly the amount and rate of unemployment a state experiences 
significantly influences the character of its unemployment insurance 
provisions. Of particular importance is how unemployment varies over 
time. The way a state designs its financing provisions, for example, 
depends to a great extent on whether it tends to suffer severe reduc 
tions in employment when national recessions develop, and how rap 
idly employment rebounds during recovery periods. Some states 
manage to ride out most recessions with relatively little impact, a pat 
tern suggesting a different statutory response for their programs as 
compared with heavily impacted states. In a number of states, seasonal
3. During the later 1970s, a number of western plains and mountain states (for example, Colo 
rado, Oklahoma, Texas, and Wyoming) experienced significant expansion of employment in the 
oil, gas, and other energy-producing industries which tended to pay high wages, causing the aver 
age covered wage levels in these states to rise from below to above the national average by 1982, 
only to resume their usual below-average levels in subsequent years as the boom collapsed.
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Table 10.2 Ten Highest- and Ten Lowest-Wage States, by Level of
Average Weekly Wage in Covered Employment, 1948,1971, 
1990
1948 1971 1990
Average Average Average 
State weekly wage State weekly wage State weekly wage
10 highest averages8
Michigan
Illinois
New York
California
New Jersey
Washington
Oregon
Nevada
Ohio
W. Virginia
$64.33
62.50
62.44
61.48
59.68
59.09
58.94
58.74
58.64
58.44
Michigan
New York
Illinois
California
Delaware
New Jersey
Ohio
Connecticut
Washington
Indiana
$175.82
169.31
166.50
161.06
160.91
160.73
159.76
155.36
155.17
152.63
Connecticut
New York
New Jersey
Massachusetts
California
Michigan
Illinois
Delaware
Maryland
Pennsylvania
$561.17
558.17
545.96
512.25
495.08
491.51
488.67
474.29
456.91
444.58
10 lowest averages'1
Mississippi
Arkansas
S. Carolina
N. Carolina
Georgia
Alabama
Tennessee
Louisiana
Virginia
Florida
U.S. average 
weekly wage
No. of states:6
  above avg.
  below avg.
$37.44
38.32
41.57
42.61
42.86
44.70
45.29
46.49
46.66
47.02
$55.85
14
37
Arkansas
Mississippi
S. Dakota
S. Carolina
N. Carolina
Maine
New Mexico
N. Dakota
Idaho
Wyoming
$111.10
113.19
113.49
117.95
120.36
121.77
123.17
123.39
124.06
124.13
$148.96
14
38
S. Dakota
N. Dakota
Mississippi
Montana
Arkansas
Nebraska
New Mexico
Idaho
Iowa
S. Carolina
$302.22
333.06
333.43
335.27
342.07
347.14
355.87
360.04
363.77
368.86
$446.68
11
42
SOURCES: Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, 1938-1982 and annual supplements, 
a. States arrayed from highest to lowest for each year; excludes Alaska and the District of Colum 
bia where, for various reasons, average wage levels are not comparable.
b. States arrayed from lowest to highest for each year; excludes Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands 
where average wage levels are not comparable, 
c. Includes all jurisdictions in system.
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employment and unemployment are a major factor which may induce 
distinctive unemployment insurance provisions to deal with such pat 
terns. A long-term decline in an important industry in a state poses 
other kinds of problems for its program, perhaps with statutory conse 
quences. During the four decades under review here, individual states 
did not consistently experience one single pattern of unemployment 
throughout the entire period. Several states tended to have above-aver 
age rates of unemployment for a lengthy span of years, but then 
enjoyed relatively low unemployment levels. Unemployment insur 
ance legislation in such states generally exhibited similar long-wave 
patterns in response, though perhaps with lags that missed key turning 
points. The principal legislative concerns arise when unemployment is 
high, especially during recessions whether national or local. At such 
times, worker representatives press for higher weekly benefit and dura 
tion provisions; employers worry about payroll tax effects as state 
reserves run down, and they resist changes that would increase costs.
While state financing provisions can be made adaptable to cyclical 
patterns of unemployment which offer some degree of regularity for 
planning reserve and tax needs, they are less sensitive to the relatively 
unexpected developments that can quickly swell unemployment in one 
state or region. The unemployment insurance programs of small states 
are particularly vulnerable to the sudden difficulties posed by such 
developments. The almost overnight fizzle in the mid-1980s of the oil 
and gas boom which began in the 1970s badly hurt the economies of 
several western and Gulf states. Major cutbacks in federal defense pro 
curement outlays have at times hit certain states very hard after years 
of lucrative, high employment-generating contracts for some of their 
important industries. The strains on the unemployment insurance pro 
grams of these states can be extreme. Pressures mount to change provi 
sions in different directions in response. Trying to legislate program 
changes in such a charged atmosphere fueled by unusually high levels 
of unemployment does not always result in the wisest provisions for a 
state unemployment insurance program.
Other Factors
State unemployment insurance laws have also been affected by var 
ious social factors and by political tendencies that make a state gener-
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ally conservative or progressive in outlook. The relative strength and 
influence of organized labor and of business groups have made a dif 
ference, as has the degree of urban industrialization in a state. Despite 
growing concentrations of populations in urban areas, most state legis 
latures reflected a strong rural-agrarian outlook until fairly recent 
times. They were rural-dominated in their makeup because legislative 
electoral districts were drawn to keep them that way. As a result, legis 
lative proposals to improve unemployment insurance that would 
mostly benefit urban workers did not usually attract strong support, 
perhaps helping to account for some of the program's inadequacies as 
perceived by many critics during the 1950s and 1960s. It took many 
years and a 1962 Supreme Court ruling to loosen the rural domination 
of the legislatures.4 Only in more recent years has this particular bar 
rier to unemployment insurance legislative improvements diminished 
significantly.
The way the legislative process is organized, the force of individual 
personalities, and the swings of political fortunes over time have also 
contributed to the nature and fate of unemployment insurance amend 
ments at the state level. These factors, of course, have been distinctive 
for each state. In some, the governor largely defined the state's unem 
ployment insurance policy. A change in party control of the executive 
or legislative branch often meant a change in direction for unemploy 
ment insurance, or a stalemate. Employment security agency directors 
in several states, by contrast, were able to establish considerable 
authority and influence over a long period of time, regardless of the 
party in power. They skillfully shaped the development of legislative 
change in their states and came to be relied upon by the political lead 
ers for handling these matters. Continuity became more the exception 
than the rule, however. In a program that grew increasingly complex, 
agency staff who remained in central positions played key roles as they 
accumulated expertise on which top administrators and legislators 
came to depend.
In a few states, patterns developed over time whereby an individual 
or two representing a large employer or group of employers would
4. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). This "one man-one vote" ruling by the U.S. Supreme 
Court eventually forced the states to redraw their electoral districts to be more evenly representa 
tive of their populations.
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work out compromise proposals with a counterpart from labor, and the 
legislation would move through smoothly to enactment. State unem 
ployment insurance legislation, almost always controversial, thus took 
different paths in different states, sometimes falling short of proposed 
objectives, sometimes getting through but in a form dictated by the 
process of the particular state.
The Broad Perspective
State unemployment insurance programs had become well estab 
lished by 1948. As a result of the low unemployment during World War 
II, they were also well funded. During ensuing years, they developed 
mainly in response to amendments of federal laws and, in varying 
degrees, to economic and labor market developments. Some state pro 
grams changed more often and more rapidly than others. In time, dif 
ferences among the states in their unemployment insurance provisions 
multiplied and widened. The states turned increasingly away from fol 
lowing the provisions recommended by the federal government as they 
gained more experience and confidence, and as interest groups asserted 
more influence at the state level. What a neighboring state did with 
regard to a particular provision was sometimes of greater importance. 
Although state provisions became more diverse, common general pat 
terns remained recognizable.
State Program Administration
Before proceeding to a review of the patterns and trends in state leg 
islation, a brief account is presented of the arrangements in the states 
for the administration of their unemployment insurance programs. 
State administration has been organized in several different ways. The 
administrative agency, which in all but a few states also operates the 
state employment (or job) service, may be established as an indepen 
dent body in the executive branch of the government, or as a subordi 
nate part of a broader state department. As state government has grown 
in size, scope, and complexity, the trend has been toward less indepen 
dence for the state unemployment insurance agency.
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In the late 1940s, about two-thirds of the states administered unem 
ployment insurance through independent boards or commissions 
(twenty-one states), or as independent departments or bureaus of 
employment security (twelve states). Unemployment insurance admin 
istration operated as a subordinate division in a department of labor or 
industrial relations, or in an equivalent department, in sixteen states in 
1948; in two other states, it was administered by the workers compen 
sation agency. By 1971, the number of unemployment insurance agen 
cies operating as subordinate entities of broader departments had 
grown to twenty-three, and to twenty-seven by 1990. The independent 
board or commission form declined in importance as compared with 
the independent department or bureau of employment security. The ten 
largest states exhibited about the same pattern and trend in regard to 
their administrative arrangements.
Almost all states provide for statewide advisory councils to assist 
the administrative agency in formulating policy, recommending legis 
lation, and resolving operating problems. Council membership is usu 
ally representative of employers, labor, and the public. Many states 
also permit the appointment of local or other special advisory bodies. 
The influence of advisory councils on state program development and 
administration has varied a great deal among the states and over time. 
In a few instances, a state advisory council may have become virtually 
irrelevant or inoperative for a time.5
Federal law requires the states to provide impartial procedures for 
individuals to appeal denials of their claims. Each state, therefore, has 
appeals machinery within the program's administrative framework 
with subsequent right of appeal to the state judicial system. Employers 
as well as claimants have access to the process. All but a few states 
allow for at least two stages of appeal and some permit requests for 
redeterminations as well. The first-level appeal is usually made to a 
referee (or examiner) or to a referee (examiner) and two associates rep 
resenting employer and worker interests. Procedures representing due 
process and a fair hearing apply. Appeal to a second level of review 
may be made from the first-stage decision. As of 1990, about half the 
states provided for an independent Board of Review or Board of
5. For a review and evaluation of state advisory councils during the first 20 years of the pro 
gram, see Becker (1959).
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Appeals to hear the second stage. In the remaining states, the indepen 
dent boards or commissions that run the unemployment insurance 
agencies, or the agency heads, usually handled this function. Final 
administrative appeal decisions may be taken to the state courts for fur 
ther review. Issues involving federal law and constitutional questions 
may result in appeal to the federal courts.
Coverage
Except for earlier inclusion by many states of smaller firms, almost 
all important expansions of unemployment insurance coverage of 
employment under state laws came about in response to changes in 
federal laws which extended the application of the Federal Unemploy 
ment Tax or required coverage of certain categories of employment by 
state law.
Size of Firm
In 1948 when the federal tax still applied only to employers of eight 
or more workers, twenty-nine states (including seven of the ten largest) 
covered smaller firms; seventeen of them covered employers of one or 
more. Following the 1954 federal extension to four or more employees 
in twenty weeks, all states covered firms of that size or smaller. A slow 
increase occurred over the ensuing years in the number of states cover 
ing employers of one or more. By 1971, shortly before the effective 
application of the federal amendment extending coverage to one or 
more, nearly half the states had already gone that far. As of 1990, 
twenty-three states including five of the ten largest, went beyond the 
existing federal requirements by covering employers of one or more 
employees in fewer than twenty weeks of the year or with a quarterly 
payroll of less than $1,500.
Agricultural Labor
By and large, state laws followed the federal definitions of agricul 
tural labor, which generally excluded their wages from the Federal 
Unemployment Tax. The only notable exceptions prior to the major
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federal extensions to farm workers in 1976 were in Hawaii and Puerto 
Rico.6
After the federal extensions of coverage in the 1970s to previously 
excluded categories of agricultural labor, states amended their laws 
accordingly. As of 1990, eight states have gone beyond the minimum 
federal specifications for coverage of large farm employers ten or 
more employees in at least twenty weeks of the year or a quarterly pay 
roll of at least $20,000. The most important of these states is Califor 
nia, which covers any farm employer with a quarterly payroll of $100 
or more the same rule applicable to all employers. Florida and Texas, 
also important for farm employment, are among the eight states that 
exceed the federal coverage requirements.
Nonprofit Organizations
Only six states covered employment by nonprofit organizations 
prior to the passage of the federal amendments of 1970, which required 
such coverage in all states.7 The federal requirement specifies coverage 
of nonprofit employers of four or more employees in twenty weeks. As 
of 1990, twenty-one states, including four of the largest ten, covered 
organizations employing one or more. Service in the employ of a reli 
gious organization for religious purposes is excluded by federal law. 
As required, all states allow nonprofit employers the option of self- 
financing their benefit costs (benefit reimbursement) in place of financ 
ing through the regular state unemployment insurance tax system.
The federal law excludes from required coverage the employment 
by colleges and universities of enrolled students, and nearly all states 
follow suit. Many states also exclude employment by these schools of 
the spouses of students. Student nurses and interns employed by hospi 
tals are excluded from coverage in most states. These exclusions apply 
for public as well as nonprofit schools and hospitals.
6. Coverage in these jurisdictions applied mainly to sugarcane workers. Minnesota also had 
some limited coverage of agricultural employment. The District of Columbia did not exclude 
agricultural labor, but it was an entirely urban area.
7. The six states were Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Hawaii, and New 
York. California allowed for voluntary coverage of nonprofit employers on a self-financing (bene 
fit reimbursement) basis. Connecticut and New York also provided for such financing.
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State and Local Government Employment
Most states had at least some coverage of state and local govern 
ment workers before their coverage was required by the federal 
amendments adopted in 1970 and 1976. Such coverage has since 
become universal with some minor exceptions for elected or appointed 
officials, members of state National Guard units, and temporary emer 
gency employees. The states provide local government entities a bene 
fit reimbursement option for financing benefit costs, as required by 
federal law.
Domestic Service
The federal amendments of 1976 extended coverage to employers 
of domestic household workers if the cash wages paid total $1000 or 
more in a calendar quarter. Before this change, only three states had 
covered any domestic service.8 As of 1990, four states (District of 
Columbia, Hawaii, New York, and the Virgin Islands) covered employ 
ers with smaller quarterly payrolls. Several other states included non- 
cash remuneration in applying the minimum $1000 quarterly payroll 
requirement.
Employer-Employee Relationship
The definition of "employee" for the purposes of coverage is left 
largely to state law, although federal law and federal court decisions 
have had a significant bearing on individual state provisions. A major 
problem is the determination of the employer-employee relationship. 
As of 1990, only six states still basically applied the common law mas 
ter-servant rule. Most states use a broader concept involving one to 
three tests to determine if the worker is not an employee. These include 
(a) absence of employer control over the worker's performance, (b) 
performance of service outside the regular course or place of the 
employer's business, and (c) customary operation by the worker as an 
independent business or profession. In 1990, twenty-eight states 
applied all three tests while twelve states applied only one or two. 
Among the ten largest states, three applied all three tests. The pattern 
was about the same in earlier years. Other states relied on a contract for
8. Arkansas, Hawaii, and New York.
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hire, whether expressed or implied. Most states specifically excluded 
from coverage insurance and real estate agents who work on a com 
mission basis.
Self-employed individuals are not covered by unemployment insur 
ance laws because such an individual's unemployment status is so dif 
ficult to determine and may be subject to the individual's control.9
Qualifying Requirements
To a large degree, the 1948 pattern of state base-period earnings and 
employment requirements to test a claimant's prior work attachment as 
a basis for benefit eligibility reflected the earlier trends toward simplifi 
cation of qualifying and benefit formulas. A third of the states that year 
(including three of the ten largest) applied the simplest approach the 
minimum flat annual earnings test, the one least likely to assure any 
specific amount of employment. 10 Most of these states held on to their 
flat annual requirements for many years, but their numbers gradually 
dwindled; more of them at least began to require earnings in more than 
one calendar quarter of the base period to try to assure that earnings 
were not limited to. a small number of weeks. Only seven states, 
including California and Illinois, remained in this category in 1990. 11 
(See table 10.3 for trends in state requirements.)
The most direct measure of past work attachment, weeks of base- 
period employment, was used for qualifying tests by only three states 
in 1948. More adopted this approach in succeeding years as many as 
sixteen states by 1971, including six of the ten largest states. The num 
ber declined in the 1980s, partly because of the federal requirement 
that states obtain quarterly wage information about individual employ 
ees from their employers not previously collected by some states, as
9. California permits voluntary coverage of self-employed individuals under certain conditions.
10. Minimum annual earnings required by these states then ranged between $100 and $300; 
only one state required, in addidon, earnings in at least two calendar quarters to increase the 
chances that the claimant's wages were spread over more than only a very limited period.
11. California's flat requirement in 1990 called for at least $1200 in high-quarter wages with no 
minimum specified for the base period, so claimants could qualify with no other earnings outside 
the one quarter. (See, however, footnote b on table 10.3 for alternative requirement if high-quarter 
wages were less than $1200.)
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Table 103 Distribution of States by Type and Level of Minimum 
Qualifying Requirement—1948,1971,1990
Type and level of requirement 
(base-period employment 
or earnings)
Total - all states (10 largest)"*
Weeks of employment
20 weeks
14-19 weeks
Multiple of high-quarter wages
More than 1.5 times
1.5 times
Less than 1.5 times
Multiple of weekly benefit amount
40 or more times
31-39 times
30 times
Less than 30 times
Varying-weighted multiples
Flat annual earnings
Less than $250
$250-$499
$500-$999
$1,000-$!, 999
$2,000-$2,800
Number of states
1948
51
3
1
2
2
-
1
1
30
2
0
18
6
4
17
11
6
-
-
-
(10)
(2)
(1)
(1)
(1)
-
(0)
(1)
(5)
(0)
(0)
(4)
(1)
(0)
(3)
(2)
(1)
-
-
-
1971
52
16
7
9
12
-
9
3
15
2
5
6
0
2
11
-
1
10
-
-
(10)
(6)
(3)
(3)
(1)
-
(1)
(0)
(1)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)(1)
(3)
-
(0)
(3)
-
-
1990
53
10
6
4C
24
1
17
6
15J7d
3
4
0
1
7
-
-
-
4
3
(10)
(6)
(5)
(1)
(2)
(0)
(1)
(1)
(2)
(0)
(1)
(0)
(0)
(1)
(2)
-
-
-
(2)
(0)
SOURCES: Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws: for 1948, the October 1948 
edition issued by the Federal Security Agency, p. 40, table 13; for 1971, the edition reflecting 
revisions issued August 31,1971 by the USDOL, Manpower Administration, pp. BT-3, 4, table 
BT-2; for 1990, the edition reflecting revisions issued January 7, 1990, by the USDOL, Employ 
ment and Training Administration, pp. 3-27 to 3-29, table 301. 
a. See table 10.1 for the ten largest states.
b. Subtotals by type add to more than the totals for all states and the ten largest since the follow 
ing states are counted under two types of requirements in the same year: in 1948 California 
required 30 x WBA or 1-1/3 x HQW; in 1971 Hawaii required 15 weeks of work and 30 x 
WBA, Pennsylvania required 37-32 x WBA but 18 weeks of work if base-period earnings less 
than $600; and in 1990 California required at least $1200 in the high quarter (could be the only 
quarter of earnings) but 1-1/4 x HQW if less than $1200 and at least $900, Minnesota required 
15 weeks of work and 1-1/4 x HQW, and Pennsylvania required 16 weeks of work to qualify for 
minimum duration payable but 40-37 WBA for maximum duration payable, 
c. Includes Washington, which in 1990 required 680 hours of work in the base period (weeks not 
specified).
d. Includes South Dakota, which in 1990 required 30 x WBA in part of base period outside high 
quarter with total required multiple not specified, but since the WBA was calculated as 1/26 
HQW, the total multiple required was at least 56 x WBA.
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their qualifying and benefit formulas did not use quarterly wage mea 
sures. States applying a weeks-of-work test were among the latter; 
many requested employers to report weeks worked and wages after 
claimants had filed for benefits. With the new quarterly wage collection 
requirement, several of these states shifted to a different qualifying 
test. The large states, however, held on to their long-established weeks- 
of-work tests.
The majority of states have tested past attachment by measuring the 
claimant's base-period earnings as a multiple of high-quarter earnings 
or of the weekly benefit amount, which itself is usually based on high- 
quarter wages. The multiple measure is a means of approximating a 
level of weeks of employment. Nearly all states using these approaches 
in 1948 applied minimum weekly benefit amount multiples, but many 
later shifted to high-quarter multiples. The weekly benefit multiple 
proved inadequate in many states as a proxy measure for an amount of 
base-period employment when very large proportions of claimants 
qualified for relatively low weekly benefit ceilings which had not kept 
pace with rising wage levels. Thus, while a multiple of thirty times a 
weekly benefit that equaled half the claimant's prior weekly wage 
translated required base-period earnings into fifteen weeks of employ 
ment at that wage, thirty times the maximum weekly benefit amount 
(usually less than half the prior wage) could have been earned in sig 
nificantly fewer than fifteen weeks in the base period. The high-quarter 
multiple approach avoids this deficiency. More states applied the high- 
quarter multiple in 1990 than any other type of requirement.
The qualifying requirement almost always specifies a minimum 
earnings amount for the week or high quarter or base period, along 
with the number of weeks or level of the multiple required. The mini 
mum base-period earnings amount is the only element of the flat 
annual qualifying test except for the requirement that these wages be 
earned in at least two calendar quarters. In states testing by weeks of 
work, a minimum amount in each week, or an average weekly mini 
mum over all weeks worked, is required. These minimums ranged 
from $20 to $99 a week in 1990. High-quarter and weekly benefit mul 
tiple states normally specify minimum earnings in the high quarter or 
the base period or both. These earnings floors are intended to screen 
out casual workers. Over the years, the required earnings minimums 
have risen, largely in response to rising wage levels. The increases
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have been much more substantial in some states than in others; in a 
number of states the minimums have remained fairly low. Minimum 
base-period earnings amounts required among all the states, as speci 
fied in their laws or as derived from their formulas, ranged from $150 
to $900 in 1971 and from $150 to $3,640 in 1990.
A tendency, especially in later years, has been to stiffen the qualify 
ing requirements. The shift to weeks-of-work and high-quarter multi 
ple tests made for closer reflection of actual employment. In addition, 
the minimum number of weeks and the size of the multiple required 
increased in some states. The minimum amount of earnings required 
per week or in the base period also rose, in some instances more than 
simply to catch up or keep pace with rising wage levels. The addition 
in 1981 of a minimum federal qualifying requirement (twenty weeks of 
work, or equivalent tests of one and one-half times high-quarter wages 
or forty times the weekly benefit amount) for federally-shared 
extended benefits spurred the stiffening tendency in state requirements. 
The financial crisis many states faced in the 1970s and 1980s also 
encouraged these trends. Analysis of the state distributions across the 
years as compared on table 10.3 shows that the number of states 
requiring at least twenty weeks of work or the equivalent in multiple 
tests, the most demanding level of these requirements, increased from 
a total of four in 1948 to eighteen in 1971 and to thirty-one in 1990.
State qualifying tests also grew more complex. Some added features 
to their basic requirements either to screen out claimants regarded as 
weakly attached to the labor force who would be admitted by the basic 
test alone, or to avoid excluding claimants considered sufficiently 
attached to warrant some benefit support. An example of the former is 
the requirement of earnings in two or more quarters of the base period 
added by flat annual states and some weekly benefit multiple states. 
Several states have added a required minimum level of earnings out 
side the high quarter or in the last two quarters of the base period to 
assure recent attachment. Examples of features added to ease the basic 
test include "step-down" provisions that some weekly benefit and 
high-quarter multiple states have applied so that if a claimant's high- 
quarter earnings or the weekly benefit amount calculated as based on 
those earnings could not meet the test when the multiple was applied, a 
lower level of high-quarter wages or weekly benefit would be used to 
meet the multiple. Step-down provisions became less popular by 1990.
282 State Laws Evolve
A few states have provided alternative requirements, so that claimants 
whose earnings and work patterns are marginal and unable to quality 
under the standard test might be able to do so under another test (see 
footnote b on table 10.3). 12 A number of states have provided claim 
ants with higher base-period earnings an alternative flat annual require 
ment in place of the basic weeks-of-work or multiple tests. Examples 
of such alternatives in 1990 are New Jersey's flat annual earnings of 
$6000 in place of twenty weeks of work, and Oklahoma's $9,500 in 
place of one and one-half times high-quarter wages.
By 1990 the range and diversity of state qualifying requirements 
had become quite wide. It should be understood that at the minimum 
qualifying levels, claimants are eligible for minimum benefits, both as 
to the weekly amount and duration, except where the duration allowed 
is uniform.
Eligibility Rules and Disqualifications
Voluntary leaving of work without good cause and discharge from a 
job for misconduct have continued to be major grounds for benefit dis 
qualification in all states. Claimant refusal to pursue or accept suitable 
job offers or referrals by the public employment office is also an 
important reason for disqualification. Being unavailable for work, fail 
ing to search actively for work, and showing in other ways a lack of 
genuine participation in the labor market all can lead to benefit denial. 
Over the years, the terms and conditions of eligibility set forth in state 
laws have become more detailed and demanding, and the disqualifica 
tions imposed have grown stiffen Beginning in 1980, new federal stan 
dards regarding eligibility and disqualifications applicable for 
extended benefits have reenforced these trends in state regular benefit 
provisions.
12. New York has provided a unique alternative to its twenty-weeks-of-work requirement for 
claimants with fewer than twenty but at least fifteen weeks in the base period. The alternative 
enables them to qualify if they had at least forty weeks of work in all in the base period and prior 
year combined.
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Job Separation Issues
State laws have increasingly restricted acceptable "good cause" for 
voluntary leaving to causes attributable to the job or the employer, rul 
ing out the worker's personal circumstances. In 1948, restricted good 
cause provisions applied in sixteen states; the number grew to twenty- 
six by 1971 and was thirty-seven in 1990. In 1990, most of these states 
did allow for one or more exceptions to this rule, such as leaving 
because of illness, sexual harassment, or to take another job. 13 To be 
disqualified, a misconduct discharge must be for misconduct related to 
the job.
Table 10.4 indicates how the disqualifications imposed for voluntary 
leaving and misconduct discharges became more severe over time. In 
1948, most states postponed benefit payment for a period lasting usu 
ally under ten weeks. The period was uniform as fixed by law in some 
states, but more states specified a range within which the claims exam 
iner could set the length of suspension depending on the circumstances 
of the job separation. Only a limited number of states suspended bene 
fits for the duration of the disqualified claimant's unemployment  
eleven states for voluntary leaving and six for misconduct discharge. 
Most duration disqualification states also required affected claimants 
to work subsequently for a minimum period of time or to earn a mini 
mum amount before requalifying for benefits should unemployment 
recur. Among the ten largest states in 1948, four denied benefits for the 
duration of the claimant's unemployment for voluntary leaving and 
three for a misconduct discharge. Nearly a third of all states also 
reduced or canceled the claimant's benefit rights. 14
By 1971, duration disqualifications were provided in twenty-eight 
states for voluntary leaving (although some of these applied only for 
voluntary retirement) and in twenty states for misconduct discharge. 
Over half of the ten largest states provided for duration disqualifica 
tions in these two categories. When states postponed benefits for a lim-
13. A claimant who quits one job to take another and is subsequently laid off may otherwise be 
disqualified for having voluntarily left the previous job without acceptable good cause.
14. A few states in 1948 canceled all benefits by canceling base-period wage credits on which 
the benefits were based, usually those wages from employment with the employer from whom the 
claimant separated; if there was no other base-period employer, the cancellation amounted to a 
total elimination of benefit rights for the benefit year, a harsher treatment than partial reduction of 
the claimant's benefits.
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Table 10.4 Distribution of States by Type of Disqualification Imposed for 
Voluntary Leaving of Work, Misconduct Discharge, and 
Refusal of Suitable Work™1948,1971,1990
Number of states (10 largest)8
Benefits postponed for"
Reason for 
disqualification Fixed number 
and year of weeks
Voluntary leaving
1948
1971
1990
Misconduct discharge0
1948
1971
1990
Suitable work refusal
1948
1971
1990
13
16
2
11
18
5
10
18
6
(3)
(2)
(0)
(4)
(3)
(1)
(2)
(4)
(2)
Variable 
number 
of weeks
28
17
2
35
23
8
30
17
8
(3)
(3)
(0)
(3)
(3)
(1)
(4)
(3)
(2)
Duration of 
unemployment
11
28
50
6
20
42
12
23
41
(4)
(7)
(10)
(3)
(6)
(9)
(4)
(5)
(7)
Benefits 
reduced or 
canceled
16
19
7
16
18
13
17
16
13
(3)
(2)
(0)
(4)
(2)
(0)
(4)
(4)
(3)
SOURCES: Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws: for 1948, the October 1948 edi 
tion issued by the Federal Security Agency, p. 60; for 1971, the edition reflecting revisions issued 
August 31, 1971, USDOL, Manpower Administration, pp. ET-2 through ET-4; for 1990, the edi 
tion reflecting revisions issued January 7, 1990, by the USDOL, Employment and Training 
Administration, tables 401, 402, and 404.
a. Number of states shows count among all states with the count among the ten largest states 
shown in parentheses; see table 10.1 for ten largest states in these years.
b. Some states may be counted in more than one type of disqualification for a given reason cate 
gory, 
c. Count excludes disqualification for gross misconduct.
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ited time, the periods of suspension tended to be longer than they were 
in 1948. A few more states also reduced or canceled benefit rights in 
1971.
Duration disqualification became predominant by the 1980s. In 
1990, this approach was used by fifty states for voluntary leaving and 
by forty-two states for misconduct discharge. To requalify for benefits, 
all these states required claimants to have a minimum amount of subse 
quent work or earnings. All ten of the largest states applied the duration 
disqualification for voluntary leaving and nine did so for misconduct 
discharge. 15 The practice of reducing or canceling benefit rights 
declined as the duration disqualification became more prevalent.
Some states have adopted provisions for designating "aggravated" 
or "gross" misconduct discharges as the basis for more severe disqual 
ifications. Such misconduct may also be termed "willful," "flagrant," 
or "unlawful." Twelve states provided for these more serious miscon 
duct discharges in 1948, twenty-two states in 1971, and thirty states 
(including six of the largest) in 1990. Most of these states canceled or 
reduced the claimant's benefits, besides denying benefits in the current 
unemployment spell.
Work Refusal
Issues relating to claimant refusal, without good cause, to pursue or 
accept jobs turn mostly on whether the job is considered suitable. As 
described in chapter 7, federal standards in the original Social Security 
Act prohibited benefit denials for claimant refusal to accept new work 
that would require surrender of certain rights with respect to union 
membership, or work under conditions and at wage levels substantially 
below certain prevailing levels. All state laws adhere to these labor 
standards, but they also spell out other conditions defining the suitabil 
ity of work for a claimant with some variation as to details. Many pro 
visions aim at protecting workers from requirements to accept 
unreasonable job demands regarding health, morals, safety, travel dis 
tance to work, and the relationship of the job to previous experience 
and skills. The length of an individual's unemployment has been a fac-
15. The federal standard, adopted in 1980, required states to impose a duration disqualification 
and requalifying test for most disqualifications in order for claimants to be eligible for extended 
benefits.
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tor all states take into account in determining the degree to which the 
claimant's past wage and grade of work should control the range of 
jobs to consider as suitable. In recent years, a trend has grown towards 
specifying more closely the amount of reduction in wage level that 
would have to be accepted by the claimant after a given length of 
unemployment. 16 The federal standard adopted in 1980 (see chapter 9) 
that applies such a rule to claimants of extended benefits has been part 
of and, perhaps, has encouraged this trend.
The kinds of disqualifications imposed for job refusal have followed 
patterns and trends similar to those applied for the major job separation 
issues (see table 10.4).
Availability and Work Search Requirements
All states deny benefits to claimants who are unable to work and are 
unavailable for work in the week for which they claim benefits. Failure 
to register for work or to report to the employment or claims office as 
required are also reasons for denial. Some states twenty-one in 
1990 specify that claimants must be available for work that is suit 
able, or that is in their usual occupations, or for which they are reason 
ably fitted by training and experience. The application of these 
provisions can give rise to issues similar to those that may occur in job 
refusal cases. State provisions defining "ability" and especially "avail 
ability" have multiplied and diversified, testifying to the difficulties in 
applying this requirement.
Being able and available for work and registered at the employment 
office is not usually enough. Except for workers laid off temporarily 
and awaiting recall at a definite date, claimants are expected to be 
looking for work. Over the years, more and more states have made the 
work search requirement explicit in their laws, often specifying a mini 
mum amount of search and submission of evidence of the search. 
While all states require claimants to be actively seeking work as appro 
priate to their circumstances, the number of states that have deemed it
16. An Iowa provision as of 1990, for example, called for lowering the level of wages consid 
ered suitable after the fifth week of unemployment from 100 percent to 75 percent of the claim 
ant's base-period high-quarter average weekly wage, to 70 percent after the twelfth week, and to 
65 percent after the eighteenth week; in no case, however, must a claimant accept less than the 
statutory minimum wage (USDOL, Employment and Training Administration 1990a, pp. 4-11).
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important enough to require an explicit statement of work search activ 
ity has grown from fifteen in 1948 to thirty in 1971 and to forty in 
1990. Among the ten largest states, the comparable numbers were three 
in 1948, six in 1971, and six in 1990. The rising statutory emphasis on 
work search rules combined with stricter enforcement has reflected the 
general trend toward stiffening of eligibility requirements.
Treatment of Special Groups
Application of the normal voluntary leaving and availability provi 
sions are usually effective in denying eligibility to claimants in a wide 
variety of circumstances without detailed delineation of each of them 
in the law. In part because of negative public reactions to the payment 
of benefits under certain circumstances that seemed unwarranted or 
difficult to explain, some states have adopted special provisions that 
single out particular classes of individuals for automatic or more 
severe disqualification. These include states that deny benefits to 
claimants who leave work or are not available for work because of 
marital obligations, such as a wife moving to be with a husband, or 
staying home temporarily to care for domestic responsibilities. Until a 
federal standard was enacted prohibiting the practice, most states auto 
matically barred benefits to pregnant women for specified periods 
before and after childbirth, simply assuming their unavailability for 
work. As many as thirty-eight states had such pregnancy rules as of 
1971. That year, twenty-two states had marital obligations provisions; 
the number dwindled to twelve by 1990, all requiring some subsequent 
employment before the disqualified claimant could become eligible.
In general, students are not eligible for benefits while attending 
school, even though they may have prior qualifying employment. 
Their unavailability for work or restrictions on job search tend to dis 
qualify them. In 1990, special provisions in twenty-two states automat 
ically denied benefits to students even though some may have been 
available for work. Many of these states made exceptions for students 
who worked part time or had worked while attending school before 
becoming unemployed.
In contrast, during the 1960s when government-supported training 
for the unemployed became an important policy, a rising number of 
states adopted special provisions permitting claimants who were in
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approved training programs to continue drawing their benefits even 
though they were unavailable for work at the time. When the federal 
standard was passed in 1970 that prohibited benefit denial in such 
cases, more than half the states had provisions of this type. Under the 
standard, claimants may not be disqualified while in approved training 
because of unavailability for work, refusal to take suitable work, or 
failure to search for work. The standard did not stipulate the basis for 
state approval for training. Generally, the states have approved only 
vocational and basic education training. As of 1990, four states may 
require claimants to accept training as a condition for benefit eligibil 
ity; elsewhere, acceptance of training is voluntary. 17
As noted earlier in connection with the extension of coverage to 
school personnel, federal standards prohibited the payment of benefits 
based on school wages to such employees between school semesters or 
terms, or during summer vacation or holiday periods, provided the 
employees have a contract or reasonable assurance for resuming 
employment when school resumes. The federal standard first applied 
only to professional staff, leaving the states free to apply the denial to 
nonprofessional employees if they chose, and most did choose the 
denial for all. In 1983, the federal standard became applicable to all 
school employees for all states. 18
Another federal standard, adopted in 1976, singled out professional 
athletes for similar treatment. States may not pay benefits to such indi 
viduals between playing seasons if they have a contract or other assur 
ance of employment in the next season. A 1976 federal amendment 
also prohibited payment of benefits to aliens who were not legally 
present in the country while employed or while claiming benefits.
Labor Disputes
In case of work stoppages due to labor disputes, all states suspend 
benefit payments to affected workers in order to maintain neutrality 
and to avoid heavy drains on reserve funds. Specific provisions vary a 
good deal with regard to the designation of the establishments affected
17. Massachusetts and Michigan have provided added weeks of benefits to claimants in 
approved training.
18. In 1991 the federal standard was changed again to restore to the states the option of paying 
or denying benefits to nonprofessional school employees at such times.
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by the work stoppage and of the workers covered by the suspension. 
Some states exclude lockouts by employers from this category; the 
number of states that did so grew from seven in 1948 to twenty-five in 
1990, including six of the ten largest states. In 1990, nine states 
excluded disputes resulting from failure by an employer to conform 
with a labor-management contract or with requirements of federal or 
state labor laws. Most states do not apply the disqualification to work 
ers idled by a dispute if the workers do not participate or have a direct 
interest in it. In 1990, all states but one (New York) denied benefits as 
long as the dispute lasted or while the work stoppage was due to the 
dispute. New York and Rhode Island had been the only states since the 
mid-1940s to limit the suspension to a fixed period, after which bene 
fits were payable. Rhode Island repealed its provision in the 1980s. If a 
dispute lasts beyond seven weeks plus the normal waiting week in 
New York, benefits become payable.
Fraudulent Misrepresentation
Originally, all but four of the states relied entirely upon court prose 
cution in cases of fraudulent misrepresentation to obtain benefits. Con 
victions were so difficult to obtain that all the states eventually adopted 
statutory administrative as well as criminal penalties. These disqualifi 
cations do not free the claimant from repayment of the benefits unlaw 
fully received or from possible fine and imprisonment. Disqualification 
from benefits is usually up to a year although a few states vary the pen 
alty with the number of weeks of fraudulent claims. Benefits are 
reduced by the number of weeks of the disqualification or are canceled 
entirely. If the fraud is discovered after the benefits have been paid, the 
fraudulent payments are recovered or deducted from future benefits. 
Disqualifications for fraud vary a great deal among the states and are 
difficult to generalize. They tend to be more severe than the usual dis 
qualifications. All but a few states provide for reduction or cancellation 
of benefit rights either specifically or as the result of an extended 
period of disqualification that lasts throughout the benefit year or 
longer.
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Disqualifying Income
All states reduce a claimant's weekly unemployment benefit amount 
by certain pensions received, on a weekly pro rata basis, as required by 
a federal standard that took effect in 1980. The pensions include Social 
Security and Railroad Retirement benefits, as well as any other pen 
sions relating to employment for a base-period employer who helped 
finance the pension. At its option, a state may take account of a claim 
ant's contributions toward financing the pension by limiting the 
amount of the reduction accordingly. A state may also disregard pen 
sions based entirely on employment prior to the base period, although 
this option does not apply for Social Security and Railroad Retirement 
benefits. In 1990, thirty-five states limited the pension reduction when 
the employee had contributed to its financing, and twenty-four states 
disregarded pensions unaffected by base-period employment. Among 
the ten largest states, the comparable numbers were seven and three, 
respectively.
Prior to 1980, many states took account of pensions in more or less 
similar fashion. Social Security benefits were less commonly treated as 
disqualifying income to offset against the unemployment benefit. In 
1971 for example, thirty-three states reduced the weekly benefit by 
employment-based pension received, including twenty states that con 
fined such reductions to pensions involving base-period employers. 
Social Security old-age pensions were included by only fifteen states. 
Seven of the largest states treated pensions as disqualifying income in 
1971. In the 1940s, when pensions were not yet a significant factor, 
such provisions were less developed or widespread.
As of 1990, thirty states reduced benefits by wages received in lieu 
of notice of job termination or by dismissal payments, or they denied 
benefit payment to the worker who received them. The number was 
down from thirty-eight states in 1971. Of the ten largest states in 1990, 
seven reduced or denied benefits for receipt of such pay. Many states 
treat dismissal pay as wages for contribution purposes, as they have 
been treated under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act since 1951.
Beginning in the 1950s, many labor-management agreements pro 
vided plans for the payment of supplemental unemployment benefits
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(SUB) to employees placed on layoff. 19 The payment, when added to 
the state unemployment benefit, would equal a specified percentage of 
the worker's weekly wage. A ruling by the federal Internal Revenue 
Service held that SUB was not to be regarded as wages. Most states 
interpreted or amended their laws to allow the continued full payment 
of unemployment benefits without treating SUB as disqualifying 
income. As of 1990, only four states (New Mexico, Puerto Rico, South 
Carolina, and South Dakota) had not taken action on this question; all 
other states permitted receipt of SUB without disqualification or reduc 
tion of state unemployment benefits.
Workers' compensation has been specified as disqualifying income 
in almost half of the states as of 1990, some calling for complete bene 
fit denial for the week it was received and others applying it to reduce 
the weekly unemployment benefit. The remaining states applied their 
able and available provisions to determine eligibility of a workers' 
compensation recipient. Those on partial disability compensation are 
the most likely to be able to work and available, but most of the states 
with disqualifying provisions for such income include temporary par 
tial disability payments.
To avoid duplication of benefits, all states disqualify workers from 
receiving benefits if they receive or seek unemployment benefits for 
the same week under another state or federal law. No such disqualifica 
tion is imposed if benefits are denied under the other law.
The Weekly Benefit Amount
Weekly unemployment benefits paid to insured unemployed work 
ers deteriorated seriously in the 1940s and 1950s as statutory benefit 
ceilings failed to keep pace with rapidly rising wages. Large propor 
tions of claimants were compensated at a flat amount, the ceiling, 
which replaced less than half their prior weekly wage. In the 1960s, 
and more so in the 1970s, states acted more frequently and effectively, 
not only to prevent further erosion of their ceilings but also to make up
19. SUB plans became well established in such industries as auto, rubber, and steel manufactur 
ing, which were especially significant in states bordering the Great Lakes.
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for ground lost earlier. The flexible maximum, which automatically 
adjusts the benefit ceiling for average wage level changes, eventually 
caught on in many states to help overcome the erosion problem. Bene 
fit formulas used to calculate the weekly amounts payable below the 
ceiling had moved toward simplification in the program's early years 
(see chapter 7) and consequently away from close adherence to the 
original concept of replacing at least half the claimant's recent full- 
time weekly wage, admittedly difficult to administer in practice. Some 
states had oversimplified by adopting an annual wage formula that pro 
duced weekly amounts far removed from the original weekly wage 
replacement idea. After World War II, the trend shifted toward formu 
las designed to better approximate that concept. A number of state ben 
efit provisions have taken account of the claimant's dependents, but 
this approach never became very widespread. By the 1980s, financial 
strains and fund insolvency led some states to trim back or partially 
reverse the weekly benefit improvements they had made over previous 
years.
Weekly Benefit Amount (WB A) Formulas
Relating the benefit to the claimant's base-period high-quarter 
wages has continued to be the method most widely used for setting the 
individual's WBA below the maximum. Its popularity diminished 
somewhat after the 1940s, particularly among the large states, as some 
turned to the more direct measure of the average weekly wage over the 
claimant's actual weeks of employment. After peaking at eleven states 
in 1980, the number using the average weekly wage formula fell off to 
six as of 1990, although the large states that had been using it tended to 
hold to this approach. The annual wage formula, more commonly used 
prior to 1948, has continued to decline to a small group of states (table 
10.5).
First used in the State of Washington in 1977, a variation of the 
high-quarter wage formula developed to significant proportions during 
the 1980s. By 1990, about one-fourth of the states had adopted it. Table 
10.5 lists this variation separately under the heading "multiquarter 
wages." Most states using this formula total the wages earned by the 
claimant in the two highest quarters of the base period and calculate 
the weekly benefit amount as a fraction of that total. For example, 1/52
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Table 10.5 Distribution of States by Weekly Benefit Amount Formulas 
_______1948,1971,1990_________________________
Type of formula (base period Number of states 
earnings measure and percent or
fraction applied)" 1948 1971 1990
Total - all states (10 largest states)"
Average weekly wage0
50%
55-66-2/3%
Weighted"
High-quarter wages
1/26-1/25
1/24-1/20
Weighted"
Multiquarter wages6
1/52-1/50(1/26-1/25)
1/48-1/44 (1/24-1/22)
Weighted"
Annual wages
1.00%-1 .25%
Weighted"
51
2
0
0
2
41
15
17
9
8
0
8
(10)
(1)
(0)
(0)
(1)
(9)
(3)
(4)
(2)
(0)
(0)
(0)
52
10
6
2
2
37
25
5
7
5
1
4
(10)
(6)
(3)
(1)
(2)
(4)
(1)
(0)
(3)
(0)
(0)
(0)
53
6
4f
2
0
28
15
7
6
14
9"
4
1
5
2
3
(10)
(5)
(3)
(2)8
(0)
(3)
(1)
(0)
(2)
(2)
(2f
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
SOURCES: Comparison of State Unemployment Laws: for 1948, the October 1948 edition 
issued by the Federal Security Agency, p. 44; for 1971, the edition reflecting revisions issued 
August 31, 1971, by the USDOL Manpower Administration, pp. BT-7 and BT-8; for 1990, the 
edition reflecting revisions issued January 7, 1990, by the USDOL, Employment and Training 
Administration, pp. 3-35 to 3-38, table 304 . 
a. Excludes allowances for dependents, 
b. See table 10.1 for ten largest states in these years, 
c. No state applied percentages between 50 and 55 percent in these years, 
d. Percentages or fractions applied vary inversely with level of wages.
e. Not applicable in 1948 or 1971; based on wages in two highest quarters, except North Dakota 
which also added half the wages earned in third highest quarter; fractions shown in parentheses 
are equivalents of high-quarter wage formula fractions, 
f. Includes Montana at 49 percent of claimant's average weekly wage, 
g. Includes Michigan at 70 percent of claimant's average weekly after-tax wage, 
h. Includes Illinois at 49 percent of 1/26 of total wages in two highest quarters of claimant's base 
period; and Massachusetts at 1/52 of wages in two highest quarters for claimants with average 
weekly wages in excess of $66 but 1/26 of high quarter for such claimants with earnings in only 
two quarters, while for those with lower average weekly wage, 1/21-1/26 of high-quarter earn 
ings.
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of the high two-quarter wage total would correspond with (or be con 
sidered equivalent to) 1/26 of a single high quarter.20 The multiquarter 
wage formula does not always yield the same WBA as that produced 
by the single high-quarter formula using the equivalent fraction. Wages 
earned in the two highest quarters of the base period are in many cases 
likely to be unevenly divided between them. One quarter may reflect a 
pay raise, overtime pay, or a bonus payment not affecting earnings in 
the other quarter; the latter, on the other hand, may reflect less than 
full-time employment for part of the quarter. A WBA based on two 
quarters of sufficiently unequal wage totals will be less than one based 
on the total in the single highest quarter, using an equivalent fraction. It 
can be argued that a shift to a multiquarter wage formula helps to com 
pensate for any overstatement of normal full-time weekly wage caused 
by including overtime or bonus pay in the single high quarter; but it 
can also understate it by averaging down the effect of a pay raise that 
began after the second high quarter or by including weeks of partial or 
nonemployment in the second quarter. In any case, the effect of multi- 
quarter in place of a single high-quarter wage formula is to lower the 
calculated WBA for some, perhaps many claimants. The shift also 
reduces total benefit outlays, a major objective of state legislation in 
the 1980s.
While a benefit equal to half the weekly wage was broadly regarded 
as the norm, the majority of the states in 1948 and 1971, excluding the 
annual-wage-formula states, had WBA formulas designed to replace at 
least a little better than half the claimant's lost weekly wage (or more 
than 1/26 of high-quarter wages), and as much as 60 percent or more in 
a few cases. These include states with weighted formulas that paid bet 
ter than half the weekly wage to claimants at relatively low wage lev 
els. The number of states with such replacement rates declined over 
time. Before the 1980s, only one or two states restricted the rate of
20. A state may instead apply a single high-quarter fraction to the quarterly average of the two 
high quarters, or derive an average wage from total earnings over the 26 weeks of the two high 
quarters and apply a percentage to the result, presuming equivalence to using an average weekly 
wage formula.
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wage-loss replacement to slightly less than half at WBA levels below 
the benefit ceiling; in 1990, four states did so. 21
One notable innovation took place in Michigan in 1980 when that 
state adopted for its average weekly wage formula an after-tax wage 
basis for calculating the WBA. Federal, state, and local income taxes, 
based on exemptions claimed, and the applicable federal Social Secu 
rity contribution were subtracted from the gross weekly wages 
reported for the claimant. The state changed its benefit-wage fraction 
from 60 percent on the gross wage basis to 70 percent on the after-tax 
wage basis. The widespread use of privately bargained supplemental 
unemployment benefit plans in Michigan, based on after-tax wages, 
was a major factor in encouraging this approach.22
Dependents' Allowances
In 1990, about a fourth (fourteen) of the states (including five of the 
ten largest) paid higher weekly benefits to claimants with dependents, 
an increase from ten states in 1971 and five in 1948.23 All counted as 
dependents minor children, usually under age 18, and most also 
included a claimant's dependent nonworking spouse. Half the states 
added a specified amount per dependent to the basic WBA up to a lim 
ited number of dependents, or up to a proportion of the basic weekly 
benefit, or some other limit. In several states, the amount added varied 
with both the level of wages earned and number of dependents accord 
ing to a schedule. In Michigan, the effect of dependents on the weekly 
benefit operated through the amount of income taxes deducted from 
gross pay to obtain the after-tax wage, the taxes being determined by
21. For example, among states with weighted formulas, the range of fractions applied to high- 
quarter wages went as low as 1/28 in Ohio in 1948 and 1/27 in California in 1971; in 1990, Mon 
tana and Illinois replaced 49 percent of the weekly wage (see footnotes f and h on table 10.5) 
while the weighted high-quarter formula ranged to as low as 1/33 in California and as low as 1/32 
of a quarterly average in Tennessee's multiquarter formula.
22. Two other unique early provisions are worthy of mention, though they no longer apply. One 
was used by Utah in the 1940s to adjust the WBA by changes in the cost-of-living index pub 
lished by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; the provision was dropped at the start of the 1950s. 
The other was adopted by Colorado in 1951 to increase a claimant's WBA by 25 percent if the 
claimant had earned over $1000 in the state in each of the prior five years and had drawn no ben 
efits during that time; the provision was no longer in effect in 1963.
23. Eight of the fourteen states in 1990 were concentrated along the Northeastern seaboard and 
five in the North Central region; only Alaska stood apart among the fourteen.
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the number of dependents claimed. In 1990, all but four of the states 
allowing for dependents provided higher benefit ceilings for claimants 
with dependents; in Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, and the District 
of Columbia, the ceiling was the same for all claimants with or without 
dependents. In four other states (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, and Ohio), 
benefits higher than the basic maximum WBA were payable only to 
claimants with dependents if the claimants also had earnings higher 
than the minimum level required for the basic ceiling.
Maximum WBA
Weekly benefit ceilings limit the extent to which the wage replace 
ment rates intended by the WBA formulas can apply. As wage levels 
rise over time, proportionately more claimants qualify for the maxi 
mum weekly amount unless the latter also rises.
Wage levels have increased persistently over the life of the program, 
and quite substantially in some periods. The following figures trace the 
trend in the U.S. average weekly covered wage (Unemployment Insur 
ance Financial Data 1938-1982) since 1940 in five-year intervals. 
Inflation accounts for much of the large increases that have occurred.
Average weekly Percent rise over 
Year covered wage prior 5 years
1940 $27.02
1945 45.11 67.0
1950 60.31 33.7
1955 78.12 29.5
1960 93.30 19.4
1965 109.99 17.9
1970 141.09 28.3
1975 190.28 34.9
1980 276.84 45.5
1985 365.38 32.0
1990 446.68 22.3
Before 1949, every state set its benefit ceiling by statute at a fixed 
dollar level. Few departed from this approach during the next decade.
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Most states altered their ceilings infrequently and by small amounts. 
As a result, given the steady and rapid rise in wages during the 1940s 
and early 1950s, most benefit ceilings declined steeply in relation to 
state average wage levels. In 1941, the maximum WBA was $20 or 
less in all states but it was at least half the state average weekly wage in 
all but eight states.24 By 1948, benefit ceilings were below $25 in 
forty-two states and less than half the average wage in all but four 
states (table 10.6). Weekly benefit amounts claimants received increas 
ingly clustered at the ceilings. For example, 60 percent of all claimants 
who qualified for benefits throughout the country in 1952 were 
assigned the maximum. For many states, the proportion was well 
above this level; in effect they were close to being flat-rate benefit pro 
grams (USDOL, Bureau of Employment Security 1958, tables B-2 and 
B-5).
Further serious erosion of benefit ceilings had largely ended by the 
mid-1950s and a few signs of improvement slowly emerged. More 
states raised their maximums more often and by somewhat larger 
amounts than before. The major development was the gradual spread 
of the "flexible maximum" provision which sets the ceiling at a speci 
fied percentage of the state average weekly wage. The ceiling's dollar 
amount is adjusted periodically, usually once a year, to maintain the 
percentage relationship and without any further legislative action. Kan 
sas pioneered the idea in 1949 when it pegged its maximum at 50 per 
cent of its average weekly wage.25 The approach took hold very slowly 
at first but grew increasingly popular in the 1960s and 1970s. By 1971, 
half the states (but only two of the ten largest) had adopted the provi 
sion. Almost all of them specified that the maximum be maintained at 
50 percent or more of the average wage. A trend developed, especially 
during the 1970s, to set the percentage level higher. By the end of the 
1970s, thirty-six states were automatically adjusting their benefit ceil 
ings to keep pace with average wage increases and twelve of them 
maintained a 65 percent level or better. The flexible maximum
24. Based on data for 1941 in Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, 1938-1982 and Com 
parison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws as of December 31, 1941, Federal Security 
Agency, December 1941, p. 86.
25. Soon after, however, Kansas limited the adjustment so that the ceiling did not exceed a spec 
ified dollar amount, which was reached by 1951. Utah was next to adopt the flexible maximum, in 
1955.
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Table 10.6 Distributions of States by Maximum Weekly Benefit Amount 
(WBA) and Maximum as Percent of State Average Weekly 
Wage (AWW)—All States and Flexible Maximum States, 
1948,1971,1990
Maximum WBA and
maximum as percent of 
state AWW
Total - all states, flexible
maximum states (10
largest states)8
Maximum WBA"
Less than $50
$50499
$1004149
$1504199
$2004249
$250 and over
Percent of state AWWC
Less than 35.0%
35.0%-44.9%
45.0%-49.9%
50.0%-54.9%
55.0%-64.9%
65.0 and over
1948"
All states
51 e
51
-
-
-
-
-
12
27
8
4
-
-
(10)
(10)
-
-
-
-
-
(4)
(5)
(1)
(0)
-
-
1971
All states
52e
7
45
-
-
-
-
6
10
10
14
10
2
(10)
(3)
(7)
-
-
-
-
(4)
(3)
(1)
(2)
(0)
(0)
Flexible
states'1
26
0
26
-
-
-
-
0
0
2
14
8f
2
(2)
(0)
(2)
-
-
-
-
(0)
(0)
(0)
(2)
(0)
(0)
1990
All states
53
-
1
4
23
16
9*
2
11
7
9
16
8
(10)
-
(0)
(0)
(3)
(4)
(3)
(0)
(3)
(1)
(2)
(2)
(2)
Flexible
states'1
36
-
0
2
14
11
9*
0
2
3"
7
16
8
(6)
-
(0)
(0)
(2)
(1)
(3)
(0)
(2)*
(0)
(0)
(2)
(2)
SOURCES: Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws: for 1948, the October 1948 
edition issued by the Federal Security Agency, p. 44; for 1971, the edition reflecting revisions 
issued august 31, 1971, by the USDOL, Manpower Administration, pp. BT-7 through BT-9; for 
1990, the edition reflecting revisions issued January 7, 1990, by the USDOL, Employment and 
Training Administration, pp. 3-35 to 3-40, tables 304 and 305; for average weekly covered wage 
data, Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, 1938-1982, and annual supplements, 
a. See table 10.1 for ten largest states in these years.
b. Does not reflect higher maximum WBA for claimants with dependents; maximum WBA for 
1948 as of October, for 1971 as of August, and for 1990 as of January.
c. States distributed by percentages specified in flexible maximum provisions, if any, except as 
noted; other states by percentages based on state AWW for 1948, 1971, and 1989 for the three 
years presented.
d. States with flexible maximum provisions requiring annual or semiannual adjustment of maxi 
mum WBA to maintain specified percentage relationship to state AWW (see footnote f for Ohio 
and Vermont); no flexible maximum provisions in 1948.
e. No state more than $26 in 1948, less than $40 in 1971, or more than $293 in 1990. 
f. Includes Vermont which in 1971 specified a flexible maximum at 50 percent of AWW plus $9 
yielding 57.5 percent of 1971 AWW.
g. Includes Illinois with flexible maximum provision specifying 49 percent of AWW but 1990 
ceiling frozen to wage level set by statute so that the ceiling equaled 43.2 percent of 1989 AWW; 
and Ohio with no percentage specified but applying annual percentage change in AWW to adjust 
maximum which in 1990 equaled 43.6 percent of its 1989 AWW.
h. Includes Louisiana and South Dakota with flexible maximum provisions in 1990 specifying 66- 
2/3 and 62 percent, respectively, of AWW but with ceilings frozen indefinitely at earlier dollar 
levels which were 47.0 and 48.1 percent, respectively, of their 1989 AWWs; and Vermont with 
flexible provisions which called for applying annual percentage change in the average wage to 
adjust the ceiling (adjustment suspended at times) so that in 1990 it equaled 48.2 percent of its 
1989 AWW.
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approach had indeed caught on. Federal pressures, including the threat 
of minimum benefit standards, helped to motivate the states to raise 
their ceilings to reasonable levels and maintain them there. Even the 
majority of the largest states joined the parade.
Further progress, however, stalled in the 1980s in the face of finan 
cial difficulties. To restrain benefit outlays, several states suspended the 
operation of their flexible maximum provisions, freezing their ceilings 
at existing levels for a year or more, or indefinitely. A few reduced 
somewhat the percentage to be maintained, and one state abandoned 
the approach altogether. In 1990, the number of states with flexible 
provisions stood at thirty-six, the same as a decade earlier; four of the 
ten largest states continued to stand apart from this approach.26 It 
should be noted that eleven of the fourteen states that in 1990 paid 
higher WBAs to claimants with dependents also provided for flexible 
maximums.27
Minimum WBA
Statutory minimum weekly amounts also failed to keep pace with 
the rise in wages in the program's earlier years. Paid to relatively small 
numbers of claimants, very few of whom are likely to be regular full- 
time workers, minimum WBAs have drawn scant legislative attention. 
Because of their limited impact, minimum benefit provisions tended to 
be ignored for long periods. In 1948, the states paid weekly minimums 
ranging from $3 to $10 with thirty-one states no higher than $6. As 
wage levels rose sharply over the ensuing years, benefit floors lagged, 
as did ceilings. Minimum state qualifying requirements also eroded to 
the extent they were based on minimum base-period earnings, espe 
cially in states that applied a test of such earnings as a multiple of the 
weekly benefit amount. In 1971, eighteen states still paid minimum
26. Included among the four largest states were California, Florida, and New York, as well as 
Texas which applied a provision to increase the benefit ceiling by $7 each year if the average 
weekly wage of production workers in manufacturing in the state exceeded the 1976 average by 
$10 or more.
27. Of the three nonflexible states, Alaska and Indiana had basic benefit ceilings in 1990 that 
were, respectively, under 35 percent and under 25 percent of their 1989 average weekly wage lev 
els, the only states so low; with maximum dependents allowed and enough added wages in Indi 
ana, the weekly benefit amount payable could go as high as 48 percent of the average wage in 
Alaska and 40 percent in Indiana.
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weekly amounts of from $3 to $10; a dozen states paid as high as $20 
to $25. While the flexible maximum provision was becoming wide 
spread, a similar provision to adjust the minimum had emerged in only 
three states by 1971. These states set their minimum WBAs at from 10 
percent to 15 percent of the average weekly wage, although two of the 
states accomplished this result indirectly by setting the minimum as a 
percentage of the flexible maximum amount. Flexible minimum provi 
sions applied in only eight states in 1990, all falling between 10 per 
cent and 15 percent of the average weekly wage. The majority of states 
had benefit floors of from $30 to $59; a few still paid minimums of $10 
or less. Among the ten largest states, minimums ranged from $10 to 
$59, and none was flexible. In general, benefit floors appeared to have 
improved somewhat in relation to benefit ceilings and average wage 
levels.
Benefits for Partial Unemployment
All states provide for the payment of a partial weekly benefit to 
encourage unemployed workers to take some part-time work until they 
can regain regular employment. The conditions and benefit computa 
tion rules that apply, however, frequently have operated to restrict or 
block the incentive to take such work. Partial benefit provisions gener 
ally concern two key elements: the definition of partial unemployment 
that can be compensated and the manner of offsetting part-time earn 
ings against the WBA. By and large, because these elements have been 
so limiting, claimants who earn in a week part-time wages equal to 
their full WBAs, or perhaps slightly more, have not been eligible for 
any benefits. Claimants with part-time earnings below those levels usu 
ally have received little advantage for their efforts since all but a small 
portion of the earnings is offset against the full WBA to determine the 
partial benefit amount payable.
Many of the states have tried to improve the incentives inherent in 
their partial benefit provisions over the years by allowing some benefit 
when earnings were over the level of the full weekly benefit, and by 
disregarding a larger portion of earnings when offsetting them against 
the WBA. In 1990, about half the states (four of the ten largest) paid a 
partial benefit to claimants who earned more than the WBA, compared 
with only one-fourth in 1948. In the earlier year, few states disregarded
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more than a small dollar amount of earnings ($3 or less) when offset 
ting part-time earnings against the WBA. By 1990, fewer than a third 
of the states disregarded a flat dollar amount, most of them $15 or less. 
About half the states ignored earnings up to a specified proportion of 
the WBA ranging from 20 to 60 percent. Others disregarded a specified 
proportion of the earnings themselves. By and large, however, the pro 
visions of most states accommodated the claimant's retention of only 
minor amounts of part-time earnings while drawing a partial benefit
Short-time Compensation
A later development that appeared first in California in 1978 was a 
provision for short-time or worksharing compensation. This approach 
covers an arrangement, agreed to by the employer and employees and 
approved by the state agency, whereby the usual full-time work sched 
ule for the week is reduced for all workers in the operation in order to 
avoid total layoffs of some of them. The reduction amounts to a loss of 
a uniform number of days or hours of work a week for all workers cov 
ered by the agreement. The usual partial benefit provisions would not 
cover the situation. Short-time compensation, instead, provides that a 
proportion of the WBA be paid to match the proportion of the regular 
workweek lost because of the reduction. For example, a 25 percent 
reduction of the normally scheduled weekly hours would produce a 
partial WBA equal to 25 percent of the WBA otherwise payable for a 
full week of unemployment. The work reduction is expected to be tem 
porary, bridging a period of slack business workload or budget short 
fall. The number of weeks of short-time compensation allowed in a 
year is limited. The usual availability-for-work and job-search require 
ments are not applied but the worker must return to full-time work 
when the employer schedules it. Special financing provisions may also 
apply.
As of 1990, short-time compensation provisions existed in fourteen 
states, including four of the ten largest. Federal legislation adopted in 
1982 called for the U.S. Department of Labor to assist states in devel 
oping such provisions and to evaluate the experience (see chapter 9).
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Waiting Period
Most states do not compensate the first week of insured unemploy 
ment in a benefit year. Until the 1980s, the trend had been toward 
reduction or elimination of the waiting period. In 1948, eight states still 
had a two-week wait, and one state had none at all; the rest required 
one waiting week. In 1971, no state required more than a one-week 
wait before paying benefits and six states had no waiting period;28 in 
six other states the waiting week became payable retroactively if the 
claimant received benefits or was unemployed for a specified period 
ranging from three to twelve successive weeks.
The trend toward elimination or retroactive payment of the waiting 
week continued during the 1970s. It peaked in 1980 when twelve states 
had no waiting period and nine states paid it retroactively; six of these 
twenty-one states were among the ten largest. Resistance to the trend 
grew in many states as they encountered financial problems. The rela 
tive cost of eliminating the waiting week was not insignificant. In 
1980, Congress amended the federal-state extended benefits program 
to preclude federal sharing of the cost of the first week of extended 
benefits in a state that did not apply a waiting week for regular benefits, 
including states that paid it retroactively. During the 1980s, the trend 
toward waiting week elimination stopped and retroactive payment pro 
visions were repealed in some states. As of 1990, only four states still 
paid the waiting week retroactively, while twelve states imposed no 
waiting week at the outset. These states included three of the ten larg 
est.
Duration of Benefits
States continued to liberalize their regular benefit duration provi 
sions throughout the 1950s and 1960s. These efforts focused on 
increasing the maximum number of weeks of benefits allowed, eventu-
28. The waiting period for partial benefits, usually the same as for full weekly benefits, was a 
week longer in a few states; in 1971, Alabama imposed a one-week wait for partial benefits but 
none for total unemployment.
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ally reaching at least twenty-six weeks in a benefit year nearly every 
where. Variable duration formulas, used by most states to determine 
the number of weeks payable to individual claimants up to the maxi 
mum allowed, have varied widely, and they have tended to be rela 
tively restrictive. As the maximum duration limit was rising, fewer 
states provided uniform duration, which allows the same maximum 
number of weeks to all eligible claimants. The major problem that 
emerged after most states had moved up to a ceiling of 26 weeks for 
regular benefits was the inadequacy of this much protection during 
recession periods when much longer term unemployment became so 
widespread and slow to subside. The solution adopted was to extend 
benefit duration during such times. This step was taken by some states 
and promoted elsewhere by the federal government as a temporary 
measure during the 1958 recession. Temporary extension was then fed 
erally mandated for all states during the 1961 recession. Extending 
benefit duration during high unemployment periods became a perma 
nent federal-state program in 1970. Financial strains led some states to 
cut back somewhat on their regular duration provisions in the 1980s, as 
with other benefit and eligibility provisions.
Regular Duration
By the early 1960s, the maximum number of weeks payable had 
risen to virtually a standard level of twenty-six weeks; some states 
moved even beyond that level. On the other hand, fewer states applied 
a uniform duration provision. Table 10.7 shows the progress in statu 
tory maximum duration and the fall off in uniform duration from 1948 
to 1971. As of 1990, only Illinois and New York among the ten largest 
states provided uniform duration, along with seven other states. In 
Puerto Rico alone was the regular duration ceiling under twenty-six 
weeks. 29 During the 1980s, the number of states with maximum regu 
lar duration limits in excess of twenty-six weeks declined to two, at 
least partly the consequence of financial strains in state reserve funds. 
As many as ten states paid more than twenty-six weeks of regular ben-
29. In 1992, Puerto Rico increased the number of weeks allowed under its uniform duration pro 
vision from twenty to twenty-six weeks.
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Table 10.7 Distribution of States by Maximum Regular Uniform and 
Variable Duration Provisions—1948,1971,1990
Type of provision and 
maximum number of
weeks payable
Total - all states
(10 largest)8
Uniform duration total
Less than 20 weeks
20-25 weeks
26 weeks
Variable duration total
Under 20 weeks
20-25 weeks
26 weeks
27 or more weeks
Number of states
1948
51
15
6
8
1
36
5
25
6
0
(10)
(1)
(0)
(0)
(1)
(9)
(1)
(5)
(3)
(0)
1971
52
8
0
1"
7
44
0
0
35
9C
(10)
(1)
(0)
(0)
(1)
(9)
(0)
(0)
(7)
(2)
1990
53
9
0
lb
8
44
0
0
42
2d
(10)
(2)
(0)
(0)
(2)
(8)
(0)
(0)
(8)
(0)
SOURCES: Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws: for 1948, the October 1948
edition issued by the Federal Security Agency, p. 52; for 1971, the edition reflecting revisions
issued August 31, 1971, by the USDOL, Manpower Administration , pp. BT-14 and BT-15; for
1990, the edition reflecting revisions issued January 7, 1990, by the USDOL, Employment and
Training Administration, pp. 3-45 to 3-48, table 309.
a. See table 10.1 for ten largest states in these years.
b. Puerto Rico at twenty weeks.
c. Range of state maximums from twenty-eight to thirty-six weeks.
d. Massachusetts and Washington at thirty weeks.
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efits as late as 1980, including one (Iowa) that paid as many as thirty- 
nine weeks.30
Besides the overall maximum limit on regular duration, the majority 
of states with variable duration formulas have also limited the total 
amount of benefits payable to a claimant to a specific fraction of the 
claimant's base-period earnings to one-third or less in most of these 
states. Only a few allowed up to one-half or more of base-period earn 
ings. The total of benefits allowed, so calculated, is divided by the 
claimant's weekly benefit amount to determine the number of weeks 
payable, up to the overall maximum. In 1990, twenty-seven of thirty- 
four states that varied duration on this basis used a fraction of one-third 
or less of base-period earnings. Five of the eight largest states that var 
ied duration based the number of weeks payable on the claimant's 
weeks of employment in the base period, such as one week of benefit 
for each two weeks of work in Florida, and three weeks for four weeks 
of work in Michigan and New Jersey.31 The remaining variable dura 
tion states provided more than a third of base period earnings or used 
other types of formulas, most of them designed to limit duration 
allowed for workers with largely seasonal employment.32 The mini 
mum number of weeks of benefits payable under variable duration for 
mulas has generally derived from the minimum qualifying 
requirement. In 1990, minimum potential duration among the variable 
duration states ranged from six to twenty-four weeks, with the majority 
in the ten to fifteen weeks range.
The result of this diversity among the states in their regular duration 
provisions is that claimants around the country with similar base- 
period employment and earnings experience may qualify for consider 
ably different levels of potential weeks of protection. Moreover, to
30. Oklahoma had also specified a thirty-nine-week regular duration limit in the 1960s, but its 
variable duration formula was so restrictive that relatively few claimants could qualify for it.
31. Included in this group were: Ohio which provided twenty weeks of benefits for twenty 
weeks of work (its minimum qualifying requirement) plus 1 week for each additional week of 
work up to the overall duration maximum of twenty-six weeks; and Pennsylvania, which qualified 
claimants with only sixteen or seventeen weeks of work for up to sixteen weeks of benefits and all 
those with eighteen or more weeks of work for up to the twenty-six-week limit.
32. For example, of the ten largest states, California allowed total benefits equal to 50 percent of 
the claimant's base-period earnings up to twenty-six weeks, and North Carolina multiplied the 
base-period to high-quarter earnings multiple by eight to determine weeks payable, subject to the 
twenty-six-week maximum.
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qualify for twenty-six weeks of regular benefits can require very differ 
ent base-period experience, depending on the state, ranging from as lit 
tle as sixteen weeks of work in Pennsylvania or $150 in earnings 
(thirty times the minimum weekly benefit amount) in Hawaii to as 
much as fifty-two weeks of employment in Florida.
State Extended Benefits
During the 1958 recession, a number of states adopted temporary 
extended benefit provisions and operated them independently of the 
federal Temporary Unemployment Compensation program enacted for 
that time. In 1959, a half dozen states established permanent provisions 
to extend benefits during periods of high unemployment, triggered on 
and off by the level of the state insured unemployment rate. The exten 
sion was usually 50 percent of the duration of regular benefits. It was 
in 1959 also that another group of states chose to raise the maximums 
of their regular duration provisions above twenty-six weeks. In 1961- 
62, when the federal Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensa 
tion program applied and was financed fully by a temporary addition to 
the Federal Unemployment Tax, the costs of regular state benefits paid 
beyond the twenty-sixth week during the period were reimbursed by 
the federal program.
In mid-1970, shortly before the adoption of the Extended Unem 
ployment Compensation Act which set up the permanent federal-state 
shared program, a total of ten states had their own extended benefit 
provisions. Most of these provisions were repealed in subsequent 
years. As of 1990, only two states (California and Connecticut) 
remained from that group. During the recession years of the early 
1980s, several states adopted temporary extension provisions to pay 
added weeks of benefits to claimants exhausting their regular benefits 
when the federal-state program was not triggered on in the state. 
Alaska and Oregon adopted extended benefit provisions later in the 
1980s to assure such benefits to claimants unable to meet the stiffer 
qualifying requirements added to the federal-state program. Hawaii, 
Minnesota, and Puerto Rico have provided for extended benefits in
State Laws Evolve 307
special unemployment situations within the state.33 Developments in 
the 1970s and 1980s pointed increasingly to a much smaller role for 
the states in providing benefit protection beyond the twenty-sixth 
week.
Seasonal Provisions
During the early years of the program, as many as thirty-three states 
had adopted special provisions to limit the benefit entitlement of work 
ers employed in seasonal activities (Murray 1972, p. 29). The principal 
motivations for these provisions were (1) the fears that benefits 
claimed by such workers during their off-season would drain reserve 
funds and threaten solvency, and (2) the fears of employers of such 
workers that the heavy costs of off-season benefits would make their 
tax rates very high due to experience rating (Murray 1972, p. 28). The 
application of these seasonal provisions, however, generally proved to 
be difficult and generated various anomalies, inequities, and adminis 
trative problems. Over the years, the trend has been toward the aban 
donment of seasonal provisions. By 1971, only sixteen states had 
them; in 1990, the number was thirteen, including three of the ten larg 
est states.
Seasonal provisions spell out the basis for special restrictions on a 
worker's benefit rights. The usual process is to define or designate a 
specific industry, occupation, operation, or employer as "seasonal." 
The particular period during which the employment activity regularly 
recurs each year may be defined for each industry or operation. These 
definitions and designations are determined administratively, on a 
case-by-case basis, after investigation or hearings, and sometimes on 
request. Most states with seasonal provisions do not allow workers
33. Hawaii added thirteen weeks when a disaster, as declared by the governor, increased unem 
ployment substantially; Minnesota provided six additional weeks for claimants losing jobs due to 
a large permanent layoff in a county with an unemployment rate of 10 percent or more; and Puerto 
Rico allowed up to thirty-two more weeks of added benefits beyond its regular uniform twenty- 
week duration in specific industries, establishments, or occupations determined to be adversely 
affected by technological or other structural change.
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with seasonal employment, so designated, to draw benefits during the 
off-season on the basis of that employment or the earnings from it
The designations of seasonal activities do not tend to apply to a 
broad scope of industries or to large significant industries in a state. 
Considering the cumbersome and somewhat political nature of the pro 
cess, limited application is not surprising and helps to account for the 
lessening appeal of this approach to the problem.
The reasonable alternative to special seasonal provisions is a quali 
fying requirement that effectively screens out workers with very lim 
ited base-period employment concentrated in less than fifteen weeks or 
so, or in a single calendar quarter, and diligent application of the cur 
rent availability and work search requirements for continuing eligibil 
ity. As noted in chapter 9, however, federal provisions adopted in the 
1970s required the states to deny benefits to professional athletes dur 
ing the off-season of their sport and to school employees between 
school years or terms unless they had no reasonable assurance of 
resuming their employment.
State Benefit Financing
The states came out of the first half of the 1940s with more abundant 
benefit reserves, relative to their total covered payrolls, than they were 
to have since that time. Their response was to lower payroll tax rates 
through experience rating, the only means available for the purpose. 
From 1940 to 1948, the yearly U.S. average of state employer tax rates 
fell from 2.7 to 1.24 percent of taxable payrolls. After rising for a few 
years to 1.58 in 1951, it resumed its decline, reaching 1.12 percent by 
1954. Throughout this period, despite substantial increases in wage 
levels, the taxable wage base continued unchanged at $3,000. The tax 
able proportion of all covered payrolls nationwide fell from over 90 
percent in 1940 to less than 70 percent by 1955. As a result, the effec 
tive average tax rate, measured on the basis of total payrolls, declined 
to about 0.8 percent by the mid-1950s. Table 10.8 summarizes the 
trends in the national averages for several of these key statistics in five- 
year intervals from 1940.
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Table 10.8 Selected U.S. Unemployment Insurance Financial Trends: 
Five-Year Intervals, 1940-1990
Average employer tax rates" as a 
percent of
Year
1940
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
Total payrolls
2.50
1.50
1.18
.81
1.15
1.18
.64
.89
1.06
1.29
.73
Taxable 
payrolls1*
2.70
1.71
1.50
1.18
1.88
2.12
1.34
1.98
2.37
3.12
1.95
Aggregate of 
taxable payrolls 
as percent of 
total payrolls
92.8
87.9
79.1
68.3
61.1
55.8
47.7
45.2
44.7
41.1
37.6
Aggregate of 
year-end 
reserves as 
percent of total 
payrolls
5.60
10.38
6.76
5.56
3.29
3.17
3.11
.53
.64
.68C
1.88 
SOURCES: Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, 1938-1982 and annual supplements.
a. Tax rates are those imposed by states on subject employers.
b. Based on state taxable wages.
c. Based on reserves net of outstanding debt owed by states to the Federal Unemployment
Account (loan fund).
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The four recessions that marked the post-World War II period 
through 1961 altered the financial scene in many states. Diminishing 
reserve funds encountered heavy demands for benefits in those down 
turns, accelerating the decline. Increasingly, states began to face prob 
lems of potential fund inadequacy and the need for careful financial 
planning. From a low point of 0.79 in 1954, the U.S. average tax rate 
climbed, to peak at about 1.4 percent of total payrolls in 1962, a level 
not seen since the early 1940s, before experience rating had taken full 
effect The great majority of states held to the $3,000 tax base so that 
less than 60 percent of all payrolls was taxed in 1962.
The tax rate trend turned down again through the boom years of the 
1960s. The U.S. average fell to 0.64 percent of total payrolls by 1970, 
its lowest level. Only 45 percent of all payrolls was taxed in 1971, the 
year before the federal tax base increased to $4,200. The increase 
raised the taxable proportion to 52 percent in 1972. The aggregate of 
state reserve funds, which had recovered from under 3 percent of total 
payrolls in the early 1960s, was falling again in 1970 and 1971. Those 
reserves were severely battered during the next dozen years and com 
pletely wiped out in the majority of states, at least at some time in this 
period. Aggregate reserves, net of outstanding loans, fell to as low as 
0.13 percent of all payrolls at the end of 1976. After some limited 
recovery in the late 1970s, state funds as a whole were negative by 
over $2.6 billion by the close of 1982 and by $5.8 billion a year later. 
Legislating tax reforms became increasingly painful as the states strug 
gled to repay federal loans, rebuild reserve funds, and allocate the bur 
den in an atmosphere charged with taxpayer hostility, strained by 
competing interest groups, and clouded by economic uncertainty.
Tax rates moved up again after 1975, the national average reaching 
above 1.4 percent of total payrolls in 1979 before subsiding for a few 
years. Tax bases finally began to move up in more states, but not 
enough to raise the U.S. proportion of payrolls taxed to as much as half 
any time after 1973. That proportion dropped below 45 percent in 1983 
and below 40 percent in 1988. Amendments of financing provisions by 
many states in 1982 and 1983 helped raise average tax rates for a while 
and by more than the experience rating schedules alone would have 
raised them. By 1985, however, the national average rate was moving 
down again, despite generally thin reserve positions. Restrained benefit 
outlays reflected improved economic conditions, but also tightened eli-
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gibility rules and pared benefit amount and duration provisions. The 
resulting net surplus revenues enabled states to pay off their debts and 
accumulate some reserves.
The scope of the financial crisis in state reserve funds during the 
1970s and 1980s warrants a little closer look. The recessions that 
plagued much of this period resulted in benefit outlays well in excess 
of current tax revenues. Benefit reserve funds eventually proved insuf 
ficient to cover the difference in most states. Moreover, the permanent 
federal-state extended benefit program enacted in 1970 came into play 
in the recession that followed soon after; by 1972, all states were pay 
ing extended benefits to exhaustees of regular benefits. Half the cost of 
the benefits also came out of state reserve funds thereby accelerating 
their depletion. All but fourteen states ran out of funds at some time, 
beginning with Connecticut in 1972, requiring them to borrow from 
the federal loan fund in order to continue paying benefits. Insolvency 
became widespread as successive recessions allowed little time in 
between to repay the loans and replenish reserves from surplus tax rev 
enues in nonrecession years.
States varied as to the length of time their funds were insolvent in 
the 1970s and 1980s. Of the thirty-nine states that borrowed in these 
years, eight did so for short periods, repaying their loans by the end of 
the year in which they were drawn. Some state funds were insolvent 
for only a few years; others were insolvent for as many as ten or more 
years in this period. At least one state fund was insolvent at the end of 
each year from 1972 through 1987, with the number rising to twenty 
by the end of 1977, declining to nine after the next two years, then ris 
ing again to twenty-three at the end of 1982 and 1983. The table below 
gives some indication of the length of time state funds were insolvent 
during the sixteen-year period beginning with 1972 as measured by 
their year-end reserve fund positions. It shows a distribution of the 
states (and of the ten largest states) by the number of years from 1972 
to 1987 that their year end reserves, net of outstanding loans were neg 
ative, i.e., insolvent.34
34. Informadon about state reserve fund loans and insolvency based on Unemployment Insur 
ance Financial Data, 1938-1982, and annual supplements.
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Number of states 
Number of years insolvent All states Ten largest*
Total
None
1-3
4-6
7-9
10-13
53
22
8
9
6
8
10
2
1
2
1
4
*As of 1971; see table 10.1.
Among the ten largest states, California never borrowed in this 
period, while Florida did but briefly, repaying the debt before the end 
of the year the loan was made. New York borrowed in 1977 and 1978 
but repaid all its debt by 1979. Massachusetts ended each of four years 
in the 1970s with insolvent reserve funds, and Texas had five such 
years in the 1980s; in neither state, however, did the amount by which 
the year-end reserve was negative ever exceed 1 percent of total cov 
ered payrolls. Ohio's fund was insolvent at the end of each of seven 
years during the 1980s and negative by more than 1 percent of total 
payrolls in all of them except 1980, more than 3 percent in 1982 and 
1983. The remaining four large states had insolvent year-end reserve 
funds in both decades Illinois and Pennsylvania for twelve years, 
Michigan for eleven, and New Jersey for ten years. Connecticut's fund 
was insolvent the longest thirteen years, finally paying off its debt in 
full in 1985. In all of the states noted with ten or more years of insol 
vency, their year-end reserve funds were often negative by more than 
1, 2, or 3 percent of total payrolls. Other states with year-end insolvent 
funds for seven or more years include Delaware, District of Columbia, 
Minnesota, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virgin Islands, and 
West Virginia. The fourteen states with seven or more years of negative 
year-end reserves represent the most serious experience with insol 
vency. While most states came through the financial crisis with com 
paratively moderate insolvency, or none at all, the concentration of 
large states among the worst cases magnified the overall problem.35
35. For additional discussion and analysis of the debt and insolvency of state funds, see Vroman 
(1986).
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Trends in state benefit financing provisions are reviewed against the 
national trends in key financing measures shown in table 10.8. Table 
10.9 extends the data in table 10.8 by presenting how the states were 
distributed by several of these measures for selected years in the 
period. The data show that average tax rates tend to be high in most 
states, as in 1983, after a recession period when experience rating 
accounts need to be replenished, while average rates move to lower 
levels, as in 1990, after a period of business expansion when experi 
ence rating accounts have been restored to more substantial positions.
Employer Tax Rates and Experience Rating
By 1948, all states provided for experience rating of employer 
taxes.36 The key factor in assigning rates is the way an individual 
employer's experience with unemployment is measured in comparison 
with that of other employers, and how that measure is related to tax 
rates. Another important element is the range over which the rates can 
vary in a state as defined by the minimum and maximum rates as spec 
ified by law. States vary in the extent benefits are or are not charged to 
individual employers; noncharging rules and the way ineffectively 
charged benefits are handled, therefore, also determine the nature of a 
state's experience rating system.37 A newly developed experience rat 
ing index calculated by the U.S. Department of Labor for each of forty- 
eight states for 1989 shows that from 38 to 91 percent of the benefits 
paid in these states that year were effectively charged. The range for 
1990, also among forty-eight states, was from 48 to 94 percent.3
Federal law initially required that individual employers have at least 
three years of experience before they could be assigned reduced rates. 
New employers paid the standard rate until they accumulated the
36. For a comprehensive treatment of experience rating, see Becker (1972). A few states tempo 
rarily repealed or suspended their experience rating provisions in subsequent years because of 
financial difficulties, but all eventually restored them when their financial status improved or in 
conjunction with tax reforms. Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands entered the federal-state system 
in 1961 and 1978, respectively, without provision for experience rating, but both have since 
adopted it.
37. Ineffectively charged benefits are those charged to employers that exceed the taxes they pay 
because they are at the maximum tax rate or because they go out of business leaving benefit liabil 
ities inadequately covered by their remaining reserve balances, if any.
38. USDOL, Employment and Training Administration Unemployment Insurance Program Let 
ter (1991). See also earlier Program Letter (1990) for more explanation of the index.
314 State Laws Evolve
Table 10.9 Distribution of States by Selected Unemployment Insurance
_______Financing Measures—1948,1971,1983, and 1990______
Financing measure 1948 1971 1983 1990
Total - all states
(10 largest)8 51 (10) 52 (10) 53 (10) 53 (10)
Average employer tax rate 
as % of total payrolls
Less than 0.50%
0.50 - 0.99
1.00-1.99
2.00 and over
Taxable wages as % 
of total payrolls
Under 40.0%
40.0 - 49.9
50.0 - 59.9
60.0 - 69.9
70.0 and over
Year-end reserve0 as %
of total payrolls
Negative
0 - 0.99%
1.00-1.99
2.00 - 2.99
3.00 and over
4 (1)
13 (4)
34 (5)
0 (0)
-
-
-
-
51 b (10)
-
-
-
-
51 d (10)
18
26
8
0
4
27
18
3
0
0
2
10
22
18
(4)
(4)
(2)
(0)
(3)
(7)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(5)
(5)
(0)
1
13
35
4
7
28
10
7
1
23
16
11
2
1
(1)
(1)
(8)
(0)
(4)
(6)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(6)
(1)
(3)
(0)
(0)
10
31
10
2
25
13
8
6
1
0
5
19
12
17
(1)
(7)
(2)
(0)
(8)
(1)
(1)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(1)
(6)
(1)
(2)
SOURCES: Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, 1938-1982 and annual supplements, 
a. See table 10.1 for ten largest states in these years (in 1983, the same as in 1971). 
b. States ranged from 76.2 to 90.9 percent 
c. Net of any outstanding federal loans, 
d. States ranged from 4.46 to 12.65 percent.
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required record. The standard rate was usually 2.7 percent, equal to the 
full federal tax offset, until the latter doubled to 5.4 percent beginning 
1985. A1954 federal amendment allowed states to reduce the period to 
one year, a matter of importance to the smaller firms brought under 
coverage as required by a federal amendment also adopted that year. 
About half of the states quickly took advantage of the relaxed require 
ment, usually specifying only one year of coverage before the taxes of 
new or newly covered employers are experience rated. About a third of 
the states still required three years of experience in 1971, and about the 
same proportion did so in 1990. The 1970 federal amendments man 
dated coverage of employers of one or more workers. They also per 
mitted states to assign newly covered employers a reduced rate 
immediately, though not less than 1 percent, on a "reasonable basis," 
without regard to individual experience, until they became eligible for 
experience rating. As of 1990, all but four states applied reduced rates 
to new employers using various grounds as a "reasonable basis."39
Types of Experience Rating Systems
The method used by about 60 percent of the states to account for 
employer experience is the reserve-ratio method. It aggregates an 
employer's past tax contributions and subtracts the total of past bene 
fits charged to that employer. The remaining balance or reserve is then 
calculated as a ratio to the employer's annual payroll. A specified 
schedule arrays possible tax rates in inverse relation to reserve ratios, 
and the tax rate is assigned from the schedule according to the employ 
er's reserve ratio the higher the ratio, the lower the tax rate. Rates are 
assigned each year after employer reserve accounts and payrolls are 
updated. The reserve-ratio method has always been the most popular 
approach to experience rating used by twenty-nine states in 1948, 
thirty-two states in 1971, and by thirty-three states in 1990 including 
six of the ten largest.
The benefit-ratio method eliminates contributions as a factor in 
measuring an employer's unemployment experience. It considers only 
the recent record rather than the total past. Benefits charged to the 
employer during the last few, typically three, years are calculated as a 
ratio to the employer's taxable payrolls in those years. That ratio serves
39. These included, for example, average industry tax rates and average statewide benefit cost 
rates over a period of years, with a 1 percent minimum and, in some cases, an upper limit as well.
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as the basis for the assigned tax rate either directly or from a rate 
schedule. The method has gained adherents over time. It was used by 
only six states in 1948, nine states in 1971, and by fifteen states in 
1990, including four of the ten largest.
Two other methods of experience rating were in use in 1990; both 
have declined in popularity over the years. The benefit-wage ratio 
method measures an employer's experience in terms of the base-period 
wages earned from the employer by separated employees who drew 
benefits. Only three states still held to this approach in 1990, compared 
to nine in 1948.40 The other method measures the percentage payroll 
decline from year to year or between calendar quarters as the basis for 
comparative employer experience and rate variation. Only Alaska used 
it in 1990; seven states did so in 1948.
A state may basically follow one of these methods but make use of 
other factors as well. For example, Michigan's tax structure in 1990 
experience rated on the basis of the benefit-ratio approach, but also 
used the employer's reserve to determine another component of the 
tax.41 Over time, the tax structures of many states became increasingly 
complex as one or more elements were added to the basic experience 
rated component, making an employer's tax rate a composite.
Range of Employer Tax Rates
Every state sets a tax rate ceiling and usually a minimum as well. As 
noted before, the major impetus for the rapid application of experience 
rating in the early 1940s was the massive reserve buildup and the 
resulting demands for reducing tax rates below the standard 2.7 percent 
level. The emphasis, therefore, began with getting rates down. Table 
10.10 indicates state distributions by the lowest and highest tax rates
40. In 1990 Illinois was in the process of converting from a benefit-wage to a reserve-ratio for 
mula and is counted here among the reserve-ratio states for 1990.
41. Michigan's tax rate structure included three components: an experience rated component 
determined by the employer's benefit ratio which covered charged benefit costs; a fund solvency 
component determined by the employer's reserve related to a uniform state solvency standard 
which is to help raise the employer's reserve to the required level; and a uniform rate component 
added for all employers to cover noncharged benefits.
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Table 10.10 Distribution of States by Minimum and Maximum Tax 
Rates—1948,1971,1983,1990
Tax rate class"
Total - all states 
(10 largest)"
Maximum tax rated
2.70 - 2.99
3.00 - 3.99
4.00 - 4.99
5.00 and over
For 1990 distribution:
5.40 - 5.99
6.00 - 6.99
7.00 - 7.99
8.00 and over
Minimum tax ratee
0
0.01 - 0.19
0.20 - 0.49
0.50
0.51 - 0.99
1.00 and over
1948
51
38
10
3
0
-
-
-
-
11
3
8
17
8
4
(10)
(6)
(3)
(1)
(0)
-
-
-
-
(2)
(1)
(1)
(4)
(1)
(1)
1971
51 C
12
12
24
3
-
-
-
-
16
17
8
4
3
3
(10)
(0)
(1)
(7)
(2)
-
-
-
-
(5)
(2)
(1)
(1)
(0)
(1)
1983
50 
2
1
17
30
-
-
-
-
ll f
19
12
3
2
3
(10)
(0)
(0)
(4)
(6)
-
-
 -
-
(2)
(1)
(6)
(0)
(1)
(0)
1990
52C
-
-
-
-
17
15
5
15
17f
20
9
2
2
2
(10)
-
-
-
-
(3)
(3)
(2)
(2)
(4)
(3)
(3)
(0)
(0)
(0)
SOURCES: Comparison of Suite Unemployment Insurance Laws: for 1948, the October 1948 
edition issued by the Federal Security Agency, p. 16, table 5; for 1971, the edition reflecting revi 
sions issued August 31, 1971, by the USDOL, Manpower Administration, pp. TT-1 and TT2, 
table TT-1; for 1983, the edition reflecting revisions issued September 4, 1983, by the USDOL, 
Manpower Administration, pp. 2-39 to 2-42, table 206); for 1990, the edition reflecting revisions 
issued January 7,1990, by the USDOL, Employment and Training Administration, pp. 2-39 to 2- 
42, table 206.
a. Minimum and maximum rates apply to taxable payrolls; they generally do not reflect special 
additions or emergency surtaxes.
b. See table 10.1 for the ten largest states in these years (in 1983, same as 1971). 
c. Excludes states that did not experience rate: Puerto Rico in 1971, 1983, and 1990; the Virgin 
Islands and Washington in 1983.
d. Maximum rate under least favorable rate schedule if more than one schedule provided in law. 
e. Minimum rate under most favorable rate schedule.
f. Includes Nebraska in 1983, and Nebraska and Utah in 1990 minimum rate not specified in 
law but set administratively instead.
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that could apply as of four selected years.42 By 1948, only thirteen 
states had rates ranging above 2.7 percent even under their least favor 
able schedules. The lowest possible rates assignable that year could be 
less than 0.5 percent in all but twelve states.
During the two decades after 1948, with diminishing reserve funds 
and recession experience to guide them, most states recognized the 
need to extend rates above the 2.7 standard level. The restricted taxable 
wage bases reduced the proportion of payrolls that could be taxed, add 
ing further impetus to higher rates to assure adequate revenues. By 
1971, the rate ceilings of over half the states, including nine of the ten 
largest, could go as high as 4.0 percent or more under their least favor 
able schedules. At the same time, states were more concentrated below 
0.5 percent for their lowest possible rates, as compared with 1948. 
With the financial crises of the 1970s and early 1980s, and the continu 
ing erosion of taxable payrolls, states shifted increasingly toward 
higher tax rates. Under the least favorable schedules provided as of 
1983, no less than thirty states, including six of the ten largest, set their 
maximum rates at 5.0 percent or more, and most of these ceilings 
ranged from 6.0 to 10.5 percent. Fewer states could assign a zero rate 
than in 1971 under their most favorable schedules; under their least 
favorable schedules in 1983, minimum rates were 1.0 percent or more 
in about half the states.
After 1984, the federal law effectively required that state tax rate 
ceilings be at least 5.4 percent to assure full employer tax credit of this 
amount against the increased federal tax. As of 1990, the least favor 
able schedules of thirty-five states, including seven of the ten largest, 
provided rate ceilings of 6.0 percent or more, with fifteen states rang 
ing from 8.0 to 10.0 percent. The most favorable minimum rates were 
under 0.5 percent in all but six states. While the range of tax rates 
assignable under experience rating formulas had widened greatly over 
the years, it is important to remember that in 1990, less than half of all 
payrolls was taxable in thirty-eight states, including nine of the ten 
largest, thus effectively narrowing the range sharply in terms of the 
total payrolls of the employers of most workers.
42. Most states have two or more rate schedules depending on the level of the state fund—the 
lower the fund level, the higher or less favorable the schedule. Some states with only one schedule 
apply an adjustment factor to the rates to reflect the fund level.
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Noncharging of Benefits
All but a small number of states that experience rate employer taxes 
specify one or more conditions under which benefits may be paid that 
preclude the charging of such benefits, or of the benefit wages 
involved, to an individual employer, thereby eliminating their influ 
ence on the employer's rate. The primary rationale for noncharging is 
that it is reasonable to consider such benefits not to be the responsibil 
ity of the employer; their payment may be seen to satisfy a social 
objective and therefore should be financed on a pooled basis. As of 
1990, all but about a half dozen of the states that experience rated 
using the reserve, benefit, or benefit-wage ratio method did not charge 
individual employers for benefits paid to unemployed workers who left 
their jobs voluntarily or were discharged for misconduct. Benefits may 
have been paid if the worker left for acceptable good personal cause, or 
after a limited period of benefit suspension, or after the worker requali- 
fied with some subsequent employment and became unemployed again 
in the same benefit year. Only fifteen states did not charge benefits paid 
to claimants who had been disqualified for refusing suitable work. The 
noncharging of benefits paid under these circumstances became more 
widespread over the years. Noncharging of the state share of federal- 
state extended benefit costs, originally the practice for most states, 
became less prevalent; only fifteen states excluded these costs from 
charging as of 1990.
Maintaining Adequate Reserves
Once the abundant state reserves of the 1940s were down to much 
lower levels, the problem of assuring adequate revenues and reserve 
funds drew more attention. By the mid-1950s, a few states were devel 
oping benefit financing difficulties in the wake of recession and 
depressed segments of their economies.43 As financing concerns grew, 
so did the complexity of state tax structures. Provisions were added to 
protect the integrity of the funds and also to preserve experience rating.
Most states specified minimum fund requirements, along with their 
experience rated tax structures, to be met before any rate reductions
43. Alaska and Rhode Island, for example, discontinued experience radng in the early 1950s, 
and Alaska exhausted its reserves in 1955.
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from the standard rate could apply (or to terminate the reductions if the 
fund fell below the specified level). About two-thirds of the states had 
such requirements in 1948. Many applied higher or lower rate sched 
ules according to fund level. Measures used to designate the critical 
fund level included a flat dollar amount, the fund as a percent of total 
payrolls, and the fund as a multiple of total benefits paid in a period of 
time. Over the years, the way these measures were specified became 
more elaborate and sophisticated in attempts to capture the points at 
which fund solvency was threatened. They were also used to trigger 
the application of various types of adjustment or "solvency" factors, 
usually uniform percentage increases in the basic tax rates or, simply, 
added flat rates. As of 1990, somewhat over half the states had provi 
sions for such solvency surcharges.44
By 1990, only sixteen states still specified fund requirements which, 
if not satisfied, would lead to a suspension of experience rating; none 
were among the largest states. Most of these states required a fund of at 
least a specified-percent of payrolls for reduced rates to continue expe 
rience rating, or to resume it if suspended. That was also the most used 
fund-level measure to trigger rate schedule changes or solvency factor 
applications. State tax provisions had become so varied as to defy vir 
tually any useful grouping by major characteristics. States facing debt 
repayment were motivated further during the 1980s to alter their provi 
sions in response to federal requirements to qualify for loan repayment 
deferrals, to avoid loss of federal tax credits for their employers, and to 
ease the impact of interest charges on loans. These further changes 
have tended to make state benefit financing more, rather than less, 
complex.
Taxable Wage Base
States may set their taxable wage bases without regard to the federal 
base. In effect, however, the federal base acts as a minimum since 
employers could lose a portion of their credit against the federal tax if 
their state had a lower base. No state departed from the $3,000 federal 
tax base, first applied in 1940, until Nevada went to $3,600 in 1954.45
44. Some states also provided for special surcharges when needed to finance interest on loans.
45. Nevada had continued to tax total wages from the outset, not going to the $3,000 base until 
1946.
State Laws Evolve 321
By 1960, the tax base was $3,600 or $3,800 in five states and $7,200 in 
Alaska.46
During the next decade, more states joined the move to higher 
bases. By 1971, their number had grown to twenty-three, including 
half the ten largest states; five states were at $4,200 or more. The fed 
eral base increased to $4,200 in 1972, and to $6,000 in 1978, already 
exceeded in that year in twelve states. In 1983, when the federal base 
increased to $7,000, half the states were at higher levels, though only 
three of the ten largest states were among them. By 1990, all but seven 
teen states had tax bases above the $7,000 level (including seven of the 
ten largest); the base was $10,000 or more in nineteen states and over 
$15,000 in six of them. Table 10.9 indicates that despite these 
increases, in 1990 taxable wages accounted for less than half of all 
covered wages in thirty-eight states, including nine of the ten largest; 
they were less than 40 percent in twenty-five states (eight of the ten 
largest).
As with any other wage-related aspect of unemployment insurance, 
the fixed-dollar tax base is soon eroded as wage levels rise. The idea of 
an automatic adjustment for wage change by a flexible tax base was 
applied first in Hawaii in 1965. Each year, Hawaii adjusted its base to 
equal 90 percent of the state's average annual wage.47 North Dakota 
followed this approach several years later, and gradually others fol 
lowed over the next ten years. By 1990, a total of eighteen states had 
flexible tax bases, most applying percentages ranging from 50 to 100 
percent directly to average annual wages.48 Only two of the large 
states were among this group. The 1990 taxable wage bases of these 
states ranged from $9,500 in Oklahoma to $21,300 in Alaska. Even 
among these states only four taxed more than half of their total payrolls 
in 1990; none of the thirty-five states with a fixed taxable wage base 
did so.
46. Alaska increased its base several times between 1955 and 1960 as part of its effort to restore 
and maintain solvency.
47. Hawaii raised its flexible adjustment in the 1970s to 100 percent of its average annual wage, 
which enabled it to tax about 70 percent of all covered payrolls.
48. Two states accomplished the same result indirectly by using the average weekly wage as the 
basis for the adjustment. For example, New Jersey set its taxable wage base at twenty-eight times 
the state average weekly wage, equivalent to about 52 percent of the average annual wage.
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Reimbursement Financing
Two major classes of employers nonprofit organizations and state 
and local government units may finance their unemployment benefit 
costs by reimbursing state funds for benefits charged instead of 
through the regular state experience-rated tax system. Federal amend 
ments adopted in the 1970s which mandated the states to cover these 
groups also required the provision of reimbursement as a financing 
option for nonprofit organizations.49 In general, the employees of non 
profit and government employers tend to experience less unemploy 
ment than do employees of private, for-profit employers. 
Reimbursement thus avoids the potential use of public funds or chari 
table contributions, in effect, to subsidize some of the noncharged or 
ineffectively charged benefit costs of private firms, as payment of 
unemployment insurance taxes would entail. Given the option, most of 
these employers have chosen reimbursement. In 1990, reimbursing 
employers accounted for about 18 percent of all employment and pay 
rolls covered by state programs.
Individual reimbursing employers may form a group to pool their 
risks and share benefit charges. The state will treat the group as a single 
employer for reimbursement purposes. Nonprofit hospitals, for exam 
ple, have formed such groups in a number of states. This plan permits 
the individual employer to take advantage of the probable low risk yet 
have some protection against the possibility of an unexpected costly 
situation.
Nonprofit and state and local government employers are exempt 
from the Federal Unemployment Tax. Since that tax finances the pro 
gram's administrative costs, these employers in effect are subsidized 
for their share of those costs by the taxpaying employers. Nor do they 
contribute toward the cost of the federal share of extended benefits, 
also financed by the federal tax.
49. Federal law may not prescribe how states must finance the benefit costs of their own or local 
government unite; states are free to adopt whatever approach they prefer, and most have chosen 
reimbursement.
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Employee Contributions
Unlike arrangements in other countries, employee contributions 
have never been an important source of unemployment insurance 
financing in the United States. By 1947, only two (Alabama and New 
Jersey) of the nine states that had an employee payroll tax for this pur 
pose during the program's formative years still retained it. Beginning 
in 1955, Alaska levied an employee tax to help strengthen its financing 
structure. A similar purpose moved Pennsylvania and West Virginia to 
adopt an employee tax in the 1980s. Alabama, however, repealed its 
employee tax during this period, leaving four states using this financ 
ing source as of 1990. The tax rates in Alaska, New Jersey, and Penn 
sylvania applied to the same taxable wages as used for employer taxes. 
Rates ranged from 0.5 to 1.0 percent in Alaska, and up to 1.125 percent 
in New Jersey; the rate was 0.1 percent in Pennsylvania. West Virginia 
taxed the gross wages of employees up to 0.15 percent if projected 
employer tax revenues fell short of expected benefit outlays for a com 
ing calendar quarter.
Concluding Observations
This review of state unemployment insurance provisions has illumi 
nated a number of significant trends over the approximately four 
decades following the economy's reconversion after World War II. 
States gradually expanded their programs' coverage from limited 
beginnings so that by the late 1970s, nearly all wage and salary 
employment was protected, though not without the mandate of federal 
law. From earlier simplified easy-to-apply formulas, qualifying 
requirements changed to reflect more closely the minimum amount of 
employment intended to signify labor force attachment even though 
most states continued to use earnings as an equivalent measure for 
employment. In later years, the required level of employment, or its 
earnings equivalent, rose generally toward twenty weeks of base- 
period work, and beyond twenty weeks in a few states, compared with 
earlier levels of fifteen weeks or less in most states. The minimum
324 State Laws Evolve
amount of earnings in the requirements also rose substantially, but 
much of the increase was to compensate for the rise in wage levels.
Eligibility rules and disqualifications imposed generally stiffened 
over the period, a trend that accelerated in later years. By the mid- 
1980s, all but a handful of states denied benefits for the duration of the 
claimant's unemployment if disqualified for voluntary leaving of work 
or a misconduct discharge, as compared with the earlier predominant 
practice of a limited period of benefit suspension. Acceptable "good 
cause" for voluntary leaving became increasingly restricted to work or 
employer-related reasons; personal reasons for leaving became less 
likely to prevent disqualification.
Weekly benefit amounts paid by the states deteriorated badly from 
their original weekly wage-loss replacement rates of half or more 
because fixed statutory benefit ceilings failed to keep up with rapidly 
rising wage levels. By the mid-1950s, in most states, the majority of 
claimants were paid the maximum weekly benefit amount rather than 
the wage-related benefits the state formulas intended. The proportion 
of wage loss compensated ranged well below half. Further deteriora 
tion ceased as states increased their maximum weekly amounts more 
often though usually not enough to recover lost ground. States enacted 
larger increases in the 1970s and, more important, the flexible maxi 
mum approach was spreading. These improvements went far toward 
the goal of compensating the great majority of the insured unemployed 
for half their lost weekly wages. Some slippage occurred during the 
1980s, however. A number of states revised their benefit formulas so 
that more claimants received a smaller weekly amount than the previ 
ous formulas would have paid; even at benefit levels below the ceiling, 
amounts were reduced to less than half the wage loss for some claim 
ants.
From their original maximum duration levels generally at fifteen 
weeks of benefits payable, the states gradually raised their duration 
limits until they were at least twenty-six weeks everywhere (except in 
Puerto Rico) by the end of the 1960s. A number of states provided 
more than twenty-six weeks, some on a regular basis at all times and 
others only during periods of high unemployment. When the federal- 
state extended benefits program came into play in the 1970s, most of 
these states dropped back to a regular twenty-six-week limit.
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The reserve-ratio system was the most popular approach for experi 
ence rating state employer payroll tax rates, and became even more so 
over time. The benefit-wage ratio method also held its adherents. Other 
approaches diminished in favor or disappeared. With overabundant 
reserves after World War II, the states applied experience rating mainly 
to reduce tax rates to below the 2.7 percent standard rate which became 
the maximum rate in most states. The taxable wage base remained 
unchanged at $3000 for many years with few exceptions, despite rising 
wages. The range of effective tax rates based on total payrolls grew 
very narrow as a result. Reserves declined sharply when periodic 
recessions swelled benefit outlays. By the late 1950s, adequate benefit 
financing was seen by more states as a serious problem area. Rates 
above the 2.7 percent level became more common and tax bases began 
moving up in some states. The recessions of the 1970s and early 1980s 
produced a crisis in state reserve funds with most requiring advances 
from the federal loan fund to sustain benefit payments. The effects of 
this experience were multiple and profound. While all state reserve 
funds regained solvency by the end of the 1980s, few were adequate to 
withstand the impact of another severe recession.
The concept that the states could serve as experimental laboratories 
for applying new ideas in unemployment insurance has proven to be a 
valuable feature of the federal-state system. Several approaches used 
successfully in one or two states spread widely throughout the country 
or became the basis for federal legislation. Prominent among these ini 
tiatives were the flexible weekly benefit ceiling in Kansas, the trig 
gered extended benefits developed in a few states in the late 1950s, and 
the indexed or flexible taxable wage base pioneered by Hawaii. Some 
initiatives did not catch on, such as Utah's short-lived cost-of-living 
adjustment for weekly benefit amounts, and New York's unique alter 
native qualifying requirement using a two-year base period. Several 
program ideas were adopted by a limited group of states but have not 
become more widespread. Among these are dependents' allowances, 
uniform duration, and short-time compensation. Others, once in favor, 
declined in use or significance for example, special seasonal provi 
sions, the flat annual earnings qualifying requirement, and the annual 
wage benefit formula. Employee contributions, applied by only three 
states for about thirty-five years, saw a small revival of interest during 
the late 1980s.
326 State Laws Evolve
The largest states showed about the same patterns as the other states 
with respect to most of the significant provisions. Notable exceptions 
have been the flexible maximum weekly benefit provision and the flex 
ible taxable wage base. The largest states have been less inclined 
toward adopting those automatic adjustments; therefore, they have 
tended to provide lower benefit ceilings, relative to their state average 
wage levels, and taxed a more limited portion of covered payrolls.
Each state has developed its own unemployment insurance program, 
subject to some important federal requirements to be sure, but never 
theless able to evolve in particular ways to reflect particular economic 
needs and political tendencies. No two state laws are exactly alike in 
all respects and many differ widely from each other. In an economy 
that operates to a large degree on a broad regional or national basis, 
some of these differences pose questions of equity for workers in dif 
ferent states. For example, two workers laid off from the same type of 
jobs, perhaps even by the same employer though in different states, 
and each with identical wage and employment experience, may qualify 
for very different benefits and face different job-search and eligibility 
rules. The remedy of a single uniform system advanced by some inter 
ests, such as organized labor, has never gained much political support. 
Instead, federal requirements have been adopted, from time to time, to 
prohibit state provisions regarded as extreme or to require provisions 
in all state laws to assure desired national policy. Efforts to impose uni 
form federal rules or standards usually meet stiff resistance, and for 
some issues, such as minimum benefit standards, they have never suc 
ceeded. Basically, the protection of state prerogatives in the federal- 
state system remains strong as of 1990. The most vulnerable area for 
the states in this regard has been a weak financial situation, a legacy of 
the 1970s and early 1980s.
The states have taken an active and significant role in shaping the 
character of the federal-state unemployment insurance system. As a 
scheme for shared responsibility and powers for applying a complex 
program affecting millions of workers and their employers nationwide, 
it has worked reasonably well over the long span of years despite inev 
itable tensions between the two levels of government and between 
organized labor and employers. The prevailing urge to preserve the 
state role has led more often to working out the tensions and resolving 
the conflicts within the framework of the system. Widespread and
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heavy state reserve fund indebtedness to the federal loan fund has been 
the most serious path to federal manipulation or control of state laws 
and real danger to the existing partnership. While a long recession-free 
period enabled the states to regain solvency by the close of the 1980s, 
their status remains precarious without much more adequate buildup of 
reserves and some overall backup reinsurance or equalization fund to 
avoid resorting to heavy costly borrowing.
The problem of how and when to compensate the long-term unem 
ployed also remains unsettled and unsettling. Total federal responsibil 
ity for benefits beyond those payable under the federal-state extended 
benefit program seems well established by actions adopted in the 
recessions of the 1970s and 1980s, though with very different 
approaches each time. The weakening of the federal-state extensions 
during the early 1980s makes the long-term benefit question more 
murky and more urgent in recessions. The result is to stimulate far- 
reaching proposals that could alter the program in some fundamental 
respects.
State legislative approaches alone are not enough to deal with some 
of the broad compelling problems and weaknesses in unemployment 
insurance in this country. Strictly federal solutions, in turn, may forgo 
important values and advantages of state involvement. The partnership 
has worked fairly well for over half a century. To continue striving to 
keep the partnership viable and active while developing remedies for 
the system's problems would appear to be the course of wisdom.

Epilogue
The early 1990s began to leave their mark on the unemployment 
insurance program as this volume neared completion and publication. 
The major economic development was the ninth recession since World 
War II. It started in the last half of 1990, ending a span of about eight 
years since the previous downturn. By comparison with that one and 
the slump of the mid-1970s, the latest recession has been less severe, at 
least in terms of unemployment rates experienced. It has, however, 
been more prolonged. By mid-1992, some weak signs of recovery had 
appeared, though the outlook remained uncertain. The current and 
long-term health of the economy, central issues in the 1992 Presiden 
tial election campaign, engendered broad concern about the nation's 
ability to adjust to fundamental change and provide adequate employ 
ment for its labor force.
The total unemployment rate, which in 1989 reached a sixteen-year 
low of 5.2 percent (annual average), rose toward 7.0 percent during 
1991 and continued to climb, reaching a peak of 7.8 percent by mid- 
1992, compared to a peak of 10.7 percent in two months during the 
1982 recession. The increase in the insured unemployment rate has 
been similarly less acute when compared with the prior recession expe 
rience. As usual, however, long-term unemployment levels rose 
sharply. Insured unemployed workers who exhausted their regular state 
benefits totaled less than two million in 1989. Their numbers increased 
to more than three million in 1991. During that year, only nine states 
triggered on to pay benefits under the permanent federal-state extended 
benefit program in which the benefit costs are shared equally by the 
federal and state governments. Besides the less elevated insured unem 
ployment rates, the more demanding trigger requirements adopted in 
the early 1980s also limited use of this program in 1991.
Political pressures began to mount in 1990 to provide an emergency 
federal program of additional unemployment benefits for regular bene 
fit exhaustees. The administration at first resisted the idea as too costly 
and not necessary President Bush rejected two bills passed by Con-
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gress for the purpose in 1991. 1 In November of that year, however, the 
President relented and accepted the Emergency Unemployment Com 
pensation Act of 1991.
This Epilogue briefly summarizes the temporary emergency pro 
gram of 1991 and a number of other legislative changes of importance 
for unemployment insurance adopted in the early 1990s.
Emergency Unemployment Compensation
The Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) Act of 1991 
(P.L. 102-164, as Amended)
The EUC program went into effect shortly after its November enact 
ment. It was to be a temporary measure, set to terminate June 13,1992. 
The Act provided for additional weeks of benefits to insured unem 
ployed workers who had exhausted their regular benefits or whose ben 
efit years had expired after February 1991, provided they were not 
eligible for benefits in a new benefit year or from any other federal or 
state program. Claimants eligible for EUC could draw up to thirteen 
weeks, but in states with unemployment rates high enough to equal or 
exceed specified levels, the maximum was twenty weeks. 2 An amend 
ment adopted in February 1992 (P.L. 102-244) increased these duration 
limits by thirteen weeks to twenty-six weeks, and to thirty-three 
weeks in high unemployment states. The amendment also extended the 
program from June 13 through July 4,1992 but with the duration limits 
lowered to thirteen and twenty weeks during this brief extension.
Two alternative unemployment rates were designated to determine 
if the higher EUC maximum duration was payable in a state. One was 
the state's total unemployment rate: if this rate averaged 9.0 percent or 
more over a six-month period, the higher duration limit would apply. 
The alternative was the state's insured unemployment rate (IUR) aver-
1. The first bill required the President to declare an emergency for it to go into effect, but he 
refused to do so; he vetoed the second bill.
2. The Act's original provisions called for three different maximum duration levels of EUC 
depending on state unemployment rates, but an amendment adopted a few weeks after the pro 
gram began simplified the structure to the two levels described.
Epilogue 331
aged over a thirteen-week period, adjusted by adding to the count of 
the insured unemployed in the calculation the total number of claim 
ants who exhausted regular benefits during the last three calendar 
months for which data were available. If this adjusted IUR averaged at 
least 5.0 percent over a thirteen-week period, the higher EUC duration 
maximum would become applicable.
State eligibility and benefit amount provisions applicable for the 
federal-state shared extended benefit program applied for EUC. The 
special, restrictive federal requirements adopted in the early 1980s 
with respect to shared extended benefits were also applicable for EUC. 
This meant, for example, that claimants who qualified for regular bene 
fits with less than 20 weeks of base-period employment (or the equiva 
lent in an acceptable earnings test) would not be eligible for EUC. It 
also meant that EUC claimants were subject to stiffer federal rules with 
regard to their availability for work, the definition of suitable work, 
and job-search requirements than was the case under state provisions 
for regular benefits. Any federal-state shared extended benefits paid to 
claimants served to reduce their EUC entitlement. The Act, however, 
gave state governors the option to terminate any extended benefit peri 
ods that had triggered on in their states under the extended benefit pro 
gram while EUC was payable.
Federal funds financed the entire cost of EUC benefits. The state 
governors, therefore, were motivated to call off extended benefit peri 
ods so as to avoid charges against state reserve accounts for the state 
share of extended benefit costs. The funds to pay for EUC were drawn 
from the Extended Unemployment Compensation Account in the 
Unemployment Trust Fund.3 This account had a total of nearly $7.8 
billion on September 30,1991, shortly before the EUC program began. 
At the outset, EUC costs were estimated to total about $5 billion.4 The 
increase in EUC duration limits adopted in February 1992 was 
expected to add over $2.5 billion more in EUC costs.
3. The Extended Unemployment Compensation Account reserve was accumulated from speci 
fied allocations of federal unemployment tax revenues to finance the federal share of extended 
benefits.
4. Estimates of Extended Unemployment Compensation Account reserve level and EUC outlays 
from USDOL, Employment and Training Administration (1992).
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Extension of EUC Program
As the program was about to expire in early July 1992, enactment of 
the Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1992 (P.L. 102- 
318) extended EUC to March 6, 1993, but with several important 
changes. The EUC duration limits were set at twenty-six weeks in the 
high unemployment states, using the same unemployment rate mea 
sures as before, and at twenty weeks in the other states.5 These limits 
were to be lowered further when the national total unemployment rate 
averaged 7.0 percent or less for two consecutive months to fifteen 
weeks and ten weeks, respectively, for high-unemployment and other 
states. They would fall to thirteen and seven weeks if this rate dropped 
below 6.8 percent for two months. EUC benefits paid under the exten 
sion provided by this Act also were wholly financed by the federal gov 
ernment, but out of general revenues instead of the Extended 
Unemployment Compensation Account. Another change specified that 
claimants eligible for EUC who could qualify for regular benefits in a 
new benefit year could choose to draw EUC if, for example, the 
weekly amount was higher. Formerly, they had to draw regular benefits 
first.
Again, shortly before the program's termination and with the urging 
of the new Clinton administration, Congress extended EUC for another 
six months (P.L. 103-6). No other changes were made apart from set 
ting a new expiration date in early October 1993, followed by a phase- 
out period to end in January 1994.6
Other Federal Unemployment Insurance Legislation
Some of the changes described here were provided in the laws 
enacted for the EUC program.
5.. These new limits were made retroactive to June 14, 1992 when the limits had been reduced 
to twenty and thirteen weeks, respectively.
6. EUC claimants drawing benefits up to the program's expiration in October 1993 (formerly 
March 1993) and with EUC entitlement remaining could continue to draw their benefits, if still 
unemployed, during a phase-out period lasting three months ending in January 1994 (formerly 
June 1993).
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Extension of Federal Unemployment Tax Increase
In 1977, the net federal unemployment tax rate was raised tempo 
rarily 0.2 percent to help repay the federal costs of extended benefits 
and emergency supplemental benefits. The Extended Unemployment 
Compensation Account in the Unemployment Trust Fund had to bor 
row heavily from the U.S. Treasury to cover these costs in the mid- 
1970s, never having been able to accumulate surplus reserves for the 
purpose beforehand. Once the account was free of debt, the temporary 
tax increase was to terminate. Additional heavy extended benefit out 
lays in the early 1980s delayed this event. The debt was fully repaid by 
1987 and the account began to build a reserve. The federal budget def 
icit problem was so severe, however, that the prospect of any revenue 
loss evoked congressional resistance to the termination of the tax 
increase. The scheduled expiration of the 0.2 percent tax increase, 
therefore, was postponed for three years through 1990.
As 1990 neared its close, Congress and the administration were 
struggling to resolve the federal budget for 1991 with the deficit prob 
lem worse than ever. Moreover, a slipping economy and proposals 
afloat for emergency unemployment benefit extension made a strong 
case for continuing the tax increase again. It was estimated that the 0.2 
percent segment was generating more than $1 billion a year in added 
Federal Unemployment Tax revenues. Accordingly, a provision in the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-508), adopted 
November 1990, extended the temporary tax increase through 1995. A 
year later, the EUC Act of 1991 added yet another year to this exten 
sion, continuing the increase through 1996.
Restored Protection for Ex-Servicemembers (UCX)
Unemployed men and women recently separated from the armed 
forces are entitled to file for UCX benefits in accordance with the regu 
lar unemployment insurance provisions of the state in which they file. 
All UCX benefit costs are financed by federal general revenues. In 
1982, this program was cut back by federal changes which preempted 
regular state provisions with respect to UCX claims in two key areas. 
One change instituted a noncompensable four-week waiting period  
no state required more than a one-week wait. The other limited the
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maximum duration of UCX benefits allowed an individual to thirteen 
weeks instead of the usual twenty-six weeks for regular state benefits.
A provision of the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 
1991 repealed these two special UCX restrictions of 1982. Thereafter, 
UCX claimants were again treated the same as regular state claimants 
with regard to the waiting period and benefit duration. In addition, the 
same provision of the EUC Act revised a special UCX qualifying 
requirement applicable to military reservists filing for benefits on the 
basis of a period of active duty. The requirement had specified a mini 
mum of 180 days of active duty service to qualify for UCX. Many 
reservists activated for duty during the Persian Gulf conflict in 1990- 
1991 were deactivated after serving less than six months. The 1991 Act 
changed the minimum requirement for reservists to ninety days 
instead.
State Option to Pay Benefits to School Employees
When unemployment insurance coverage was extended to school 
employees in the 1970s,7 a distinction was made between professional 
and nonprofessional employees in regard to potential benefit rights 
during nonwork periods between school years or terms. The federal 
law prohibited payment of benefits to professional school employees 
during such periods if they had a contract or some other reasonable 
assurance of continued employment when school resumed. The same 
prohibition did not apply to nonprofessional employees. States had the 
option to determine whether or not benefits could be paid to these 
employees in similar circumstances. Some states did allow payment; 
others did not. In 1983, the federal law was amended, removing the 
state option and including nonprofessional school employees in the 
federal prohibition of benefit payment between terms. The EUC Act of 
1991 repealed the 1983 amendment thereby restoring the option to the 
states with respect to nonprofessional employees.
7. School employees were covered when employment for nonprofit organizations and state and 
local government came under coverage, as required by federal law.
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New Advisory Council
The EUC Act of 1991 also provided for a new Advisory Council on 
Unemployment Compensation with members appointed by the Presi 
dent and by the heads of both houses of Congress, an arrangement sim 
ilar to that used for the National Commission on Unemployment 
Compensation in 1978. The Council's task is to review, study, and 
evaluate the federal-state unemployment insurance system and to 
report its findings, conclusions, and recommendations to the President 
and Congress. A new Council would be reinstituted every four years. 
The legislation called for the Council to make its first report by Febru 
ary 1,1994.
Changes in the Extended Benefit Program
The Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1992, which 
extended the EUC program until March 6, 1993, also included a few 
provisions which bear significantly on the permanent federal-state 
extended benefit program. The latter program, in effect, was not opera 
tive while EUC benefits were payable.
One provision of the 1992 Amendments suspended the more strin 
gent federal rules relating to claimant availability for work, job search, 
and suitable work as these apply to current eligibility for extended ben 
efits. Also suspended was the federal requirement for a minimum 
amount of work or earnings in employment following a disqualifica 
tion in order to become eligible for benefits again. During the period of 
suspension of the federal requirements, state provisions covering these 
matters with regard to regular benefits were to apply for extended ben 
efits. The suspension would not begin until after the EUC program's 
expiration date in March 1993, and it would continue through 1994. 
The question of what to do about the federal rules after 1994 was 
assigned to the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation.
Another change modified the federal qualifying requirement for 
extended benefits which specifies a minimum of twenty weeks of base- 
period employment or the equivalent in base-period earnings of at least 
one-and-one-half times high-quarter earnings or forty times the weekly 
benefit amount. The application of the federal requirement depends on 
which of these three types of qualifying tests the state uses. If a state 
uses none of them, it must choose one to apply the federal minimum to
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extended benefit claimants. The change made by the 1992 amendments 
permits each state to provide, by law, at its option, the use of any one 
or more of the three acceptable types of requirements to determine 
whether the extended benefit claimant meets the minimum test. While 
the change appears to be modest and subtle, it can be important for 
some claimants.8
Yet another amendment offered the states a new extended benefit 
trigger option. The existing trigger mechanism is based on the state 
insured unemployment rate (IUR) averaged over a thirteen-week 
period. (In this calculation, only claims for regular benefits are 
counted; extended benefit claims or exhaustees are not included.) 
Under existing provisions, an extended benefit period triggers on in a 
state when that rate equals 5.0 percent or more and is at least 120 per 
cent of the IUR average for the corresponding thirteen-week periods of 
the two preceding years. The states also have the option to specify in 
their laws that the 120 percent requirement is suspended if the thirteen- 
week IUR averages at least 6.0 percent. The 1992 amendments added 
another trigger option based on the state's total unemployment rate 
(TUR), seasonally adjusted. If this rate, averaged over three successive 
months, equals or exceeds 6.5 percent and is at least 110 percent of the 
corresponding three-month average in either of the two prior years, the 
state may trigger on an extended benefit period. Moreover, if a state 
chooses this option and its three-month average TUR rises to 8.0 per 
cent or more and satisfies the 110 percent requirement, the state must 
pay up to an additional seven weeks of extended benefits, raising the 
duration limit for such benefits from thirteen to twenty weeks.
Authorizing Short-time Compensation
The Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1992 also dealt 
with short-time compensation, or worksharing benefits. Legislation 
was enacted in 1982 to encourage and assist states to develop and 
implement provisions which would accommodate worksharing plans 
agreed to by employers and their employees to avoid layoffs during 
temporary slack periods (see chapter 9). As of 1992, seventeen states 
provided for short-time compensation when these plans were in effect.
8. Thus, if an extended benefit claimant fails to meet one test, the state may then apply one (or 
both) of the alternative tests which the claimant might be able to meet.
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State laws generally define a week of insured unemployment as one 
in which the claimant was not employed and had no earnings or had 
limited part-time work with earnings less than a specified amount, in 
which case a partial unemployment benefit might be paid. Under short- 
time compensation, the recipient remains employed though on a 
reduced work schedule which could amount to as much as 90 percent 
of the employee's normal workweek. Moreover, short-time compensa 
tion recipients are not subject to the usual availability and work search 
requirements. Strictly speaking, short-time compensation payments 
out of state unemployment insurance trust funds raise a question of 
their validity in view of the federal standard tracing back to the original 
law (Title IX of the 1935 Social Security Act) which prohibits with 
drawal of such funds for any purpose other than the compensation of 
unemployment.
The 1982 legislation authorized the development of short-time com 
pensation as a temporary experimental program, with provision for 
review and evaluation of the experience, a task accomplished in the 
mid-1980s. The authority for this program expired in 1985. No further 
federal legislation on the subject followed until the 1992 amendments. 
One of these permanently authorized the payment of short-time com 
pensation out of state unemployment insurance trust funds, provided 
that the relevant state law covered several conditions specified in the 
federal law. For such compensation to be payable, the state provisions 
must stipulate that the worksharing plan's reduction in the normal 
workweeks of employees is in lieu of temporary layoffs, that the reduc 
tion must be at least 10 percent of the normal workweek that the 
amount of short-time compensation paid be an equivalent proportion 
of the full weekly benefit payable for a week of total unemployment, 
and that recipients of the compensation not be subject to the availabil 
ity and work search requirements, though they must be available for 
employment at their normal work schedule. As an option, states may 
allow employees, while on reduced workweeks and receiving short- 
time compensation, to participate in state-approved, employer-spon 
sored training designed to improve their job skills.
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State Programs
While some states altered their unemployment insurance provisions 
between 1990 and 1992, the overall patterns among them did not 
change much from those described in chapter 10 as of 1990. Weekly 
benefit ceilings went up in many states especially where flexible maxi 
mum provisions were used, although in some cases the ceilings 
remained frozen at earlier levels or were restrained from rising as 
much as the percentage setting specified because trust fund levels were 
too low. The ten largest states showed no changes from 1990 to 1992 in 
their formulas to apply qualifying requirements or to determine claim 
ant weekly benefit amounts and the number of weeks of benefits pay 
able. Taxable wage bases remained at $7,000 in fifteen states in 1992, 
compared with seventeen in 1990; they were $10,000 or more in nine 
teen states, the same as in 1990. Of the ten largest states, three were at 
$7,000 and two at $10,000 or more in 1992.
A few of the other states altered their provisions somewhat. No gen 
eral trends are discernible among these changes. Perhaps the most 
noteworthy changes came in Puerto Rico, which ended its long-held 
unique positions in two areas taxes and duration of benefits. Starting 
in 1992, Puerto Rico applied experience rating to assign individual 
employer tax rates. It had been the only jurisdiction in the nation not to 
have experience rating. The doubling of the full federal tax credit 
allowed for experience rating, beginning in 1985, meant that all 
employers in Puerto Rico went from a state tax of 2.7 to 5.4 percent. 
No employer could pay less without experience rating and qualify for 
the full tax credit against the federal unemployment tax. Revenues 
increased well beyond levels needed to assure adequate reserves, even 
though Puerto Rico has tended to be a high benefit-cost state. (Its tax 
able wage base was at the minimum $7,000 level.) As did many states 
in the 1940s, Puerto Rico turned to experience rating as the only way 
to reduce the inflow of unneeded revenues. The other major change 
was to increase the uniform duration payable from twenty to twenty- 
six weeks for regular benefits. In no jurisdiction is the regular duration 
limit now less than twenty-six weeks.
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In 1990, total state benefit outlays from all state reserve fiinds 
exceeded total unemployment tax revenues by about $3 billion. With 
reserves totaling over $38 billion, the interest earned made up the dif 
ference. Eleven states, however, saw their reserves decline over the 
year, several sharply. These included all the New England states, 
except for Vermont, plus the large states of Florida, Michigan, and 
New York.9 The picture worsened substantially in the next two years 
when total benefits paid exceeded total state tax revenues by about $10 
billion in 1991 and $8 billion in 1992. The aggregate of state benefit 
reserve funds at the end of 1992 was about $26 billion net of $1.3 bil 
lion in outstanding loans. About half of this debt was owed by Con 
necticut and the rest mostly by Massachusetts and Michigan, with less 
than $20 million by the District of Columbia.
The much milder effects of the recession of the early 1990s on the 
state programs compared with the heavy impacts of the downturns in 
the early 1980s and mid-1970s was at least partly due to the virtual 
replacement of shared extended benefits by the totally federally funded 
EUC benefits. From its start in November 1991 through December 
1992, the EUC program paid out a total of $14.3 billion in benefits. In 
effect, the complete national pooling of long-term unemployment ben 
efit costs has supplied an element of reinsurance for the state programs, 
besides helping to sustain millions of jobless workers through pro 
longed periods of unemployment during the recession and slow, weak 
recovery. 10
9. The 1990 data are from the annual supplement for 1990 to USDOL Handbook of Unemploy 
ment Insurance Financial Data, 1938-1982.
10. The data for 1991 and 1992 are from Ul Data Summary, 4th quarter cy 1991, pp. 9 and 13, 
and 4th quarter cy 1992, pp. 8, 9, and 13, U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training 
Administration.
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